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PREFACE
This project is the product of a grant provided by the Ford
Foundation, West Africa office, and warehoused and administered
by the Diamond Awards for Media Excellence Trust Fund. The editor and contributors to the book are grateful especially to Mr.
Innocent Chukwuma, Resident Representative in the Lagos office
and Dr. Paul Nwulu, Head of the Media Desk at the office. The
book, consisting of thirteen chapters on various aspects of the
media in the Fourth Republic, has its origins in the approval of the
Foundation following a proposal sent to it by me to do an extended paper, entitled Watchdogs or Captured Media? A Study of the
Role of the Media in Nigeria’s Emergent Democracy 1999-2015.
Funded by the Ford Foundation, the paper, published as a
monograph, was submitted in November 2016, thereby providing
the basis for a full length edited book on the subject. To bring
out comparative perspectives from other African countries, it was
decided to include the experiences of Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, so that Nigerian readers can both compare and contrast how
our experiences since 1999 resemble, as well as differ from the
trajectory of State-media relations in these other countries. One
of the highlights of the project was the hosting of an international
seminar in Lagos on September 5 and 6, 2017 in which all the contributors presented their prospective chapters to a panel of scholars, serving as peer reviewers for the purpose of refinement and
cross-fertilization of ideas. The conference was rewarding in that it
helped to syncronize, as well as clarify ideas, providing a common
ground, from which the contributors could proceed to finalize the
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outcome of their researches.
What is contained in these pages, therefore, is the updated
version of the contributions, following the criticisms and valuable
suggestions at the Lagos conference. The contributors sought to
answer the question to varying extents of the degree to which the
Nigerian media in its print, electronic and digital forms had kept
the traditions of a watchdog media alive or whether it had been
captured by the political class through the familiar spoil-sharing
arrangement, which characterize much of Nigerian politics. It is my
hope that we have done justice, reasonably, to the enterprise of
illuminating the role, changing profile, record and orientation of
the media in the context of Nigeria’s wobbling semi-democracy.
Those who have contributed to shaping the ideas and perspectives set down in this book are too numerous to mention. It is
important, however, to mention the coordinating role of Mr. Lanre
Idowu, supervising Trustee of DAME for providing the stimulating
atmosphere under which the work was begun and completed. Of
course, the editor and panel of contributors bear responsibility for
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the book.
Professor Ayo Olukotun
Oba (Dr) Sikiru Kayode Adetona Professorial Chair in Governance
Department of Political Science
Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago Iwoye.
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FOREWORD
Gentle Giants in a Wild Jungle
This is a project of extensive institutional and intellectual collaboration at various levels: between the grant giver (the Ford
Foundation) and, on the other hand, the “middle man” (Diamond
Awards for Media Excellence), as well as the recipient (who is also
the distinguished editor (Professor Ayo Olukotun) of this important volume, and his eleven indefatigable collaborators. This is a
commendable project, attesting to what respectful collaborative
efforts can accomplish.
Watchdog or Captured Media? A Study of the Role of the Media in
Nigeria’s Emergent Democracy, 1999-2016 is an extraordinarily impressive book, pitched to enliven the horizon of an African readership. It draws on the vast experiences of scholars and practitioners,
thus giving the book its breadth and depth, and foregrounds the
agency of the Nigerian state along with the excesses of its leadership. In its capacious scope, the book offers us an opportunity
to understand Africa’s giant nation, provoking our wonder and
admiration for dedicated journalists, as well as empathy for state
protagonists. Professor Ayo Olukotun, as a very able editor, has a
tremendous capacity to bring people together, to distil their different insights into a coherent whole, and to provide a new light
on the great issues of the moment. No doubt, he has assembled
essays, which constitute these golden chapters to whet the intellectual appetite of media experts and the general reader.
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The contributors have been very carefully chosen, as they comprise luminary mainstream journalists, writers, human rights activists, teachers and professors of journalism, scholars, and editors.
As distinguished writers, their diversity is very much reflected in
the rich opinions and analyses on such broad and thematic topic
as the media and the state, with chapters that cover various issues.
For example, there are comparative discussions of Ghana by Professor Kwame Karikari, former head of Ghana’s broadcasting house
and a seasoned journalism professor; Kenya by Peter Kimani, another seasoned media expert; South Africa by Professor Abiodun
Salawu; digital media co-authored by Professor Lai Oso and Dr.
Tunde Akanni; two chapters on the coverage of religious conflicts,
one by Dr. Nathaniel Danjibo, the other by Professor Olukotun
and Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure; state media relations by Professor Chris Ogbondah; technology and ownership by Olukotun;
the Freedom of Information Act by Edaetan Ojo; Corruption in the
media by Lanre Idowu; television and democracy by Dr Oluyinka
Esan; and talk radio by Funke-Treasure Durodola.
The guiding central narrative of the book is one of power and
responsibility: if, as it is assumed, that the media is tasked with
shaping society and curbing the excesses of those in leadership
positions, how successful has it been? This is an important query as it relates to the conceptual balance of power in society, an
informed citizenry, and critical opinions. And as to the specific
years in focus—1999 to 2016, the Nigerian Fourth Republic, the
period following long interlude of military rule—the connection
of the media to which democracy was both critical and crucial. Indeed, the selection of an era brings the essays into focus, whereby
the book engagingly informs us of the place of the media in the
Fourth Republic, covering its contributions, constraints, and challenges. The competent introduction by the editor, Ayo Olukotun,
the scholar-cum-practitioner, places the book in its proper context
and, in the final analysis, supplies a useful overview for its readers.
As to the value of the watchdog credentials of the media, there
can be no doubt. That, indeed, is why older democracies have
treated the media as the Fourth Estate (or Realm), following the
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three organs of government. Also, with the media as a watchdog,
shocking scandals have to be exposed, while corruption has to be
reported in the process, the false claims of politicians have to be
ridiculed and, as a result, authoritarian governments do not want
these activities in the public domain. Instead, they endeavour to
force the media merely to report and praise, falsely pretending
that both the media and the government are mutual collaborators
in nation-building projects.
The contributions of this book are manifold, but I plan to focus
on six aspects that interest me. The first one is that the core query
it raises is not ambiguous: Did Nigeria produce a captive media or
that of watchdogs in the formative years of its post-military democracy? The answers are more than clarified in all the chapters.
In this clarity, the book moves us beyond the narrow conceptualizations of the media around communication tools and policies as
well as news gathering. Highlighted are the more critical issues of
the forces that shape the media, and what the media itself is trying
to shape.
In this symbiotic conception, the second major contribution,
the book creates a dialogue among and between media professionals and theorists. The role of the media as a watchdog derives
from the expectation of the public that it should hold government
accountable: the objectives of setting up private media in relation
to the government, as stated in Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution, enjoining the media to “monitor governance.”
To be commended is the comparative dimension that the book
supplies, the third main contribution. State-media relations are
not peculiar to Nigeria, which may have informed the decision to
undertake comparative work, including South Africa, Kenya, and
Ghana. Can an African model emerge? Is one country better than
the other? Evidence is provided on Ghana, Kenya and South Africa
to show some similarities with and differences from Nigeria.
Tensions in state-media relations fill the pages of the book; as
well as the challenges in reforming various spaces and institutions. This, to me, constitutes the book’s fourth contribution. It is
right to seek and fight for freedom of information as Ojo argues
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in chapter three.While it is a fact that media scholars and professionals criticize themselves, the profession, and content delivery
is one of the most significant aspects of the book. For example,
Lanre Idowu devotes an entire chapter to corruption. Internal crises within some media organisations and conflicts with the state
have brought about some power decline of the media, as we notice in chapter ten on Kenya. The linkages between the media and
democracy are acutely represented in chapter 6. Major aspects of
governance, especially the core ones of peace and conflicts, are
illuminated in notable manners, as in the case of chapters 7 and 8.
The media is visible in reporting all major national issues, including the various perspectives of leading figures on a wide range of
issues, as well as criticism of state underperformance.
A fifth contribution is the cogent analysis of the problems that
beset the media: a combined newspaper circulation that is less
than half a million a day; the challenges of living in a failing state
where the citizens are denied access to basic human needs; and
the media split into competing identities—ethnic, religious, regional—with divisive results. If the nation itself is sliced into identity components, so too do separate media outlets serve Muslims
and Christians, Yoruba and Igbo. In spite of these problems, the
book argues that the media is taken seriously by those in power,
and by the public who respect journalists who are pro-democracy and pro-development. The state exercises forms of control via
its ability to grant licenses, and uses its dominance in advertisement to punish newspapers that criticize it. The era was predictably marked by tension as the retired military general who came
to power in 1999 not only won an election that did not generate
trust, but his mindset was still that of an autocrat. As noted in the
book, there were cases of journalists who were arrested, closure of
newspaper houses, the shutdown of Freedom Radio in 2006, and
one television station had its license suspended.
Following that is the sixth contribution that speaks to improvement, significantly regarding using technology more effectively,
and how to deliver news in a media age.
As the very first book on the media during this era, it is a pi-
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oneer work that will be referenced in all subsequent books. The
future is too hard to predict, but I would like to assume that the
media will continue to assert itself, fight for freedom, and speak
for the poor and the marginalized. The public will expect both the
state and the media to show accountability. The means of disseminating information will become more expansive and digitized.
The heterogeneous citizens living in a plural society will equally
be served by a heterogeneous media fully connected to various
groups. The respected media will not support corruption and enable authoritarianism. State control of the media will give way to
privatized ownership with a voice. To draw from the United States
especially, the left has shown the pervasive failures of corporate
media (in terms of what is called the media monopoly) and even
so-called public media (NPR and PBS), and has looked instead to
independent media, including community radio, none of which
would be considered privatized.
In essence, readers of this impressive book and I have a lot of
work to do, which is to empower the media to reform the state.
There is a question we need to address: how are we, as marginalized citizens, empowered to empower the media? Issues of accountability and good governance involve not just the media but
all of us as citizens. As we live in a mismanaged Nigerian state
which, like a jungle, requires being tamed, we have to turn the
media into wild dogs that can not only bark but bite. We have to
invest the media with positive political influence. We must know
the main source from which our people get the news the most,
and in the process, to penetrate those to offer critical interpretations of the news they provide. Where the possibility of good
leadership exists, the media must be non-corrupt in its internal
workings to support accountability. In a plural society, the media
must reflect that plurality so that minority and marginalized voices
are not suppressed.
In the end, watchful citizens should be able to harness the power they have in the age of social media. Platforms, websites and
apps are legion, with university students and teenagers possessing more experience than their parents’ generation. Social media
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will continue to become part of Nigeria’s culture, hence it should
reform Nigerian politics and its space. Indeed, social media should
force the traditional media to reform itself, and it should provide
ideas to reform the country and create the network to offer a more
youthful leadership that will revolutionize the state.
Toyin Falola,
The Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities
& University Distinguished Professor,
The University of Texas at Austin
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
Ayo Olukotun
This section introduces the subject matter of this book, underlines its point of departure, as well as embeds it within historical
and theoretical perspectives. As the title of the book suggests, it
deals in 13 chapters with the role, changing profile, record and
contexts of activities of the Nigerian media in the period between
1999, when the Fourth Republic commenced, until 2016, a year
after the historic election of 2015. As known, in 2015, for the first
time, an opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, won
elections against the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which for
fifteen years had held power at the centre. It may be of interest
to remark that no substantial published work has been written
up till this book, with respect to the role of the Nigerian media
in their print, electronic and digital forms regarding Nigerian democracy. Hence, the chapters in this book, which had been written
by experts and practitioners in the field of communication and
cognate disciplines, seek to fill a gap in the literature. The writings
also amplify the subject of discourse, which is essentially woven
around the extent to which the media have maintained their roles
as watchdogs in the Fourth Republic, by comparative case studies
from Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, given that these countries
have in African terms, substantial media presence.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
The Nigerian media, in term of size, are the biggest in Africa,
followed by Kenya and South Africa, and are regarded as the epicentre of Nigeria’s magnificent civil society. They have emerged as
the arbiters of national conversation, partly because of their antecedents in the seminal anti-colonial and anti-military struggles.
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Most recently, they played heroic oppositional roles with respect
to the brutal dictatorships of the 1990s and are regarded as the
vanguard of the crusade to return Nigeria to civilian rule after 16
years of unbroken military rule. Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, observed in the twilight of military rule that:
The press, and let me seize this very opportunity to stress this, has
been magnificent, heroic and one of these days, when there is more
pleasure, we are going to erect a statute; I am going to see personally
to this, that a statue for heroism of the press is erected at a prominent
place in this country, we must never forget (The Guardian, October 17,
1998, p. 5).

As I have argued elsewhere, (Olukotun, 2017a), it is possible
to speculate that Soyinka has not yet erected this monument because there is not enough pleasure in Nigeria or in the media,
which are increasingly, despite their expansion and increasing
digitization, accused by their critics of having been captured by
the political class, and consequently, have lost the bite they once
had. Illustrative of these critical voices is an article entitled “More
freedom, more problems” (Agbaje and Adebanwi, 2003). In other words, even though the media have enjoyed more freedom in
the period since 1999, freedom which was deepened by the passing of the Freedom of Information Act in 2011, there are critical
doubts whether they have lived up to the billings predicted by
their crusading role under the military, when they invented rebellious communication outlets, such as alternative newspapers and
a pirate radio to enhance the struggle for democracy. These are
some of the main issues that the various contributors to this book
have grappled with.
In the next two sections of this chapter, I sketch out topography
of the media, as well as conceptualize the political and accountability terrains, including the role of the state in what is often described as a low quality democracy or a semi-democracy.
Topography of the Nigerian Media 1999-2017
Following the Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication,
the mass media are conceptualised to include the “various technological means of producing and disseminating messages and
cultural forms... to large, widely dispersed, heterogenous audienc-
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es” (Chandler and Murdy, 2011:257).
Ordinarily, this would include electronic and digital avenues of
communication, as well as books, films, theatre and popular culture outlets. For convenience and conciseness, however, we zero
in on newspapers and magazines, as well as television, radio and
online news sites.
The media in Nigeria and much of Africa are best understood
in the context of their pre-colonial origins in oral narratives and
festivals, as well as their colonial and postcolonial identities as enablers of authoritarian rule, at least until the democratic transitions
of the 1990s. Bourgault (1995) alludes to the authoritarian legacy
in broadcasting, whereby Nigerian journalists conduct interviews
for politicians without interrogating or critically appraising what
they have to say. On one occasion, as Bourgault narrated it, a television journalist actually slept off while the politician was narrating
in a monotone the so-called achievement of government. Broadcasting, despite liberalisation and the growth of a fragile private
sector, is largely state-owned. The fact that coup-makers in the
years of military rule employed predawn broadcast to announce
change of governments meant that a certain apprehension and
circumspection continue to trail state regulation of the broadcasting sector. Hence, state radio and television tend to have national
reach as opposed to most private broadcasters who have limited
reach, although this is offset by their capacity to connect to satellite broadcaster through DSTV; even as at 2016, and in spite of the
approval, after a long struggle, of community radios, broadcasting
is still tightly regulated while “the decision to grant a broadcasting
license remains a subjective presidential privilege”.
Other constraints include: High licensing fees, which restrict
ownership to the wealthy, as well as restrictive clauses in the
broadcasting code, which limit editorial content and programming. Broadcast managers, who test the limit of regulation, have
done so to their own regret as the shutdown of the Kano-based
Freedom Radio in 2016, and the detention, for 78 hours of the
editors of Channels Television in 2008 illustrate.
In the print media, the newspapers especially, there is a tradi-
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tion of lively outspokenness, partly because it is private sector-led,
partly because of the history of civil agitation dating back to colonial rule and also because Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diversities make it difficult for dictatorship to operate since ethnicity
and religion can become rallying point of civil agitation by the excluded. Even at that, there are official constraints and persecution
to independent newspapers, as I show in a subsequent chapter,
advertisers—and government is the largest advertisers--tend to
blacklist critical publications, sentencing, in effect, to a short lifespan. Considering that newspapers operate a shoe-string budget
and do not print many copies, the subtle denial of advertising becomes important. Of course, when subtle hints do not avail, direct
methods are employed. Examples abound in the Fourth Republic
of the shutdown of publications such as Weekly Insider in 2004,
as well as arrest of editors and the seizure of copies of independent newspapers, such as occurred in June 2014 when the Nigerian Army carried out searches, leading to confiscation of copies of
Leadership, The Nation, Daily Trust and the Punch. The ejection of
the State House Correspondent of the Punch, Olalekan Adetayo,
in 2017 over a story connected to the ill-health of President Muhammadu Buhari followed the same trend.
It should be noted as well, that Nigeria’s ethnic and religious
diversities are reflected in the media and become obvious in times
of ethno-religious conflicts involving opposed ethnic and religious groups. For example, Mahmud Jega, former editor of the
Kaduna-based New Nigerian, and currently, the Executive Director
of the Abuja-based newspaper, Daily Trust, argued that:
As far as I can see, among the biggest national newspapers, such as
The Guardian, Punch and Vanguard (all Lagos-based) regional slant is
most consigned to letters, columns and editorials. However, in troubled
times it bursts out to the front pages and is easily seen in news selection and drowning out of other news (Jega, 2003:18).

The issues arising from dichotomous perceptions of national issues and ethno-religious conflicts are discussed in two chapters in
the book. Worthy of note is the fragility of the media despite their
visibility and loquaciousness. Newspaper titles appear, disappear
and reappear with frequency, a trend also replicated in other Afri-
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can countries such as Kenya. Similarly, it is doubtful if any newspaper prints up to a hundred thousand per day, while the combined
circulation of newspapers is believed to be less than five hundred
thousand per day. Nonetheless, the print media command an influence and prestige, for historical reasons, more than circulation
figures would indicate. They are taken fairly seriously by policy
makers and appear to have an influence depending on the conjuncture on policy making (Olukotun, 2004a, 2004b; Omotoso,
2018). Nonetheless, the rapid demise of newspapers in the context of the poor working conditions of journalists has accentuated
a moral and ethical crises discussed in a separate chapter in the
book.
Finally, the Nigerian media, as several observers have noted operate within the free market, capitalist system and do not harbour
left leaning varieties as you find in some European countries. In
this sense, and as Oyovbaire (2001) noted, it is a status quo media.
According to him:
The radicalism of the media as an anti-colonial and pro-independence
vehicle, as an anti-bad governance vehicle, as an anti-military rule and
pro democracy institution is really no more than being only radicalism
of the right or centre ideology. It is indeed a capitalist press. There is yet
to exist in the Nigerian media scene any left wing or socialistically ideological newspaper or magazine of stature or long duration. For obvious
reasons, the same goes for the broadcast media – in a real sense Nigeria has only an establishment or status quo media (Oyovbaire, 2001:16).

This is unsurprising given that socialist ideology did not take
root in Nigeria, while in the Fourth Republic, ideological debates
have been noticeably absent from political discourse. It is interesting that the posture and leaning, largely centrist, of the media have not changed and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future,
despite increased internet penetration and the popularity of the
social media in a country where youths constitute a preponderant
proportion of the population.
Media as Watchdog in a Semi-Democracy
The idea of the media as watchdog of democratic liberties is
entrenched in liberal, social and socialist democracies. It speaks to
such other ideas and concepts as muckraking, investigative jour-
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nalism, exposures of scandals and corruption in high places, as
well as being vigilant generally over the conduct of public officials.
It is regarded as the bedrock of democracies established or developing. In practical terms, it spans a variety of practices, such as the
fact-checking of claims made by public figures, journalists acting
as undercover agents in order to collect information that they will
otherwise not have had access to, as well as generally, speaking
truth to power. This view of the cardinal functions of the media is
quite different from those purveyed by concepts such as developmental journalism or journalism of nation-building, which privilege the role of the media as nation-builders or as sacrificing some
of their liberties to mainstream national integration and economic
development (Coronel, 2010). Of course, there are less glamorous
sides to watchdog reporting, such as their alleged tendencies to
play the politics of scandals or get the public so inundated with
stories of corruption that they are no longer shocked by revelation
upon revelation.
Obviously, the role of the media as watchdog is a function of
their historical antecedents in any particular country, the media
ownership structure, constitutional protection for civil liberties, an
attentive public which provides a ready audience and feedback for
that role, as well as previous successes or failures of such advocacies. It should be pointed out that in Nigeria, as in most African
countries, we are dealing with an authoritarian state carrying a
large residue of military autocracy in electoral forms. Regarding
Nigeria’s transition from military to semi-democracy, Adekanye
(1999:10) informed pertinently that “the authoritarian regime from
which this country has just transited was not just a military backed
one but specifically military in character long entrenched in government and with a surfeit of corrupt interest in hanging on to
power”.
Nothing illustrates this viewpoint better than the fact that first
eight years of the Fourth Republic featured presidency of a retired
military General elected to power in elections widely criticised for
their imperfections. That apart, retired generals, as well as security forces, have been quite visible in what can be described as
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a civilian-autocracy. This situation described by Zakaria (1997) as
democratic illiberalizm is replicated in most African countries and
often, as Ogbondah argues in his contribution to this book that
the watchdog role of the media can only be perpetuated at a cost.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, in the period under study, Nigerian journalists suffered peremptory arrests, persecution of critical media,
forcible closure of newspapers, such as occurred in September
2004 of Weekly Insider, shut down of Freedom Radio in 2006, the
suspension from broadcasting of Channels Television in 2008 and
detention of its editors, as well as the arrest in January 2017 of the
publisher of Premium Times over a report critical of the Chief of
Army Staff, General Tukur Buratai. As Berger (2012:140) noted:
Control and repression of mass communications via the media has
played its part in preventing the industry from reaching its wider potential. Corresponding to top-down and despotic rule, media is widely
treated as a tool by the powerful who (that) have little interest in dialogue with subject populations. While state power in much of Africa
is successfully abused by rulers to stay in power- and this includes deployment of state-owned media (often the largest component within
the media sector), in other respects dysfunctionality is the order of the
day. This latter feature impacts on the infrastructure for media (such as
electricity).

In other words, and as I have argued elsewhere (Olukotun,
2013), the Nigerian media are caught between a failing state and
a deformed public sphere, to the extent that a predatory state is
unable to guarantee the minimal conditions for its medium term
survival, and harbour several infrastructural deficits such as epileptic power supply and ineffective protection of citizens including journalists. Another dimension of the problem which impinges on media capacity to effectively play the role of a watchdog
concerns the bifurcation of the Nigerian public sphere into ethnic, religious, regional and primordial divisions. Indeed, Adebanwi
(2002) has argued that there is no national media in Nigeria but
an Arewa media, Nkenga and Ngbati media, corresponding to Nigeria’s major ethnic groups. In the same connection, conversation
on the internet is characterized according to Sieptulnik (2002) “by
frequent postings in in-group linguistic codes, for example, Ni-
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gerian English and Pidgin and the formation of splinter listerves
and netgroups such as Ananet, the Yorubanet, corresponding to
the divided nature of the Nigerian public sphere as it often cleavages along gender, ethnic, regional and political lines” (Spittlenick,
2000:189). Obviously, a divided public sphere suggests that the
watchdog role of the media is a differentially perceived across the
nation’s ethnic and religious fault lines. To put it differently, one
man’s social crusader is another man’s ethnic irredentist.
Equally important, as I show in my chapter on the economic
and technological profile of the media, is the fragility of media
institutions, many of which appear, capsize sometimes, reappear
only to go off the media scene terminally. Although this is not peculiar to Nigeria, and in part reflects a global trend of media volatility and high mortality rate, its Nigerian dimension is remarkable.
Taken along with the poor working conditions of journalists and
their survival through the prevalent Brown Envelope syndrome,
which Lanre Idowu discusses in his contribution, the context of
watchdog journalism is far from auspicious.
In spite of these limitations, the idea of the Nigerian media as
watchdog of the public space is deeply embedded in Nigeria’s
media history and ideology. In fact, it finds expression and constitutional recognition in Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution, which
enjoins the media to “monitor governance and to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the government to the people”.
Buttressing this entrenched tradition is a senior Nigerian journalist
who argued that “the media are charged with the role of holding
government accountable and to guard against the abuse of power. Hence, the need to raise countervailing structures of, surveillances to monitor government’s activities and stem an inherent
disposition towards excess (Oseni, 1995:3).
We find throughout the period under discussion that this role
has been exercised by the media on such occasions as the resolute opposition of the media to Obasanjo’s ‘third term agenda’
which would have illegally extended his tenure, to reports of corruption in the Jonathan administration which led to the easing
out of a former Minister of Aviation, Ms. Stella Oduah, and to the
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exposure of the rot in the Nigerian Police College by Channels
Television triggering thereby a national outcry and official redress.
So, criticisms of the media as captured and incorporated into the
spoils-sharing arrangement of the political elite have some bite,
but does not state the whole truth. The watchdog may no longer
be as active as it once was; it may even manifest signs of ill health
as in the increasing cases of corruption in the media, but it still
barks and has proved frequently that it is capable of scaring away
intruders and predators. In the concluding section of this chapter,
I give a summary of the contributions made by different scholars
to the voyage of understanding the Nigerian media in the Fourth
Republic.
Section Three: Summary of the Chapters
The chapter by Prof. Karikari narrates the issues through a detailed focus on the Ghanaian media. He throws up the contradiction that, while the 1992 First Republican Constitution grants wide
ranging freedom to the media, the performance of the watchdog
role is encumbered by a salad of factors such as the influence
of proprietors, political and economic patronage, corruption of
journalists as well as weak professional norms. Hence, while the
media, including the usually tepid state-owned segments, have
gone out of their ways to serve as watchdogs to officialdom, there
is general feeling that the media could have more effectively performed this role than they have done.
Employing buttressing data from interviews conducted with
journalists, Karikari maintained that out of five journalists interviewed, four of them described media performanceof their watchdog role as below average. The overwhelming position that arises
from the scholar’s empirical data is aptly summarized by one of his
respondents who said in answer to a question that:

“I don’t think they (the media) have done well. May be some pockets
do a good job. With the coming into being of the Constitution of the
Fourth Republic and the liberalization of the media, you would think
that when quantity improved quality would follow... But what you find
is that most of our journalists are following the ministers, the district
chief executives. Our newspapers are filled with a lot of ‘he said’ stories.
Our newspapers are filled with a lot of PR stories. Even business, when
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business is doing something it is the PR side of the business story that
is followed. Who is asking the businesses the critical questions?”

If journalists feel this way about their own colleagues, it is unlikely that the general public will feel any better about the performance of the watchdog role of the Ghanaian media. Nonetheless,
all hope is not lost given that there are signs here and there of
the re-awakening of the media to their core functions as well as
redemptive and emancipatory roles.
The chapter by Prof. Lai Oso and Dr. Tunde Akanni on the Digital Public Sphere narrates developments in electronic journalism
and the growth of online platforms within the context of the theoretical postulations of the German scholar Jugen Habermas on
the Public Sphere. Oso and Akanni argue that social media campaigns on digital platforms such as the one involved in sensitising the public to violence against persons, the increasing political
use by public officials of Twitter and Facebook, the widening of
the discursive space by online publications and citizen journalism,
more than compensate for abuses of digital platforms through
the spread of fake news, hate speeches and impersonation. They
make a distinction between institutionalised Citizen Journalism, as
practised by Premium Times and Cable and non-institutionalized
Citizen Journalism evidenced by such outlets as Linda Ikeji’s Blog,
Nairaland and the Nigerian Village Square. Although some of these
outlets are filled with scandals and sensational news about celebrities, there is a critical mass of outlets that focus on politics and
widen the democratic space. That is not all. Oso and Akanni go on
to argue that not only has Citizen Journalism deepened democracy, the online media have revived investigative journalism, citing
as an example the cases of Sahara Reporters, Premium Times and
Cable. They conclude that “Citizen Journalism has deepened and
widened the journalism net to embrace more actors and voices. It
has further liberalised access to the public sphere.”
Two chapters, one by Dr. Danjibo and the other by Prof. Olukotun and Mrs. Jesuminure deal with media coverage of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Danjibo looks at several outbreaks of
ethno-religious conflicts such as the Sharia Law Crisis, the Miss
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World Beauty Pageant Crisis as well as the Kidnap of the Chibok
Girls and the clash between the Nigerian Army and the Shittes in
2015. He makes the point that the Southern newspapers during
the Sharia law crisis cast aspersions and demonized Sharia, giving
the example of the Punch Newspaper (February 17, 2000, p.17)
which had a bold caption titled “Sharia: Advent of a Millennium
Monster”.
Danjibo also alludes to gaps in the training of journalists as well
as their poor investigative skills, Citing the example of the Chibok girls’ saga in which Nigerian newspapers came up with figures
lower than the ones reported by CNN and Aljazeera. In his words
“ while the CNN and Aljazeera gave the figure of the kidnapped
girls as over 270, the Nigerian media, which most of the times are
not on the combat field, reported far lower figures.” The paper
by Olukotun and Jesuminure discusses the way in which the media preponderantly located in Southern Nigeria report and frame
ethno-religious conflicts. They employ a case study approach to
investigate the extent to which journalists adopt enemy frames to
report crises that often break out pitting Christians against Muslims as well as Hausas against Igbos. They take the view that while
journalists do not precipitate ethno-religious conflicts, once crises
break out; they tend to define the issues in antagonistic terms.
Citing the specific example of the Miss World Beauty Peageant
and the crisis that broke out over ThisDay reportage, they make
the point that in times of crisis, there comes into play a reinforcement of generic cleavages such as North versus South, and the
consequent demonization of intra-cleavage differences. On this
score, they refer to a statement by a former editor of a southern
newspaper, the Nigerian Tribune, which suffered collateral damage
in the course of the Miss World Beauty Pageant crisis. According
to the editor, “Every southern newspaper was taken to be ThisDay
in the North. Our vehicles could not move freely and our members
of staff were afraid for their lives, we lost millions of naira”. In other words, the context of play mobilises the existing cleavages in
confrontational terms without discrimination about the fine differences. The chapter closes by recommending instructional strategy

11

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

through which journalists can embrace conflict sensitive reporting
in order not to stoke the fires of ethno-religious crisis.
The paper on changing economic, technological and ownership landscapes by Prof. Olukotun locates the discourse on the
watchdog role of the media within the context of factors such as
the high mortality of media, protracted defaults on the salaries of
journalists, the emergence of a partisan journalistic sphere with
the establishment of media institutions by high profile politicians,
the emergence of a Netocracy allied to the global public sphere
among other issues. The paper maintains that the debate on the
watchdog role of the media must be brought down to the capacity profile of the media, shifting technology and demographics as
well as the vulnerability of, especially, independent newspapers
where mortality rate tends to be high. The paper argues that in
the period under study, the watchdog role of journalists tended
to assume an irregular character because of the limitations of capacity and the harsh constraints of an economic milieu hostile to
business. Hence, while critical and investigative journalism continued to occur, they certainly did not do so in a sustained agenda
building manner.
The paper on Corruption in the Nigerian Media by Mr. Lanre
Idowu situates the discussion on the brown envelope syndrome
within the context of the extant socio-political conditions of the
society, the harsh economic milieu and the difficulties of practicing ethical journalism in such a context. He also locates the widespread syndrome at individual, organisational and inter-organisational levels. Hence, despite what he called “occasional flashes of
brilliance” on the part of the media, there continues to be manifestations of corruption partly reflecting the decay in the larger
society. For example, such practices as pack journalism by beat
associations of journalists which operate like cartels, the payment
of protection fees by reputation managers of institutions, the
granting of awards of dubious credibility to non deserving individuals and organisations are some of the ways in which corruption manifests in the media. Considering the corrosive effects of
media corruption, Idowu recommends a clutch of measures which
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will include the proper funding of media organisations, upgrading
of skills in media management, naming and shaming mechanisms
as ways of discouraging ethical infractions as well as a renewed
attention to the enforcement of journalistic codes. The vicissitudes
of the anti-corruption struggle in the larger society mounted by
President Muhamadu Buhari, warn us that combating media corruption requires a sustained systemic, multi-pronged long term
struggle, rather than flashes in the pan or insubstantial gestures.
The chapter by Edaetan Ojo on the Road to The Freedom of Information Act and beyond, chronicles in elaborate detail the over
a decade struggle by journalists and other civil society actors to
ensure the passing into law of the Bill. Ojo, whose organization,
Media Rights Agenda, was in the forefront of the crusade, documents the long drawn struggle which began in 1999 for the passing of the Bill. He traverses a diverse and complex terrain, which
includes the advocacy strategies of civil society activists, countless
meetings with legislators, as well as media campaigns on radio,
television and print media sustained through the vicissitudes of
struggle. Apart from these, there were letter writing campaigns,
short message service or texts directed at the mobile phones of
legislators, signature campaigns in which MRA assembled several
hundreds of signed petitions to galvanize support for the Bill, as
well as the dissemination of educational and enlightenment literature. In the end, the advocacy paid off with the signing of the Bill,
thus opening another chapter, as Ojo narrates, in the chequered
efforts by journalists and civil society to use the Bill as a tool of
good governance.
Peter Kimani takes a look at the rise, fall and rise of the independent media in Kenya. He does this by doing case studies of the
2007 and 2013 General Elections when the media, the print media
is his focus, in his words, “capitulated under pressure from inside
and outside”. The study traces in detail, the ethnic and political
battles fought by the media, as a section of them enlisted in the
political fray, which the elections represented. For example, during
the 2007 election, the Nation was faced with a crisis occasioned
by political division. As Kimani saw it, there were two camps in
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the newsroom, one supporting President Kibaki an ethnic Kikuyu,
while the other supported opposition Chief, Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo. The case study illustrates the emasculation of the watchdog role of the media because of partisanship and the penetration
of the media by ethnic and political struggles. Interestingly, three
newspapers: the Nation, the Standard and the Star became, for
a season, the site of these political and ethnic battles. Broadly,
the same picture prevailed during the 2013 election, when major newspapers tended to fracture along ethnic lines. Overall, he
scores the media a pass mark in terms of their watchdog role.
In his chapter, entitled Elections and The Media, Comparing the
Experiences of South Africa and Nigeria in 2014 and 2015, Professor Abiodun Salawu analyses the watchdog role of the media
of both countries through the prism of their roles in facilitating
electoral participation, as well as civic discourse and engagement.
Based on an empirical survey, he reaches the conclusion that in
both countries that the media, including the new media, were in
the forefront, increasing political participation among citizens. Of
course, there was a higher level of media-led participation and discourse in South Africa than Nigeria, because of what he calls, the
lower use of the media in Nigeria because of electricity shortage
and other deficits. Hence, there was higher reliance on the new
media in South Africa for political information during the elections
than Nigeria, where there is a lower level internet penetration. In
both countries, the study established that the media, new and old,
performed vibrant watchdog roles and, therefore, increased political participation during the period of the election.
In her contribution entitled, Television and Nigeria’s Democratic Aspiration, Dr Oluyinka Esan discusses through a selection of
media text, the role of television in stimulating participation and
civic engagement in the years under study. She analyses issues
dealing with contents, changing technology and globalization, as
they affect the role of television. Of interest is the role of private
television such as Channels TV with 90 minutes “Sunrise Daily”
programme. According to her, the programme is “anchored by a
panel of three hard-nosed interviewers noted for their adversarial”
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style. In other words, the reach and focus of television, is increasingly broadening attention outside of government officials to take
on issues that affect the everyday man and woman. She also mentioned in the same connection, greater audience reach because
of the use of indigenous languages, as well as programs targeted
at youths and lovers of sports. Hence, it is now possible for the
media through television to build, what she called, “the informed
citizenry required to make informed decision.”
To complement Esan’s discourse focused on television, Funke
Treasure-Durodola looks in detail at such features as “Talk Radio”,
“Phone-in Programmes”, “The President Explains”, all of which
mainstream the participatory and civic engagement dimensions
of radio. Treasure, a senior radio journalist, argues that such interventions as radio magazines like “Kubanji Direct” on Radio Continental, Raypower’s “Political Platform” and “Fact File”, as well as
“Wake Up Naija with Funke-Treasure underline the democratic and
informative potential of radio as an instrument of engagement.
In his chapter on state media relations, Professor Chris Ogbondah shows that in spite of the formal structures of democratic
rule in the period since 1999, there are continuities between the
military years when the Nigerian media struggled against a tight
leash and the period of formal democracy. True, some of the repressive laws by which the military persecuted the media have
been removed and journalists are no longer under the jackboots
of the generals. Better still, there is a Freedom of Information Act
to empower journalists and civil societies in their struggles for accountability. Nonetheless, as Ogbondah demonstrates, there still
remain many more miles to be covered in the search for a free
press. In this connection, the author draws attention to such violations as media closure and confiscation of publications, threats,
physical assaults and killings, the use of strategic criminal libel and
seditious suits, as well as the political control of the media through
financial constrains, such as the manipulation and high cost of
broadcasting licenses. Overall, however, there is a better climate
for journalists to carry out their legitimate functions, but now and
then there is a reversion to the years of impunity and outright
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persecution.
CONCLUDING NOTE
As the preceding narration suggests the scholars have looked
in fairly considerable detail at various aspects of the role, orientation, performance and constrains of the media in the context of
Nigeria’s emerging democracy. Obviously, no one book can do
complete justice to such a complex and variegated topic, but what
is available here adds up to a substantial examination of the topic.
For example, we do not deal with dimensions and genres of media, such as films, theatre, video and indigenous orature, but it is
our hope that we have sought as a monitor of media performance
in the context of the question posed at the outset, namely, to what
extent have the media acted as watchdogs, and to what extent can
they be described as captive media? I return to this question in the
concluding chapter of the book. But, it is a delight to have contributed in some meaningful way to filling some of the lacuna in
the literature on media studies in Africa. As is well known, most of
the books and publications on media in Africa have been preoccupied with such concerns as newsgathering, the status and role
conception of media workers, as well as changing communication
policies in various countries. We jettison these rather narrow perspectives in order to capture, as Jakobowicz (1995:129) suggest
“a series of processes and institutions, such as economic forces,
international relations, the state and political movement”. It is our
view that this is a more productive approach to the evolving conversation on the impact of the media in a transitional democracy,
bearing in mind that there has not been enough cross-fertilization of ideas between democratic theorists, comparative politics
scholars and students of communication in Africa. We hope that
these chapters have gone some way in bridging this gap as well as
opening up possibilities of further and deeper enquiries into the
abiding issues and challenges.
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STATE-MEDIA RELATIONS:
Constraints on Freedom of the Media
By Christian Ogbondah

“In 13 years of democratic rule, the culture of democracy is still
far from taking firm root in Nigeria. Its tenets are breached with
sickening regularity….” (The Guardian, January 15, 2013).
“Since the return of democratic rule in 1999, the Nigeria
police have scarcely shown that it is willing to play by the rules
of democratic norms. It still applies bare-knuckle tactics where
it is not called for.” (ThisDay, January 30, 2007).

Introduction
The above passages from the editorial commentaries of The
Guardian and ThisDay respectively, epitomize what many Nigerians believe to be the state of the democratic order in the country
since May 29, 1999 when Nigeria transitioned from military autocracy to civil democracy. Following the transition, many Nigerians hoped that arbitrary detention of journalists, closure of media
houses and confiscation of media products that characterized the
era of military dictatorship would be committed to the dustbin of
history. They hoped that the new democratic state would be the
prime mover of democratic values especially media freedom i.e.
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the right to disseminate diverse views and news without governmental interference. The Daily Champion reflected this hope in its
editorial of October 11, 2004 when it said, “For a nation that has
just come out of…years of military dictatorship – bruised, broken
and battered – the event ushered in much hope for the people.”
The Guardian reiterated this view in its editorial on May 29, 2013:
“With the return to civil rule, expectations of Nigerians were high.
Against the background of the impunity of the past, they expected the rule of law….Against massive human rights violations; they
expected the veneration of rights.”
The Guardian underscored this view in another editorial titled,
“Citizens and torture,” on October 20, 2014: “Human rights violation which was once a routine under military rule in Nigeria was
expected to have come to an end with the inauguration of civilian
democratic rule in 1999.”
Nigerians anchored these hopes on the belief that the worst
form of democracy is better than the most benevolent dictatorship. Ironically enough, however, human rights violations especially restriction of media freedom seems to endure under the
[new] democratic formation. Notably, the state utilizes the same
repressive institutions – Nigeria’s brutal police force, the dreaded
State Security Service (SSS) etc. – used by past military regimes to
restrict media freedom. This is why in its editorial of May 29, 2013,
The Guardian said: “The return to democracy after many years of
military rule…has not brought much of the desired change. If anything, the system has changed, but not the attitude. The personnel
have changed, but the vices continue.”
The objective of this chapter is to make a critical analysis of the
obstacles on media freedom in Nigeria within the context of statepress relations from May 29, 1999 to 2017. To achieve its objective,
this chapter will first make a brief description of state-press relations during the era of military rule. This will help provide the context for understanding state-press relations since 1999. After that,
it will make a detailed examination of legislative and constitutional
reforms aimed to create the enabling environment for media freedom in the post-junta era. Next, the chapter will highlight the ma-
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jor obstacles on media freedom -- problems that seem to persist
for the media in Nigeria, and therefore ought to be solved as part
of the on-going [re]democratization in the country. The chapter
concludes with recommendations on how to mitigate these obstacles in order to catapult Nigeria to a vibrant democracy.
Overview of State-Press Relations Under Military Rule
Nigerian press did not enjoy a sweetheart relationship with the
state during the periods of military rule that lasted for nearly thirty years. State-press relations during those periods was tenuous
as noted by several scholars, including Adekanye (1997), Ibelema
(2003), Pate (2011; 2002), Adeyemi (1995), Agbaje (1993), Ajibade
(2003, 1999), Aboaba (1979), Oreh (1976) and Onyedike (1984).
Others who made this point are Utomi (1981), Dare (1972), Ogbondah (1994; 2003), Youm and Ogbondah (1990-1991), Seng and
Hunt (1986) and Hunt and Seng (1988). However, Jose (1975) and
Ekwelie (1979) claimed that the press was [relatively] free during
the Yakubu Gowon regime. But Ogbondah (1991; 1989), Onagoruwa (1977) and Olorunsola (1977) have fiercely challenged this
claim with analyses of the Amakiri case of 1973. The Amakiri case
arose when at the instruction of a state military governor’s Aide
de Camp (ADC), a reporter of the Nigerian Observer, Minere Amakiri, was dealt 24 strokes of a “horse whip across his bare back, his
head and beards shaved with a pocketknife and detained for 27
hours in an unused toilet.
During the periods of military rule, the state annulled the nation’s constitutions. It promulgated numerous press decrees, institutional measures and arbitrary actions to minimize the ability
of the press to disseminate pluralistic views and news. The more
obnoxious of those decrees as well as institutional measures and
arbitrary actions are described here to provide the background for
understanding the nature of state-press relations since 1999. The
measures included: 1) The State of Emergency Decree of 1966; 2)
The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decrees No. 1 of
1966 and 1967; Decrees No. 1 of 1984 and No. 17 of 1993;3) State
Security (Detention of Persons) Decrees No. 3 of 1966 and 1967;
Decree No. 2 of 1984 and Decree No. 11 of 1994; 4)The Morning
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Post and Sunday Post (Prohibition) Edict of 1967; 5) Newspapers
(Prohibition of Circulation) Decree No. 17 of 1967and Decree No.
12 of 1978; 6) Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree
No. 24 of 1967; 7) Police Act Decree No. 41 of 1967, and 8) Public
Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decrees No.11 of
1976 and No. 4 of 1984. Others were: 9) Newswatch Decree of
1987; 10) Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree 35 of 1993;
11) Newspapers Decree 43 of 1993; 12) Newspapers Etc. (Proscription and Prohibition From Circulation) Decree No. 48 of 1993;
13) The Concord Newspapers and African Concord Weekly Magazine (Proscription and Prohibition from Circulation) Decree No. 6
of 1994; 14) The Punch Newspapers (Proscription and Prohibition
from Circulation) Decree No. 7, of 1994, and 15) The Guardian
Newspapers and African Guardian Weekly Magazine (Proscription
and Prohibition from Circulation) Decree No. 8 of 1994. Momoh
(May 1985), and some of the writers mentioned have described
detailed provisions of these press decrees.
The enforcement of those decrees resulted in the detention of
many journalists as described by Aboaba (1979), Adeyemi (1995),
Agbaje (1992), Ajibade (2003; 1999), Akinkuotu (1999), Anyanwu
(2002), Ekwelie, (1979), Jakande (1979), Ogbondah (1994), Olukotun (2004a; 2004b; 2002a; 2002b; 2000), Olorunsola (1977), Onyedike (1984), Oreh, (1976) and others. Security agents also arrested
and detained scores of political critics without trials documented
by Onanuga (1999), Charles-Obi (1999), Ofeimun (1999), Olorunyomi (1998) and others. The enforcement of the decrees further
resulted in the closure of media houses – just as junta officials
arbitrarily confiscated newspaper and magazine copies at newsstands Agbese (1989), Ogbondah (1994; 2003). Some journalists
were murdered, including Dele Giwa, editor-in-chief of Newswatch. Others were physically tortured (Abati, 1999; Ekpu, 1999;
Ajibade, 2003; Ogbondah, 2002; Orji, 2003). Kudirat Abiola, wife of
Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the June 23, 1993, presidential election, was among the political critics who were murdered.
All these actions as well as the absence of due process created
tenuous state-press relations throughout the periods of military
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rule. With the transition to civil rule in 1999, Nigerians hoped that
these extra-legal actions against the media would be relegated to
the past.
State-Media Relations, 1999-2016
Since 1999, the National Assembly has enacted noteworthy legal reforms for the media. It has abrogated at least one anachronistic press law. Unlike the military era when soldiers governed,
using decrees and edicts, the country is today governed through
constitutional rule. Due process and rule of law have replaced arbitrariness, impunity and extra-judicial actions. All these reforms
described below are intended to create the enabling environment
for media freedom.
1. The 1999 Constitution
The 1999 Constitution provides for freedom of expression. Section 39(1) provides that, “Every person shall be entitled to freedom
of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart ideas and information without interference.” Section
39(2) provides that, “…every person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions.” Section 22 empowers the media to
hold the government accountable: “The press, radio, television
and…the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the…
accountability of the Government to the people.” According to
Section 15(5), one of the responsibilities and objectives of the
state is to “abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.” The
media, therefore, have a constitutional obligation to criticize, and
hold the government accountable for abolishing corruption. It is
important to underscore this obligation because attempts by the
media to carry out this constitutional duty, and the government’s
reactions to attempts by the media to do so underpin the [tenuous] nature of state-press relations. In one word, the effort by the
media to fulfill the constitutional obligation of holding the government accountable is the key source of tension in state-media
relations in Nigeria.
2. Freedom of Information Act
Another legal reform enactment is the Freedom of Informa-
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tion Act (FOIA). Enacted on May 28, 2011, the FOIA affirmatively guarantees members of the press and public access to government-held information, upon request. Section 1(1) of the Act
states: “…the right of any person to access or request information, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the
custody or possession of any public official, agency or institution
howsoever described, is established.” Section 1(3) guarantees requesting entities the right to institute proceedings in the court to
compel public institutions to comply with the provisions of the
law. Section 2 of the law mandates public institutions to ensure
that information and records of their activities are kept, and in a
manner that facilitates access to a requesting entity. Section 10
criminalizes willful destruction or altering of information before
it is made available to a requesting entity. Section 12 enumerates
categories of information that may not be disclosed.
3. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In addition to the above-mentioned legal provisions, is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the
Banjul Charter), an international human rights instrument intended to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in
the African continent. Article 9 of the Charter, which Nigeria is
signatory to, provides for the right of media freedom.
4. Human Rights Commission
The establishment of a Human Rights Commission charged
with the duty to promote and protect human rights, including
media freedom, is another recent legal reform. It came into being
by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 1995, as
amended by the NHRC Act, 2010. It serves as mechanism for the
enhancement and enjoyment of human rights, including media
freedom. The NHRC was established in 1995, following the enactment of Decree No. 22 of 1995 by Sani Abacha’s military dictatorship. Few Nigerians knew it even existed because it did not make
any substantial impact on human rights. It was set up as part of
the late dictator’s white-wash effort to counter international criticisms of the regime’s woeful human rights record.
5. Abrogation of Newspaper Amendment Act of 1964
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A notable reform for the media was the abrogation of the obnoxious Newspaper Amendment Act of 1964 on February 4, 2003.
The law impeded journalistic practice for forty years as it made
libel, a civil crime, punishable by a one-year imprisonment or a
fine of two hundred pounds (Elias, 1969). Its full provisions are
contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette of
September 5, 1964.
Obstacles on Media Freedom
Despite the enactment of these legal policies, there are still
enigmatic problems (obstacles) to media freedom. There are two
categories of these obstacles: i) external, and ii) internal. External
obstacles include legal constraints, arbitrary actions, extra-judicial
and institutional measures exerted on the media by the state and
anti-media entities. Some of these constraints have been documented by Akinsiku (July 15, 2014), Ogbondah (2011; April 29,
2013; 2004; 1997), Olukotun (2002b; 2004a), Joseph (1997), Oso
(2011), Tete (2001), Harry (2015), Udeze (2012) and Pate (2011).
Unethical behavior by media professionals constitutes internal
threats to media freedom.
External Obstacles
The weaknesses in certain sections of the constitution and other legal policies are part of the external obstacles to media freedom. They include the following:
(i)  Derogable Measures and Claw back Clauses
Section 39(1&2) of the Constitution provides for the right of
freedom of expression. But that right is derogable as Subsection
3 states that:“Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that
is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -(a) for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of courts or
regulating telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematograph films….” Further, Section 45(1a) states:
“Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society – a) in the interest of defense, public safety, public order,
public morality or public health….” This means that media free-
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dom is subject to certain conditions as noted by Mapuva (2016)
and Nyamnjoh, (2005). Hansungule (1995) observed that majority of African countries have adopted the practice by which press
freedom is enshrined in the Bill of Rights while at the same time
allowing, in the same clause, for the lessening of that right by
state action. Hansungule (1995) further notes that even “in those
constitutional frameworks in which it may not be derogable, it is
still, nonetheless, subject to claw back measures which, if put in
practice, could end tearing up the protection and, therefore, rendering the right vulnerable” (p. 14). What this means is that a claw
back measure reverses or limits the rights provided in the Constitution. Ogbondah (2002; 1997) argued that derogable and claw
back provisions take with the left hand what the Constitution has
given with the right hand. The exercise of the right of expression
is therefore, limited ab initio by such clauses as “provided that
individuals abide by the law,” “within the law,” “in the interest of
public safety” etc. Michaelsen (2012) highlighted the problematic
nature of claw back clauses in the current era of international terrorism. The problem with claw
back clauses and degrogable
measures in Nigeria can be seen from how the Court of Appeal
upheld the obnoxious Public Order Act on March 10, 2016, citing
Section 45 of the Constitution.
(ii) FOIA Controversies
There have been contradictory court rulings (in Ibadan, Enugu,
Abuja and Lagos) on the question of whether the FOIA is binding
on the 36 states of the federation. Justice S.A. Akinteye, presiding
over an Oyo State High Court in Ibadan in 2013, held that the FOIA
applies to the entire federation, and therefore does not need to
be “domesticated by any state before taking effect in all the states
across the federation.” Justice D.V. Agishi, presiding over a Federal
High Court in Enugu in 2014 made a similar ruling. But the Federal
High Court in Lagos presided over by Justice Okon Abang, ruled
on October 31, 2014 that the FOIA is only binding on the Federal
Government and its agencies and not on the [36] states because it
was enacted by the National Assembly. The question is yet to be
resolved. It seems the question will make its way to the Supreme
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Court for final adjudication. The controversial rulings collectively
constitute an obstacle in the ability of the media to access government-held information at the state level. As the Daily Independent said in its editorial on Nov. 13, 2014, “Any impediment in enforcing FOI Act nationwide would negate the essence of the law.”
(iii) Antiquated Laws
Another problem is that the FOIA [silently] co-exists with the
anachronistic Official Secrets Act of 1962, a child of the colonial
era. With the 1962 Act, all government-held information is classified as “top secret,” creating an impenetrable veil of secrecy
that makes it difficult for journalists to obtain information from
state officials. Elias (1969), Osinbajo and Fogam (1991), Aihe and
Oluyede (1979) and Okoro and Okolie (2004) have described the
provisions of the law. Although some government officials have
said that the FOIA supersedes the Official Secrets Act, those verbal pronouncements are not enough. There ought to be a written
legal policy that speaks to supremacy of the FOIA over the Official
Secrets Act.
(iv) Extra-Legal Actions
The chronic use of arbitrary actions and extra-legal measures
by the state in its relationship with journalists constitutes another
category of obstacles on media freedom. They include the following:
(a) Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions
Since 1999, state security agents have arrested and detained
scores of journalists and media personnel without any court orders. Three editors of the Insider Weekly magazine - Osa Director,
Chucks Onwudinjo and Janet Mba-Afolabi - were arrested on
November 24, 2003. A report in the Newswatch of December 1,
2003, noted that security officers arrested the editors for allegedly publishing a false report titled, “Aso Rock Oil Bunkering Scandal.”They were subsequently charged with sedition even though
the Federal Court of Appeal had declared sedition unconstitutional in Chief Arthur Nwankwo v. The State, a 1983 case that has become a locus classicus in sedition cases in Nigeria. On September
4, 2004, security officers went back to the Insider Weekly maga-
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zine, and arrested its production editor, Raphael Olatoye. Others
arrested between 2002 and 2005 included the editor of Global
Star, Isaac Umunna, and Ben Adaji of The News magazine.
In June 2006, security officers arrested Mike Aruleba of the African Independent Television (AIT), and Rotimi Durojaiye of the Daily Independent in connection with a story that questioned the
age and cost of a presidential jet that the Obasanjo government
purchased. The state brought a charge of sedition against them.
The then general manager of Leadership, Abraham Nda Isaiah,
was arrested in January 2007 in connection with the paper’s report about the health of former President Umaru Yar’Adua, an issue the government wanted to keep secret (Henry, January 10,
2007). The publisher of Abuja Inquirer, Dan Akpovwa and its editor, Sonde Abbah, were also arrested and charged with sedition
in 2007 for the publication of an article, “Obasanjo-Atiku FaceOff: Coup Fear Grips Nigeria.” The government abruptly dropped
each of the sedition cases brought against the media. Ogbondah
(April 29, 2013) has described some details of these cases. Four
editorial staff members of the Nation – Yusuf Ali, Yomi Odunuga,
Lawal Ogianegbon and Dapo Olufade – were arrested and detained on October 11, 2011 in connection with a front-page story, “Obasanjo’s Secret Letter to Jonathan Stirs Anger: Ex-President
Seeks Sack of PTDF Chief, Four Others.” In February 2013, police
officers arrested and charged three journalists at the Wazobia FM
radio station in Kano with defamation for airing a show that said
polio immunizations in the predominantly Muslim city were an
anti-Islamic Western conspiracy. Dapo Olorunyomi, publisher of
Premium Times, was among the prominent journalists arrested in
2017 (Ibemere, January 19, 2017). One citizen, Isiaka Yusuf, was
arrested and detained for posting on the Twitter, pictures of a jailbreak by suspected members of Boko Haram jihadist sect.
(b) Media Closure and Confiscation
Since May 29, 1999 several media houses have been shut down
by the state. Broadcast stations have been shut down more than
the print media. This is in sharp contrast with the era of military
rule when the print media bore most of the brunt of media clo-
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sure. During the period of military rule, there were only a handful
of private broadcasters. The NBC closed down AIT and RayPower
100.5 FM stations for about 12 hours on October 24, 2005, and
Freedom Radio 99.5 FM, Kano, on March 28, 2006 (Madu-West
and Ajakaye, March 30, 2006). Then, on May 14, 2006, SSS officials ordered the stoppage of an AIT live broadcast in the National
Assembly and confiscated the tape of the program titled, “A documentary on tenure elongation” (Akunna, May 15, 2006). The state
closed down Channel Television in September 2008, following its
broadcast of a hoax attributed to the News Agency of Nigeria. On
May 10, 2009, the NBC shut down Adaba 88.9 FM Radio Station in
Akure, Ondo State (Alake, May 18, 2009; Sowole, May 18, 2009).
On April 27, 2015, the government barred the AIT from covering
the activities of the then President-elect Buhari because of “security issues,” in the same manner it expelled the Punch State House
reporter, Olalekan Adetayo, from covering the Presidential Villa
in Abuja in 2017. Then on November 7, 2017, a number of media
houses, including the Premium Times, were barred from entering
the National Assembly to cover President Buhari’s presentation of
the 2018 budget. Earlier in 2015, the NBC barred at least 18 songs
from being broadcast by television stations in the country. The
NBC said that the songs contained vulgar lyrics, obscene scenes
and violence, and promoted ostentatious lifestyle, drug trafficking
and indecent exposure. Ironically, those songs are played on web
sites and in nightclubs in the country. For example, when the Kano
State government banned Hausa rapper, Ziriums’ satirical song,
‘Girgiza Kai,’ (“Shake Your Head”), he began to use online sites to
distribute his songs.
(c) Threats, Physical Assaults and Killings:
Threats and physical attacks on media houses as well as assaults
and killings of journalists seem to persist in Nigeria. On October
14, 2003, for example, angry members of the National Assembly
threatened to sanction journalists who graphically reported allegations of a N54-million bribe against two senators. On August
30, 2003, [the then] Vice President, Atiku Abubakar’s security officers assaulted a photojournalist of the Daily Independent, Akin-

29

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

tunde Akinleye, while covering a public event in Lagos. Since 1999,
at least a dozen journalists have been murdered in Nigeria. But it
was the killing of Godwin Agbroko, head of the editorial board
of This Day, on December 22, 2006 that many remember. Another
victim was Ogunbayo Ohu, assistant news editor of the Guardian.
He was murdered on September 21, 2009 (Agha, September 22,
2009). The April 26, 2012 simultaneous bomb attacks on Thisday newspapers in Abuja and Kaduna, and the offices of the
Sun and the Moment by suspected members of Boko Haram in
what is now known as the “Black Thursday for the Nigerian Press,”
are among the attacks against the press that will be remembered
for a long time to come.
(d) Strategic Criminal Libel and Seditious Suits (SCLSS)
The state utilizes charges of criminal libel and sedition strategically to intimidate, harass, and discourage journalists from
criticizing the avalanche of corruption in the government. For example, in November 2003, the government filed a charge of sedition and criminal libel against three editors of the Insider Weekly magazine mentioned earlier. In June 2006, the police brought
charges of sedition against Mike Aruleba of the AIT station and
Rotimi Durojaiye of the Daily Independent. The same charge was
filed against Imo Eze, the director of the Ebonyi Voice newspaper, and one of his journalists, Oluwole Elenyinmi. Then in October
2007, the Akwa Ibom State Government brought a charge of sedition against Jerome Imeime, a newspaper publisher in the state
for an article that accused the then governor, Godswill Akpabio
of corruption. Another case of sedition was brought against the
editor of Leadership, Abraham Nda Isaiah, in 2007 for reporting on
the health of the then President Umaru Yar’Adua which the government was keeping secret (Henry, January 10, 2007). In 2014, a
journalist with the Sun, Ebere Wabara, was charged with seditious
publication against the then governor of Abia State, Theodore Orji.
Charges of sedition were also preferred against political critics. For example, sedition was preferred against the former Senate president, Iyorchia Ayu, Paul Ofana and Timi Frank during
the presidential electioneering campaign in 2007. In all these,
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the state abruptly dropped the charges or it showed little interest to prosecute them conclusively. For example, Ayu, Ofana and
Timi appeared in the court sixteen times in their trial, while the
prosecution appeared only three times (Muraina, May 21, 2009).
They eventually won their case. The Federal Government similarly “abandoned” a libel case that President Muhammadu Buhari
brought against DAAR Communications. The court disposed the
case on December 6, 2016 because according to Justice John
Tsoho “no representations from the parties have been entered
since the matter was assigned to the court.” The state knows it
will hardly win a sedition case. However, it continues to bring the
charge against journalists in order to harass, intimidate and discourage them from holding the government accountable for the
mammoth level of corruption among state officials. These may be
compared to the Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation
(SLAPP) cases in America that big corporations use to discourage
whistle blowers.
(e) Financial Constraints
Many Nigerian media houses are in the doldrums, financially.
Some broadcasters cannot take off in the air due to financial constraints. Ogundimu (1996) noted that the NBC issued 114 licenses
in the first four years of the liberalization of the sector. By 2017, the
NBC had issued 402 licenses. As Onwumechili (1996; 2006), Dokpesi (1997), Ajia (1994) observed, many are yet to go on air due
to financial difficulties. Some are unable to renew their licenses.
For this reason, by March 2017, the licenses of 54 broadcast companies were revoked for failure to pay the license fees within the
stipulated 60-day period. The financial health of the print media
industry is also down. No newspaper today has matched the circulation figure of 500, 000 copies of the Sunday Times in the 1970s.
Today, the daily circulation of all Nigerian newspapers combined,
including evening titles, is not close to that highest-ever figure
mentioned earlier. With the abysmally low circulation figures, and
given the high cost of major raw materials – newsprint, ink and
plates, computers, cameras, press maintenance, circulation costs
and newsgathering expenses, most newspapers and magazines
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struggle to break even on sales. It is due to financial difficulties
that many newspapers are unable to pay the salaries of their workers for several months, leading to intervention of the government
in state-owned newspapers. For example, the Triumph, Kano State
government-owned newspaper, was shut down in October 2012
due to financial difficulties. It resumed publication when the state
government intervened with a N50 million subsidy (ANON, October 4, 2002). This type of state intervention interferes with media
freedom because as the old adage says, “He who pays the piper
dictates the tune.”It is also as a result of financial difficulties experienced by many media houses that their reporters accept “brown
envelopes,” payola, transportation fees, “family support” etc. from
news sources to make ends meet. In turn, accepting brown envelopes potentially leads to conflict of interests. These constitute
internal threats to media freedom.
Internal Obstacles
Unethical practices among many Nigerian journalists constitute
internal threat to media freedom. Agbaje and Adebanwi (2003),
Ogundimu (2003) and Sonaike (2000) highlighted this problem in
their analyses of the problems created for, and by the press in
the post-military era in Nigeria. Kukah (1996) noted that unethical
practices can erode public confidence in the press. Unethical behavior on the part of journalists can constitute the greatest threat
to media freedom under the current political formation. This is
because unethical behavior on the part of journalists can provide
the excuse for the state to enact press censorship laws. For example, in 2006, SSS officers invaded Rhythm 93.7 FM radio station in
Port Harcourt, and arrested its news editor for broadcasting untrue news report that a bridge in Choba had collapsed.
Some journalists are guided by ethical considerations on their
jobs. Many are not. This has created a moral crisis today in Nigeria’s media industry. What the former Speaker of the National
Assembly, Ghali Na’aba, said about the press epitomizes the dilemma of the [moral] crisis facing many journalists and the media.
During the Nigeria Union of Journalists Press Week in Abuja in
2000, Na’aba told media professionals that the Nigerian press is
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willing to let ethnic and tribal sentiments supplant its commitment
to professional values. The former Attorney-General of the federation, Kanu Agabi, even accused the press of being balkanized and
pushed into “championing ethnic tendencies.” Some Nigerians
have attempted to illustrate the media’s tendency to championing ethnic sentiments with the coverage of the allegations of forgery and perjury involving four prominent politicians from different
ethnic groups. They were Chuba Okadigb, the first Senate President of the Fourth Republic; his successor, Evan(s) Enwerem; Salisu Buhari, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and
Bola Tinubu, former governor of Lagos State. Olukotun (2004a),
Ogundimu (2003) and Sonaike (2000) have analyzed media coverage of the scandals. In the aftermath of the media coverage of
the Enwerem, Buhari and Tinubu scandals, many Nigerians said
they developed low opinions about the media. In a commentary
titled, “The limits of investigative journalism,” in the October 1,
1999 issue of the Guardian, Levi Obijiofor, a journalism instructor
in Queensland, Australia, argued that the Nigerian press, with its
most influential papers located in the southwestern part of the
country, relentlessly investigated allegations of forgery and perjury
against Buhari and Enwerem. Paradoxically, argued Obijiofor, the
press did not investigate similar allegations against Tinubu who
comes from Southwestern Nigeria, a conclusion that Ogbondah
(2000) also made. One Nick Dazang, writing in the October 5, 1999
issue of e Vanguard, said:
Consider: the South-West press was the most shrill and clarion in the
Salisu Buhari and Evan(s) Enwerem scandals even though they did not
entirely unearth the two scandals in the first instance. Incidentally in the
Bola Tinubu scandal, which bears hues and colorations as the Buhari
one, the South-West press was eloquent and deafening only by its silence. The upshot of this strident silence is that suddenly there are two
standards for measuring villains – one reserved for those who hail from
the privileged South-West zone and the other for the lesser citizens
who hail outside it. Arising from this rather unhappy and topsy-turvy
situation, there is this impression that the media in Nigeria can no longer be trusted to be responsible to discharge their constitutional duty
of holding public officers accountable to the people.

Dazang concluded that, “There are people, who in the after-
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math of the obvious bias in the reportage of the Tinubu scandal,
who no longer consider the Nigerian media credible.” Another Nigerian, one AbdulkareemYakubu, from Maiduguri, reiterated this
perception about the Nigerian media in a September 1999 issue
of the e Vanguard titled, “Selectivity of the media.” Yakubu said:
It is really ironical that the same media that helped to bring
down Buhari is silent over this Tinubu affair. And there seems to be
some kind of conspiracy among the southwest media to cover up
the Tinubu affair instead of investigating further on the case. They
seem to be mute on the issue….Anyone that has been following
Tinubu’s case will know that the southwest media do not want to
write about it. This goes to show that some of the media houses
in the country are under the control of some individuals. This becomes glaringly clear when you read Salvator Amadi’s account of
his encounter with Tinubu and his men in the National magazine
of September 13, 1999 (Ogbondah, 2000).
The perceived partisan press coverage of the three scandals
raised the fear among some Nigerians that the press is out to
protect certain individuals on the basis of political clout, ethnicity
or patronage. Yet, the code of conduct of the Nigerian press requires the media to present truthful, accurate, fair and balanced
news reports, a requirement that is strongly articulated by The
Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947), Merrill (1997; 1989),
Black, Steele and Barney (1997), Gordon and Kittross (1999) and
Momoh (2004).
Another form of unethical practice among many journalists is
the acceptance of financial favors from news sources. Stephen
Farris highlighted this problem in an article in the European edition of Time magazine of April 15, 2002. He said, “Bribery is just
one of the challenges Nigeria’s press faces as the country makes
the difficult transition from dictatorship to democracy.” Adebanwi
(2003) underscored this point when he said, “the incidence of corruption in today’s Nigerian press has become alarming” (p. 95).
All these have contributed significantly to the low opinions that
some Nigerians have about the media in their country. This is in
sharp contrast with the recent past when Nigerians held the jour-
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nalism profession and journalists in high esteem. They respected
journalists for their ethical standards. This was reflected in the top
national leadership positions held by writers and newspapermen
such as Herbert Macaulay, Ernest Ikoli, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi
Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Peter Enahoro, Lateef Jakande, Tony
Momoh etc.
Inability of journalists to uphold ethical standards in news reports can provoke lawmakers to draft repressive press laws to enforce moral probity on the part of journalists. The enactment of
such laws can incapacitate the ability of the press to carry out its
constitutional obligation to hold the government accountable. At
the same time, the failure of journalists to uphold ethical principles can erode public trust and support for the press. During the
periods of colonial rule and military dictatorship, the press carried
the public along in its crusade for the introduction of democratic norms. But lack of ethical applications in news coverage can
constitute a serious threat to public support for the press. This is
because the public can always rally around the press when obnoxious laws are enacted, and when journalists are attacked by the
state. But, the public will not rally around the press when it fails to
be ethical i.e. when it fails to be fair, impartial, balanced, objective,
honest, truthful and balanced in its news reports. Unethical behavior on the part of journalists can lead to loss of confidence, trust
and respect for the press by the public and government officials
and loss of public interest in media products can affect the industry’s financial stability and existence.
It is mostly because of these obstacles that the Nigerian press
has never been ranked as free by either the New York-based Freedom House or the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (RSF),
the two organizations that rank freedom of the press in the world.
Rationales for Attacks on the Press
Although the government explained that security officers took
the actions described against the media in this chapter to maintain
public safety and security, the pragmatic rationale for the state’s
actions against the press was to incapacitate its ability to investigate and unearth the avalanche of corruption, embezzlement,
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illegal private capital accumulation, avarice and stealing of public funds by state officials. For example, the state arrested Durojaye of the Independent and Aruleba of AIT after the publication
of the report titled, “Controversy over age, cost of presidential
jet.” The report exposed the inflated cost of a used presidential
jet (“Tokunbo” in local parlance) that the government said it
purchased. The government of Nigeria is weak, and it thrives on
corruption. Adebanwi (2012) has made a scholarly analysis of
corruption in Nigeria. Below is an infinitesimal description of the
colossal level of corruption in the country.
When Nuhu Ribadu headed the EFCC he revealed to the BBC
of London that since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent
country, successive governments have stolen or wasted more than
$380b (Madunagu, October 21, 2006). The chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC), Professor Itse Sagay, revealed to Nigerians on June 5, 2017 that 55 top
government officials and businessmen corruptly enriched themselves with public funds to the tune of over N1.35 trillion between
2006 and 2013. Details of the illicit public money enrichment can
be accessed at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/55-topgovt-officials-businessmen-stole-n1-4-trn-obj-yaradua-jonathan/. A huge part of Nigeria’s crude oil is stolen in partnership
with government officials: about 680,000 barrels daily, or about
$7 billion annually. Civil servants defraud the country of N700b
annually. In February 2015, the former Minister of Finance, Ngozi
Okonjo-Iweala, revealed that the government discovered 62,893
ghost workers in the federal pay roll, saving the nation N208.7b. At
the National Identity Management Commission alone 4,800 of its
10,300 staff were discovered in 2013 to be ghost workers. According to a report in the February 4, 2016 issue of Vanguard, the
House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on Failed Rail Contracts, found 169 ghost companies that registered as contractors
with the Nigeria Railway Corporation for projects valued at N1
trillion. Top state officials are frequently owners of the ghost companies.
Top government officials at the state level also use ghost work-
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ers to embezzle public funds. For example, in June 2015, Ekiti State
Governor, Ayo Fayose, revealed that 809 ghost workers were unmasked in a staff verification exercise conducted that year in the
state, according to a news report in the Nation of June 26, 2015. In
May 2016, the Governor of Sokoto State, Aminu Tambuwal, announced that the state government recovered over N300 million
from the payrolls of the 23 local government councils in the state
in one month only, following the discovery of thousands of ghost
workers. In one local government council alone in the state, top
government officials sold 200 appointment letters to a contractor in Zamfara, another state. Lagos State discovered N82 million
ghost-workers fraud at different levels of the Local Government in
2012. According to a report in the Daily Times of November 23,
2011, the names of two infants -- a one-month-old and a fivemonth-old) -- were discovered on the payment voucher of a local
government council during an exercise to fish out ghost workers in
Zamfara State in 2011. Their payroll documents indicated that the
one-month-old had an Ordinary Level Diploma (OND) certificate,
an equivalent of high school certificate. According to a report in
the November 24, 2011 issue of the Nigerian Tribune, 725 ghost
workers were discovered in Bauchi State that year. The story is
the same in other states. For example, Plateau State government
discovered a fake commissioner among 5,000 ghost workers. A
news story in Vanguard of February 18, 2013 titled, “A country
of ghosts,” reported the figures of ghost workers in some of the
states as follows: Kano State, 8,000; Kebbi State, 9,300; Delta State,
7,000 and 8,000 in Rivers State.
In its issue of December 15, 2015, the Guardian reported that
in the police pension scheme alone, N1 billion was paid to ghost
pensioners yearly whereas the amount required was N500 million..
In 2012, a workers’ verification exercise at the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) threw up 17,000 fake workers that were
receiving regular salaries and allowances on its payroll, amounting
to billions of Naira in fraud. There is a mammoth level of corruption at all arms of federal and state governments. Two or three
examples may suffice to illustrate the level of graft at the federal
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government. In March 2008, the House of Representatives Committee that investigated the scandal of $16 billion expended in the
power sector was told that the then President, Obasanjo, inaugurated a non-existent National Integrated Power Project (NIPP) in
Cross River State, and illegally deducted money from the Federation Account to the tune of $3.975 billion over eight years for the
project. When a commission headed by Ambassador Kabiru Rabiu
visited the power project sites to verify what the illegally deducted
money was expended on it surprisingly discovered that nothing
was on ground at the site of the project inaugurated in 2005, according to reports published in March 21, 2008 issues of the Nigerian Tribune and the Guardian respectively. At least three Senate
presidents and two Speakers of the House of Representatives and
many ministers and commissioners and heads of government
agencies at the federal and state levels have been removed from
office since 1999 on corruption charges. In 2003, an Ad-Hoc Committee of the House of Representatives that investigated alleged
shortfalls in government revenue found that over N77.188b was
unaccounted for by various revenue-generating agencies of the
Federal Government.
The Nigeria Police Force stinks with filthy heaps of corrupt practices. Interestingly, this is the agency at the forefront of attacks
against the media in Nigeria. A World Bank and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID)-sponsored national survey conducted in 2001 by the Zero-Corruption Coalition, an association of organizations and individuals committed to
fighting corruption in Nigeria, found that the Nigeria Police Force
is the most corrupt public institution in the country. Police officers
extort N20 from commercial vehicle operators at checkpoints, and
many a time they fatally shoot those who do not give the N20bribe (less than 25 US cents). The police force is so corrupt that
the courts have convicted many of its officers for graft. The former
Inspector-General Police, Tafa Balogun, served about six months in
jail for corruption. The court ordered him to pay a fine of N4m in
2005. Balogun’s immediate successor, Sunday Ehindero, was also
well fingered in a N21m-fraud, N2.5b of police cooperative money
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and the source of money for allegedly building eight magnificent
houses.
Nigeria is so corrupt that in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 and
2007, Transparency International (TI) regularly ranked it as one of
the most corrupt countries in the world. Between 2001 and 2003
for example, TI ranked Nigeria as the second most corrupt country,
and in 2004, it was ranked as the third most corrupt in the world.
In 2005, TI ranked Nigeria as the seventh most corrupt country
while the country received a ranking of sixth most corrupt country
in 2006. In 2013, Nigeria was the 14th most corrupt country. This
paper strongly contends that the pragmatic explanation for the
chronic attacks against the press by the state is to minimize the
ability of journalists to hold the government accountable and to
investigate the avalanche of state corruption. This creates an unending conflict between the government and the media, resulting
in tenuous state-press relations.
Recommendations
The National Assembly should undertake a comprehensive review of the entire legal framework in the country with the aim to:
a) enact laws that will provide stronger protection for the media;
b) expunge or significantly reform antiquated laws that are still in
the statute books. This will help to create a more enabling environment for media freedom in Nigeria.
Enact Anti-Censorship Legislation
The National Assembly should urgently enact an Anti-Press
Censorship Act that provides against state interference, intimidation, harassment and brutalization of journalists. The law should
criminalize the use of extra-legal measures such as arbitrary detention of journalists, closure of media houses and confiscation and
seizure of media products and equipment by any security agent.
An example of this legal policy can be seen in Ghana. Article 16
of the Constitution of Ghana unequivocally provides against press
censorship, governmental interference, control of the media and
harassment of journalists. Article 162(2) guarantees that “there
shall be no censorship in Ghana.” Section 4 of Article 162 provides
that, “Editors of newspapers and other institutions of the mass
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media shall not be subject to control or interference by Government, nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their editorial
opinions and views, or the content of their publications” (Kludze,
1993, p. 140). For a country like Ghana that witnessed the deleterious effects of state restrictions against the press -- as documented by Anokwa (1997), Ekwelie (1978), Hachten (1975), Bourgault
(1995), Ofori (1993), Oquay (1995) and Twumasi (1980) -- these
constitutional reforms are exemplary. Members of the Nigerian
National Assembly should emulate their Ghanaian counterparts
and enact anti-censorship legislation that outlaws the arbitrary
arrest, detention, harassment, intimidation and physical abuse or
torture of media personnel and seizure of media products and
closure of media houses.
Abrogate Antiquated Laws
There are antiquated laws that still exist in the statute books.
One of the laws is the Official Secrets Act of 1962. The law enforces a culture of secrecy in the conduct of public affairs. Today, the
Official Secrets Act has become anachronistic as it collides with
the FOIA. It should be significantly reformed to reflect the principles of the FOIA. Another anachronistic law is the National Archives Act. It should be amended so that the clause that provides
for the non-disclosure of state records or documents until after
ten years could be formally repealed as it also collides with the
FOIA. Sedition, an antiquated law that the court has declared as
unconstitutional, is used strategically by the police to harass and
intimidate the media. The Federal Court of Appeal declared in Arthur Nwankwo v. Governor of Anambra in 1983 that sedition is
unconstitutional. Despite the ruling, over-zealous police officers
periodically bring the charge against Nigerian journalists. The
National Assembly should follow the Federal Court of Appeal’s
ruling in the celebrated Arthur Nwankwo case and repeal the law
of sedition – if only as a matter of formality. Furthermore, the court
should sternly warn the Nigeria Police Force to desist from bringing cases of sedition before it. On its part, the court should decline
to hear any case of sedition. As Okonkwor (1993), Onagoruwa
(1977) and Ogbondah (1997) have noted, some judges have called
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for the abrogation of all antiquated laws in the country.
Expunge Claw back Clauses and Derogable Measures
Claw back clauses and derogable measures in the Constitution
should be expunged or reformed. While it is necessary to protect
individual rights and societal interests, limitations on media freedom should be determined by the courts and not by the arbitrariness of the executive or other organs and agencies of the state.
Schramm (1967) stated this succinctly when he said: “In general, countries in Western democratic traditions believe that there
should be a minimum of control on the press and that such controls as there is should rest with…the courts, which we hope will
limit their attention to such offenses as libel….” (p. 9). This view is
also articulated by Baron (1973), Knight (1968), Emerson (1970;
1966), Gilmore, Barron and Simon (1997), Merrill (1974), Meiklejohn (1979), Levy (1963), Lowenstein (1967; 1966) and others.
Public Order Act
The Public Order Act (POA) that requires individuals and groups
to obtain a police permit prior to holding rallies is anachronistic, oppressive and anti-democratic. The law is a colonial heritage
used by British imperial autocracy to suppress anti-colonial activism and criticism. It should be abrogated or drastically reformed.
Many countries that once had it have expunged it from their statute books or reformed it. In 2007, for example, the Zimbabwean
government reformed its Public Order and Security Act (POSA),
and Britain has progressively reformed its Public Order Act of 1936
through the Public Order Act of 1986 and the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act of 1994. There are other [security] problems facing Nigeria such as religious extremism, secessionist movements,
Niger Delta crisis, oil theft, corruption, armed robbery, growing
availability of arms etc. that pose greater threat to peace, security
and public order than political rallies.
One of the problems with the POA today is the unrelenting
action of the police to continue to enforce it despite court rulings
against the law. In 2005, a High Court in Abuja presided over by
Justice Anwuri Chikere nullified the Public Order upon the reasoning that it was obsolete and a neo-colonialist. The judge specifi-
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cally stated that the law collided with Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. Then, in December 2007, the Court of Appeal in Abuja
presided over by Justice Rabiu Danladi Mohammed unequivocally
declared that the law was alien to the nation’s democracy, and
therefore “null, void and of no effect.” The Court declared that
public protests and rallies are part of the freedom of expression
and association guaranteed by Sections 39 and 40 of the 1999
Constitution and Articles 9 and 11 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Regrettably, the police continue to insist
that their constitutional responsibility to maintain public order, security and public peace was not nullified by the judgment.
FOIA
The Legal Defense and Assistance Project should appeal the
October 31, 2014 ruling by the Lagos High Court and any similar
rulings for further interpretation and clarification on whether the
FOI Act is binding on the states or not. It took a sustained struggle for 17 years by different stakeholders, especially the Nigeria
Union of Journalists, Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), and the
Media Rights Action (MRA), that spearheaded the FOI Bill before
it was signed into law. The Nigeria Union of Journalists and other
stakeholders should unite to fight what may be the final phase
of the battle to entrench the FOIA in all the states and the Federal Capital Territory. Further, it should initiate the passage of the
states’ version(s) of the FOIA as well as Open Media Access laws
by the Houses of Assembly of the respective states. So far, only
three states’ Houses of Assembly -- Delta, Ekiti and Lagos -- have
adopted the FOIA since its passage. The States’ Houses of Assembly should act in the public interest by ensuring that the FOIA is
passed in the 33 states that are yet to do so.
Summary and Conclusion
Nearly two decades after Nigeria transitioned from military autocracy to civil democracy media freedom – ability of the media
to gather and disseminate information without interference– is yet
to be fully entrenched in the country. The state continues to utilize
the same repressive institutions – the SSS and the police – that
were used by past profligate military dictatorships to restrict me-
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dia freedom. The arbitrary closure of media houses and detention
and physical assaults of journalists persist. All these are antithetical to government’s promises not to tolerate impunity against
journalists. For example in his nation-wide broadcast on October
1, 2000, President Obasanjo said. “I have always believed in fundamental human rights and freedom, because I know that these
values represent the best expression of democracy.” And on November 7, 2017, the minister of information and culture, Lai Mohammed, while contributing to a debate on “UN plan of action on
safety of journalists and the issue of impunity” at the 39th session
of the General Conference of the UNESCO in Paris, said “Nigerian government does not engage in impunities against journalists
and will never tolerate such’’ (ANON, November 8, 2017). Security
officers continue to charge editors and political critics with sedition in attempts to intimidate journalists and minimize freedom of
expression. This is in spite of the court’s ruling [in 1983] that sedition is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression
(Ekwelie, 1986; Onagoruwa, 1977; Okonkwor, 1983, Ogbondah
and Onyedike, 1991). These were not what Nigerians hoped for, at
the dawn of the new democratic order on May 29, 1999.
Although these incidents endure, they have lessened compared
with the periods of military rule. The press today has witnessed
less crushing brutality in the hands of security officers than it did
under military rule. Journalists have not witnessed incidents like
that of Dele Giwa, editor of Newswatch, who was murdered with
a letter bomb in 1986 or the assault of Minere Amakiri, Nigerian
Observer reporter, who was brutalized in 1973. Further, the Nigerian press has not witnessed the trial – and imprisonment – of
journalists by a tribunal like the trial and imprisonment of Tunde
Thompson and Nduka Irabor of the Guardian in 1984. As Nigeria
has finally made the transition to civil democracy officials of the
state must understand that a free press will help to strengthen the
pillars of the new democratic society. A free press will help catapult Nigeria to a vibrant democracy.
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The Road to the Freedom of
Information Act and Beyond

2

By Edetaen Ojo

Introduction
The idea of a Freedom of Information law in Nigeria was originated at some point in 1993 by three civil society organizations,
independently of each other. The three organisations, Media
Rights Agenda (MRA), the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) and
the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), decided to forge a common front and work together to realize their goals for the enactment of a Freedom of Information Act.
Their common objective was to ensure the adoption of a law
which would make documents and information held by government or government agencies and officials accessible to citizens
in an effort to make government transparent and accountable to
citizens, as well as to ensure that governance was participatory.
The three organizations constituted a team to work on the project, with each organization represented on the team. The team
was tasked with developing a roadmap for the realization of the
common objective as well as overseeing the campaign.
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Media Rights Agenda was designated the technical partner in
the project under the arrangement agreed upon for taking the
project forward. In keeping with this role, it was asked to produce
a first draft of the Freedom of Information Law for consultations.
Media Rights Agenda solicited inputs into the proposed draft
of the Law by designing and administering a questionnaire on
identified stakeholders, particularly practicing Nigerian journalists.
Based on responses to the question as well as extensive research into such laws around the world, MRA’s Legal Director, Mr.
Tunde Fagbohunlu, now a Senior Advocate of Nigeria and a partner in the law firm of Aluko and Oyebode, produced in 1994 the
first draft of the proposed bill entitled “Draft Access to Public Records and Official Information Act”.
The content of the draft drew substantially from the experiences of other countries operating freedom of information laws.
But it was also based on some of the suggestions arising from
the consultations among the three organizations as well as the
recommendations made by the stakeholders on whom questionnaires were administered, particularly practicing Nigerian journalists.
Consultative Process in Finalizing the Freedom of
Information Bill
The “Draft Access to Public Records and Information Act” produced by Media Rights Agenda in 1994 became the basis for further discussions and debates on the issue and was subsequently
subjected to a series of review exercises involving various stakeholders.
The first of such exercises was a two-day technical workshop
jointly organized by the three partner organizations on March 10
and 11, 1995 to examine and revise the draft, taking into consideration the views of other interest groups, which might use the
proposed legislation.
Participants in the workshop included human rights workers,
journalists, lawyers, university lecturers and representatives of the
National Broadcasting Commission and the Federal Ministry of Information.
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Chaired by eminent journalist and Nigeria’s former Information
Minister, Prince Tony Momoh, who is also a lawyer, the main objective of the workshop was to achieve a consensus among the
various interest groups that are affected by the availability or otherwise of a legally protected right of access to government held
information, on the need for a Freedom of Information Act in Nigeria and the content of such a law.
There was a common understanding among the various interest groups represented at the workshop that the legal regime
governing access to government held information in Nigeria must
undergo a structural transformation. Their conclusion was that
since statutes which permit any sort of access to official information in Nigeria were few, the overall effect is that a culture of secrecy prevails in all government institutions, nurtured and given
legal effect to by such laws as the Official Secrets Act and some
provisions in the Criminal Code, which make it an offence to disclose certain types of government-held information.
The general consensus at the workshop was that this existing
legal regime should be replaced with one in which there is a general right of access to government held information, unless such
a right is specifically removed by statute in certain circumstances
and to protect specific, statutorily recognized interests.
A Campaigns and Monitoring Committee was established in
accordance with the resolution adopted at the workshop to carry
out follow-up actions on the campaign for the enactment of the
revised draft into law.
However, although getting constitutional backing for the legislation was of crucial importance, and the National Constitutional
Conference set up by the regime of then Head of State, General
Sani Abacha, was then still in session, it was agreed by the participating groups that it would be inappropriate to lobby the Conference to provide constitutional support for the draft law.
The rationale was that having rejected the Conference as lacking in credibility, a civil society advocacy directed at it would confer legitimacy on it and its work. Therefore, the draft was never
submitted to the Conference.
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But it was sent to the Minister for Information, and the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. Members
of the committee also met with the then Attorney-General of the
Federation and Minister of Justice, Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, to secure
his support for the enactment of the draft into law. Although he
was in principle supportive of the idea, it was clear that he lacked
the political influence within the Abacha regime to push the draft
through.
The political situation in Nigeria deteriorated shortly afterwards
as the Abacha regime became more repressive and brutal and the
law was never passed.
Following the death of General Abacha in June 1998, the regime
of Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar, which took over political
authority in the country immediately, embarked on a transition to
civil rule program under which elections were held into various
levels of government between December 1998 and February 1999.
This development created the necessary political climate to revisit the issue. Another opportunity to review the draft law and
its content came up in March 1999 when Media Rights Agenda,
working with ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censorship, in London; and the Nigerian National Human Rights Commission, organized a Workshop on Media Law Reform in Nigeria
at Ota in Ogun State.
Held between March 16 and 18, 1999, the workshop was attended by 61 representatives of the media, both independent and
state controlled; regulatory bodies; the legal profession; international institutions; local and international non-governmental organizations; and other interest groups. Participants at the workshop included the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, Dr. Abid Hussain; a member of the
European Parliament, Mrs.Glenys Kinnock; Judge John Oliver Manyarara, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Media Institute of
Southern Africa (MISA); Justice Paul Kedi Nwokedi (rtd), the then
chairman of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission; Prof. Auwalu
Hamisu Yadudu, then special adviser to the Head of State on Legal
Matters; Prince Tony Momoh, a former minister of information;

56

Edetaen Ojo

then Senator-elect, Tokunbo Afikuyomi; Ms Bettina Peters, deputy general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists
(IFJ) in Belgium; Mr Kabral Blay-Amihere, then president of the
West African Journalists Association (WAJA); Ms. Jeanne Seck of
the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
in Paris, Ms Brigid O’Connor, regional information coordinator for
West Africa at the British Council; and Mr. Olisa Agbakoba (SAN).
A substantial part of the workshop was devoted to discussion of
the draft Freedom of Information law, which was further reviewed.
In The Ota Platform of Action on Media Law Reform in Nigeria,
a consensus document, which emerged at the end of that workshop, further recommendations were made on the content of the
draft law.
The recommendations include the following:
a. In addition to a constitutional guarantee of the right of access to public information, a Freedom of Information Act should
be enacted at the earliest possible opportunity, reflecting the principle of maximum disclosure.
b. The Draft Access to Public Records and Official Information
Bill published by Media Rights Agenda, the Civil Liberties Organization, and the Nigeria Union of Journalists should be taken as the
basis for discussion on this issue, but its provisions require further
review.
c. All legislation, which unduly inhibit or restrict the right of
Freedom of Information, such as the Official Secrets Act, should be
amended to reflect the principles of the Freedom of Information
Act.
d. The cost of obtaining public information should be affordable to the majority of citizens.
e. The proposed Act should contain a provision, which stipulates that, the individual requesting the information need not
demonstrate any specific interest in the information requested.
f. Doctoring of public records before they are released to the
person, entity or community requesting for them and obstruction
of access to public records should be made a criminal offence.
g. In the application of any exemption, there should be a pre-
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sumption of access to public information in the proposed Act. Exemptions should be narrowly drawn and subject to a test of actual
harm.
Following these recommendation, Media Rights Agenda revised the draft access to information law once again to give effect
to the agreements reached at the workshop.
The Freedom of Information Bill in Fourth National
Assembly (1999 to 2003)
The legislative process on the Freedom of Information Bill began late in 1999 with identifying sponsors for the bill from among
members of the House of Representatives. Hon. Tony Anyanwu
and Hon. Nduka Irabor initially agreed to sponsor the Bill, while
Hon. Jerry Ugokwe had apparently also decided to present a separate Bill on Freedom of Information to the House.
However, Media Rights Agenda was able to persuade them to
harmonize the two versions of the Bill and co-sponsor a single Bill,
following a series of mediatory meetings and an offer by Media
Rights Agenda to undertake the harmonization process. The Bill
was subsequently introduced into the House of Representatives as
a private member’s Bill and published in the Federal Government’s
Gazette on 8th December 1999.
On February 22nd and March 13th, 2000, the Bill went through the
first and second readings respectively. At the second reading, all
the members of the House of Representatives who took the floor,
spoke in glowing terms about the Bill and the House thereupon
decided that the Bill did not need to go through a public hearing
since there was a unanimous decision that it was one legislation
that the country needed very urgently. The House thus rose with a
resolution that the Bill be referred to the Information Committee,
then chaired by Hon. Uche Maduako, for the Committee’s review
of its contents. The Bill was subsequently referred to the Information Committee on March 27, 2000 after the conclusion of the
second reading.
After its review by the committee, a report was presented to the
plenary session in May 2001 with strong recommendations that
the bill be passed into law. This was done by Hon. Chijioke Edeo-
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ga, who had taken over from Hon. Maduako as Chairman of the
House Committee on Information.
Here, however, unknown and unforeseen political intrigues
came to play as the hitherto receptive members who had lauded
the Bill in the first and second readings became hostile and started questioning the process with a clear indication that quite a
number of the members of the House present were no longer interested in the Bill or were determined to prevent the House from
passing it into law. The situation apparently arose from a falling
out between one of the key sponsors of the Bill, Hon. Tony Anyanwu, and the leadership of the House of Representatives with
Tony Anyanwu demanding financial records of the House from
the leadership, which expectedly set off alarm bells about the kind
of use to which the Freedom of Information Bill could be put if it
was passed into Law. At the end of the day, it was decided that a
public hearing be conducted on it.
With MRA playing supportive roles to see the public hearing hold, such as providing key resources and personnel, paying
for media advertisements on the public hearing, paying for the
transportation, accommodation and subsistence of all the participants who came from outside Abuja to attend the public hearing
or make presentations, providing refreshments for participants at
the public hearing, etc, the public hearing was held on 2nd and 3rd
October 2001.
The public hearing was a success as all speakers were unanimous in their support for the bill and urged the House to pass it
without further delay. However, political intrigues set in again as
the report of the public hearing remained undisclosed and the
passing of the Bill lingered for close to two years till that National
Assembly was dissolved in June 2003 following the general elections of new members in April 2003.
The Freedom of Information Bill in the Fifth National
Assembly (2003 to 2007)
When the 5th assembly was inaugurated, the sponsors of
the Bill did not return to the National Assembly. However, many
newcomers had been elected and so sensitization and enlight-
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enment process had to be started all over again, with MRA still
leading the advocacy efforts.
However, it was not a totally hopeless process as Hon. Abike
Daibri came on board as a new member of the House, with her
sterling journalism background in the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) where she had overtly reported civil society and human
interest issues made her a natural ally. She pitched her tent on the
side of the FOI Bill. She subsequently became the lead sponsor of
the Bill and had as co-sponsor Honourable Duro Meseko, Honourable Depo Oyedokun and Honourable Emeka Ihedioha. All four
of them were former journalists. The Bill was passed by the House
of Representatives with minor amendments on August 25, 2004.
Sequel to the passage by the lower legislative chamber of the
National Assembly, the Bill was transmitted to the Senate, where
it went through a first reading on November 23, 2004 and a second reading on February 22, 2005. It was thereafter committed to
the Senate Committee on Information and National Orientation,
Chaired by Senator Tawar Wada and the Bill went through a public
hearing on April 26, 2005.
However, when the report was presented by Senator Tawar
Wada, chairman of the Senate Committee on Information, for the
consideration of the Senate on December 20, 2005, political intrigues came to play again as some senators objected to it being
passed just because the House of Representative had passed it,
while others saw no reason why it should not be passed.
The debates dragged on and the majority decision was that the
Bill be stepped down. An ad-hoc Committee was then constituted to work on the Bill one more time. Members of the committee were Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba (SAN) as chairman, Senator
Timothy Adudu, Senator Nuhu Aliyu, Senator Jubril Aminu, Senator Adeleke Mamora and Senator Udoma Udo Udoma.
The ad-hoc Committee in carrying out its work noted that the
Public Hearing held by the Senate Committee on Information did
not take into consideration the views of some government agencies. The Committee, therefore, organized a hearing on the Bill for
such government agencies.
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On April 27, 2006, the hearing took place and was attended
by 11 of such government organizations namely, the Office of
the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, the Nigeria Police,
the State Security Service (SSS), the Nigerian Intelligence Agency
(NIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Immigration Service,
Nigeria Customs Service, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), National Agency for Food, Drugs Administration and
Control (NAFDAC), and Corporate Affairs Commission, which expressed their views to the Committee. Most of the agencies were
in support of the Bill being passed into Law, except the Nigeria
Police, which expressed reservations.
While Senate legislative process by the adhoc committee was
going on, the advocacy campaign continued within and outside
the National Assembly, with many other civil society advocates
including Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC) and the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), playing key roles to lobby members to
assent to the Bill. The different efforts yielded fruitful result as the
Senate unanimously passed the Bill on November 15, 2006.
With the advocacy now a nationwide campaign, the National
Assembly in 2007, constituted the Conference Committee on the
Freedom of Information Bill to harmonize the two versions of the
Bill passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Members of the Committee from the Senate were Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba (SAN), Senator Udoma Udo Udoma, Senator Jibril Aminu,
Senator Nuhu Aliyu, Senator Adeleke Mamora, and Senator Uche
Chukwumerije. The members from the House of Representatives
were Hon. Halims Agoda, Hon. Bunza Farouk Bello, Hon. Abdul
Oroh, Hon. Wale Okediran, Hon. Abike Dabiri, Hon. Bala James
Ngilari, Hon. Emeka Ihedioha, and Hon. Dipo Oyedokun.
The 14-member Conference Committee which was responsible for harmonizing the two versions of the Bill as passed by the
House and amended by the Senate concluded the harmonization
of the two versions of the Bill on February 14, 2007 and it was finally passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate
in the first quarter of 2007.
From the legislature, the harmonized Bill was thereafter sent to
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the Executive arm of government to the then President Olusegun
Obasanjo for his assent. Here again, the efforts got stalled as President Obasanjo claimed he did not receive the Bill. In the waiting
game that ensued, a civil society delegation sought audience and
met with Obasanjo, who was completing his maximum eight year
term as president and was not eligible for re-election.
The meeting took place in April 2007 and was led by Mr. Edetaen Ojo, with the aim of acquainting members of the group
with the president’s thinking on the Bill which had been awaiting
Obasanjo’s assent since it was sent to him by the Clerk of the National Assembly on March 23, 2007 through his Special Adviser on
National Assembly Matters, Senator Florence Ita-Giwa.
The former President expressed reservations about three areas
of the Bill, which he said he was uncomfortable with, namely:
Section 1: The Short Title of the Bill - Freedom of Information
Act. Former President Obasanjo said he was opposed to the title
of the Bill and would prefer that it should be called “Right to Information Act” because, according to him, “Freedom” is absolute,
while “Right” comes with responsibilities.
Of course, the short title of the Bill is hardly of any significance
and it was difficult to see how this could have informed his refusal
to assent to the Bill.
The long title of the Bill states its purpose quite clearly with no
ambiguity whatsoever. It states that it is “A Bill for an Act to make
public records and information more freely available, provide for
public access to public records and information, protect public
records and information to the extent consistent with the public
interest and the protection of personal privacy, protect serving
public officers from adverse consequences for disclosing certain
kinds of official information without authorization and establish
procedures for the achievement of those purposes and related
purposes.”
Section 13(1): The head of a government or public institution
may refuse to disclose any record, the disclosure of which may be
injurious to the conduct of international affairs or the defense of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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The former President said he was concerned that the Bill only
excludes from public access records which may be injurious to the
defense of Nigeria, but did not also exclude records which may be
injurious to the “security” of Nigeria.
Civil society advocates were of the view that the text of the Bill
adequately protected Nigeria’s potentially sensitive defense records and information.
Besides, the protection of the internal and external security
of Nigeria is also covered by the National Security Agencies Act,
which is one of the laws entrenched in Section 315(5) of the Nigerian Constitution. It extends to the protection of the documents
and other acts relating to the security of Nigeria. The actions of
the national security agencies established under the Act are protected from judicial scrutiny.
In effect, the former President’s concerns were adequately addressed both under the Bill as well as under the National Security
Agencies Act.
Section 13(2) says: However, in the interest of the public the
court may override the refusal by the head of the government or
public institution to disclose the information applied for.
The former President was concerned that with this provision,
the courts would be given the power to review any decision by the
head of a public institution not to disclose any information and as
such, heads of public institutions could then be compelled by the
courts to disclose any information which they would otherwise not
want to disclose.
President Obasanjo’s view suggested that he did not believe
that the refusal of a government institution to disclose any record
or document under the proposed Law should be subject to judicial review to determine whether there is a public interest in the
information being released.
Such a position is obviously untenable under a democratic form
of government. One of the cardinal principles of the doctrine of
separation of powers is the inherent powers of the courts to review administrative decisions not only to ensure that they are consistent with the Law, but also to prevent arbitrariness and abuse
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of power. It was the view of the civil society proponents of the Bill
that the notion that the decision of a public officer can never be
questioned in a court of law has no place in a democracy, particularly where that public officer is elected to serve the people.
This tactically became a dead end for the Bill as the 5th assembly
was at that time winding up for another new set of elected legislators to come in. Though Obasanjo’s action was widely criticized
and condemned, it nevertheless changed the reality that the Bill
was once again stalled for another set of legislative process to begin all over with the new set of incoming members of the National
Assembly.
The Freedom of Information Bill in Sixth National
Assembly (2007 to 2011)
With the stalling of the process by the refusal of Obasanjo to
assent to the Bill before the expiration of his tenure, the advocacy
for the FOI had sufficiently won nationwide sympathy from many
more quarters, locally and international. New independent groups
had joined the fray, offering diverse support, locally, nationally
and internationally.
Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa had been re-elected into the House
of Representatives and maintained her disposition to the Bill and
had emerged the new mouthpiece for the Bill in the House, urging
fellow members to revisit the Bill.
In ally with her, was the deputy Senate leader, Senator Ndoma-Egba who also was clamoring for the Senate to similarly revisit
the Bill. He, along with 24 other members, co-sponsored the Bill
in the Senate to sail through its first reading in October 25, 2007.
Senate Ndoma-Egba had reasoned that since the Bill was not
signed into law by Obasanjo and his veto was not overridden by
the last National Assembly, it was imperative to re-introduce the
Bill and allow Senators the opportunity to properly debate it before passing it.
Following this also, the federal government under President
Musa Yar’Adua, also made overt pronouncements to dissociate
itself from the position of the past executive arm, declaring that it
was disposed to the FOI law being in place. The then Secretary to
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the Federal Government, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, had indeed disclosed on October 26, 2007 that the Umaru Yar’Adua-led
government was committed not only to stamping out corruption
but also institutionalizing transparency in the country.
Similarly, as the support for the passage of the FOI Bill grew,
the House of Representatives had also said that it was not against
its passage. Speaking on a media interview on January 7, 2009,
the Chairman, House Committee on Media, Hon. Eseme Eyibo,
explained that the passage of the FOI Bill was on top of the House
agenda in the year, noting that the Bill was central to good governance in the country and as such could not be discarded by anybody even as the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria
(NPAN), the Guild of editors, the Nigeria Union of Journalists and
other stakeholders in the media industry had expressed dissatisfaction over the continued delay of the passage of the Bill, and
were generating several comments, reports and editorials in the
media on the issue.
Also in support of the Bill, the then Minister of State for Information and Communications, Mr. Labaran Maku, on August 20,
2010 described the FOI Bill as institutional to the media. He had
noted that the Bill was not about individuals; but about ensuring
that a democratic government is run as a public institution and
that it is about the future of the country.
However, despite the wide clamor and support being generated
for the Bill, majority of members of the House of Representatives,
many of whom were first timers, still refused to allow the Bill to be
introduced, a situation which made Abike Dabiri-Erewa, the MRA,
the NGE and the emerging frontline advocators to continue sensitizing and ‘lobbying’ members of the House. Abike Dabiri-Erewa
reportedly told her colleagues in December 2010 that the FOI Bill
would actually ease their work as legislators as they wouldn’t have
to be making lengthy explanations on issues that are readily available to the public to access the information. “Let us have a change
of perception as a parliament and pass the Bill because the FOI Bill
will deepen democracy and ensure accountability and transparency in public service. The Bill is not harmful in any way; it is either
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we want to pass it or we do not,” she said.
The pleas and sensitization notwithstanding, majority of members of the House of Representatives remained adamant to passing the Bill. Earlier on in April 29, 2008, the report of the House
Committees on Information and National Orientation and Justice
on the Bill had been rejected by the House. Also on January 21,
2009, the majority of the members forced the Speaker, Mr. Dimeji
Bankole, to stand down consideration of the Bill as they kicked
against it after a vote to negate the motion.
Hon. Ita Enang, the Chairman of the House Committee on Business and Rules was also shouted down on December 16, 2010 in a
move to resuscitate the Bill. Enang had in a motion requested the
House to refer the Bill to the committee on information for consideration before bringing it back to the House but as soon as he
moved the motion, majority of members, kicking against the Bill,
shouted No! No! No! to his request.
Intervention by Deputy Speaker, Bayero Nafada, to save the
motion proved abortive as he was forced to stand down the motion till another time as there was difficulty getting a member to
second the motion. In the ensuing drama, the Deputy Speaker,
Alhaji Usman Nafada, who presided over the session, had called
on some lawmakers to second the motion but they declined.
However when Hon. Peter Linus indicated his intention to
second the motion, he was not allowed to, as shouts of ‘put the
question, put the question’ were heard from all directions in the
chambers, an indication that the motion would not be passed thus
forcing Honourable Nafada to stand the Bill down.
Many members of the House of Representatives belonging to
the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) complained that it was
inappropriate for a proposed legislation as important as the Freedom of Information Bill to have as its lead sponsor a member of
the minority party in opposition, in objection to the Honourable
Abike Dabiri of the now defunct Alliance for Democracy (AD) being the lead sponsor.
Meanwhile, as the Bill lingered on, different stakeholders continued efforts to influence the National Assembly members, indi-

66

Edetaen Ojo

vidually and collectively towards passing the Bill. These influences
were to dramatically play out as the House of Representatives, in
plenary presided over by the Deputy Speaker, Hon. Usman Bayero Nafada, reversed its decision on the Bill on February 10, 2011
mandating its Joint Committee on Information and National Orientation and Justice seven days to conclude work on the Bill.
The decision was sequel to motion by Ita Enang and 20 others
entitled “Rescission under Order 9, Rule 1 (6) of the Standing Order of the House of Representatives: Freedom of Information Bill,
2007” which asked the House to resend the Bill to the joint committee for fresh consideration.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Dimeji Bankole, subsequently assured that the House would pass the Bill and
then mount pressure on the executive arm to assent to it. The
Bill was subsequently passed by the House of Representatives on
February 24, 2011.
As advocacy pressures continued to build, the Newspapers
Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) also stepped up efforts to lobby the senate leadership through a courtesy visit to
the office of the Senate President, Senator David Mark, to present
their case for the early passage of the Bill by the upper legislative
chamber. The NPAN team, which was led by its president, Chief
Ajibola Ogunsola, chairman of Punch Newspapers; included Mr.
Nduka Obaigbena, chairman, Leaders and Company, publishers
of THISDAY newspapers; Alhaji Kabiru Yusuf, chairman, Trust Media Limited; Mr. Sam Amuka, chairman, Vanguard Media Limited
and Alhaji Isa Funtua. The visit alongside initiatives by others was
to yield fruit as the Senate on March 15, 2011, commenced the
clause-by-clause consideration of the Freedom of Information Bill
ahead of its third reading. Consequently on March 16, 2011, the
Senate passed the Freedom of Information Bill.
Following this, and in compliance with the Standing Orders of
both chambers, a 12-man committee of the National Assembly
was constituted to harmonize the two versions of the Freedom of
Information Bill. Each of the chambers has six members in the harmonization committee. While the Senate named its Conference
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Committee members on March 16, 2011, the House of Representatives designated its members on May 11, 2011. The Conference
Committee was made of : Senator Ayogu Eze, (chairperson); Hon.
Henry Seriake Dickson, (co-chairperson); Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba (SAN), Senator Adamu Talba, Senator Anthony Manzo,
Senator Kamorudeen Adedibu, and Senator Otaru Ohize. The
others were Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Hon. Ahmed Wadada, Hon.
Mohammed Sani Takori, Hon. Patrick Ikhariale and Hon. Nkem
Abonta.
The committee met on May 19, 2011, and harmonized the
differences between both versions of the Bill. While the harmonized Bill was presented before the Senate by Senator Ayogu Eze,
chairperson of the Conference Committee, the Bill was presented before the House of Representatives by the co-chairperson of
the Committee, Hon. Henry Seriake Dickson. After considering the
reports of the committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively, the Senate, on May 24, 2011, approved the
harmonized version of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill.
Subsequently, President Goodluck Jonathan who had been
sworn in as President by the Chief Justice of the Federation following to the death of President Yar’Adua, signed the Bill into law
on Saturday May 28, 2011.
Advocacy and campaign strategies employed
Over the course of the 12 years that the advocacy for the adoption of the Freedom of Information Act lasted, a series of planning
meetings were held by the core group of advocates to forge or
revise their strategies for the campaign. However, as each plan
of action was executed, new challenges emerged and new plans
had to be designed. As the advocacy advanced and the challenges grew bigger, there was the need to device multi-pronged approach strategies. Of the three partners, which started the efforts
to secure a Freedom of Information Law for Nigeria in 1993, only
Media Rights Agenda remained throughout the campaign and
others became exhausted by a prolonged, exhausting and bruising campaign.
In the general context, the strategies involved in the advocacy
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drive for the enactment of the FOI law in Nigeria entailed a combination of different methods, beginning with the action point of
making the first draft in 1994, then to the review meetings, the
stakeholders sensitizations meetings/workshops, legislative advocacy (including official correspondence through letters, one-onone visits, parleys, telephone calls, text messages, etc) and media
publicity.
Others, which included personal and discreet interventionist
strategies such as private meetings to principal members of the
house of assembly, facilitated by administrative aides and assistants to such principal officers as well as strategic alliances built
amongst different stakeholders both within the civil society fold
(beyond MRA’s initiatives) and within the National Assembly, also
played crucial roles. Critical also is the different strategic roles
played by different funding/donor organizations as well as by
principal members of the National Assembly who became advocates for the Bill.
A major challenge that the advocacy for the enactment of
the Bill encountered when the movement started was how to
broaden the constituency for support for the campaign, especially
among civil society organizations. Although the civil society
was united in their desire to enthroning democratic rule,
not many fancied the idea of a clamor for an access to information regime, because at that time, it didn’t look like
a priority issue. This was especially so with all the turbulence associated with the democratic future of Nigeria at
that time.
So before 1999, only very few civil society organizations
understood and shared MRA’s goal of clamoring for a society where the freedom of expression and information
operates. In fact, very few partner organizations bought the idea
and initiative to embark on follow-up activities or sought to introduce Freedom of Information public enlightenment components
and campaigns into their core projects and activities. This made
MRA to become the lead advocate organization for the Nigerian
FOI advocacy process.
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In the process to bring in more stakeholders, MRA had to keep
on the drive whilst at the same time creating niches for interested
stakeholders to buy into the advocacy process. One of the activities embarked on in relations to this was to print sensitization
materials and provide documentation on the FOI, and its operations in other lands. This, MRA extensively did in year 2000. The
reach-out drive also included giving sensitization talks in forums
on how a society that operates a freedom of information policy
aids development.
To break the barrier of being the only organization driving the
campaign, a multi stakeholders’ forum was convened in September 2000 with the objective to identify various stakeholders in a
freedom of information regime, and agree on how the different
stakeholders can support the campaign for the enactment of the
Bill into law, amongst others. The meeting was attended by representatives of various interest groups, including the Academic
Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the Nigerian Labour Congress
(NLC), the NUJ, the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria
(NPAN), the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), humanrights NGOs,
the media, the legal profession, international organizations and
agencies, etc.
This strategy for a stakeholder forum paid off as several individuals and organizations emerged as advocates for the passage
of the Bill from the parley, under the group, ‘Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC) that was subsequently formed. From this also
emerged the need to have FOIC coordinators for the campaign at
local levels and this got many more actors involved both at individual and organizational levels as state and zonal coordinators
of the FOIC across the country. Instrumental to further achieving
this was the creation of an internet listserve for the group through
which members were being added and correspondence and view
on issues bordering on freedom of expression and free press were
being discussed.
Over the years, the FOIC internet listserve grew to having membership base of about one thousand five hundred (1,500) enlightened persons and civil society organizations, most of whom have
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emerged as notable advocates of the FOI, both at individual, organizational and institution capacities. The FOIC listserve, managed
by MRA, is still very much active, discussing daily, related issues
on the FOI.
Media Campaigns
Media campaigns played a crucial role throughout the advocacy program, and formed the channel through which the issues were
brought to national prominence. The strategy for the media advocacy
was with the primary purpose to keep the issue alive in the public
domain and create a groundswell of public opinion in favor of a
regime of access to information to act as a further pressure for
legislative action by the National Assembly.
The activities under this strategy included visits to media houses to meet with journalists, editors and columnists to solicit support for the campaign through the publication of articles, editorial
comments and stories on the freedom of information issue.
It also entailed issuing periodic press releases and press statements to highlight developments on the issues; granting of press
interviews on the issue; facilitating publication of feature stories
and opinion articles, production of briefing packs for journalists
containing materials and information about the Bill and freedom
of information issues generally. The strategy also included organizing sensitization workshops for journalists.
As a result of these efforts, virtually all Nigerian newspapers
published several editorial comments in support of the Bill. Others published news and feature articles, opinion articles, and cartoons on the Bill. The text of the Bill was also published in full
in several newspapers as paid advertisements in order to ensure
wide spread awareness about the Bill and its content. Many radio
and television stations held numerous discussions and other programs where guests appeared to promote the Bill and explain the
principles behind it.
Some of the broadcast stations in which MRA personnel, collaborating partners and other guests appeared to promote the Bill
and explain its principles include the African Independent Television (AIT) in Lagos and Abuja, in its “Kaakaki” program, a popular
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breakfast program; the sister radio stations, RayPower1 and 2, Minaj Broadcasting International television (MBI), the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) Channel10 in its Morning Ride programme,
another breakfast programme; the Federal Radio Corporation of
Nigeria in Kaduna; the NTA in Kaduna; Murhi International Television (MiTV) in Lagos; Radio Lagos, Degue Broadcasting Network
(DBN) television in Lagos, Channels Television in Lagos,etc.
It’s worthy of note, however, that the fact that the MRA and the
leadership of its partner organizations were manned by former
journalists was instrumental to the success of the media advocacy
as their media skills were the assets used in mass communicating
the issues.
An Unwilling President
Prior to approaching individual members of the National Assembly to sponsor the Freedom of Information Bill, Media Rights
Agenda had explored the possibility of getting it passed into Law
as an Executive Bill. By some coincidence, in his inaugural address
on assumption of office on May 29, 1999, President Olusegun
Obasanjo identified corruption as “the greatest single bane of our
society today” and promised that under his administration, “all
rules and regulations designed to help honesty and transparency
in dealing with government will be restored and enforced.”
In addition, shortly after the inauguration of the new government, President Obasanjo announced his plan to present to the
National Assembly for consideration and enactment into law, an
anti-corruption Bill.
Against this background, Media Rights Agenda felt that the
time was right to also introduce the Freedom of Information Bill
to the National Assembly and that it would have an easier passage
if it was sent to the National Assembly by the President as an Executive Bill.
On June 10, 1999, Media Rights Agenda wrote to President
Obasanjo expressing support for his commitment to fight corruption in Nigeria and his plan to present an anti-corruption Bill to
the National Assembly.
MRA observed that accountability and transparency in Govern-
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ment were crucial to any meaningful anti-corruption crusade, arguing that accountability and transparency could not be possible
if citizens have no right of access to information held by the State
or its agencies or if no mechanism exists for giving practical effect
to the right to freedom of information.
It therefore requested President Obasanjo to also present the
draft Freedom of Information Bill to the National Assembly as an
Executive Bill for consideration along with his anti-corruption Bill
and support efforts to secure its enactment into law.
The request was borne out of the organization’s realization that
Executive Bills would usually receive more serious and urgent consideration from the legislators than private members’ Bills.
Media Rights Agenda also wrote letters to the then Minister of
Information, Chief Dapo Sarumi, and the Minister of Justice, Mr.
Kanu Agabi (SAN), apprising them of the existence of the Bill, its
contents and soliciting their support for its speedy enactment into
law.
However, by a letter dated July 19, 1999, signed by his personal assistant, Mr. Ojo A. Taiwo, President Obasanjo declined to
present the Freedom of Information bill as an Executive Bill and,
instead, advised Media Rights Agenda to send the draft directly to
the National Assembly.
Similarly, several months after its letter to the Justice Minister,
on March 29, 2000, Media Rights Agenda received another letter
dated January 20, 2000, from the Legislative Drafting Department
of the Federal Ministry of Justice, in which reference was made to
the organization’s June 10, 1999 letter to the President.
In the letter signed on behalf of the Federal Attorney-General
and Minister of Justice by Mrs. Christie Ekweonu, she said that she
had been directed to inform Media Rights Agenda “to properly
channel your cause through the Federal Ministry of Information
which is the relevant governmental body that regulates the practice and dissemination of information. Your case will be duly considered if it originates from the relevant Ministry.”
Ironically, at the time Media Rights Agenda received the letter
from the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Freedom of Information
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Bill had already gone through the first and second readings before the House of Representatives in the National Assembly and
was already being considered in greater detail by the Information
Committee of the House.
Legislative Advocacy at the National Assembly
The defining stage for the enactment of the Bill was at the legislative chambers of both the House of Representatives and Senate in the years from 1999 to 2011. The entry of the Bill into the
House of Representative was via an international forum organized
by UNESCO in Abuja to which MRA’s Legal Officer, Maxwell Kadiri
had gone to speak as a resource person. It was in that forum that
Hon. Tony Anyanwu and Hon. Nduka Irabor got introduced to the
Bill. With further interaction, Hon. Anyanwu resolved to push the
Bill to the House and requested a copy to be sent to him, as well as
to other members of the Houses. That disposition, created the inroad for MRA to introduce the Bill to members of the houses, and
with Hon. Anyanwu’s assistance as well as that of several others,
the legislative advocacy process began.
This process was to include several visits to members of the
house in form of door-to-door enlightenment campaigns both in
their offices in the National Assembly in Abuja and in some other
parts of the country, and at their homes in the Apo Legislative
Quarters in Abuja. Despite undertaking several advocacy visits to
the National Assembly, i t w a s r e a l i z e d t h a t it would be
difficult to meet with all the members through such one on one
meetings especially because the window for such meetings was
often very narrow as members usually had series of other engagements during intervals between their sitting period at the National
Assembly and the period they leave for home or other activities.
There was, thus, the need to devise ways of meeting with a
large number of the members in one venue to plead the cause of
the Bill. In trying to solve the problem, MRA was advised to consider organizing a function for all the legislators at which issues
concerning the Bill would be discussed in a relaxed and informal
environment. Acting on this advice and ahead of the scheduling of
the Bill for First Reading, Media Rights Agenda, with support from
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ARTICLE 19, organized a cocktail reception for members of the
House of Representatives. The event took place at the Abuja Sheraton Hotel and Towers. It was attended by about 250 legislators.
The advocacy work at the Senate included meetings and parleys with Senators, either in their offices or homes, depending on
which venue they preferred. However, it should be pointed out
that unlike their colleagues in the House of Representatives, most
of the Senators were not favourably disposed towards members
of the advocacy team meeting them in their homes to hold discussions focused on the Bill. As a result of this, a majority of the
meetings took place in their offices at the National Assembly complex.
These advocacy visits, like the previous ones carried out in the
House of Representatives, were done in phases. Consequently, during the first phase of this advocacy exercise in the Senate,
the advocacy team from Media Rights Agenda met with 30 Senators in all. Of this number, except for a few of them who were
non-committal and preferred to wait until the Bill was referred to
them from the House of Representatives, all the others expressed
their willingness to support it. They included Senator M. T. Mbu,
Senator Martins Yellowe, Senator Adolphus Wabara, Senator Fajimi, Senator D.Saror, Senator Femi Okurounmu, Senator Rowland
Owie, Senator Matori, Senator Ishaq Mohammed, and Senator
Tokunbo Afikuyomi.
In fact, Senator Owie, the only Senator that agreed to meet the
advocacy team at home, and who was then the Chief Whip in the
Senate, promised to use his leadership position and close contact
with Senator Tafida, the then Chair of the Senate Rules and Business Committee, as well as with the then Senate President, Senator Chuba Okadigbo, to get the Senate to give the Bill accelerated
hearing. The level of support received by members of the advocacy team from this first time discussion with the respective Senators
was quite impressive, contrary to the negative public perceptions
about the Senate.
The Role of Donors and Funding Partners
The advocacy campaign was greatly enhanced by the support
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received from funders and donor partners. An instance of a crucial
moment when this came to play was when the House of Representatives indicated that it did not have funds to conduct a public
hearing in 2001 and the MRA, had to confer with the Nigerian
office of the International Human Law Group (Law Group), then
headed by Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, to convert funds earmarked for advocacy activities to part-sponsor the Public Hearing.
Through funds provided by the Law Group, MRA substantially
funded the Public Hearing by covering the cost of the production
and placement of advertisements in national daily newspapers and
weekly newsmagazines to announce the Public Hearing, paying
for the transportation,accommodationandsubsistenceofalltheparticipantswhocamefrom outside Abuja to attend the Public Hearing
or make presentations, providing refreshments for participants at
the Public Hearing, etc as well as production of radio and television jingles to publicize the Public Hearing. Others included the
cost of an independent legal consultant engaged by the Committee to produce an independent report on the deliberations at the
Public Hearing.
Other advocacy activities were funded by the Open Society
Justice Initiative (OSJI), the European Union, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the British Government, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through
PACT Nigeria. Overheads covered included frequent travels by
MRA advocacy team partners from other civil society organizations from Lagos to Abuja, the activities of the Freedom of Information Coalition including workshops, meetings and seminars,
production of campaign materials, production of radio and television jingles, production of radio and television documentaries, etc.
Funds were also provided to MRA and other civil society organizations for freedom of information advocacy activities over
the years by ARTICLE 19, The Public Affairs Section of the United
States Embassy, the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), in
Lagos, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization(UNESCO), Action Aid International Nigeria, the Global
Opportunities Fund, and many others.
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Advocacy Training Workshops, Seminars,
Sensitization Workshops
MRA organized and held several seminars, workshops, training
and sensitization activities at various levels and venues to sensitize
different sectors of the Nigerian society to the FOI Bill, its underlying principles and benefits. Sensitization meetings were held for
journalists, editors, civil society organizations, including community based organizations, faith based organizations, and grassroots
organizations; government information officers at Federal and
state levels, etc. These meetings served to enlighten Nigerians on
the Bill and enlist their support for the passage of the Bill.
Letter Writing Campaigns
Media Rights Agenda and the Freedom of Information Coalition wrote hundreds of personalized letters to various individuals
and organizations, including all the members of both chambers
of the National Assembly, all the Ministers in the first cabinet of
President Olusegun Obasanjo, other presidential aides, religious
leaders, political parties, media organizations, etc.
In November 2002, MRA wrote formally to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, Alhaji Umar Ghali Na’Abba, and the
Chairman of the House Committee on Information, Honourable
Lawan Farouk. MRA reminded Alhaji Na’Abba of his commitment
to ensure the speedy passage of the Bill and to express concerns
that the Bill may not be passed as the administrative term was
drawing to a close.
In the letter to Honourable Farouk, MRA reminded him that
the Public Hearing on the Bill on October 3 and 4, 2001 attracted
impressive participation and contribution from stakeholders with
a general call for the passage of the Bill. MRA expressed concern
that despite this, no word had been heard or action taken on the
Bill thereafter. It appealed to Honourable Farouk to ensure that
the Committee’s report was submitted as soon as possible so that
the Rules and Business Committee of the House could slate the
Bill for the Third Reading.
MRA also wrote to the 30 registered political parties, prior to
the 2003 general elections seeking to get them make a commit-
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ment to supporting the passage of the Bill. The letters written in
April 2003 on behalf of the Freedom of Information Coalition were
sent to the chairpersons and secretaries of each of the political
parties as well as their presidential candidates.
The letters asked them to make the campaign to secure the
right of Nigerians to have access to public records and information a cardinal policy of their parties as well as asking them to
support the enactment of the Freedom of Information Bill into law.
Along with the letters, MRA also provided the parties and their
candidates with materials on access to information, including copies of the Bill, a number of documents giving background information to the Bill and a document entitled “The Public’s Right to
Know”, published by ARTICLE 19, which sets out the ways in which
governments can achieve maximum openness in line with the best
international standards and practices.
The import of all these letters was that they served to introduce
the draft FOI Bill to these important stakeholders who hitherto
may have been unaware of the draft Bill. The letters also ensured
that the FOI Bill remained in the legislative agenda and was not
consigned to the archives without passage. Through the letters,
MRA also presented these stakeholders with copies of the FOI Bill
and educational materials on the Bill to enlighten them and get
their support for it.
Short Message Service (SMS)
Short Message Service (SMS or text messages) was also used
effectively as an advocacy tool at various times. To ensure the effectiveness of the use of SMS as an advocacy tool, MRA initially
assembled the mobile numbers of the members of the two chambers of the National Assembly. These were broken down according to their Chambers: Senate and House of Representatives; the
constituencies of the legislators, and the committees they belong
for effective use.
The FOI Coalition broke down these numbers according to the
constituencies of the legislators and distributed them to its members in the various geo-political zones for targeted advocacy.
Text messages were, therefore, sent from the FOI Coalition Sec-
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retariat and from all over Nigeria to the members of the National
Assembly at critical points in the legislative journey of the Bill. Text
messages were sent when there was a Reading of the Bill in any of
the chambers, during Public Hearing, during committees’ sittings
and during harmonization by harmonization committees of the
two chambers.
SMS/Text Messages ensured short, appropriate and targeted
advocacy messages are delivered to the appropriate legislators.
During First, Second and Third Readings, it ensured that a specific
chamber was targeted as well as during the harmonization processes, it ensured that only members of the harmonization committee were targeted. Responses from these text messages have
served to help MRA gauge the acceptability of the Bill in the two
chambers. MRA got some inspiring and encouraging responses
from these text messages; of course it also got responses in which
legislators expressed their opposition to the Bill. This helped to
identify opposition to the Bill and to know where to focus future
advocacy efforts.
Using the Internet for Advocacy
The Freedom of Information campaign also took advantage of
the rising use and effectiveness of the Internet to further the FOI
advocacy efforts. In this area the internet was used to widen the
advocacy efforts and to generate ideas for better advocacy from
all over the world. Three internet forums were used to advance
the advocacy work, namely the FOI Coalition listserv, FOI Coalition
website, and the MRA website.
Following one of the action plans of the Second Stakeholders’
Meeting on the FOI Bill, MRA created and managed a listserv:
FOICoalition@yahoogroups.com. It served as a platform through
which information on the activities of the coalition and developments regarding the Bill were shared by members. They also used
it to suggest new strategies for the advocacy. Even after the passage of the Bill into law, it has remained vibrant and relevant in
being used to share information on openness, transparency and
accountability, and good governance as well as freedom of expression, media development and related matters. But through
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the listserv, only subscribers could be reached hence the registration, design and development of a website for the coalition. The
Freedom of Information Coalition and the MRA websites served
to complement each other by disseminating information on the
progress of and activities around the FOI Bill around the globe.
The FOI Coalition site www.foicoalition.org was used to disseminate information about the odyssey of the Bill while MRA’s website, www.mediarightsagenda.net was used to disseminate information on the activities of MRA as well as on the FOI Bill.
Internet advocacy around the FOI Bill ensured that the Bill acquired international status and recognition. It became not just a
Nigerian Bill for Nigerians but a Bill that attracted global attention
and interventions from individuals and groups from all over the
globe. Internet advocacy guaranteed that the FOI Bill got rich
inputs that ensured we have the quality of FOI Act that we have in
Nigeria today.
Signature Campaign
At a time when progress on the passage of the FOI Bill into Law
appeared to have stalled, a signature campaign was embarked
upon to get signatures from all over Nigeria and from around the
globe to support a petition asking the National Assembly to pass
the Freedom of Information Bill into law before the end of 2007.
The coalition aimed to secure at least one million signatures
in support of the petition from Nigerians across the country and
in the Diaspora. The petition was meant to be presented to the
National Assembly on September 28, 2007, on the year’s “International Right to Know Day”. Launched on September 11, 2007, the
campaign secured several hundreds of signatures from Nigerians
scattered across the globe.
Although the FOI Coalition could not get the one million signatures it sought and so could not present the signatures to the
National Assembly, it was worth noting that eminent Nigerians,
including then Governor Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State signed the
petition. It also galvanized widespread support for passage of the
Bill and continuously kept the Bill in the legislative agenda.
Production and Dissemination of Educational Materials

80

Crucial in all the advocacy efforts for the passage of the Bill was
the production and wide distribution of information, educational
and communication (IEC) materials on the FOI Bill.
With funding support from the International Human Rights Law
Group, Media Rights Agenda, in August 2000, printed campaign
materials aimed at creating awareness and soliciting public support for the Freedom of Information Bill. MRA printed color posters, handbills titled: “What You Should Know About the Freedom
of Information Bill”, and three different types of color stickers.
The posters contained messages promoting the values and
benefits of an open and transparent government to the democratic process and the economy. The handbills gave highlights of the
Bill, explaining in more detail its content, purpose and benefits. It
contained information about the Bill such as “What is the Freedom
of Information Bill?”, “Current State of Access to Information in
Nigeria”, “Benefits of the Freedom of Information Bill”, “Who Can
Benefit?”, “How Can Nigerians Support the Bill?” etc.
It provided contact information for members of the National
Assembly, advising members of the public to write to their representatives in the National Assembly or telephone them with a
request that they pass the Bill. The stickers contained messages
of support for the bill and transparency in governance generally.
The materials were distributed in major cities in southeastern,
south western and the northern parts of the country. These campaign materials complemented other efforts employed by MRA
and the FOI Coalition to spread information about the Bill and to
enlighten Nigerians about it and its benefits to them. Nigerians
considered them so useful that after distributing what they have,
the coalition members still requested for more from the FOI Secretariat.
Beyond the FOI Enactment
The level of usage of the FOI Act by journalists and the media
generally has not been commensurate with the level of interest
and efforts invested by the media community in ensuring the enactment of the FOI Bill into Law.
Agbese (2016) laments that I am unable to reconcile this apparent ne-
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glect to use the law on the part of our news media with the sweat that
marked the struggle to birth the law. Since the Bill became an act of
parliament, there has been no major demand, if indeed any, major or
minor, by the news media on the government and their agencies to
give them access to the loads of information kept out of the reach
of the Nigerian public. The worst thing you can to do a law is to let it
gather dust, half remembered and half forgotten.

Similarly, Olumhense (2013) had earlier wondered:

Why are more citizens and organizations not taking advantage of the
FOI? If the press truly understands that its role is to reveal, not conceal,
why is it not waving the FOI flag at every public door?

Few journalists and media houses are known to have made
use of the FOI Act to request information from public institutions.
However, there have been a few exceptions. The Daily Trust newspaper moved very early in the life of the Law to test its efficacy,
beginning in late 2011 when it started using the Law to seek information from various public institutions. It has been one of the
most dogged media users of the Act in Nigeria. Premium Times,
the online investigative media outlet, is also known to have made
vigorous use of the Act in seeking official information from government bodies and has indeed opted for the litigation option in
enforcing compliance by public institutions which failed to grant
its request for information.
Beginning from December 2011, Daily Trust wrote at least 12
requests for information to 11 different government ministries,
departments and agencies asking for a variety of information but
only five of them responded, although none of them granted access to the information requested. The others simply ignored the
newspaper’s request.
The ministries and agencies that Daily Trust sent FOI requests
to are the State House, Abuja; the Office of the National Security
Adviser, the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation, the
Ecological Funds Office, the Public Complaints Commission (PCC),
the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Office of the Inspector
General of Police, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Nigeria Prison
Service and the National Assembly.

82

Edetaen Ojo

Of the five agencies which responded to Daily Trust newspaper, two said they would not give the information requested; one
asked the newspaper to be more specific in its request while the
other two were evasive in their responses. The office of the Attorney-General of the Federation and the State House ignored the
newspaper’s requests which merely asked for basic information.
On December 8, 2011, Daily Trust wrote the Code of Conduct
Bureau, asking for copies of President Jonathan’s assets declaration details. After several follow-ups, the Bureau, in a letter dated
February 20, 2012, responded saying a provision of the Constitution has “precluded the Bureau the liberty” to give such information. In the letter signed by its secretary, Alhassan Ibrahim, the
Bureau said it needed the National Assembly “to spell out the
conditions and terms” upon which it would make available to the
public information on assets declaration by public officers.
Daily Trust also wrote a letter to the Ecological Funds Office on
December 8, 2011, asking for information on amounts of money
disbursed to states for ecological projects as well as the names
and locations of such projects. But the newspaper never received
any response from the office even after several follow-up visits.
On December 12, 2011, Daily Trust sent an FOI request to the
Inspector General of Police seeking information on the existing
framework on personal firearms possession, the number of people granted personal firearm licenses and the number of certified
firearm dealers in the country. The Police did not respond to the
newspaper’s request. On April 12, 2012 Daily Trust again sent the
same request to the new Inspector General of Police with a reminder but there was no response.
On January 7, 2012, Daily Trust through a Freedom of Information request to the Federal Civil Service Commission, sought to
know the total number of staff in each ministry and their states of
origin. The commission did not respond to the request.
On March 1, 2012, Daily Trust wrote the Public Complaints
Commission seeking information on the number of complaints
received and handled, and budget releases in 2011. On March 27,
in a letter with reference number PCC/HQ/ADM.16/74 and signed
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by Mr. C. Nwosu, the Commission said the “information you requested are not yet available.” Instead, the Commission gave the
newspapers its reports for 2009 and 2010.
On March 1, 2012, relying on the FOI Act, Daily Trust wrote to
the Nigeria Prison Service, requesting information on the number
of condemned prisoners, which prisons they are held, the number
of hangmen and number of gallows available. The service wrote
back on March 14, 2012, asking the newspapers to send its inquiries to the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA).
On March 27, 2012, Daily Trust wrote a similar request for the
same information to the the National Security Adviser, referring
the NSA to the response it received from the Prisons Service.
On May 3, 2012, the Prison Service, by a letter signed by Babatunde Owolabi, provided general information, warning that the
data “may be sensitive and injurious” to the service if used inappropriately. The agency did not give Daily Trust the number of
gallows available or prisons where condemned inmates are held
as it requested.
On April 20, 2012, Daily Trust wrote the National Assembly
requesting details of contracts for the procurement of Jeeps for
Senators and Toyota Camry cars for members of the House of
Representatives for their committee work. But rather than provide
the information, in its reply the National Assembly demanded the
specifics of the contracts referred to.
Daily Trust also wrote another FOI letter to the National Assembly asking for the Hansard of specific sessions of the Senate and
House of Representatives. This request was ignored.
Daily Trust wrote a letter to the State House on April 20, 2012
asking for details on the number of people who were on the President’s delegation during his trips to Australia, Ethiopia and Germany. Initially, officials refused to accept the letter because, according to them, Daily Trust used a wrong nomenclature for the
addressee. The paper wrote another letter the way they suggested, to the permanent secretary, State House; this was accepted
but there was no reply.
The Ministry of Justice also failed to respond to Daily Trust’s let-
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ter sent to it on April 20, 2012, seeking a copy of the White Paper
on the Galtimari-led Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North East Zone
On July 12, 2012, Daily Trust wrote to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), requesting details of a recruitment
exercise that it had just conducted at that time, but the NNPC
denied the request through a letter dated July 17, 2012, with a
reference number CSLD.1099. The letter, signed by NNPC’s legal
adviser, Mr. Anthony C. Madichie, claimed that the provisions of
FOI Act did not apply to the corporation. It claimed that the NNPC
is a “statutory corporation” and that section 31 of the FOI Act precludes the application of the FOI Act to it.
In July 2017, Daily Trust wrote to the NNPC requesting information on turn around maintenance the corporation had carried on
the plants in the last 20 years including expenses for them.
In response to the Daily Trust request, the NNPC’s lawyers,
Omale O.B & Co., said the corporation could not grant the request because the information sought was a “trade secret” and
confidential information that may “cause harm.” It said it could not
also give the information because section 31 of the Act excludes it
from granting such requests.
On June 1, 2015, Premium Times newspaper, through a Freedom of Information letter dated the same day, requested from
the Central Bank of Nigeria complete data on the deposits and
withdrawals from the Excess Crude Account; revenues from oil and
gas exports with dates deposits were made; and deposits from
the revenue proceeds accrued from signature bonuses from the
award of oil blocks, royalties on awarded oil licenses/leases, and
petroleum profit tax/penalties from January 2005 till date.
The newspaper, through another FOI letter also dated June 1,
2015, requested from the NNPC complete data on oil and gas
production from January 2005 till date; revenues from oil and gas
exports with dates deposits were made to bank accounts from
January 2005 till date; deposits from the revenue proceeds accruing from signature bonuses from the award of oil blocks, royalties
on awarded oil licenses/leases, petroleum profit tax/ penalties;
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and complete data on the deposits to the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) and Excess Crude Accounts.
Neither the NNPC nor the Central Bank responded to the newspaper’s request.
In 2013, Atiku Sarki, then reporting for the New Nigerian newspaper, made seven FOI requests to various public institutions for
which he got two responses which were mere promises to get
back to him. None of the institutions supplied the information he
requested. Atiku Sarki requested from the Accountant General of
the Federation information on how much had been spent by the
office on the new Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information
System (IPPIS) and how much had been saved as a result of the
introduction of the system.
In another request to the Office of the President, Atiku Sarki asked for the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Executive
Council (FEC) held on Wednesday, June 19, 2012 at which the
council approved the resumption of payment of subsidies to marketers which was suspended following the probe in the sector.
From the Federal Ministry of Power, the journalist requested
information on the amount spent in the last two years [2010 and
2011] for the procurement of spares for the repair of Egbin and
Ughelli Thermal Stations. The ministry responded asking him to
direct his request to the Thermal Power Stations with the excuse
that the information he requested were not with the ministry.
Atiku Sarki’s FOI request to the Corporate Affairs Commission,
dated September 19, 2012 sought a breakdown of the Commission’s annual revenue generation from January 2008 to August
2013. The Corporate Affairs Commission responded only to say
that it would get back to him with the information, but it never did.
But it has by no means all been doom and gloom in the usage
of the Act. While some of the media organizations and individual
journalists who have attempted to use the Act have faced some
challenges, there have also been successes recorded by both the
media and other civil society organizations in either the information that they have been able to obtain with the Act or the positive
judicial pronouncements that have emanated from the courts as
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a result of the efforts of those that have challenged the action of
public institutions in denying them information.
Indeed, Malami (2017) had this to say: “It is noteworthy that the
bulk of FOIA requests since 2011 have invariably originated from
these organizations (i.e. civil society organizations) that by dint of
such requests have kept Public Institutions on their toes and also
enhanced understanding of the practical aspects of the FOIA.”
Although the FOI Act is not yet where a lot of people projected it would be it has nonetheless moved Nigeria from an era of
secrecy onto the road to transparency and accountability. In the
space of six years of the existence of the FOI Act, thousands of FOI
requests have been made to various public institutions at the federal, state and local government levels on various issues like public procurement, health, water, road, education, budget allocation,
implementation of projects, and so on.
Some of these requests for information have resulted in full
access to the information sought while some have only brought
about partial access. Without doubt, a lot of others have been
denied with no justifications for denial. From the denial of the FOI
requests, court cases have sprang up which have expended the
frontiers of the Law by giving positive interpretations to many of
the provisions and thereby advanced the implementation of the
Act.
The Freedom of Information Act and Its Prospect for
Media Practice in Nigeria
Prior to the enactment of the FOI Act, a major challenge for
most journalists was the difficulty in obtaining information from
government bodies, among others, through legitimate channels.
The situation was worsened by the absence of any legal protection for journalists’ confidential sources, which created additional
challenges for journalists and the media to persuade sources to
give them information unofficially. Without access to information,
journalism practice was extremely difficult.
The Act, if effectively implemented, can change this situation
drastically. With the coming into force of the Act, media professionals now have a real possibility of legitimately obtaining much
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of the information they require to do stories that will be of interest
to the public and impact governance. In addition, public officials
who provide them with information of public interest unofficially
will also be protected against any adverse legal or employment
related consequences.
Using the law, journalists can approach virtually any public institution and where necessary, some private bodies, to request the
information that is relevant for their work. If the law works well,
journalists, like other members of the public, should be able to get
the information within seven days on average.
In addition, civil servants and other public officials who are privy
to information which show a violation of any law, rule or regulation; mismanagement, gross waste of funds, fraud, and abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety will now be encouraged to come forward voluntarily to reveal such information to the media or to the public through other
channels without fear of reprisals.
Obviously, the responsibility for implementation and ensuring
compliance with the Act rests with a variety of stakeholders. But
the media will be a critical stakeholder in this regard.
Some of the key stakeholders with responsibility for enforcement and ensuring compliance will have to be prompted or prodded to perform their roles for the law to be effective. The media is
ideally placed to do the prompting and prodding.
These media and individual journalists can contribute to the
effective implementation of the Act, in the following ways:
• Enlightening and educating themselves about the provisions of the Act
• Publicizing and popularizing the Act
• Using the Act to obtain information from public institutions and relevant private institutions.
• Complying with the provisions of the law
• Ensuring that the law is working by monitoring its implementation
Journalists can enlighten and educate themselves about the
provisions of the Act by reading the Act to ensure that they are
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sufficiently familiar with and fully understand its provisions to be
able to discuss it in detail; to enable them ask pertinent questions
about the Act; and to enable them challenge any misinformation
or inaccurate representation of the provisions of the Act.
They should also try to read up as many materials as possible
about access to information issues generally. Unless journalists
have a good knowledge and understanding of the Act, they will not
be able to write or talk knowledgeably and authoritatively about
it; they will not be able to ask intelligent and pertinent questions
of public officials and other individuals about the Act; they will
not know how to use the Act to obtain information themselves;
they will not know what to do or how to bring themselves into
compliance with the Act; and they will not be able to monitor its
implementation as they will not know what is required to be done
under the Act by public institutions and relevant private bodies.
Journalists and the media in general, evidently need to use the
Act to obtain information in the course of their work as public records and documents are invaluable assets to journalists and the
media as a whole. They are important in ensuring that the media
have accurate and reliable facts; in helping the media to correctly
report events that may have escaped public attention when they
happened or where the full facts are not known.
There are a multitude of records and documents covering a
wide variety of issues and subjects, generated daily and stored
by various government departments and agencies as well as private bodies. Public institutions, whether at federal, state or local
government levels as well as private entities utilizing public funds,
performing public functions or providing public services hold a
vast amount of information that would constitute a treasure trove
for the journalist and the media, whether print or broadcast.
The Freedom of Information Act is a powerful tool through
which the media can gain access to these public records and documents. Since government officials are inherently wary of releasing documents which do not favor them to journalists, the Act becomes indispensable as it can be used to compel them to release
such records and documents.
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Individual journalists as well as media organizations and corporate entities can make an infinite number of applications to any
public institution and any private body covered by the Act in an
effort to obtain almost any type of information, except the limited
categories of exempted information, which can themselves also
be obtained where an overriding public interest can be demonstrated.
By so using the Act, the media can itself contribute towards a
new culture of openness and transparency as the public institutions get more and more used to being asked for information and
begin to develop the practice of giving out information.
Government-owned media, whether owned by federal, state or
local governments, are themselves public institutions within the
meaning of the Act. They will therefore have to fulfill all the obligations of public institutions required under the Act.
Private media organizations which may be said to be utilizing
public funds, performing public functions or providing public services, will themselves also be subject to the application of the Act.
They will also have to fulfill the relevant obligations under the Act.
However, for individual journalists and private media organizations that do not fall within the scope of the application of the Act,
they nonetheless need to respect and comply with the requirements of the Act and the procedures specified in it in seeking to
obtain information under it.
Strict compliance with the requisite procedures outlined in the
Act will also enhance their chances of obtaining information under the Act and successfully challenging any denial of access to
information. Whenever they fail or neglect to comply with the
provisions of the Act, they may unwittingly be providing grounds,
justification or excuses for public institutions or relevant private
bodies to deny them access to information.
Journalists and the media also have an important role in ensuring that the Act is working by monitoring its implementation.
They can do this in two principal ways, namely:
• By submitting requests for information to public institutions and private entities covered by the Act, and thereafter

90

Edetaen Ojo

documenting and reporting on their experiences on how many
relevant institutions satisfy the requirements of the Law.
• By a systematic assessment of the level of compliance by
public institutions with various actions mandated by the law
and issuing reports of their findings
Since all public institutions and private bodies covered by the
Act have numerous obligations under the Act, journalists and the
media have a lot of work to do in monitoring compliance with
these obligations.
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Corruption in the Nigerian media:
The brown envelope syndrome
By Lanre Idowu

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The question, “Is the Nigerian media corrupt?” may well be met
with a reply: Is the color of the sky blue? Nigeria, alongside many
other states, is grappling with the developmental challenges of
corruption to good governance, transparency and accountability.
For much of the period of this study, 1999-2016, corruption was
a constant challenge for the four administrations that occupied
office. In recognition of its reality and menace, reformatory institutional organs were established during this period to curtail the
spread of corruption by punishing culprits convicted through due
process. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC)
and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are
two of such bodies established to fight corruption. Important legislations such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Fiscal Responsibility Act and the Public Procurement Act were also passed
during this period in the effort to throw light on hitherto murky
terrains that promoted corruption. As an outcome of this anti cor-
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ruption fight, EFCC Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu told the BBC in 2006
his agency had recovered more than $5bn between 2004 and 2006
and successfully prosecuted 82 people (BBC, 2006).
Ten years later, in 2016, Nigeria’s Attorney General Abubakar
Malami told a conference in Abuja on financial fraud, cyber crime
and other cross border crimes that Nigeria recovered $2 trillion or
N400 trillion in twelve years. Of this sum, $2 million was attributed
to military dictator, General Sani Abacha in 1998. Malami disclosed
that a Nigerian government report in 2013 revealed that between
2001 and 2013, N20.6 trillion or $33.14 billion was tracked as illicit
funds flows into Nigeria’s financial system of which $7.4 billion
were proceeds of corruption and embezzlement (Vanguard, 2016).
The extent of corruption and other social vices in any society
often reflects the room or latitude given to it and the attendant
consequences. Mismanagement, avarice, poor legal framework
and weak enforcement have all combined to crown corruption as
a way of life and give Nigeria an unflattering reputation. Not surprisingly, as the media do not operate in splendid isolation from
the rest of society, corruption by various accounts also thrives in
the media. “Corruption in the Nigerian media: The Brown envelope syndrome” is, therefore, a declarative statement that recognizes there is corruption in the Nigerian media, which is decorated
in protective garb (of a brown envelope) and is so rife that it has
become a pattern.
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
In examining our key words, “Corruption”, “Nigerian media”,
“Brown envelope” and “Syndrome”, our concern is not esoteric
pontifications about corruption being real or imagined, homegrown or imported, but the desired need to set the tone for a
deeper understanding of a phenomenon that has shaped media
performance and will continue to do so for more ill than good for
some time to come. We agree with Skjerdal (2010, 307) that:
On the basis of informal accounts and an increasing number of media
commentaries addressing the dilemma of brown envelope there is legitimate reason to believe that this phenomenon and other types of
informal incentives and bribes are common in African media practice.
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Nigeria being an active and big player in African media practice, our interest recognizes and shares three broad focal areas as
germane to understanding the phenomenon of “brown envelope”
journalism. They range from the socio-political factors guiding
daily living in Nigeria, to the economic realities constraining media practice, and the interest in seeing journalism as a profession
and occupation with its own codes of ethics. In weighing the clash
of these factors and the resultant impact on media practice, this
essay brings to bear the perspectives of a journalist, who has been
on the field as a reporter and writer, an editor who has deployed
journalists to various assignments, evaluated and interrogated
their submissions, a media ombudsman with extensive experience.
It adds the insights of a trainer who has interacted with participants on issues of professional practice, and a spokesperson that
has experienced, firsthand, journalists and some of their antics in
relation to the subject of discussion.
Corruption
Globally, corruption is a vile word that describes dishonesty,
bribery, fraud, sleaze, vice and racketeering. It is a development
issue akin to debilitating diseases for which the world is struggling
to find a panacea. It navigates the corridors of power relations and
wealth distribution. Corruption is not a stranger to the contests
to access power, position and privilege, wealth, especially public
wealth, and influence. Corruption is driven by the quest to have
an edge over others using public resources for private gains. It is
about appropriating to self what belongs or should belong to the
commonwealth.
Arising from poor records of governance and a skewed notion
of public service in its first four decades of existence as an independent country, Nigeria as stated has earned an unenviable reputation as a corrupt state where might was seen as right, and impunity enthroned as acceptable way of life. The media being part
and parcel of society reflect the morality and behavior prevalent in
society (Yusha’u: 2009, p.167) and (Omotoso, 2017). Even as various news media organisations are making honest efforts to stay
above board and monitor governance on behalf of the public, the
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lure of corruption explains why the media as watchdogs of power
and governance have not always lived up to the constitutional and
societal expectations of holding government accountable to the
people. They have not always maintained the professional detachment that is critical to even-handed assessment of happenings
in society. In not paying sufficient attention to their professional,
social and constitutional responsibilities, they, alongside political
and business leaders, share some responsibility for the poor image cultivated for Nigeria in its first five decades of existence.
Acts of corruption in the media can be seen at three different
levels involving the individual, the organization and across organizations. Because of the odious images attached to corruption, it
is usually done discreetly; its modus operandi known only to the
initiates or the observant. A discussion of the lexicon of terms
applied to corruption in the Nigerian media explains its growing
prevalence and the rising sense of entitlement that accompanies
it. The debilitating impact of corruption on the national economy dictates that it engages more than a passing attention. There
have been some efforts at addressing it. Luckily, the government
of the day holds the war against corruption as one of its three pillars of concern; the other two being insecurity/terrorism and the
depressed economy. Presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari
was not being alarmist when he declared in 2015: “If we do not
kill corruption in this country, corruption will kill Nigerians” (The
Nation: 2015, March 13).
Nigerian media
By Nigerian media, we refer to the media of communication employed to reach out to, or communicate with, a mass or
vast audience in a plural society like Nigeria. It is differentiated
from person-to-person communication although messages obtained through a mass medium are often reinforced through person-to-person communication. The media are channels and platforms to engage, share messages, and receive feedback. They may
come as the traditional media of print (newspapers and magazines), electronic (radio and television) or the digital media of using the internet superhighway to reach audiences on websites or
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in the social media. The Nigerian media came into being in 1859
as a missionary effort to promote news-reading. From that initial
missionary effort, the Nigerian media developed into an economic
tool of sharing community and trade news, and morphed into an
organ of raising social and political consciousness, even if their
performance on this score has been irregular. The Nigerian media
now cover newspapers, magazines, television stations, radio stations, and online publications.
Brown Envelope
Brown envelope is a euphemism for bribe; it refers to the purchasing of favorable mention in the media in the short term or
cultivating favorable relationship in the long term through cash
and/or material gifts. As Skjerdal (2010, 369) perceptibly observes,
it has three ingredients: it is personal, confidential and contractual.
It is a pact between a giver and receiver, a buyer and a seller. It
attempts to confer legitimacy on the medium by building on the
time-honored practice of exchanging correspondence with individuals or corporate bodies through letter writing. The envelope
confers some respect on the addressee as worthy of special and
confidential attention from the addresser.
Syndrome
This refers to a condition, pattern, disorder, and symptoms of
a larger problem. In the context of the news media, it refers to
the growth of corruption into an acceptable pattern, a tolerated
condition, and a disorder that indicates a larger societal problem
about the scourge of corruption.
Our task then is to examine the existence, indeed, the prevalence of corruption in the Nigerian media for which the much
talked about brown envelope merely illustrates, and establish
what consequences this disorder has for the professional health
of Nigerian journalism and what could be done to strengthen the
capacity of the Nigerian media to play its watchdog role much
more effectively.
UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN MEDIA, THE THEATRE
OF, AND ACTOR IN THE DISORDER
The Nigerian media owe their origins to the town of Abeokuta,
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capital of present day Ogun State, where missionaries from the
Church Missionary Society of England had established a mission
in 1846. Freed Nigerian slaves who had been quartered in Freetown, Sierra Leone, had repeatedly implored the missionaries to
establish the Yoruba (Abeokuta) mission in their desire to reunite
with their kin back home and extend the liberating message of
Christianity. The freed slaves’ clamor finally resonated with the
CMS who thereafter dispatched three missionaries to Abeokuta
through Badagry in December 1842 first on an exploratory mission and later in 1846 as a definite mission. In a setting that saw
Christianity as a redeeming theology and education as crucial to
its appeal, it was not surprising that a Caucasian missionary, the
Rev Henry Townsend (1815-1886) introduced Iwe Irohin fun awon
Egba ati Yoruba (The newspaper for the Egbas and Yorubas) which
emphasized the need to develop a pool of readers who can be
reached through the pages of Iwe Irohin. Townsend’s expressed
objects of establishing the paper, Iwe Irohin (The Newspaper) in
December 1859, thirteen years after the establishment of Nigeria’s first primary school and six months after the founding of the
first secondary school, was to stimulate in the people the habit of
seeking information through reading, promote the virtues of the
written word, and the empowering influence of information on
commerce and politics (Idowu, 2017).
Shape
The Nigerian media, today, come in all shapes, sizes, formats,
and guises. For the print media, they range from the handy, sensationalist tabloids, to the sober, wannabe broadsheets. Various
magazines, basking in the colors of the rainbow, adorn the newsstands; all struggling for a limited market share. Numerous sites
abound on the digital sphere, all in search of audiences.
Color and Tone
The media parade all sorts of players from the trained to the
untrained; from the purpose-driven journalists to the gatecrashers, the ethical and the whimsical. They discuss all manner of issues: the puerile, salacious, ennobling and useful, the enervating
and the elevating. All manner of subjects is covered from politics
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to economy, religion, sports, real estate, music, fashion, lifestyle,
to horticulture, agriculture, energy, the environment, oil and gas
etc.
Scope
It is a vast world across different platforms: newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, online publications, blogs and
chat-rooms and across various offering in the social media. Access
to information is vast. Mobile telephony is ubiquitous. Internet access continues to grow in Nigeria with disruptive consequences
for the old order of information dissemination and management.
From a paltry figure of 200, 000 in 2000, there are now 93, 591,
174 internet users in 2017, which represents a 146, 637% growth
rate. This figure further represents a population penetration of
48.8% of Nigeria’s 191 million people, which is close to the world
average of 49.7%. Facebook holds the widest appeal with 16 million users or 10.9% of Africa’s 146.6 million Facebook users (PWC,
2015). Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, LinkedIn are other popular
platforms. The emergent picture of this growing connectivity of
Nigeria to the digital public sphere is one of enhancing the prospects of participation, engagement and citizenship (Olukotun,
2015, p.19). Excessively filtered stories in the mainstream media
are giving way to other outlets, even if the gate-keeping function
of the media is increasingly compromised with worrisome consequences for the integrity of the information shared and the speed
it is disseminated.
The newspapers are experiencing mixed fortunes with the
growing importance of the digital media. Nonetheless, there are
58 regular newspapers discussing, politics, economy, and lifestyle
issues (Media Review, 2015).
There are at least 43 regular online newspapers and magazines
with Premium Times, The Cable being household names (Iyare,
2015).
The National Broadcasting Commission lists 332 radio stations,
and two national networks, one belonging to the Federal Radio
Corporation of Nigeria and the other to Ray Power, Nigeria’s first
licensed private radio station. In addition, there are 40 Internet
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Radio stations (Wikipedia).
There are 112 television stations with the Nigerian Television
Authority and the African International Television providing network services.
Geopolitical ownership/presence of the Nigerian media
Table 1.0 Major Newspapers
South West: Nation, Punch, Tribune
South South: Thisday, Vanguard, Independent
South East: New Telegraph, Sun
North Central: Authority, Blueprint, Leadership
North West: Trust, People’s Daily
North East: Trust
Table 2.0 Television (112)
South West: TVC, MITV, Galaxy, LTV, OGTV
South South: AIT, Channels, Silverbird
South East: ABS
North Central: PRTV
North West: Abubakar Rimi TV
North East: Gotell
Network: NTA (public-owned)
Table 3.0 Radio (332)
South West: 94 Radio Continental, Inspiration FM, Star FM
South South: 56 Cool FM? Ray Power FM, Rhythm FM
South East: 47 Classic FM, Wazobia
North Central: 42
North West: 51 Radio Freedom
North East: 24 Gotell
FCT: 18
Network: FRCN and Ray Power
The Nigerian media remain vibrant, diverse with mixed participation of various tiers of government, private, religious and educational ownership interests. Even as there is positive growth of
private media organs in the north, especially in newspapering,
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there is still noticeable gulf in ownership between the north and
south. Technological advancement has seen rising influence of
new media in overcoming spatial boundaries, providing a more
intense media reach, that is as liberating as it is disruptive. The
speed and ends to which the new media allow content to travel
remain a current challenge for the industry in terms of the legal
environment in which the media operate and the ethical waywardness that envelopes journalism practice.
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA
Political, Noisy and Confrontational
Owing to the pattern of growth and development over the years
from the days of missionary activities, to the era of colonial administration, the period of nationalist struggle for independence, the
effort at self rule, to the collapse of the First Republic, the period of
military rule, and subsequent efforts at civil rule, the mainstream
Nigerian media have cut the picture of a political, noisy and confrontational instrument of constructing social legitimacy (Agbaje,
1992, Olukotun, 2002). Ownership often comes to define tone and
content with ongoing uneven efforts to professionalize news content. The politics of the land is easily discerned in media content as
often media ownership is another way of playing politics.
The media remain veritable platforms for contesting ideas and
influence. Major ownership in newspapering tends to be private,
with pockets of pronounced politicians owning media organs and
sympathizers directing affairs at others. Broadcasting remains
largely in the hands of the public sector even as its operations increasingly tilt to commercial broadcasting in the search for more
funds to run the stations beyond the grants from the owner-governments. The core news content and programming, however,
tend to reinforce the interests of the current occupants of public
office, with the opposition given limited media access even when
they offer to pay to be heard.
Politics remains the main staple of the Nigerian media. Media
Review’s Annual Top Ten Stories published in the Nigerian media
as determined by Top Ten Editors for the period 2001 to 2006
showed politics as the main focus. In the 2006 survey of stories
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conducted January 2007, for instance, seven of the Top Ten stories
were on politics. They ranged from the gale of impeachments, to
the conflict between President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice President Atiku Abubakar, spate of political killings, reinstatement of
Oyo State Governor, Rasheed Ladoja, the declaration of state of
emergency in Ekiti State and the sacking of Chris Ngige as Anambra State governor (Idowu, 2009, p.174-175).
Event signalers
Generally, the media tend to generate more heat than light.
They are adept at signaling events, sensationalizing on current issues to catch public attention. In the Top Ten Stories survey for
2003, Media Review noted the following as elements that guided
Nigerian editors’ news judgment: conflict and controversy, shock
and unusualness, disruption and destruction, criminality and
grandstanding (Idowu, 2009, p.139). Trend reporting of development-oriented issues has never been the strength of the media,
with focus on big political and business figures with elite interests/
clashes framed as public issues.
Between Reporting of Issues of Public Interest and
Issues in the Public Interest
The quality of content especially on issues of corruption remains concerning. As previously noted, a lot still needs to be done
in the news judgment and management of our media personnel.
Beyond the general excitement generated in the media, what’s the
quality of reporting generally? How often do the media break corruption stories? How do the media cover corruption-related reports? Is
their focus long shot or close up? Are the reports of public interest or
in the public interest? Are they excitable watchdogs or docile lapdogs?
(Idowu, 2009, p.186).

The Nigerian media’s underbelly is in follow ups, tiebacks and
nuanced interpretations. Too much focus is paid to the immediate,
the here-now, and to issues of public excitement, which are not
necessarily those that are in the overall public interest. Attention
is usually too fleeting and flighty before something else comes
into the picture. The intrepid and crusading journalism that defined a section of the media’s principled opposition to military
rule in the 1990s is now a rarity. The result is the steady diet of the
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predictable and commonplace and the dearth of the rigorous, the
investigative and the revealing. This enthronement of the ordinary
and the glorification of the safe and instant materially-rewarding
journalism results from the corruption of social values. It is a toga
the Nigerian media need to shed for a more assured future.
Occasional flashes of Brilliance
To be sure, there have been instances since the return to civil
rule that the media have discharged themselves creditably on issues of (public) corruption. The exposure that led to the resignations of the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, Salisu
Buhari in 1999 and the first Senate President, Evan(s) Enwerem in
1999/2000 on dodgy academic credentials epitomized the media’s
moral outrage that leadership must be above board. The muted
campaign on similar charges related to the former Governor of
Lagos State, Bola Tinubu, however, suggested double standards
on the part of the crusading section of the media that contributed
to the ousting of the legislative duo at the centre. The media campaign in 2014 that culminated in the resignation of Aviation Minister Stella Oduah over questionable expenditure on bullet proof
cars also stands out to the credit of the media. So did the assault
on the Goodluck Jonathan administration’s prevarication on the
issue of corruption that resulted in the president’s faux pas that
“stealing is not corruption.” The short-lived enterprising example
of NEXT newspaper deserves commendation. When the health
of President Umaru Yar’adua was failing, it was NEXT that alerted
the country to it and the attendant intrigues of a cabal ruling in
the name of a prostrate president. The exposes on the sweetheart
deals in the oil sector under the watch of petroleum minister, Dieziani Madueke were also refreshingly different.
Partisanship is visible
Although every successful publication must have a defined editorial focus, the professional evenhandedness that should accompany news treatment is not always present. It is not uncommon
to find several publications not agreeing on the basic facts of a
story. Often, the editorial position of Nigerian publications is defined by ethnic, religious and geopolitical considerations and the
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pressures of the commercial place to outdo the competition. The
good news is that diverse ownership provides some cancelling out
of the overt prejudices.
Because the country is diverse and the newspaper ownership is diverse
too, no government can say it controls the media. If one or two newspapers are supporting a government, there are others, who by virtue of
ownership structure, will do otherwise (Bello, 2017).

But poorly served is the news consumer who relies on only one
source. What remains constant is the uneven fidelity to ethics by
our news media, which in some cases are driven by naked corruption arising from greed and insufficient homework and latent
considerations such as the corruption of values, fostered by the
socio-political climate and the economic realities facing the individual journalist or media organization concerned.
Elite and Hampered Media
Notwithstanding the diversity in ownership of the Nigerian media, organs of the media have over the years served as instruments
for the contestation of power and ideas (Agbaje, 1992). Much of
what is prevalent in the body politic finds expression in the media. Corruption has been a cankerworm in Nigerian politics. It is
not surprising that corruption finds bold expression in the media
as media access in the traditional remains elite-centered, expensive, and limited in reach. This unevenness of media access is in
itself corruptive and provides a development challenge. Much of
the publishing model in the country relies on commercial advertising for sustenance. The advertisers are usually the elites with
the ad capital. Their focus is on the inner cities which hold the
spending capital. In the face of a troubled economy, the advertiser
has grown more powerful with enhanced capacity to shape media content, which increasingly is not the product of independent
media judgment but the induced preference of the commercial
advertiser.
The result is growing disconnect between perceived reality by
the public and professed reality of the commercial persuaders on
the one hand, and widening gulf between the urban and rural
communities, on the other hand. It is a continuing contest for ad-
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vantage between elite groups. And because the media owners are
usually political/business interests, access is usually restricted to
fellow soul mates or those with the financial power to purchase it.
The result is predictable content, limited flow of ideas, and constricted space for balance in public discourse. The cherished role
of the media giving a democratic vent for the sharing of public
intelligence and consequently fostering development is thus compromised. Rather than vigilant watchdogs the emergent picture
for a large section of the media has been one of co-opted partners
or compromised lapdogs.
The parlous economy that has seen progressive devaluation in
the national currency between 2000 and 2015 has also constrained
the economic power of the media with dire consequences. In particular, since the fall in oil prices of mid 2014, growth has slowed
down. Whilst there was 6.3% economic growth in 2014, it fell to
2.7% in 2015. GDP contracted by 2.2%. By 2016, inflation had doubled to 18.8% from 9.6% in 2015 (World Bank). For the media,
between 1999 and 2016, many titles like the Sketch, Concord, Post
Express, Anchor, Tempo, National Interest, The Comet, New Age,
Spectator Weekly, Westerner, Newswatch, Next, New Nigerian, Nigerian Compass and PM News/The News have disappeared from
the newsstand (Olukotun, 2015, p.36-37).
Since then, the National Mirror has joined the list. Tell and
Champion are occasional publications making cameo appearances when they strike luck with advertisers. For many others, the
word is “surviving” not thriving as circulation remains static and
advert patronage is limited. Business models of publishing are being reviewed with several migrating online even as the means to
make online publishing profitable remains a present challenge.
Where the media are not free and strong enough to discharge
the expected responsibility to society, it is a matter of time before
that influence begins to be eroded. That has been the lot of a
good section of the Nigerian media in the 4th Republic. They have
resorted to all sorts of schemes to keep afloat in the stormy sea of
publishing with unpleasant consequences for the media’s ability
to carry out investigative reporting on which depends such con-
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cerns as transparency, accountability and good governance.
With some knowledge of the theatre of media practice, the
shape, size, scope of the media and the general underpinnings
that drive content as useful background, it becomes necessary to
examine more closely the subject of corruption in the media.
CORRUPTION IN THE MEDIA
Corruption as we have noted is a vile word, which conjures negativity. Corruption is about dishonesty, bribery, fraud, sleaze, vice
and racketeering. Dishonesty may entail barefaced lie, an act of
cover up, the practice of looking the other way because favors
have exchanged hands or will exchange hands.
Bribery is inducement to act in a way that one would not ordinarily do, or in a way that is unusual, irregular and conflicts with
acceptable social norms and practice. Fraud is a scam, a hoax designed to deceive and deprive a party of something they would
not part with ordinarily.
An act of sleaze is sordid, ugly and repugnant to a community’s
or society’s ethos. Its ugliness is in its baseness as something to
be avoided or done in extreme secrecy because there is nothing
edifying about it to bring it out in the open. Vice is an undesirable
quality; an act that is bad and without merit. It is the antonym
of virtue. In religious terms, it is sinful and requires atonement
for forgiveness to follow. Racketeering is an organized means
of scamming or depriving the public of something that is rightly
theirs.
In totality, corruption is abusive in character; it is taking undue
advantage of public office or privileged position for private gain.
Globally, it is frowned upon. The Code of Ethics for Nigerian Journalists (1998) expressly decries corruption under Article 7 (i) on
REWARD AND GRATIFICATION: “A journalist should neither solicit
nor accept bribe, gratification or patronage to suppress or publish
information.” It explains in 7 (ii) “To demand payment for the publication of news is inimical to the notion of news as a fair, accurate,
unbiased and factual report of an event.”
Using the definition of corruption by Transparency International as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”, corruption in
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a news media setting can be interpersonal between a reporter and
a news source in the exchange of money or favors for private gain.
It can be intra organizational where an editor directs reporters to
slant stories to fit a preconceived agenda, notwithstanding facts to
the contrary. It can be inter-organizational where the organization
arranges with another a stream of favorable reports for a consideration. Corruption obtains in extortion where news subjects are
blackmailed to part with money/favors for news to be suppressed
by individuals and organizations. It dovetails into racketeering
as a non transparent way of funding the media through undisclosed/invisible support such as behind-the-scene sponsorship by
government, private or commercial interests to guarantee steady
stream of positive reporting disguised as independent coverage.
The Lexicon of Corruption
Corruption’s prevalence in Nigerian journalism is betrayed in
journalist’s wordlist for it. “Awoof” is an age-long word for a windfall, an extra earning. It resonates so well with West Africans that
it has been employed as a product name for various sales promotions by telecom giants, MTN and Airtel and a top bank like the
United Bank for Africa. When journalists talk of awoof, the reference is to undocumented income, a gift for services rendered or
expected to be performed.
“Better life” is an endearing term that sees a bribe as an investment in a better life for the journalist. It is a parody of a program
started by Nigeria’s first lady, Maryam Babangida, during the Ibrahim Babangida military presidency (1985-1993). She had launched
an empowerment scheme termed “Better life for Rural Women”,
which promoted agriculture cooperatives and mainstreamed
women’s plight to national attention. In full, “Better Life” meant
Better Life for Nigerian journalists through an informal practice of
cash and or gifts for positive news coverage. Others call it “BTA”,
an acronym for Basic Transport Allowance, a perquisite for journalists in the period spanning 1980 through 2000. A cash gift from
a news source at a news event, for example, qualifies for a BTA,
which journalists had come to expect as part of the freebies of the
job. It is seen as a token of “thank you” for attending the event.
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“Communiqua” is another parody of the word, communiqué.
Journalists are not unfamiliar with communiqués being issued after major conferences and seminars. Aside from obtaining these
official pronouncements at the end of such meetings, corrupt
journalists also expect their own communiqua as their individual
takeaways. They rationalize it as akin to the honoraria resource
persons take home from such parleys.
“Family support” or “handshake”, is also deceptively attractive.
It is no more than a description of untaxed income as welcome
gift in the course of the job. The same is true of “pay as you go”, a
term borrowed from the advent of global system for mobile communication (GSM) in Nigeria in 2001. The prepaid bouquet as distinct from postpaid product offering was termed pay-as-you-go
for uninterrupted access to service. In the same token, continuous
payment of bribe by news sources to journalists qualifies in their
lingo as “pay as you go” for regular exposure or coverage.
Corrupting setting, Corrupt Media
Corruption is a malaise that afflicts all societies. Since Nigerians are human beings and humans are susceptible to the vice of
corruption, Nigerians are not immune from corruption. In a developing country, especially one with weak institutions where the
processes of transparency and accountability are still in infancy,
corruption ranks as one of the ills that mark out the underdevelopment of such societies. There are certain practices among
various ethnic groups that make up Nigeria, that unwittingly
predispose the people to some corrupting practices. Among the
peoples, common values are prevalent. There is respect for age,
position and authority. Elders are respected, if not venerated; authority figures and positions are highly regarded. Acts of hospitality expressed in extending gifts to visitors are also important
to Nigerians. It could range from the offer of water or carbonated
drink to a guest to a whole meal and material gifts when the visitor departs. It is not a one-way traffic. Visitors, too, are known to
bring gifts to their guests as a hospitable gesture. Some journalists have been caught in this vortex of not being able to differentiate between what is a gift or bribe; between what is a hospitable
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or compromising act. Consider a situation where a reporter, after
interviewing a subject, takes his leave and is offered some money
to supplement his transport fare. His gentle protest not to take the
gift can be frowned upon as disrespectful.
(Oshunkeye, 2011) quotes Lekan Otufodunrin, an editor with
the Nation as narrating the story of Prof. Itse Sagay, a lawyer, who
gave a journalist a cash gift and reprimanded him (the journalist)
as being rude for wanting to reject the gift:
Somebody was telling me recently about a reporter from The Guardian
who went to interview Professor Itse Sagay, one of Nigeria’s foremost
constitutional lawyers who just turned 70. When he was leaving, he was
given some token, but the journalist refused to take it and the Professor got angry and insisted that he must take it. ‘If I want a favor, I don’t
have to talk to you,’ Sagay was quoted as saying. ‘I can talk to your
boss. I know your MD and I know your editor. So, if I give you money,
it is not because I need a favor from you.’ The Professor also reminded
him that it was even rude for him to reject something from someone
that is old enough to be his father.

Yet the Code of Ethics of Nigerian journalists under article 7 (i)
forbids a journalist to “neither solicit nor accept bribe, gratification
or patronage to suppress or publish information.”
HOW CORRUPTION MANIFESTS IN THE MEDIA
A 2017 Focused Group Discussion (FGD) involving ten journalists, seven print and three broadcast, five men and five women,
with a mean experience of eight years, provides useful insights
into the phenomenon of corruption. Their views will be interspersed with other findings in this section. All agree corruption in
the media is prevalent and systemic; all admitted being conversant with the code of ethics of Nigerian journalists. All agreed that
one common area where journalists are exposed to direct bribery
is at press conferences where a news subject addresses the press
on issues the subject wants the press to consider as important
and also fields questions from the press. I begin with a personal
example.
At Press conferences
My first encounter with media corruption was at an event in
Ijebu Ode hosted by the Nigerian Agriculture, Commerce, Industry
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and Manufacturing Association (NACCIMA) in 1983. I had been assigned to cover the association’s luncheon, which included a visit
to its patron, Chief Adeola Odutola (1902-1995). At the luncheon, I
noticed that about six of us—journalists from various media houses—were on the same table. Midway into the lunch, a man clutching a folder, brought out some envelopes and placed one before a
journalist before moving on to the next. When he placed one before me, I asked what it was. He answered: For your transportation.
I opened it and saw it contained Naira notes. Then it hit me; it was
the notorious bribe money I had been warned against. So, I said to
him: Thank you very much sir, but I cannot accept this. I came with
my car and my organization is responsible for the fuelling. He
looked surprised, and said I should keep it as it’s provided for by
his organization. I pushed it to him and noticed the quizzical expression on the faces of two journalists whose acquaintance I had
just made. One whispered to me; ‘take it, it’s yours.’ I insisted the
man, who I later learnt was a PRO (public relations officer), must
take his envelope and he did. After the event as I headed back to
Lagos with one of the journalists I met there, the PRO accosted
me, saying he respected me. We talked for about two minutes and
I told him I understood he was doing his job but he should appreciate I was doing mine also. We parted on a good note and I made
my way back to Lagos.
Such assignments as a lunch incorporating a press conference
are desired by some journalists who see them as lucrative events
to go home with some extra salary benefits. Nkereuwem (2012)
speaks “of the shame that overwhelms me when I see my colleagues rushing for the Brown Envelope that are usually on offer
at press conferences and other events.”
Such journalists can be seen milling around after events in the
expectation that some envelopes would be shared. Where such
expectation is taking too long to meet, some bold ones are wont
to ask: “Anything for the press?” or suggestively inform: “We want
to go back to the office to file our reports.” Where the host is hard
of hearing, some journalists try other means. “Oga (master), we
want to go and work on your story but can you help us with trans-
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port money?” For good effect, some may even add; “We haven’t
been paid for some time, but because of the importance of your
event, we had to make private arrangements to be here…” They
usually leave the sentence hanging, hoping the message would
sink in.
A colleague’s experience in 2016 when she invited a female reporter to an event illustrates this point:
She told me that she had come to cover an event to which I invited her
only because of her regard for me as she had to hire a camera because all
cameras had been assigned for other events that day. She mentioned a
figure and left it hanging that I should refund the ‘cost’ so that the story
could be aired. I had to pay her.

If the news subject does not play ball, then it is not uncommon
to black out the interview as it happened back in 1988 to the then
Primate of the Church of Nigeria, Rt. Rev Abiodun Adetiloye. The
cleric had spoken to some journalists at the Murtala Muhammed
Airport, Ikeja on a number of national issues. The journalists, however, blacked him out because he did not give them “transport
money” (Idowu, 1996, p.198).
One story that illustrates the corrupting appeal of press conferences or arranged interviews with newsmakers remains the August
14, 2010 midnight meeting of former President Ibrahim Babangida with as many as 40 journalists at his Minna home in Niger State.
Babangida, military president from 1985 to 1993, was positioning
himself for another shot at the presidency, this time through the
ballot box. His publicists had arranged this midnight parley with
senior journalists, including editors, to learn, first hand, of Babangida’s planned return to office. An online news medium, Sahara
Reporters, reported that Babangida had not only gathered such a
large crowd of journalists to his Minna home at that strange hour
but each journalist went home with N250, 000 or $1666 as transport reimbursement.
Although the news pages of Nigeria’s mainstream newspapers
kept mute about the development, two critical commentaries at
that time on its consequences for the health of the Nigerian media
are relevant here. Idowu (2010) in IBB, Sahara Reporters, and the
Press, decried the growing practice of journalists receiving money
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to publish stories and explains the appeal of corruption:

Too many things are taken for granted in Nigerian journalism that the
strange has become the accepted. Many journalists see nothing wrong
in accepting money to publish stories. Take for example the age-long
practice of facility tours when Governor ‘A’ or Company ‘B’ invites the
media and pays for the journalist’s passage and accommodation in expectation of coverage. While the facilitators see it as opening doors to
better media access, the journalists, sadly, find such trips augmenting
if not guaranteeing their pay for the month. In their thinking new contacts have been cultivated; new horizons are waiting to be explored.
The result is a pattern of tainted reporting far from the envisaged professionally processed news served to the public………Receiving monetary gifts in the name of transport reimbursement, no matter how
popular it is, compromises the integrity of news.

Olatunji Dare, in his column of September 7, 2010 in The Nation, accused the editors present at the chat of indiscretion:

They unwittingly stultify themselves when they lend themselves to that
kind of usage and invite the kind of speculation that has attended what
was clearly a misadventure, however, noble their intentions……(dismissing midnight as)….hardly the most auspicious time of day or of night
for transacting serious, honest-to-goodness business.

So far, we can say “Brown envelope” remains inducement given by individuals and organizations desirous of positive mention
in the media. It thrives because it obeys the law of supply and
demand. There must be a giver and a receiver and for as long as
there are people willing to pay there will be those ready to accept.
The third point is that such episodic public assignments attract a
breed of journalists.
Pack Journalism
Corruption is the name of the game where journalists operate
like cartels by encouraging pack journalism. Those who practice
this find it beneath them to hanker for envelopes at public events.
Theirs is an effort to deodorize an odious practice. In full bloom,
pack journalism operates with appointed coordinators to negotiate their fee for covering their ‘clients’ events. They usually work
under the guise of beat associations of reporters and correspondents. The client’s contact person deals with the coordinator, who,
in turn, shares out what is due to the respected participants. These
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participants are also graded with “A” publications/organizations
earning more than the “B” or “C”. Sometimes, also, the promised
coverage guides the fee charged. A straight news report on the
front page carries higher reward than an inside story. An extensive
feature commands more gravitas than a short news report. Usually the coordinator arranges the slant of the reporting and plants
similar write-ups in the selected publications. Pack journalism
helps in suppressing stories and promoting particular viewpoints.
The money does not go to the organizations but the individuals
for whom it remains a windfall.
The failure of previous efforts to control, ban, or eradicate pack
journalism through outlawing beat associations shows the extent of the problem facing the media. In 2002, the trio of Nigeria
Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) and
the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN) under
the umbrella of the Nigerian Press Organization (NPO) banned
journalists from belonging to beat associations in reaction to the
widespread perceived corruption of the associations. As I noted
then:

They (associations) are accused of operating like cartels, which rather
than foster competition among members, encourage pack journalism.
Members, upon pain of exclusion, reportedly share reports from the
pool and agree on angles to play up in their reports for reasons that
are hardly altruistic. The result is that members’ reports to their various
media are beginning to sound, read and appear too similar (Idowu,
2009, p.122).

The desperate action was not expected to put the corrupt practice out of business and it did not. As I warned:

Banning these beat associations does not mean they have ceased to
exist. The directing minds may well choose to be subtler about their
operations. Truth is solving a problem has created another. In saying
that reporters cannot freely join an association, their right to free assembly is being short-changed. In slapping a blanket ban on these associations, the NPO is adjudging all guilty before trial. This is hardly
an ennobling statement about our emerging democracy (Idowu, 2009:
124).

Many years after, the problem remains ingrained into Nigerian
journalism practice.
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Protection fee
Some well-heeled reputation managers of some organizations
also support their media contacts through regular payments of
money into their accounts as a way of maintaining their relationship of mutual benefits. The money is paid to the contacts
to watch out for negative reports and snuff them out before they
grow into public nuisance or disturbance and also as an expression of goodwill for regular use of their reports. This may not be
tied to specific events but qualifies as a protection fee payable
regularly, sometimes at festive occasions. In this regard, a racket
is put in place to exploit the traditional virtues of hospitality to
seduce and compromise the media.
No matter the veneer the institutional persuaders may apply
to the practice, corruption is the name of the game where news
managers offer protective news coverage to clients in exchange
for regular pay. Olukotun (2002, p.79) cites the example of an offer to a senior journalist at the Daily Times in the early 1990s by a
top management staff of the paper to write “pro-government articles in order to attract allowances outside his salary from security
agencies.”
The practice was not limited to security agents. Private individuals, especially politicians, also promoted it. Nwabauni (2015)
gives an account of a top politician who pays protection fee to
editors regularly. In one of her contributions to the BBC Letters
from African journalists’ series, she says of the politician:
I know a top Nigerian politician who goes beyond brown envelopes
to listing a number of editors on his payroll. As he disburses his staff
salaries monthly, he also makes payments into the editors’ bank accounts. This ensures that whenever he has any “news” to disseminate,
it gets published in several media without any questions asked or facts
checked.

Looking elsewhere and Passing off
Corruption also resides where compromised journalists ask irrelevant questions when faced with opportunity to grill opinion
leaders. Usually, a big name is lined up for an interview with great
expectations that some earthshaking disclosures will emanate. Instead of grilling the news source, the journalists revel in asking soft
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questions that do little justice to the occasion. Biodun Oduwole,
a past president of the Nigerian Guild of Editors, in (Idowu, 2018)
explains that whilst trying to fund the Guild’s activities during his
tenure of office (1993-1996) his executive was forced to rely on
public office holders:

We had a program that brought experts in government to come and
address us. I remember one of such incidents; we went to Kaduna and
we asked the governor to come and talk to us. I invited Wada Maida
(also a past president of the Guild) and I asked him about what the
man had done that we could ask questions about. Wada told me he
had done nothing. The event turned out a big embarrassment because
after the man had addressed us, we started asking question based on
the information we had and the man was overwhelmed. But there was
a limit to which we could go, because the man was our host. And in
that situation, there was nothing we could do? You just have to look for
sponsors and because many corporate organisations were not interested in what we do, we had to look towards political sponsors.

In other words, the Guild could not grill the governor much so
that they would not come across as ingrates who whilst enjoying
his ‘benevolent’ sponsorship of their meeting were also embarrassing him with hostile questioning. So they settled for looking
elsewhere, moving on to other safe subjects.
By extension the obsessive practice of seeking state sponsorship of professional and industry activities which is common to
media organizations predisposes them to being beholden to such
sponsors. It is an admission of the organisations’ ill preparedness
for creative solutions to challenges of their trade outside of the
watchful and approving gaze of state sponsorships and endorsements. Over time, it blunts their journalistic pens and detracts from
the weight and impact of the media in the democratic process of
holding government accountable to the people.
Dubious Honors
Corruption drives the popular practice of media houses conferring dubious honors on office holders whose activities they are
supposed to monitor. Such titles like: “Most Media-friendly Governor”, “Best performing Senator from the South South”, “Most Gender Sensitive CEO”, “Best News Source”, “Most corporate socially
responsible Bank etc without clear parameters betray an attempt

116

Lanre Idowu

to confer undue honor and advantage on news subjects, contrary
to the notion of reporting as a fair and balanced account of happenings in society. It is no more than a fraudulent attempt to pass
off such persons in borrowed garbs.
When reporters begin to crown news sources with questionable awards,
one needs not be clairvoyant to know that the critical faculties that
good journalism needs would become blunt over time (Idowu, 2009,
p.123).

The tragedy is that what was deemed a shortcoming of beat
associations in 2002 has since been taken over by media organizations who now organize all sorts of awards for their clients, with
many of them beholden to the sponsors.
As one of the FGD participants observed:
Today, you have newspapers giving awards. Even NUJ (Nigeria Union
of Journalists) gives awards. If you get money from such enterprise,
it is not very likely that you would do very balanced stories (on your
patrons).

Indeed, news organizations have been known to confer awards
on all sorts of characters with questionable antecedents without
any sense of shame or remorse.
Deceptive Content packaging
Corruption is at the heart of the practice where the news media present sponsored special section stories as news features. It
amounts to non full disclosure and shortchanges the audience.
Corruption is promoted where the media unduly sensationalizes,
where the headline has little bearing on the body of the story. It
is a depraved and short-lived attempt to hoodwink the consumer into patronizing media products that are otherwise undeserving. Corruption is inherent in the use of undue adjectives such as
“leader of thought”, “opinion leader” to qualify news subjects to
whom journalists have a less than professional association. Such
stories are said to smell of patronage such as a bottle of beer
in bygone era. These days, it refers more to exchange of money.
Public relations practitioners speak a lot of many press releases
published in the media today only seeing the light of day when
supported by pecuniary or material gifts.
Appearance fee at briefings
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Some journalists, usually the senior ones, also receive what is
known as appearance fee when they attend high profile briefings
by politicians or corporate big guns. Sometimes expensive gifts
are preferred to cash and this set of journalists has been known to
receive high end laptops, I-Pads etc.
WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION?
As stated elsewhere, factors responsible for corruption in the
media range from the economic to the political and the social.

Economic: Poor branding, Sliding sales, limited advertising, erosion of
appeal by social media, impaired ability of employers to meet obligations—late salaries, inability of staff to discharge their responsibility,
pressure to moonlight to make ends meet
Political: Inability to differentiate between political sympathies and loyalty to professionalism. Dwindling influence of the media, which are
seen as irritants and barely tolerated in political circles.
Social: Playing catch up in the face of sweeping social media impact
(accompanied) by a sense of professional inadequacy ((Idowu, 2015).

At the heart of corruption is an opportunity for extra income
of the illegitimate or difficult-to-justify type. It is not wrong for
journalists to want to augment their income as multiple streams
of income remain valid, provided they do not arise from situations
that conflict with their professional and ethical obligations. The
problem arises where the source is hazy, shady and difficult to
justify in the open.
Irregular and Poor remuneration
Irregular or low pay can sometimes be a factor in stimulating
corrupt practices in journalism. The industry has never been high
paying, but the matter is compounded when the low pay is not
forthcoming. Journalists resort to moonlighting to make ends
meet. Such legitimate outlets as speechwriting, teaching, and research provide additional opportunities for journalists to hone
their skills and earn extra income. Others embrace options that
provide quicker returns but are less honorable. Journalists of this
mould engage in racketeering. In more recent times where the
distressed economy has impaired employers’ ability to discharge
their obligations, journalists have received added boost to indulge
in unwholesome practices.
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Nkereuwem (2012) provides the depressing salary compensation for Nigerian journalists as ranging:

Between N20, 000 and N40, 000 ($124-$247). One or two pay about
N70, 000 ($432)--these ones are the high flyers. It is therefore conclusive that more than 80 per cent of the journalists in the country do not
earn enough to pay their basic bills.

Such reality, says Oshunkeye (2011), provides justification for
unethical behavior:

As long as we continue paying journalists slave wages, as long as media owners continue to pay wages that hardly take journalists home,
so long would the roots of corruption in the industry deepen. So long
would mediocrity continue to thrive in the industry, and so long would
the consuming public continue to doubt products that the media churn
out day after day. If the journalists happen to come from organizations
that are struggling, or if they work in a media where they are being
owed four or five months’ salary, it becomes so easy for them to rationalize their decision to accept the offer of ‘brown envelope’. And the
easier it becomes for them to adulterate the truth they know. And this
often puts the society in great jeopardy in the long run.

A female participant at the FGD discussion cites the example of
NEXT, an enterprising newspaper, which vanished after two years
in the market:

When (Dele) Olojede started NEXT they were paying well until they
couldn’t sustain it, because the company could not service their loan.
Some of their reporters who were not collecting bribes initially had to
start collecting it because they stopped paying. There is a particular
case of one who had refused on one occasion, but had to go back to
collect it when he realized he had bills to pay.

Greed
Greed has always been a motivator for those without self
contentment. The corrupt journalist can be found in the league of
those who covet that extra income from unacceptable means that
is undisclosed to employers and hidden from the state. It is driven
by the desire to keep for oneself what otherwise would have been
shared with employers or taxed by the state. It is this factor that
appeals more to Nkereuwem (2012) than poor or late pay:
As much as we may argue that journalists are prone to taking bribes
because of their poor remuneration, the truth is that it is greed and the
desire for more than we can legitimately acquire that pushes journalists
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to take bribes. If a person cannot take a gun to rob another person because he does not have enough, he ought not to take a bribe because
he does not have enough. Both are criminal acts; if you are religious,
both are sins.

Low ethical values
Improper conduct is at the heart of corruption. It is the “conscienceless appropriation of the commonwealth for private gain”
(Idowu, 2009: 183). At play is the self above the common good.
Whilst the common good is about a journalism that informs and
educates, that empowers the citizen with useful information and
commentary to guide conduct, the corrupt journalist is concerned
with self interest and the accruing private gain. While public journalism crows about the journalist’s independence of action in selecting the news fare to process and disseminate, corrupt journalism imprisons independent judgment in the court of vested
interests. While the service delivery of public journalism is committed to common good if tinged in parts with elements of enlightened self interest, corrupt journalism is about naked self interest. In ruling out poor pay alone as a corrupting factor, Agu
(2008) alludes to poor ethical values in journalists as also propelling corruption:

The remuneration system is bad. Although it has improved in a number
of media houses, there is still room for improvement. This, however,
does not mean that a good pay alone is a panacea to the prevalent
level of corruption. Some people who are well paid are still very fraudulent. There is the need to dwell more on ethical training, history and
philosophy, so that the role of the journalist as a trustee of the public
and the society becomes internalized as an article of faith.

An environmental journalist who participated in the FGD recalls
how his strong ethical values prevented him from succumbing to
the lure of lucre:

In 2014, I did a story on environmental degradation as a result of cement production. The moment we got to the community, the people
told us they would not talk to us because other journalists had come at
different points but did not do the story. We promised them we would
be different. As we continued the story, the company got wind of it and
they offered us N10million, but we rejected it. They threatened us on
several occasions and got people to talk to me. On another account,
they went to my school to report me to the HOD. If you are the type
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that loves money, don’t go into journalism.

Wanting to be like Joneses
Journalists get drawn into corrupt acts when they fail to understand the difference between journalism and other sectors of
the economy such as banking and energy. Whilst it is true that
journalism does not have to sentence its workers into penury, it is
unrealistic now to expect basic reportorial duties to command the
same pay as an executive in any of the above mentioned sectors.
Journalists who become disgruntled because they cannot match
up with their relations or friends in these sectors are prone to corruptive acts. Whilst those with strong moral fibre may engage in
other legitimate endeavors to augment their income, the morally
weak or those with personal sense of inadequacy may readily recourse to accepting invisible income to keep up with the Joneses.
A print journalist at the FGD speaks to the problem when she
observed:

If you want to play according to the rules, you have to be comfortable.
What stops me from earning as much as anybody who is any industry?
Until people realize that we have a duty to make the democracy work,
they won’t pay attention to the challenges in the media.

Lack of sufficient Interest
There are many in journalism that are mere birds of passage;
they see the occupation as a stepping stone to other things, and
lack any passion for it. For such people whatever they can make
from journalism and however they make it adds up to the mission
of exploiting the job for the immediate rewards it brings. According to the duo of Jimi Disu and Taiwo Obe in the July 9, 2017
edition of The Discourse on Classic FM 97.3, the culture of the
newsroom has changed from what it was in the 1980s when they
were foot soldiers in the newsroom. The passion of news hunting,
they say, has yielded way to journalism as a meal ticket with few
news organs showing zero tolerance for corruption.
Conflict of interest
Inability to differentiate between the role of a public interest
journalist and special interest publicist is also a common problem for journalists. Many find it difficult to maintain an emotion-
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al detachment from the stories they investigate and report. They
become so involved they soon wear the garb of a sympathizer
and publicist who crosses over from the professional reporter to
the unofficial spokesperson that manages the reputation of the
organization they are paid to monitor and report on. Because they
are so involved, they begin to suppress some unpalatable stories
about the organization. They do not need to be paid for the services being rendered. The corruption is inhered in the fact that
they have unwittingly started to shortchange their audiences by
giving incomplete accounts of what is happening in that sector.
It amounts to what I have described elsewhere as “attempting to
run with the hare and hunt with the hounds” (Idowu, 2002), (MR,
June), 5 2009, p.123).
Ethical ignorance and Poor articulation of Editorial
philosophy by Corporate Bodies
There are journalists who are deployed to the field with little
grounding in the ethics of the job. Some do not know they are not
expected to collect gratification from news sources. Some see it as
perks of the office and are acculturated by despicable seniors to
see it so. They grow up with a false sense of entitlement with great
injury to their individual sense of worth and the soul of the profession. At a seminar for maritime journalists in June 2015 (Idowu,
2015) of the 30 participating journalists, half confessed not being
conversant with the code of ethics of Nigerian Journalists, which
was adopted in 1998 and a follow up to the Formal agreement
of 1978 (NPO). At another seminar for journalists, this time an inhouse seminar in a Lagos media house in 2014 (Idowu, 2014), seven of the twenty participants struggled to articulate their organization’s editorial policy; a clear indication that many work almost
mechanically without a robust understanding of their place within
their organization’s larger editorial mission. In such situation fidelity to the journalist’s pact with society becomes a mere lip service;
the watchdog role of the media, clearly understated.
Skills Deficiency is another
Many people lack sufficient knowledge of their job and the required dedication to pursue the long route of cultivating needed
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understanding with their contacts on the type of material useful
for publication. So, rather than invest in building that relationship,
they resort to the short course of inducing media access. A male
FGD participant captures the situation:
One of the problems confronting the industry is inadequacies on the
part of several stakeholders. The PR man who wants his material published knows that some of his material are not worthy of being published, so he seeks to influence the media. Rather than just send their
invitations and count on the media to use their discretion, what they do
is to tout. And when you tout, you pay, knowing that stories compete
for attention. PR practice in Nigeria is largely media-driven and they
know it.

Poor Branding, Inadequate Capitalization
This poor articulation also speaks to the erosion of the brand
identity in the market place, which fuels poor performance as reflected in poor sales and inability to cope with the changing business mode, and which in turn impair employers’ ability to pay their
workers in due season. Bello (2017) of Thisday offers an interesting perspective:

The media has always been badly funded. We have investors who think
the media is what you get into and reap immediately, forgetting that
it is expensive with high cost of running and as such profits take time.
When they realize this, they stop funding and the workers are left to
fend for themselves. There are also investors who go into media business for politics. The readers and stakeholders out there are very discerning. The moment they see that this particular media is for political
promotion and it is (being) done in an unprofessional way, they will
not buy. When this happens, you will not have a market share or make
enough money. That is where the problem begins.

cumulative result of poor funding, product packaging and
market research is that both the organization and the employee
resort to desperate measures to stay afloat with dire consequences.
The

The result is a dance of survival, which leaves many with broken limbs
and sprained ankles, which translate to inability to discharge their responsibilities such as paying salaries on time. In this pitiable condition,
individual practitioners find ready excuse to resort to dishonest means
to make ends meet and corporate players become mincemeat for capricious interest groups. The public’s right to as full a picture of the
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course of events as possible becomes compromised (Idowu, 2002:5,
2009, p.123-124).

Survival
In full realization of the reality of publishing as big business
and the deflation of promoters’ outsized ego, many publishers become contractor-publishers ready to do the bidding of the state
and other vested interests by turning their media to grateful lapdogs for patronage. Many journalists convert their identity cards
to extortion licenses in emulation of what the publishers do. Nwabauni’s well known example brings a chilling reminder:
My friend, who was a reporter with one of Nigeria’s popular newspapers, said her boss often justified his non-payment of salaries by saying:
I’ve given you a platform to make money. Use it.

This survival mentality accounts for the dent in image when
the media was fingered as a beneficiary of slush funds from the
amount budgeted for fighting the Boko Haram insurgency in the
country’s Northeast. Nowhere in recent history is the underwhelming state of the media in matters of rectitude publicly displayed
than in the Office of the National Security Adviser’s (ONSA’s) slush
fund that was paid to keep the media quiet following a brazen seizure of newspaper copies from distribution vans and newsstands
in June 2014. Government agents had justified the action under
the guise they were looking for arms and ammunitions. Expectedly, the move attracted media condemnation, more so when these
seizures did not unveil any of these deadly weapons for arms and
ammunitions. In the uncertainty of the time, normal operations
were disrupted. Issues begging to be addressed ranged from
whether the raid was a prelude to renewed assault against the
media as was the case under military rule. Some of the victims
threatened to sue the government. Some called for a trenchant
opposition to the administration.
Spotting an opportunity to resolve the impasse, the newspapers
under the aegis of the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) resolved to dialogue with the government. A meeting was arranged with then President Goodluck Jonathan in Lagos,
who apologized for the embarrassment caused NPAN members.
An agreement was reached to settle the matter out of court. A
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sum of N120 million was agreed to be shared among twelve (later 13) newspaper organizations affected: Blueprint, BusinessDay,
Guardian, Independent, Leadership, Nation, New Telegraph, Nigerian Tribune, People’s Daily, Sun, Thisday, Trust, and Vanguard. Each
organization was to pocket N9 million and the balance of N3 million, given to the NPAN secretariat. By the time the scandal broke
out at the probe panel instituted by the government of President
Muhammadu Buhari, eight of the beneficiaries had collected their
allocations. The deal became a scandal in the public space when
it was established that the slush fund was from the money earmarked by the previous administration to fight the Boko Haram
terrorist insurgency in the Northeast of the country. The circuitous
manner in which the payment was routed through the account
of a company that was alien to the NPAN under the dodgy expense head of energy consultancy showed the untidiness of the
deal. When it became clear, the media coordinator of the deal,
NPAN’s President, Nduka Obaigbena, also secured additional sum
of N550 million for his organization ostensibly as compensation
for the bombing of his newspaper’s Abuja office in April 2012, the
image of the media nosedived.
The NPAN scandal epitomizes grand corruption where the organized media agreed to collect public funds secretly from the
government as compensation for earlier infractions against the
media. It was not wrong for the media to reach an out of court
settlement. What was odious was that it was done secretly; it was
an abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which prevented the
media from establishing the principle for the general good that in
a democracy all actions by the government and the people must
be rooted in respect for the rule of law. By shielding its agreement
with government from the public, it made a mockery of the media’s cry for free access to information, promotion of transparency
and accountability in governance. It failed in making the public
know that the law is no respecter of persons and governments.
The immediate consequence as Fatade (2015) observes is the
crisis of legitimacy it creates for the organized media:
It remains doubtful if the present crop of media owners and journalists
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can superintend Nigeria’s democratic journey to the Promised Land
based on what we have seen so far. We cannot also continue to pretend that all is well with our profession by refusing to speak out against
corruption that is incapacitating us from playing our watchdog role
effectively. Of course I support the argument that we might not expect
the media to be different as corruption permeates every area of our
lives but with the self-assigned and constitutionally-guaranteed oversight functions of the media, Dasukigate offers us ample opportunity
to review our activities and how we have succeeded in throwing the
profession to the dogs.

CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION ON THE
NEWS PROCESS AND SOCIETY
The immediate challenge resides in the nature of corruption
and its erosion of the fidelity attached to news as the balanced,
professional and independent processing of information into
news of value for the consumer. Journalism’s role in society is to
guide public understanding through a fair, balanced portrayal of
happenings. It is a professional task, which presupposes that to
every issue there is more than one side and demands journalists
should evaluate the issues at stake, leaving no stone unturned before presenting findings the public can trust and act upon. After all
as Dennis (1991) quoted in Idowu (2015, 5) says:
The public is buying a communication system, they are paying for public communication, and it stands to reason they want the resulting information to be competently gathered, accurate and useful to them.

Where what is presented as facts are no more than procured or
manufactured alternative facts, a credibility problem arises. Where
the public cannot trust the media, a great pillar of democracy becomes weakened and the constitutional role of holding government accountable to the people compromised.
Redefines the Concept of News
Because corruption is deceitful and amounts to the enthronement of self interest above communal good, it ends up eroding
standards. As previously observed:
Rather than an unvarnished picture of happenings in society it becomes
a tainted account for special interest groups. Rather than the forum for
ventilating useful ideas, the integrity of news becomes compromised
and a steady and dangerous disconnect between society and its com-
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ponent parts is set in motion (Idowu, 2013, Media Review March/April
2013).

Takes the audience for granted
Corruption insults the intelligence of the audience by purporting to give them a tainted and fractured picture of reality. It makes
a mockery of the ‘truth’-searching function of journalism, which
should propel journalists to dig and unearth the many sides to
an issue in the effort to get as near a complete picture of an issue
as humanly possible. This enterprise is expected to be guarded
jealously as it gives both the reporter and the news medium advantage over others. That is the contract journalists have with society, not the enthronement of pack journalism, which promotes
conformity and not divergence.
Ultimately Damages Media credibility
Nothing makes a medium gasp for breath early than one that
is lacking in credibility (Idowu, 2015: 9). When what a medium
is publishing is at variance with what the public is experiencing,
the medium soon slides into irrelevance because rather than be a
long distance runner it loses steam early as a sprinter. Withdrawal
of patronage is the punishment an abused patron can visit on a
medium that takes delight in calling the patron a fool. The saying
that you can fool the people sometimes but not all the time underscores the relationship between a medium and its patrons.
Corrodes the notion of public service and
compromises standards
Corruption lowers standards and corrodes the public service
meaning of much of serious journalism. It results into a situation
where the people look up to the media to play out its agenda-setting role but in exchange receive a diluted coverage, full of fury
without substance. Where they get a docile lapdog instead of a
vigilant watchdog, the notion of public service is corroded, standards become compromised, and negative values are enthroned
(Idowu 2013).
Underreports important areas of the economy/society
A situation where progressively, the media deploy cloudy lens
to monitor society results into the media ignoring some important
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areas of society thereby imperiling and weakening society’s reliance on the media as a faithful barometer of public opinion and
happenings in society.
Corruption encourages the media to promote the asinine at
the expense of the deep and developmental. The World Bank in a
publication on how corruption impacts development, says:
Corruption is bad for development. It leads governments to intervene
where they need not, and it undermines their ability to enact and implement policies in areas in which government intervention is clearly
needed.

It can be said that corruption is bad for journalism. Development issues, which may not bring immediate bread and butter
benefits such as associated with the political and economic news
beats, tend to suffer. Corruption leads media organizations to elevating pseudo events into big events and emphasizing issues that
do not justify such attention. It has the capacity to undermine the
robust concern for the socio-economic transformation of society
as envisaged in Chapter II of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution on the
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy,
which cites concern for the environment, provision of jobs, food
and shelter for the citizenry as urgent state duties.
Ethical disservice
Corrupt reporting compromises the editorial independence of
the journalist, which is one of the cardinal professional ethics, in
that what is published becomes what is procured not what is significant. It undermines the media’s ability to independently examine society, and pick areas truly deserving of media attention.
It makes a mockery of the maxim that He who comes to equity
must come with clean hands since tainted conscience and compromised hands cannot see corruption as a national war to prevent the conversion of commonwealth to private pockets.
COMBATING CORRUPTION
In fighting corruption in the media, efforts must be made to
promote awareness of corruption by connecting its menace to real
life situations. Journalists must also be reminded of their quadruple mandate of responsibility to self, the profession, the state, and
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their organization. The notion of responsibility needs to be developed first in the individual for it to be imbibed and practiced. The
ethical concerns of journalism emphasize its truth-seeking function in the concern for such principles as accuracy, fairness and
balance. The constitution of the land assigns a watchdog role to
the media, enjoining a vigilant oversight of freedom to uphold the
responsibility of government to the people. Finally, every self respecting medium must nurture and defend its credibility before its
publics. An increasingly professionalized media can only be useful
to an organization if it is useful to society since no medium exists
just for itself. So, a number of measures are needed to be able to
stimulate the desired change in media environments.
Produce media managers (beyond reporting)
The training of mass communication professionals needs
strengthening in the area of media management. What currently obtains emphasizes the reporting side of training with scant
attention to the management side. More courses in the fields of
economics, business administration/management and marketing
need to be integrated into the training curriculum of mass communicators with the ultimate goal of allowing specialization in media management. Too many promising publications have simply
disappeared because of marketing and management problems.
Using the travails of Newswatch magazine, which resulted into a
takeover, as reference, I had noted in 2011:
The financial difficulties experienced by Newswatch are being replicated in many newspapers across the country. In many instances, accomplished writers do not necessarily make successful managers. In the
long term, media training curricula require that closer attention be paid
to media/business management than has hitherto been the case. In the
short term, we, media managers need to rethink our business models,
bury our egos and seek for help if we are not to supervise the untimely interment of our enterprises or hand them over to publishers with
questionable credentials. (Idowu 2011, NEXT, May 11).

Fund media operations and Pay journalists better
Improved business management should make a difference in
the fortunes of the news media with vital areas of marketing, distribution, engagement, penetration, reporting and editing being
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run by specialists. In such a situation, needed funds will be available for improved compensation that can reduce the temptation
for journalists to moonlight to make ends meet. Whilst poor pay
is not sufficient reason for corruption, it does alongside irregular
payment provide incentive for receiving sop.
Eniola Bello, managing director of Leaders and Company, publishers of Thisday titles, is unequivocal on fair and timely payment
of wages:
The first thing is to ensure there is proper funding. Pay well and pay
on time. For instance, why would a journalist leave his job where he is
a core staff and go to work in banks where he is a support staff? It is
certainly not because they enjoy the job, it is about resources. The organizations send them on funny errands, and even request to see their
press releases in some instances. I give you a funny example. When
I was the editor, a journalist-turned public relations executive came
to my office and complained that I used a photo where his boss was
frowning. I sent him away.

With proper funding media organizations should be able to pay
their staff better, invest more in investigative reporting through
which the capacity of media to connect more with their audiences, impact on governance, and promote change would be better
enhanced. With a more credible media, standards and patronage
will improve and journalists better remunerated.
Ground journalists in the rudiments of the profession
Deploying journalists to the field without adequate grounding
is counterproductive. Many have not imbibed the corporate philosophy sufficiently well before being assigned to corruptive environments where bad behavior is easily copied. When the abnormal appears normal, it becomes almost a mission impossible to
make them unlearn their bad habits. A situation where journalists
are unfamiliar with the ethics of their profession is dangerous. Not
only should they be exposed to its contents, periodic in-house
and external seminars will help them deepen their understanding
of the challenges of their trade, help them to compare notes with
peers and prepare them for better professional engagement. As I
noted elsewhere:
The combined import of the codes is to have the media act rationally,
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fairly, sensibly, and responsibly in the public interest. The pursuit of
truth through honest, fair, factual and balanced account of significant
happenings in society is at the heart of the watchdog and gate keeping functions of the media. When that trust in the content of what the
media serve the public is missing, journalism becomes at best fiction
writing, and at worst, a danger to the society it purports to serve. So
codes are useful, regulatory guides to shape professional conduct.
They distinguish the profession of journalism from a free for all trade
without standards. They recognize the power of the media for good or
ill to shape society and seek to reassure the public that media responsibility is something taken seriously, not only as a constitutional duty,
but indeed a personal, professional and organizational responsibility
(Idowu, 2015B).

Retrain journalists regularly
Journalism is a knowledge-based activity which requires updating of practitioner’s knowledge to be able to inform the public
appropriately. It is a craft that requires constant honing of skills.
Regular training and retraining remain pivotal for it to play the
role of a pathfinder and educator in society.
Move journalists round beats periodically
Part of what predisposes journalists to undue familiarity with
news sources is prolonged stay on particular beats. Whilst experience helps in cultivating contacts and servicing networks, journalists’ overall professional development is helped where there is
wide exposure to other fields. Promoters of pack journalism can be
found largely in the rank of journalists covering specialized fields.
Develop reward schemes to encourage professional journalism
Awards remain useful barometers for benchmarking and assessing professional output in the media. They spur journalists to
greater productivity and generate healthy competition. They bring
recognition that opens wider opportunities for professional development and remain a cherished tool to enhance professionalism.
Examples of such media awards in Nigeria include the Diamond
Awards for Media Excellence (DAME), which has run annually from
inception in 1992 to date, the Nigeria Media Merit Award (NMMA)
and the Wole Soyinka Investigative Awards (WSIA). Such platforms
need to be strengthened by development partners, media owners,
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corporate bodies committed to excellence so that they can continue to be fountains of encouragement for ambitious journalists
who want to be acclaimed for professional excellence.
Provide journalists with outlets/forums to discuss
professional challenges
Media owners need to devote more attention to ethical challenges and provide outlets for regular assessment of media performance. Internal and external ombudsmen are necessary to interface regularly with the workforce to provide timely feedback
on performance and stimulate discussion of challenges faced on
the field. Media NGOS and professional associations also require
more encouragement in this area. If journalism is to continue to
remain relevant and impactful, there must be sustainable interest
in discussing the challenges of the profession.
Punish infraction of journalistic codes through naming
and shaming mechanisms
The organized media must come to terms with the need for
media regulation as a public trust-building mechanism to enhance media credibility. Too much energy has been dissipated on
whether a statutory or voluntary regulatory body is desirable. Experience has shown that both models are problematic. The Nigerian Press Council, first established in 1978, rechristened Nigeria
Media Council in 1988, and renamed Nigerian Press Council again
in 1993, is distrusted by the organized media who see in it a ruse
for government control. The government, on its part, through inconsistency, has fuelled this distrust. The media’s preferred alternative, the Independent Ombudsman mechanism, remains a fine
idea in print, which is yet to get the public’s buy-in since its establishment in 2009. The statutory model is underperforming having
had most of its assigned responsibilities adjudged incompatible
with provisions of the 1999 Constitution by a federal high court. In
the face of no serious attempt to challenge the court’s judgment,
a hybrid public-private mediatory body that is jointly funded may
offer the most promising future. It will require men and women of
good faith admitting failure and expressing desire to start de novo
for a new partnership that will result in an inexpensive mediatory
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council where ethical breaches can be addressed and regular pronouncements on media infractions made. Such declarations will
have the salutary effect of using moral suasion of naming and
shaming to moderate media behavior. There is no point having
codes of ethics that no one is examining periodically. The growth
of professional practice is best assured where the media as an
institution is prepared to submit to the peer review of fellow professionals operating independently in such a council. The example
of Media Review as an independent, private effort has shown that
it is possible to subject the media as an institution to regular analyses for self improvement. If such a model could run for a quarter
of a century years, a better funded version by a committed public-private partnership should be able to improve on it.
Encourage plural ownership and commit owners to
ethical journalism
Media pluralism in a society as diverse as Nigeria along lines
of ethnicity, religion, gender, class remains not only desirable but
imperative. Media owners need to be encouraged to see their investments as public trusts that require credibility for them to be
useful to even the owners. Media businesses should be nurtured
along sound business principles and less as ego trips for longevity in the market place. To encourage public interest journalism,
funding models need to be reviewed in light of the digital disruption that continues to alter the old ways of doing business. The
alternative will be slow, painful death of their businesses. Whilst
strong media organs are necessary, government, through the legal environment, should also put in place antitrust measures to
ensure that what should be a democratic and liberating industry
is not reduced to a monopolist, restrictive agenda-setting sector.
Last Word
There is hope for the future but a lot will be expected of people
of goodwill from owners to managers, workers, and professional
bodies to take the necessary internal cleansing steps within the
media. From the governments, there is need to provide positive
legal framework to encourage responsible journalism to thrive
such as strengthening antitrust laws to discourage media oligop-
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olies. There must still be room for Public service journalism especially on public owned electronic stations. Everything cannot
be abandoned to the whims of commercial journalism as there
remain legitimate public concerns and developmental issues that
commercial journalism cannot adequately serve if our media must
be seen as watchdogs and our democracy endure.
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4
Changing Economic, Technological And
Ownership Landscapes
Ayo Olukotun
Introduction

The Nigerian media have come a long way from their incarnation as traditional outlets, manifested in orature, festivals, town
criers and village square assemblies through the rudimentary print
journalism and pamphleteering of the colonial period and the analogue format of newspapers and television in the post colonial
period, to the more recent digital innovations and the hybridized
structures intermeshing electronic formats with more familiar
forms (Olukotun, 2002, 2003 and 2013). It has been argued by
scholars such as Kerr (2011) that the new media with its bloggers,
internet chatrooms, citizen journalists and social media recall the
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dialogic and bottom-up horizontal communication modes of the
indigenous African media, and therefore, are all the more participatory and democracy enhancing. There is of course, a contrary
point of view, which alludes to the rise of a Netocracy, populated
by young urban professionals with access to the internet and its
global spinoffs, as opposed to an underclass that, in a metaphor
employed by Castells (2000) are switched off from global currents.
This chapter discusses issues of changing economics, technologies, ownership and production in the period between 1999 and
2016, in order to assess the capacity profile of the media, with
reference to their abilities to carry-out their roles as watchdogs.
Obviously, the capacity of the media to act as healthy watchdogs,
which has a long ancestry in Nigerian media history and culture,
is a function of such issues as ownership structure, changing
technologies, production modes, governance structure as well as
shifting perceptions of audiences who consume media products.
Hence, despite the fact that many Nigerian newspapers have crusading titles, such as Vanguard, the Punch, Nigerian Tribune and
the Champion, their performance of the watchdog role which is
also stipulated by Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution, is a matter to be determined less by a militant press ideology than their
strength or weakness as players in the economic and technological market place. That point is put differently by Coronell (2010:
13), who argues that “The journalist as watchdog therefore, is a
role defined differently across countries and cultures. That definition is fluid often contingent on the existing social, political and
economic conditions and a reflection as much of the historical
moment as it is of preexisting structures and media cultures.”
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the watchdog role of the Nigerian
media in the period understudy has been enhanced by the emergence of a diasporic online media, typified by the investigative
Sahara Reporters, which has often provided stimulation and actual corruption stories for the local media which are increasingly
inserted into global news flows. Another example of the impact of
changing technology of the Nigerian media is provided in the early days of the Fourth Republic by TheNews magazine, which broke
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the news concerning the fake credentials of the former Speaker
of the House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari. While reporters of
TheNews carried out investigations within the country, the American angle of the research, which required a verification of Buhari’s claim to have attended the University of Toronto, Canada
was conducted by Dapo Olorunyomi, who had lived in the United
States on exile in the twilight of the military years, as well as Kunle
Ajibade, another founding director, who was also in the United
States at the time. This transnational collaboration, checking of
data, as well as the use of internet facilities gave a robust mien to
the expose, which led to the resignation of the former Speaker.
As a postscript to one of the finest moments of that magazine, it
is interesting to remark that the vicissitudes and hardship, which
surround media production, occasioning the closure of several
newspapers, has turned TheNews into an occasional and irregular
publication which exists mainly as an online medium, mirroring a
global trend in the decline of newspapers.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections, namely:
the global backdrop, changing economic and technological profiles of the Nigerian media as well as the concluding section which
ties the issues together.
2.1 The Global Backdrop
The media, in their variegated genres, are central to globalization and indeed to civilization. There is no doubt concerning
the pervasiveness of media demonstrated by the widening spread
of internet penetration, the use of personal computers, cellular
phones, as well as the reach of Cable News Network (CNN). As
Castells (2000) reminds us, political leadership and much of the
substance of politics have become inseparable from the power of
the media to draw, and to fix images in the public consciousness.
Nigeria and much of Africa remains a backwater, recent changes
notwithstanding, in an information age, in which the United States
and a handful of countries including China are dominant. For example, ‘platform imperialism’ by which it is meant the hegemony
of the United States on social networks, search engines and smart
phones leaves Nigeria at the margins of these transforming devel-
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opments.
As Jin (2013,145) informs:

The hegemonic power of American-based platforms is crucial because
Google, Facebook, iPhone, and Android have functioned as major digital media intermediaries thanks to their advanced roles in aggregating
several devices. The U.S, which had previously controlled non-Western
countries with its military power, capital, and later cultural products,
now seems to dominate the world with platforms, benefitting from
these platforms, mainly in terms of capital accumulation.

Table 1: List of 20 most popular Web sites (2017)
Alexa
traffic
Rank
(As of
April 3,
2017)

Site

Domain

Google

google.com

1

Facebook

Facebook.
com

3

You Tube

Baidu

Wikipedia
Yahoo!

youtube.com

2

Similar
Web
Top
Websites (As Type
of May
2017)
1

Search engine

2

Social Network US

3

11

Search engine

China

yahoo.com

6

4

Portal and
media

U.S

5

5

7

27

Google India

google.co.in

8

9

Taobao

Taobao

10

65

Tmall

140

U.S

4

wikipedia.org

Reddit.com

Amazon

Video sharing

U.S

Baidu.com

Reddit

Tencent QQ

Principal
country

qq.com

amazon.com
tmall.com

9

11
12

36

14
74

Encyclopedia

U.S

Social news
and entertainment

US

Portal

China

Search engine

India

Online shopping

China

Retail

Online shopping

U.S

China
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Twitter

twitter.com

13

6

Social network

U.S

Sohu

Sohu.com

15

204

Portal

China

Google
Japan

google.co.jp

Windows live live.com

14

16

20

7

VK

Vk.com

17

12

Sina Corp

sina.com.cn

19

110

360 Safeguard

360.cn

20

85

Instagram

Instagram.
com

18

15

Search engine

Email.web
services and
software suite

Japan

U.S

Social network

Russia

Portal and
instant media

China

Photo sharing and social
media

US

Internet securi- China
ty software

Source: Alexa.com, July 23, 2017.

As table 1 above shows, the domination of platforms by the
United States is moderated slightly by the emergence of China
as a notable global player. Hence, what we have is the carrying
forward and strengthening of the preeminent position of the United States in information, cultural, and now platform imperialism.
The significance of this for Africa, and Nigeria in particular is that
the emerging global public sphere, is as Curran (2000:13) informs
“developing in a lopsided, uneven way which is clearly connected
to wider inequalities of power and resources in the world”. This
information asymmetry is reinforced by the global dominance of
news agencies located in the United States, and Europe, as well
as the increasing concentration, through vertical and horizontal
integration of media in a few hands. This results in the efficient
transmission of Western, especially cultural perspectives and the
dominance of a neoliberal world view. Franklin and Love (1998)
are substantially correct, therefore, when they see the global media dominated by the United States as agenda setters for Nigeria,
Africa, and the rest of the world.
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Another trend worth mentioning is the decline of newspapers,
and their uncertain future in the form in which they have existed for centuries. Particularly hit by the downturn are newspapers
in the United States and Britain, where the digital revolution has
been reshaping the industry. The Bloomberg QuickTake in a report
on May 19, 2015, entitled The Fading Newspaper informs that in
the United States:
Industry’s revenue has fallen by more than a third since 2005, its best
year, when sales reached $60.2billion. Newsrooms are shrinking and
most papers are printing less news. Today, newspapers employ roughly a third fewer professionals than they did at their peak in 1989…
Since2011, prominent papers like the New York Times, the Washington
Post, and the Chicago Tribune have started digital subscription plans in
hopes that readers would pay to preserve traditional news gathering.

In the United Kingdom, according to The Audit Bureau of Circulation, between 2001 and 2014, the circulation of the ten major
national newspapers declined from 12.6million copies sold on average each day, to 6.89million copies. The predictions and prospects for growth or recovery in that country and several others
in Western Europe are not too bright. This decline, though real,
appears not to have diminished the political influence of newspapers since it doesn’t take account of online readers, as well as their
power to set agenda for television, and the online media.
As Harvard Professor, Norris Pippa (2000) warns, it is possible to
make too much of the narrative of newspaper decline, which has
been frequently espoused before the challenges posed by the internet. It also understates both the popularity of newspapers and
their ability to connect or adapt to changing modes of production
and distribution (Pippa 2000). There is also a counter narrative to
the story of decline in Asia and Latin America. In India for example,
newspapers are booming in the face of growing internet penetration. An article, in the Huffington Post (May10, 2015), informs that
despite 214 million internet users in India, the newspaper business
is thriving with 94,000 registered newspapers, up from 14,000 in
2011, and strengthened still by increasing circulation for several
newspapers.
Before zeroing in on Nigeria, it is important not to erect the
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examples of the United States and Western Europe into a typology
that fits all cases. It is also interesting to observe as Thussu (2007)
has documented, that global media flows, dominated by the United States are also countervailed by contraflows from developing
countries, some of which like South Africa and India, are increasingly global players.
Nigeria, still at the margins of this development, has already
entered the global market place with Nollywood, and the emergence of a diasporic online media such as, Sahara Reporters which
are accessed globally. As Thussu (2000,18) correctly observes,
on this score “In this era of globalization, the one way vertical
flow, has given way to multiple and horizontal flows as subaltern
media content providers have emerged to service an ever growing geo-cultural market”. For example, Hollywood, and Nigeria’s
growing entertainment industry, estimated to be worth 55 billion
dollars, and increasing annually, is rated in some quarters as one
of the most profitable businesses internationally, thus providing a
clear example of lucrative subaltern contra flow.
2.2 Changing Economic and Technological Profiles
The period between 1999 and 2017 witnessed phenomenal expansion in the media industry as a result of the liberalized political space, the exigencies of political competition warranting the
replication of media outlets; as well as an economic boom riding
on unprecedented increase in the price of oil in the world market
for many of these years. Nigeria’s oil boom produced a new class
of billionaires, and economic players, several of whom invested in
the media industry. The period consequently, reinforced Nigeria’s
position as the country with the largest and most vibrant media
industry in Africa, followed by South Africa and Kenya. The number of publications is put roughly at 120, several of them founded
in the period since 1999. To give an idea of the expansion of the
media industry cutting across several types, the former Director
General of the Nigerian Broadcast Commission, Emeka Mba, informed two years ago (Punch, September 1, 2015) that Nigeria has
the biggest broadcast sector in Africa, as it boasted of 133 federal television, 122 state radio, 68 state television, 51 multi-chan-
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nel, multi-point distribution services, 97 private radio, 43 private
television, 63 federal radio, and 27 campus broadcasting stations.
Obviously, therefore, the country is well covered in terms of the
electronic media with the majority of them owned by the state.
In a trend mirrored across the media, many of these outfits are
rudimentary and exist at the margins of survival. The breakdown
provided by Mba did not include community radios, 17 of which
were approved by the federal government after many years of
struggle and agitation by civil society organizations. It should be
noted that the broadcasting sector is trapped in relative obsolescence as a result of the failure of the country to undertake the
switch over from analog to digital broadcasting. This implies that
Nigeria will continue to broadcast analog signals until it is able to
migrate, hopefully at the end of 2017.
As mentioned, over 120 newspapers, not counting community publications survive in the Nigerian market; although many of
these are shoestring enterprises which can capsize and sometimes
reappear without notice. For example National Interest staged a
comeback in 2003, after it was rested for six months only to go off
the streets terminally three years later. Circulation figures remain
contentious because of the failure of the effort made to revive in
2008, the Audit Bureau of Circulation, which had been comatose
for years.
An important development, mentioned earlier, is the growing
number of Nigerians who are able to access the internet and social
media networks, thus resulting in better engagement and participation of citizens in democratic discourse. Significantly for example, the elections of 2011 and 2015, as well as social outbursts such
as the anti-fuel price increase of 2012 and President Muhammadu
Buhari’s health travails in 2017, were attended by interesting if
occasionally frightening conversations on the social media. According to the Nigerian Communication Commission, the number
of internet users on the Global System for Mobile (GSM) Communications Network jumped from 76,322,802 in 2014 to 81,892,840
by January 2015. It should be mentioned that the increasing use of
social media platforms and internet application is a direct conse-
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quence of the continuous rise in the number of people who subscribe to the mobile telecommunications networks. The National
Bureau of Statistics put the figure of subscribers at 86 million for
2016; up from 2.3million subscribers in 2002.
Access to the internet, has obviously been of tremendous value
to professional journalists as well as citizen journalists, in view of
the abundance of information and the opportunities to connect
with national and global discourse. The problems associated with
patchy networks, breakdown of computers, fitful electricity notwithstanding, journalists are increasingly information technology
savvy, a situation that did not obtain at the beginning of civilian
rule.
As Kperogi (2012) observes, pertinently, the Post Express blazed
the trail of online journalism in Nigeria. According to him:
By the close of the 1990s, a few other newspapers, notably the (Nigerian) Guardian, Punch, Vanguard, and ThisDay, had websites where they
episodically republished selected contents from their print editions. By
early 2000s, almost all the legacy newspapers in Nigeria had some Web
presence aided in part by the aggregation and distribution of their content, along with those of African newspapers, by the AllAfrica.com, the
Washington DC-based multimedia content service provider widely recognized as the world’s largest Africa-centered site (Kperogi 2012:447).

To be noted too, is the fact that the majority of Nigerian newspapers can be read online and maintain active websites. Kperogi
(2011) insists, however, that their online activities and presence
are limited to interactivity, and does not, for the most part, include
the latter stages of multimediality and hypertextuality. As he put
it, “the websites of Nigerian homeland newspapers failed the requirement of Duze’s multimediality and hypertexuality and seem
to be stuck in Pavlik’s first stage in the evolution of online journalism.” (Kperogi, 2011, p.123).
Kperogi recognized, even as at 2011 that several newspapers
such as Leadership, Daily Trust, Punch, and the Nation had moved
on beyond the first stage of online journalism; although he is correct to say that hypertextuality, whereby newspapers can update
content as news breaks, as well as stream video and audio is still
a rarity, while hitches with website functionality were frequent.
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Nonetheless, the situation is rapidly improving, and the vitality of
online journalism has been increased by the addition to the media
space of such online news publications as the Cable commenced
in April 2014, Premium Times, started in October 2011, and Eagle
online started in January 2012 and Bounce commenced in March,
2017. See Table below.
Table 2: Online News Publications
Name of publication

Founder

Date

The Cable

Simon Kolawole

April 29th,2014

The Gleaner News Online
Premium Times
The Eagle Online
Sundiata Post
Global Patriots
The Rainbow
Freedom Online
Newsdairyonline
Real news
Prompt News
Nigeria Politics Online
News Express
New Mail
The Quick News
Greenbarge
Watchdog
Urhobo Today
biztejjers.com
Metro Watch
New Sentinel
The Citizen
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Dapo Olorunyomi
Dotun Oladipo
Max Amuche
Simon Ibe

Chijama Ogbu

Gabriel Akinadewo
Danlami Nmodu

Maureen Chigbo
Akeem Oyetunji

Semiu Okanlawon
Isaac Umunna
Semiu Salami

Monday Ashibogwu
Yusuf Ozi-Usman

Ben-Bright Mkpuma
Laba Oghenekevwe
Yemi Adeoye

Collins Edomarusen
Peter Jones

Malachy Agbo

November 2003
October 1st 2011
January 9, 2012

September 2013
March 2015

February 2013

January 9, 2015

September,2008
November
2012

19,

May 18, 2013
April, 2010

August 29, 2012

September, 2010
November
2007

July 20, 2013

August, 2009
May, 2012

October, 2011

November,2013
March 2014
June, 2012

10,
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Global village Extra

Taiye Olayemi

2013

Micheal Simire

August, 2012

Femi Soneye

persecondnews.com
EnviroNews Nigeria

Segun Adeleye

World Stage

Omoyele Sowore

Sahara Reporters

Omoyele Sowore

Sahara Reporter TV

Remmy Nweke

DigitalSENSE

Horatius Egua

Frontier News

Afolabi Odeyemi

You News

Dr. Ismaila Iro

Gamji.com

Dele Momodu

The Boss

Chude Jideonwo

Ynaija

Simon Ateba

The Simon Ateba News

Mideno Bayegbon

The News Guru

Linda Ikeji

Lindaikejiblog

James Bamisaye

Daily Post

Uche Eze

Bella Naija

Media 24

Bounce

February, 2012
February 7, 2008
2006

April, 2011

August 30, 2009

November, 2011
February, 2012
1998

November, 2015
May, 2010
May, 2015

October, 2016
2007

March, 2015
July, 2006

March, 2017

Source: Research Notes

The list above, it should be pointed out, includes several sites
that are no longer active, or have become moribund, again reflecting a trend in which other kinds of media, in particular newspapers started with gusto, and go off the streets after a few years of
publication. Nonetheless, it is conceivable, given Nigeria’s youthful population that the number of daily readers of news pages on
the web is bigger than the number of those who buy ink stained
papers.
Table 3: Top leading sites
Site
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on site
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Total sites
linking in
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Vanguardngr.com

5:55

2.70

17%

13,835

Guardian.ng

4:39

2.36

21.90%

1,114

Punchng.com

Thisdaylive.com

Sunnewsonline.com
Channelstv.com

Tribuneonline.com

Pmnewsnigeria.com
Nan.ng

7:37
4:01
3:57
3:13
4:57
7:52

11:04

3:46
1:92
2.08
1:86
2.26
2.61
6:46

8.60%

20:40%
14.20%
14.90%
10.90%
11.30%
5.50%

8,896
1,692
1,466
891

1,947
817
289

Source: Alexa, July 23, 2017

As the table above shows, an increasing number of Nigerians,
mainly the elite, are able to get their news, from either the online
versions of major newspapers, or online news sites such as the
influential Premium Times or diasporic Sahara Reporters. Considering that newspapers increasingly source their reports from online publications, a synergy has been created between both forms
of media, especially on anticorruption and human rights issues.
Social media, in spite of their abuses such as the impersonation
of prominent Nigerians like Professor Wole Soyinka and Chief
Olusegun Obasanjo, as well as recycling rumours and fake news,
constitute exciting spaces for civic participation and democratic
discourse.
Nigerian journalist, Tolu Ogunlesi alluded to this dimension
when he wrote (The Punch September 28, 2015) that:
You also have to remember that this is a country for which most of
our history, what one might call truly mass media was in the hand of
the government (television and radio until the liberalization that began
mid-1990s), and what was passed for private or independent wasn’t
really ‘mass’ in its distribution (the newspapers, newsmagazines). It is
into that context that social media have landed, offering us something
truly liberating: mass media in which we are not only consumers but
also producers and distributors as well.

The other side of the explosion in newspapers is the high mortality of titles as a result of a mismanaged economy with severe
infrastructural deficits. Hence, the birth of several new titles as well
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as the high death rate of titles can be seen as two sides of the
same coin. Some of the prominent new titles which have survived
include the Nation 2006, the Sun 2003, Daily Independent 2002,
Leadership 2004, Daily Trust 2001, New Telegraph 2013, and Business Day 2001. Among those that did not survive are; Nigerian
Compass, National Interest, The Comet, Next, New Age, the Anchor,
NewsWatch, the Examiner, Tempo, PM News and others.
The economic climate also affected older titles such as the Post
Express, founded in July 1996 by businessman Sony Odogwu, but
rested in July 2003, the New Nigerian, which for many years was
the regional voice of the northern part of the country, was finally
rested in 2012. The Champion, owned by an Igbo businessman,
Emmauel Iwuanyanwu, has remained comatose for a decade. The
distress was particularly hard on the magazine sector where Tell
and TheNews had to downsize considerably and as at October
2015 were owing their staff several months of salaries. NewsWatch, respected for its sober and dignified analysis, was acquired
after several years of distress by businessman, Jimoh Ibrahim, who
turned it into a daily newspaper, entitled Newswatch Daily. Ibrahim also owns National Mirror, founded in 2006 but which had
become comatose.
Table 4: Some Newspapers Rested Between 1999 and 2016
Title

Year rested

Concord

2000

Sketch

The Post Express

2003

Tempo

2003

The Comet

2007

Spectator Weekly

2008

National Interest
New Age

Westerner

Newswatch
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2006
2008
2011
2011
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Next

2011

Nigerian Compass

2012

New Nigerian
PM News

Newswatch Daily

2012
2015
2016

Source: Research Notes

As mentioned earlier, the protracted default on salaries is a pronounced feature of these years, with some titles and electronic
media, owing as many as 20 months of salaries. News broke two
years ago concerning the sealing of the premises of Daily independent, by the Nigeria Union of Journalists, which accused the
management of owing 23 months of salaries (The Nation, October
8, 2015). There was also the celebrated case of ThisDay newspaper, against which a former editor, Paul Ibe, won a landmark case
in court compelling the company to pay his outstanding salaries
and allowances. The paper reportedly owed between 6-8 months
of salary arrears, a story that is replicated across a wide stratum
of the media.
In this respect, the demise of Next newspaper, which excitingly
deepened accountability through investigative journalism is typical of the difficulties faced by independent newspapers seeking
to make a mark. Adaobi Nwaubani captures this dimension of the
problem when she wrote that:
But revenue soon began to dry up. In Nigeria, established newspapers
are paid to keep big stories off the front page. Adverts are supposed
to buy silence. Often, Next would run a story in its popular weekend
edition, only for editors to arrive at the office on Monday to meet an
aggravated marketing team- certain big advertisers had terminated
their business that morning. After one revelation about corruption in
the oil trade, scores of advertisers instantly pulled out (BBC Africa Report, March 5, 2015).

The point being made here is that advertisers exercise
indirect veto on editorial content by sanctioning independent private media, which set out to be fearless and daring. Considering
that the state is the biggest advertiser, it has often used this pow-
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er to skew the media playing field, in favor of state-owned electronic media as well as compliant and complacent, private media.
Important as that issue is, it is not the only reason for the rapid
collapse of newspapers.
Regarding the escalating cost of input into newspaper production, in most of the years under study, the table below is instructive.
Table 5: Rising Cost of Newspaper Production Input (2004-2016)
N Value
Item

Black Ink

Qty

1 Kilo

2004
380

Printing Film 1 packet 21,990
Newsprint

1 Ton

Plates

1 packet N.A

*N.A - NOT Available

2008
500

2012

1300

33,000 34,000

109, 000 N.A

2015

2016

2017

N.A

N.A

N.A

2421

1,300

2,500

145,000 185,000 185,000 400,000

18,000 21,500

94,500

120,000 160,000

Source: Research Notes

As Table five shows, the increasing cost of newspaper production inputs such as newsprint, plates, and black ink put pressure
on publishers, many of whose enterprises were undercapitalized
to begin with. Another dimension of the problem is the additional pressure that the lack of adequate infrastructure, power and
security, brought on businesses, including newspapers and the
electronic media. Drawing attention to this problem, Mr. Steve
Ojo, President of Galaxy television, a fiercely independent medium argued that:

Government has not supported the industry; the infrastructural facilities that would ensure that the industry thrives are not there. For example- we supply our own power, water and every other infrastructure
we need. Under any circumstance, anywhere (else) in the world, the
government provides all these facilities. In Nigeria the reverse is the
case. (The Punch, April 30, 2005 pg 24)

Noticeable too, is what may be called the return of the north
to Nigeria’s discourse map because of the rebirth of the Northern
media in the years under study. In an ethnically divided country,
and given Adebanwi’s jibe that Nigeria lacks a national media, but
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instead has an Arewa media, Ngbati media and Nkenga media
(Adebanwi, 2002), this rebirth is crucial. As backdrop to this development, the lamentation of the former governor of Nasarawa
state, Dr. Abdulihi Adamu, on the virtual absence of a northern
media from the nation is instructive.. In a 2005 lecture, “Where is
the Northern Press?”, to the Arewa Media Group, he elaborated:
Is there something, I wonder that makes it impossible for newspapers
to survive in this part of the country? Perhaps, the answer lies in the
stubborn refusal to appreciate the role the news media play in the development of societies and in the contest for power, particularly in a
democracy. The balance of power or the balance of terror is a stabilizing factor in every society. I do not argue for a press war. I argue
for freedom from other people’s mass media in order that we may be
heard (Media Review, July 2005, p26).

At the same time as Adamu made these remarks, the New Nigerian had become comatose; it however, did not suspend publication until February 2012. What is of interest is the recent establishment and relative profitability of a clutch of newspapers
based in Abuja such as Leadership, Daily Trust, People’s Daily, and
Abuja Inquirer, among others. In this list, easily the most successful
are the Trust group of publications, which includes, Weekly Trust,
Daily Trust, Sunday Trust and the Hausa language Aminiyah, and
Leadership, founded in 2004 by Sam Nda Isaiah, most recently, a
presidential candidate on the platform of the All Progressive Congress in the 2015 election. These independent newspapers appear to have broken the jinx of frequent collapse of newspapers in
that part of the country. When you add to these, private television
stations such as Desnims, founded by Halifa Baba Ahmed, Gotell TV based in Yola, and the Kano-based Radio Freedom owned
by Bashir Dalhatu among others, one gets a sense of the bounce
back of a northern regional media. The consequence of this is that
of an increasingly level playing field, with regards to the access of
diverse ethnic groups to the media. In this same connection, the
vacuum created by the eclipse of Champion newspapers, has been
filled to a large extent by the newspaper chain of former governor
of Abia state, Dr Orji Uzor Kalu. The chain includes: the Sun and
New Telegraph. Although these are based in Lagos, they draw a
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substantial part of sales and advertising revenue from the SouthEast and the South-South.
Table 6: Ownership and Location of Major Media Institutions
Name Of Medium
The Guardian
ThisDay
The Vanguard
The Punch
Daily Trust
The Nation
National Mirror

Location

Proprietor & State Of Origin

Lagos

Nduka Obaigbena (Delta)

Lagos
Lagos
Lagos
Abuja

Lagos
Lagos

African Independent Television Lagos
Channels Television
The Sun
Leadership

Lagos
Lagos
Abuja

Maiden Ibru (Delta)*

Sam Amuka-Pemu (Delta)

Ogunsola/Aboderin (Oyo)
Kabiru Yusuf (Kano)

Bola Tinubu (Lagos)

Jimoh Ibrahim (Ondo)

Raymond Dokpesi (Edo)
John Momoh (Edo)
Orji Kalu (Abia)

Sam Nda Isiah (Niger)

Source: Research Notes

As Table six demonstrates, although nine out of eleven major
media institutions are located in Lagos, only three of these, the
Punch, the Nation and National Mirror have Yoruba proprietors.
Indeed, the emerging trend as shown in the table is a preponderance (five out of eleven) of media owners from the Niger Delta
area, a fact that may not be unrelated to the petroleum-driven
political economy of Nigeria and the incorporation of the elite
from the Delta area into national framework of accumulation and
distribution of spoils.
As may be expected, a good number of newspapers and electronic media are owned by politicians across the political spectrum. Media Review, in an article, entitled A Peep into Tinubu’s
Media Empire, mentions that the former governor of Lagos state,
Bola Tinubu is a major shareholder in The News magazine, as well
as a proprietor of the Nation newspaper, and the broadcast giant,
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Radio and Television Continental, concluding that he is truly one of
Nigeria’s few media moguls (Media Review, April 2012). Tinubu is
not the only politician to establish media institutions. The case of
Dr. Orji Kalu has already been mentioned; there also is the Nigerian Compass and the Westerner, established by former Ogun state
governor, Gbenga Daniel both of which are defunct. Then there is
the Union, reportedly owned by Diezani Alison Madueke, former
minister for petroleum, and the newspapers of Mr. Jimoh Ibrahim,
a member of the People’s Democratic Party. Ibrahim owned National Mirror, founded in 2006, as well as Newswatch Daily which
he bought over from the former owners of NewsWatch magazine.
Gotel Television based in Yola is owned by Atiku Abubakar, Nigeria’s former Vice President. Although to some extent, ownership of
media by politicians tends to widen the discourse space, it carries
nonetheless, the price tags of partisanship and censorship of journalists who work in these newspapers.
It is worth mentioning too that Nigerian Journalists work under
far from ideal conditions of employment. As the preceding narration has demonstrated, defaults on workers’ salaries are a rampant
syndrome, often presaging the collapse of newspapers. Hence, although most newsrooms, following a trend blazed by ThisDay,
have been updated with computers and other information technology gadgets, widespread abuse in terms of the irregular payments of the salaries of workers has not abated. As African Media
Barometer (2011,52) expressed it:

Across the industry, working conditions for Nigerian Journalists and
other media professionals are poor. Salaries are low, irregular and in
some cases, inexistent. This is not only true of private media organizations even journalists of state-owned media are underpaid and complain of lack of career prospects. Many workers in the state-media are
also recruited as casual staff and work under even more pathetic conditions.

CONCLUDING NOTE
The preceding sections suggest that the media in the period under study continued to be vibrant and visible in national
discourse despite such downsides as frequent collapse of media, economic distress, and protracted defaults on the wages of
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journalists as well as the poor working conditions. Hardest hit are
courageous newspapers such as Next newspaper, which published
major investigative stories of the rot in the petroleum industry.
Its assemblage of a fine crop of professionals and state of the
art equipment could not save it from the economic blizzard accentuated by state and corporate denial of advertisement from
collapsing a few years after it excitingly made appearance on the
media scene. In other words, journalists and media organizations
most likely to be at the forefront of playing the watchdog role face
tremendous pressures, not just from the vicissitudes of the harsh
and mismanaged economy, but from being informally blacklisted
by the establishment which often penalizes such media organizations. Yet another side to that unhappy story is the active courting
by the states and the corporate public sphere of critical journalists,
who are often co-opted, and media institutions which have a tendency to throw up subaltern discuss and do daring investigating.
That apart, the instability and the shoestring nature of media
enterprise and the hand to mouth journalistic culture suggest that
the cost of advocacy can be quite high. A further restraining factor
is the increasing ownership of media by high-profile politicians
who set them up to equalize what they perceive as a journalistic
public sphere skewed against them. The best that one can expect
from these political tinged media are exposures or muckraking
against political opponents, rather than watchdog journalism of a
professional, agenda building kind. In view of these disabling factors, some critics of the media have opined that under the Fourth
Republic they have lost their bite and keen watchdog role. For example, Olumhense (2005), a former editor of ThisWeek magazine,
who now lives in the United States, bitingly stated on one occasion
that:
On a sustained basis, none of the sordid assorted deals within the National Assembly has been investigated and reported; none of the colossal ethical chaos in the states has been profiled and nothing of the
crisis of the unimplemented policies nationwide has resulted in a front
page show and tell, none of the unrestrained looting in the states that
the federal government unveiled nearly one year ago have been narrowed down to anyone. In other words our corruption stalemate has
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persisted for so long partly because the press has become complacent
or became a part of it (The Guardian, April 2, 2005).

Olumhense came close to portraying the Nigerian media as a
captured institution in the above statement. However, this portrait does not take into account several media-led crusades such
as the one cited earlier, which resulted in the resignation of the
Speaker; as well as the expose conveying an investigative scoop
by Channels Television on the rot in the Police College, which led
to temporary redress of the situation. In other words, despite the
lean topography of the media, their location, ethnic and regional
divisions and the far from friendly economic climate, a few independent media organizations, notably, those begun by media
professionals, have kept advocacy for good governance on the
front burner as well as redeemed to an extent, the looming decline
of the media into a captured Fourth Estate of the Realm.
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Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere
By Lai Oso &
Tunde Akanni
Media institutions and technologies shouldered the
burden of extreme hopes, expectations and fears
throughout the twentieth century, and this show little sign of abating in the digitised twenty-first .... The
persuasive role of mediated communication in contemporary social, political and cultural life is, however, rarely in dispute (Goode, 2005, p.89).
Introduction
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In both popular and academic discussions, the central role of
the media of communication in the democratic process is generally acknowledged. The importance of the media has led many
scholars to theorize the ‘mediatization’ thesis or media logic (Altheide and Snow, 1979; Hjarvard, 2008; Ampuja, Koivisto and
Valiverronen, 2014). Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is also
an effort to understand the role of the media in the political and
democratic processes. The media provide the space to discuss,
debate issues, acquire information and knowledge which are essential ingredients for democratic participation by citizens.
Technology has expanded the public sphere, and also our understanding of the mass media. Incidentally, these new technologies and the communication platforms they gave birth to arrived
in Nigeria, like in many other African countries, with the wave of
political and economic liberalization. In this case, the transformation of the political and democratic processes coincided with the
transformation of the media landscape and the public sphere.
While the Nigerian print media have largely been privately owned and offered some level of diversity, Nigeria’s genuine
road to liberalization of access to public information disseminated
through the broadcast media may be said to have begun no fewer
than four decades after the pioneer, indigenous broadcast station,
especially the television, was established in 1959. Broadcasting,
from inception in 1932 till 1992, was owned and controlled by the
government at both federal and state levels.
Several countries of the world including Nigeria will continue to
remain indebted to the third wave of democracy, which enabled
them to belong in the league of democratic entities providing for
free speech, free press and allied rights among others as enshrined
in the renowned universal charter of rights.
The story began with the need for support from Bretton Woods
Institutions in the 1980s during the era of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). Among other conditions was the insistence
by the prospective loan providers that Nigeria should begin to
consider the processes of democratizing, deregulation and privatization. It was, for instance, required that Nigeria should open
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up its airwaves for private participation. Finally in 1992, the incumbent military government under General Ibrahim Babangida,
then promulgated a decree which legitimized private ownership
of radio and television stations (Mohammed, 1996). The development paved the way for Raypower Radio and African Independent
Television (AIT) to enter the media family. The two new stations,
owned by an individual, have since been joined by several others
which have, in their respective ways, availed different sections of
the society limitless opportunities to publicly volunteer their opinions on national and regional issues even as they have also served
as veritable sources of information.
The privately owned broadcasters only came to complement
the window of opportunities for Nigerian citizens’ involvement
in public debates. Beyond any government policy, law or even
some international pressure, McLuhan’s prediction, premised on
the promise of technology, of the world as a global village especially via the computer, beyond the realistic television capabilities of his time, has since manifested and changed the world’s
communication landscape. The globe, according to McLuhan, has
been contracted into a village by communication technology and
the instantaneous movement of information from every quarter
to every point at the same time. He added that the next medium
after television, whatever it may be, may be the extension of consciousness and would include television as its content, not as its
environment, and will transform television into an art form (McLuhan, 1962; McLuhan, 1964). Not only has this come to pass, the
reality today is also that the pre-existing print media genre has
become another content accommodated by the all-encompassing
internet.
This shared planet for the hitherto delineated genres of the
print and the broadcast media has conferred the common feature of enhanced interactivity not only between the electronically served media contents and their audiences but also between
the literally wired up audiences taking advantage of substantially
blurred physical and social boundaries made possible by digital
innovations. This new age of digital interaction has enabled in-

161

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

formation exchanges between interested discussants of common
issues within whole nations and also transcending geographical
restrictions. “We are helping to change the lives of over two billion people, by connecting everyone, raising voices and enhancing
participation through the open web” declared Lee, the founder
of the worldwideweb in a statement issued to commemorate the
28 year anniversary of the innovation on Sunday March 12, 2017
(http://newtelegraphonline.com/ business/www-28-years). Distance, and to some extent, social barriers, are being eliminated in
the new media and communication ecology.
This chapter will focus on the technology-driven public sphere
in relation to democratic politics in Nigeria. It will examine the
most used digital platforms for engagement with Nigerian issues.
It will as well investigate the online activities of what has come to
be known as citizen journalism and general online conversations.
This study will as well examine the place and interactivity friendliness of two leading online news media namely Premium Times
and the Cable and how they have affected public policy over time.
THE NIGERIAN MASS MEDIA: A NARROW WINDOW FRAME

“... news as a frame, characteristics of the window, its size and composition, limit, what may be seen ... (Tuchman: 1978, p. 269).

The mass media in their various forms, which now include the
digital media, are the main organs of the public sphere. In Nigeria, since the colonial time, the newspaper press has provided the
public space for actors in the civil and political society to ventilate their views, discuss national issues and intervene in the policy
process. Despite their dwindling circulation figures and even their
precarious survival, they remain quite influential especially among
the political and policy elite. It seems impossible to talk of Nigeria’s political development and democracy without giving a pride
of place to the press.
As Olukotun recently observed, “Shining as the role and the
record of the media have been, the story contains contradictions
and rough patches” (Olukotun, 2017, p.4). In the main, the Nigerian press is accused of being ethnic and regional in orientation,
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largely reflecting the ownership structure, location and the pattern
of political competition in the country. Another problem is commercial and economic fragility of many of the media organizations. This has greatly affected the professional autonomy of the
organizations and their journalists.
The Nigerian press from inception, has always being political
(Omu, 1978) and cantankerous. With its base in Lagos which was the
seat of the colonial government, the press was largely an instrument
of agitation by the educated elite against their exclusion and marginalization by the colonial government. From its small beginning
as one-man enterprises, where the owner is also the journalist, the
newspaper press has continued to function as a veritable barometer
to gauge the political mood of the country. Whether during the colonial period or under the military, many Nigerians credit the press
for its role in the country’s political and democratic process. The
tradition of a highly voluble and political press which, in the main,
mirrors the cantankerous nature of Nigerian politicians continues
till today. The Nigerian press does not just mirror the character of
the Nigerian society and the events happening in it; it is an active
participant. Some of the leading newspapers are owned by the
politicians and businessmen. It is also important to observe that
the newspapers, due to economic pressures, low circulation, competition from the new media, are cutting down on pagination and
editorial contents. The highly competitive media market has also
led to a lot of sensationalism and entertainment-oriented coverage of events apart from increasing attention being devoted to
celebrity news. The Nigerian press is becoming more and more
responsive to the dictates of the market in the process of news
production. Events that will either increase circulation or generate
advertisement are more likely to be captured in the news net than
any other. A glaring example of the press’ response to market
pressure is how the front pages of newspapers are sold to advertisers in the practice known as wrap-around. We can also note
that the front pages have been turned to display boards to advertise stories and attract readers’ attention to such stories which are
tucked in the inside pages.
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In terms of representation of the country’s diversity, it is generally taken that the Nigerian media are largely urban and elite oriented, and class biased. The media represent very narrow ideological interests, those of the contending factions of the ruling elite.
Just as the poor are poorly and marginally represented in the state
and its institutions and apparatuses (Ake, 1985), so are they symbolically annihilated in the media. The Nigerian media are pro-establishment and pro-capital. No Left-oriented publication has survived in the country. A prominent member of the establishment
intellectual class, Sam Oyovbaire, eloquently expressed the situation some years back that, despite its radicalism, anti-colonialism,
anti-dictatorship, the Nigerian press is indeed a capitalist press
(Oyovbaire, The Guardian, August 29, 2001). The media, both old
and new, often serve as ventriloquists of the unruly debates and
ethnic cacophony that are the hallmarks of Nigerian politics. There
is no doubt that by its architecture, the culture of news production
does limit popular participation. This is, of course related to the
social inequality and distribution of power in the society.
While broadcasting started as part of the apparatus of colonialism, the political and commercial context under which it operates
has not been too dissimilar to that of the newspapers, especially
under the prevailing political economy.
Despite the privatization of Broadcasting, government continues to be the dominant player in terms of ownership and control,
and regulation. There are about 201 TV stations owned by both
the Federal and State governments as against 43 privately owned.
The state and federal governments own 185 radio stations while
the privately owned ones are 97.
Although broadcasting seemed to have made substantial progress over the years availing Nigerians with multiple windows to
ventilate their views, the statutory challenges for it are not any less
encumbering especially with regards to regulation, which is still in
the hands of the Federal Government.
The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), established to
regulate broadcasting nationwide, is largely run by government
appointees who hardly reflect different shades of stakeholders of
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the broadcast media sub-sector. As if to ensure maximum hold on
NBC, government appointees to the N.B.C. board include representatives of the State Security Service (SSS), as well as those of
the Information and Culture ministry. Even at that, though NBC is
the sole regulator for broadcasters, unlike its contemporary, the
National Communication Commission (NCC), it does not have the
power to approve license. At best, it can only receive and process
applications and pass its recommendations to the President.
Most of the TV and radio stations in the country maintain active
presence on the internet. This is in addition to their being accessible to audiences across the globe through satellite connection. It is
also worth to note that the policy of deregulation, which ushered
in commercial and private broadcasting in the country, effectively
ended the philosophy of public service broadcasting in the country. The Federal Government-owned Federal Radio Corporation of
Nigeria (FRCN) and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) have
been forced to operate as commercial organizations in competition with privately-owned ones like Channels TV, AIT/Raypower,
Television Continental (TVC) and Radio Continental (RC), Silverbird
Television (STV), all of which appear to be more popular than any
government-owned broadcasting organization in the country.
The inhibitions above notwithstanding, the broadcast media sub-sector in Nigeria has been trendy in performance with a
substantial measure of broadcasting being done on the internet,
complemented interestingly by the multimedia presence of several Nigerian newspapers. Technology has also enabled many voices to get into the airwaves through phone-in programs, e-mail,
twitter and other new devices.
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The general opinion is that technology has created a new media ecology which has widened the public sphere. With digital
technology, journalism can now throw its net wider and deeper to
capture more social actors as both sources and consumers, thereby enriching democratic participation.
The idea of digital public sphere is of course linked to the now
popular concept of public sphere which came into the front page
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of academic discourse with the publication of Habermas’ book,
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society. The central idea is the existence of
an open space where citizens can exchange views and ideas like
the Greek agora or a town-hall meeting. According to the Habermas, it is “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1974 p.49). The
public sphere is characterized by equal access and participation
by all citizens. It is an assembly of individuals, not just as a public
or crowd, but as an institution which allows for participation of
those involved. To the German theorist:
Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted
fashion — that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions — about
matters of general interest.

Although Habermas prefixes it as bourgeois, the public sphere
affords “general accessibility especially to information, the elimination of privilege and the search for general norms and the rational legitimation” (Garnham, 1986, p.42).
As an autonomous space, it is independent of both the state
and market; it is a sphere “which mediates between society and
state” and “has made possible the democratic control of state activities.” Through reasoned argument, the state is held accountable and illegal use of power is brought into the open through
publicity.
Another feature of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere
is the role of rational critical thinking; “in which the merits of arguments and not the identities of the arguers were crucial” (Calhoun
1992, p.2).
Beyond providing a forum for debate and exchange of ideas
and views, the inclusive and universal character of the public
sphere has led to the view that it could facilitate the emergence of
a common public culture. The public sphere, the argument goes,
should also facilitate “participation in a broader public culture and
nurturing a sense of cohesiveness, common identity and belonging” (Hodkinson, 2011, p.176). The idea is that citizens’ meaningful
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participation in the polity must be based on a shared set of common values, sense of belonging and community (Garnham, 1992).
Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’ addresses
this function of the media in the construction of common identity
and feeling of ‘nationess’ among people. The media do this by
their provision of a common media experience to the people.
From the above, the two main requirements for the public
sphere adequate for a democracy are quality of discourse and
quantity of participation (Calhoun, 1992, p.2). In effect, as Schudson has argued, it is not just that people must participate but the
quality of such participation and involvement is equally of importance (Schudson, 1992). Dahlgren adds one additional requirement, universality, i.e. the norm that it must be accessible to all
citizens (Dahlren, 2001, p.35).
The theory as postulated by Habermas, has been criticized by
many scholars as being “not wholly satisfactory” (Fraser, 1992,
p.111). Fraser has argued that rather than guaranteeing equality of access and participation, the bourgeois public sphere theorized by Habermas was actually exclusionary; especially on the
basis of gender, ethnicity, class and status. Habermas seems to
have over-privileged a public sphere inhabited and dominated by
bourgeois white male. She also argued that Habermas failed to
acknowledge the existence of “other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois
competing public spheres” (Fraser, p.115). She was also of the
view that the public sphere was “a masculinist ideological notion
that functioned to legitimize an emergent class rule.” In this context, the bourgeois public sphere was an institution mechanism
for hegemony and political domination. The import of Fraser’s
critique as noted by Mustapha is that “there was never a single
public sphere built on rationality, consensus, and accessibility ...
but a multiplicity of public spheres and counter publics, built on
conflict, contestation, and the containment of “awkward class and
groups and their preferred modes of cultural and political expression” (Mustapha, 2009, p.3).
As Habermas noted, the ‘unrestricted’ conversation in public
sphere “requires specific means for transmitting information and
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influencing those who receive it.” Thus the mass media are the
main organs of the public sphere (Habermas, 1974). The mass
media are expected to serve “as an instrument or a forum for the
enlightened, rational, critical and unbiased public discussion of
what the common interests were in the matters of culture and
politics” (Gripsrud: 1992, p.89).
But of recent, many scholars have raised a lot of concern about
the health and functions of the mass media. It is believed that the
mass media have fallen short of public expectations of their role in
the democratic process. Whether expressed as ‘democratic deficit’ (Hackett, 2010) or ‘media malaise’ (Norris, 2000), journalism
is blamed for some of the ills of democracy — low citizen participation, cynicism and lack of trust in political leaders, poor civic
engagement.
It is also argued that the media have increasingly become captive instruments of the powerful social class.
The transformation of the media has of course been foreshadowed in Habermas’ concept of refeudalisation. Journalism was
taken over by organised private interests, an expanded state and
the logic of the market. With the establishment of the bourgeois
constitutional state, the press was “relieved of the pressure of its
convictions ... and take advantage of the earning possibilities of
a commercial undertaking, thus the transformation from a journalism of conviction to one of commerce” has begun (Habermas,
1974, p.53). The rational and dialogic character of the public sphere
was lost to commercialism. These forces affected the critical edge
of journalism. The result is captured by the British media scholar,
James Curran:
Modern media fell under the sway of public relations, advertising and
big business, whereas the early press had facilitated participation in
reasoned public debate, the new mass media encouraged consumer
apathy, presented politics as a spectacle and provided pre-packaged
convenience thought. The media in short managed the public rather
than express the public will. (Curran, 2002, pp.23-24)

The main argument is that recent developments in the media
and the society in general — commercialization, privatization,
deregulation, technological innovations, globalization — have
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“amplified and broadened the mercantile logic of media operations ...” (Dahlgren, 1991, p.10). The restructuring of the economy,
which came in the wake of the ascendency of neo-liberalism in the
1980s, changed the structure, ownership pattern and the operating philosophy of the mass media, especially in broadcasting, in
many parts of the world including Nigeria. The mass media have
become more dependent on capital and social control of the privileged class.
Colin Sparks (2001) has identified three main ways in which the
mass media have fallen short of the ideal of the public sphere.
First, the limitations set by the market, concentrations of ownership and dependence on advertising revenue. This factor mirrors
the argument of critical political economy (Murdock and Golding,
2005).
The second way is the elite orientation of the media. According
to Sparks: “The existing media superserve social elites. The serious
press tends to be the preserve of the upper social groups, excluding largely for economic reasons the poor.” Lastly, due to their
scale of operation and the need to make profit which dictates a
high level of professionalism “media professionals effectively ration public discourse in our societies.” Hence, “the room for genuine public access is very small ....” (Sparks, 2001, p.78). The two
main determinants of news are money and power (McQuail, 2013).
The public sphere has not only become very narrow in terms
of access and the voices and interests it represents, it has become
depoliticized and depoliticizing. The symbolic absence of women, youth and other disadvantaged groups has been observed by
many scholars. The “crisis of public communication” (Blumler and
Gurevitch, 1995) has no doubt affected the quality of citizens’ engagement in democratic politics.
In the Nigerian situation, the ethnic and regional orientation
and ownership structure of the country’s media which, as Adebanwi recently observed, rendered “the Nigerian press ... totally
captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and calculations” (Adebanwi, 2016, p.223) has affected their functions as
organs of democratic communication. In the main, the Nigerian
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press expresses very narrow partisan and parochial interests often clothed in the garb of ethnic, religious and regional interests.
Olukotun has observed that the working environment of Nigerian
journalists and the fragility of media business, among other factors, limit their role in advancing democratic causes (Olukotun,
2004). As Tuchman metaphorically remarks, the Nigerian media
net is for the big fish (Tuchman, 1978, p.21). The majority of Nigerians, due to many factors, are outside the symbolic space offered
by the mass media.
THE NET IS WIDER
There is a long tradition of millenarian prophecy in relation to new
media (Curran, 2011, p.99)

It is in that light that many express the hope that the emergence of the digital media offers a discursive opportunity for symbolically marginalized voices to insert the views and ideas in the
public sphere and enhance their representation and participation
in the democratic process. The role of the social media in the ‘Arab
Spring’ has greatly heightened the euphoria about the power of
the digital public sphere to enhance popular participation in the
democratic process.
Negrine (1997) notes this age of silicon-chip society makes
information processing incredibly easy. This is possible through
innovative use of silicon boards in a variety of forms and techniques enabling a revolution in information technology. “As one
form of communication is overtaken by another, and yet another, the inherent possibilities of more varied forms and patterns of
communication become ever more complex” (1997, 51). Negrine
further explains that the convergence of computer and telecommunications facilities signifies the transition from the more traditional and commonplace forms of communication via the wire
telephone network to a sophisticated system of communication.
This links together three essentials, namely, computers, processors
and telephone systems (including mobile telephony and satellite).
One result of all these is the collapse of the boundaries between
different networks or systems of communication, in what is generally termed convergence. This subsequently makes it possible to
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talk about a wider electronic communication infrastructure rather
than separate technologies which transmit information. Castells
(2000, 46-47) recalls that whereas in 1956, the first transatlantic
cable phone carried 50 compressed voice circuits, optical fibres
in 1995 could carry 85,000 similar circuits. “This optoelectronics
based transmission capacity, together with advanced switching
and routing architectures… are the basis of the so-called 1990s
information superhighway…” Castells and Henderson (1987) particularly note that the superhighway has since been characterized
by what they describe as “space of flows” and “space of places”.
The new territorial dynamics tend to be organized around the
contradiction between placeless power and powerless places, the
former relying upon communication flows, the latter generating
their own communication codes on the basis of historically specific territory.
Recently, a study by the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at
Columbia Journalism School has revealed that:
• Technology platforms have become publishers in a short
space of time, leaving news organizations confused about
their own future. If the speed of convergence continues, more
news organizations are likely to cease publishing — distributing, hosting, and monetizing — as a core activity.
• Competition among platforms to release products for
publishers is helping newsrooms reach larger audiences than
ever before. But the advantages of each platform are difficult
to assess, and the return on investment is inadequate. The loss
of branding, the lack of audience data, and the migration of
advertising revenue remain key concerns for publishers.
• The influence of social platforms shapes the journalism itself. By offering incentives to news organizations for particular
types of content, such as live video, or by dictating publisher
activity through design standards, the platforms are explicitly
editorial.
• The “fake news” revelations of the 2016 American Presidential election have forced social platforms to take greater
responsibility for publishing decisions. However, this is a dis-
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traction from the larger issue that the structure and the economics of social platforms incentivize the spread of low-quality content over high-quality material. Journalism, with high
civic value — journalism that investigates power, or reaches
underserved and local communities — is discriminated against
by a system that favors scale and share ability.
• Platforms rely on algorithms to sort and target content.
They have not wanted to invest in human editing, to avoid
both cost and the perception that humans would be biased.
However, the nuances of journalism require editorial judgment, so platforms will need to reconsider their approach.
• Greater transparency and accountability are required from
platform companies. While news might reach more people
than ever before, for the first time, the audience has no way
of knowing how or why it reaches them, how data collected
about them is used, or how their online behavior is being manipulated. And publishers are producing more content than
ever, without knowing who it is reaching or how—they are at
the mercy of the algorithm (http://www.cjr.org/tow_center_ reports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineered-journalism.php)
There is no doubt that technology had always had a telling effect on political communication and the political process in general. For instance, Blumler and Kavanagh note that the emergence
of television marked the beginning of the second age of political communication in the 1960s. The third age, which is the current phase, “is marked by the proliferation of the main means of
communication, media abundance, ubiquity, reach and celerity
(Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999, p. 213). This, no doubt, refers to
the multiple and diverse communication platforms that have been
developed through ICTs during this era of information revolution.
Digital technologies have created many internet-based communication platforms that have no doubt changed the media and
communication landscape. As a writer has observed, “Whether referred to as cyberspace, the web, the information superhighway
or, more formally, the internet, this new medium has linked the
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world through a shared, virtual space that brings a whole new
meaning to McLuhan’s (1964) conceptualization of the global village. (Tedesco, 2004, p.507)
The arrival of the internet led to an enthusiastic acceptance and
proclamations of its potential to revive the public sphere and democracy. The role of the internet in the public space is premised
on the open-ended and non-controlled nature of communication
that it has enabled. Also the lacking of traditional social markings in internet interactions which enables voices which hitherto,
have remained silent and unheard to come forward, further enhances its role (Dahlgren, 2001). To the cyber-utopians, or those
Cormunello and Anzera labelled ‘digital evangelists (2012, p. 462),
the internet is the magic wand to cure the media of their ailments
and democratic deficit and restore the health of democracy. The
internet, to many, is enriching traditional journalism with greater
access to sources and information. As James Curran puts it, “... the
internet is bringing into being ... an efflorescence of web-based
journalism which is compensation for the decline of traditional
news media ... the old order of monopoly journalism was a ‘desert
of MacWorld, now being reclaimed by a legion of bloggers, citizen
journalists and proliferating web-based start-ups” (Curran, 2011,
p.113). The inherent features of the technology give it the potential and possibility of addressing some of the failures of the traditional mass media. The internet dubbed ‘the network of networks’
is “revolutionary because it is a hybrid of the largely one-directional print, audio, and video media while offering opportunity for
a two-way communication feedback loop. Another feature of the
internet is its lack of information control structures or gate keeping
that characterize traditional print and broadcast media” (Tedesco,
2004, p.510). The internet has enabled the old and new journalism
to converge “in a protean synergy of network journalism” (Curran,
2011, p.113). The vertical and hierarchical gatekeeper model of
journalism is being replaced by an “open-ended, reciprocal, horizontal, collaborative, self-generating and inclusive reporting and
comment of a kind never experienced before” (Curran, 2011).
The internet offers citizens, notwithstanding their professional
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skills, the opportunity for access (in terms of production, dissemination and consumption) to the public sphere and registers their
voices, views, agenda and interpretative frameworks. It has been
found useful as a tool of advocacy and mobilization by non-mainstream and oppositional groups. In a way with the internet, the
monopoly of discursive power hitherto enjoyed by the powerful
and media professionals has been disrupted. Barber and his colleagues have summarized the structural possibilities of the internet as follows:
(a) inherent interactivity; (b) potential for lateral and horizontal communication; (c) point-to-point and non-hierarchical modes of communication; (d) low costs to users (once a user is set up); (e) rapidity as a
communication medium; (f) lack of national or other boundaries; and
(g) freedom from the intrusion and monitoring of government. (Barber
et al 1997, p.8, quoted in Tedesco, 2004, p.511)

One does not need to be a new media determinist before
agreeing with Castels that “we are in a new communication realm”
which, according to him, “... is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that
communicate with many.” (Castells, 2010, p.9)
It is argued that participation in public debates becomes more
open, as access to information online media provide the world with
diverse information and perspectives about governments, international organizations including non-governmental organizations.
This online regime equally avails the citizens with the needed enablement to voice their positions publicly without the interference
of gate-keeping activities of formal media organizations and their
professional journalists. It is also worth noting that it makes connective action less dependent on large infrastructure and could be
hardly restrained by the authorities. Furthermore, given that this
production online of the digital public sphere aims at non-market
goods by employing non-market means, it has been portrayed
as an effective way of circumventing the commercial logic that
influences traditional media communication (Schafer, 2015). Also
important, perhaps, is the interplay between traditional forms of
street protest and social media interventions to direct actions.
Jenkins (2016, 11) recalls that the efforts of Youth and Partic-

174

Lai Oso & Tunde Akanni

ipatory Politics (YPP) Research Network discovered young activists who have overcome enormous difficulties in gaining access
to the means of cultural production and circulation. These include
“bloggers who did not own their own computers to film makers
who did not own their own cameras and who relied on community centers and public libraries for digital access … many of those
economically deprived, socially marginalized, historically disempowered-do not.”
Many other commentators advise caution, if not total rejection,
of some of the celebratory claims of the cyber-utopians. The pessimists hold that in spite of the celebratory disposition of many to
the inception of the internet and accompanying offerings, digital
divide is still real. To them, online debates hardly reflect diversity as
search engines discretionally profile users as they hide filter bubbles leading to what has been described as “echo chamber effect”.
This is a situation in which certain views are not challenged but
rather echoed and consequently justified in online communities
(Sustein, 2001). Pessimists also argue that economic interests of
online platform operators may also depoliticize the environment
and consequently cushion consumerism. The big players among
the telecommunication services providers are often concerned
with their profit alone in utter disregard for the plight of the people lending so much strength to the claim of the pessimists.
There is also the issue of access. As many scholars (Golding,
1990, Golding and Murdock, 1986) have argued, access to the
means of public communication is determined by structure of socio-economic inequality that exists in society. The adoption and
sustained use of innovations are related to socio-economic opportunities as they are distributed among the population. Elaborating on this critical issue, Annika Bergström explains that:
The diffusion of media technology and use of it has proven to be
strongly related to socio-demographic factors. Age particularly plays
an important role for the adoption of digital technology, and younger
persons are over-represented among the so called innovators and early adopters. (Bergström, 2017, p.81)

The idea of digital divide (social and geographical) is real and
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multidimensional. It is related to not just having access to computer and/or internet but other factors like availability of social
resources, literacy and linguistic skills, economic cost and, in the
Nigerian case, power supply. Digital gap also ranges from the
global to national and domestic where gender and age stratify
access and use (Livingstone, 2010). Many people lack the crucial
capitals for a meaningful participation in the public sphere. Purchase of internet facilities is not a one-off thing. The gadgets and
software are regularly being updated which requires purchases to
keep updating and acquiring the requisite new skills. Norris has
argued that the internet, unlike other older mass media whose
technologies are more-or-less stable, has a tendency to exacerbate inequalities because of the “chameleon-like capacity of the
digital technologies to morph, converge, and reappear in different
guises” (Norris, 2001, p.17, quoted in Livingstone, 2010, p.128).
Within the African context, there is the fear that the internet may
widen the existing gaps between the rich and urban based elite
and majority of rural and urban poor (Sonaike, 2004; Oso, 2007).
Related to this is the poor state of ICT infrastructure in Nigeria and
other African countries.
We may illustrate this position by noting the literacy rate in Nigeria. A national survey conducted in 2012 by the National Bureau
of Statistics, puts adult literacy rate at 56.9% “with huge variations
between the states” (UNESCO, 2012). For instance, compare states
like Lagos (92.0%), Osun (80.0%) and Anambra (75.1%) with Borno (14.5%), Katsina (21.7%) and Jigawa (24.2%). In terms of geographical disparity, urban areas record 74.6% in comparison to
rural areas 48.7%. Gender inequality is also reflected as the male
population is credited with 65.1% literacy rate to 48.6% for female.
The survey also shows that there are 40 million adult illiterates in
the country.
Another source (CIA World Factbook) puts the total literacy rate
at 59.6% as at 2015 with male literacy rate at 69.2% and female
at 49.7%. The age disparity is also reflected in another collation
by Koema. According to this source, there are 9.4 million young
illiterates in the country compared to 41.2 million adults. Adult
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female illiteracy rate is put at 61.4%, while youth female illiterate
rate is 62.1%. (https://knoema.com/atlas/Nigeria/topics/ Education/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate).
Suffice to say that these disparities will be related to access and
use of ICTs and even in the ability of the various social groups to
participate in the democratic process. While the hype about the
so called pervasive influence of the internet in almost all areas of
our lives is quite all over the place (Livingstone, 2010), the reality
at least in the context of Nigeria and other developing countries,
may suggest a lot of cautious optimism and skepticism. One can
also detect a form of return to the old and discredited notion of an
all powerful media theory; though with a reverse order — the people using the internet-based platforms to influence and change
things. Even a notable scholar, Sonia Livingstone, has pointed to
“a rising disappointment that many of the much vaunted opportunities — the internet’s potential to revitalize democracy, re-motivate learners, overcome social exclusion and enhance global
understanding — are far from coming to pass (yet) (Livingstone,
2010, p.123).
Contextualizing the Digital Sphere in Nigeria
As at February 2017, Nigeria had 154,120,484 active telephone
lines amounting to 110.09 per cent of the 140 million population
according to the 2006 Census figure. The distribution along the
available technologies of GSM, CDMA, Fixed Wireless, and VOIP
are 99.7 per cent, 0.10 per cent, 0.15 and 0.05 respectively. NCC
estimates that as at May 2017, internet users in Nigeria stood
at 91,595,319 with 91,565,319 on the GSM network. Meanwhile,
based on the projected population of 182,201,960, Nigeria is said
to have 53 per cent internet penetrations, while mobile subscription has increased to 81 per cent (Chima, 2017). Of all internet
users in Nigeria, 36% of them are women (Web Foundation, 2015).
Nigeria also ranks 13th out of 58 countries surveyed on the 2017
Affordability Drivers Index (ADI) showing a decline from the previous year’s rating. This may not be far from slow or ineffective policy and regulatory process (A4AI, 2017; Akanni, 2016). Although,
Whatsapp seems to have caught up with most social media users
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over time, Facebook is credited with whopping share of 93.72% of
social media users in the country (Statsmonkey.com, 2015).
These figures may also hide a lot of things;for instance, Nigeria
ranks 5th in Africa in terms of quality of internet access. We also
know that class, regional and geographical disparities also exist.
As in most social services, the urban poor and rural dwellers are
poorly served.
Today in Nigeria, a youth-led social media campaign is raising
awareness of the link between sexual violence and reproductive
health and adding a critical new voice to the national debate over
reform of the country’s anti-violence laws.
Since 2014 “#Choice4Life” campaign has been engaging thousands of Nigerians online and providing young people, in particular, a space to openly discuss the dangers of unsafe abortion and
speak out in support of the Violence Against Persons Prohibition
(VAPP) bill pending at the National Assembly. The bill would provide an important legal framework for dealing with issues including rape and female genital mutilation.
As many Nigerians will recognize the “turning point for social media as a tool of political engagement in Nigeria was 2010”
(Ogunlesi, 2013, p.20). With the 2011 General Election then a year
away, the then President, Dr. Jonathan opened his Facebook page
in May of that year. This followed the success of Barak Obama in
the US Presidential election where he used the Facebook to mobilize support for his campaign and electoral feat. According to a
study:
Jonathan actively engaged the people on his Facebook page during the
campaign. He was able to attract more than 500,000 Facebook fans in
daily conversation on many issues of national importance. (Oso, Odunlami and Adaja, 2011).

Other politicians followed Jonathan. Since then, many Nigerians
as individuals and groups have maintained active engagement on
the social networks for different causes and issues.
In other words, digital media’s impact appeared to begin to
register on Nigerian electoral process and political campaign in
2011 (Ibraheem, 2014) peaking up in 2015. According to Policy
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and Legal Advocacy Centre, PLAC (2012) the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) even endorsed this by ensuring regular updating and easing the access of the public to it as
fully demonstrated in its collaboration with technologically savvy civil society organization, Enough is Enough (E.I.E.). According
to Asuni and Farris (2011), more than 70,000 people were able
to contact INEC directly to report incidents and have their questions answered, while the commission also received about 4,000
tweets and 25 million hits on its website in three days during the
presidential election alone. INEC’s use of social media during the
2011 elections significantly strengthened its capacity to receive
and respond to the concerns of election stakeholders during the
general elections. The EiE coalition further worked with INEC to
set up Facebook and Twitter accounts that allowed for the open
exchange of information, ideas and comments between INEC and
other election stakeholders. EiE also established a Youtube campaign strategy where videos of important events are shared with
the public. It included training citizens to partake in the monitoring of the electoral process by capturing events on their mobile
phones and uploading same and making it go viral within seconds. Not the least was EiE’s Revoda, a mobile phone application for election mapping. Revoda made it possible for users to
register their phone numbers with a particular polling unit, so that
reports made about the polling unit could easily be authenticated
and followed up by INEC (Asuni and Farris, 2011, p. 2). As at June
2012, Revoda had been downloaded almost 10,000 times. This application made it possible to document logistical deficiencies and
fraudulent behaviors during the 2011 elections.
In what was similar to Kenya’s Ushaidi internet platform, which
came into being after the 2008 election riots in Kenya, Community
Life Project in Lagos set up what it called an interactive website
called Reclaim Naija. The Reclaim Naija platform enabled citizens
to report incidents of violence and electoral malpractices through
text messages. The messages so received were to be plotted on
an interactive map. Between the National Assembly elections of
April 9, 2011 and the presidential election of April 16, 2011, citizen
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observers submitted 6,000 incident reports to the platform (Harwood, 2011). The Reclaim Naija platform was also used to report
incidents and progress during the voter registration exercise in
January 2011. The reports sent through Reclaim Naija were collated in real time and fed back to the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC). This assisted INEC in troubleshooting in many
locations across the country. The information was also useful to
the media in monitoring and publishing stories on the voter registration exercise, thereby helping to amplify the voice of the people. In addition, the Reclaim Naija website serves as a one-stop
online resource for information on the 2011 elections. It features
all the polling units, senatorial districts and wards, the Nigerian
Constitution, information on candidates, the 2010 Electoral Act,
the election timetable, electoral guidelines, certified voters’ registration figures, political parties as well as civic and voter education
modules (PLAC, 2012).
Significantly, PLAC (2012, p. 8) notes that the use of the digital
media by INEC and the civil society bodies must have been encouraged during electioneering seasons, even if indirectly, by the
Electoral Act of 2010 which among others, provides:
• Section 154 which empowers INEC to make use of electronic media to conduct civic education and public enlightenment.
• Section 34 which requires INEC to “publish by displaying or
causing to be displayed at the relevant office(s) of the Commission and on the Commission’s website, a statement of the
full names and addresses of all candidates standing nominated”, at least thirty days before the day of the election.
• Section 71 which requires INEC to “cause to be posted on
its notice board and website, a notice showing the candidates
at the election and their scores; and the person declared as
elected or returned at the election”.
• Section 56(2) which states that INEC “may take reasonable
steps to ensure that voters with disabilities are assisted at the
polling place by the provision of suitable means of communication, such as Braille, large embossed print or electronic
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devices or sign language interpretation, or off-site voting in
appropriate cases”.
Unlike the civil society organizations, the political parties,
though aware of the digital media and their capabilities, made
minimal use of them prior to 2011 elections (Asemah and Edegoh,
2012). This, however, may have changed with the increasing user-friendliness of the digital media and their increasing popularity.
In addition to their media advisers who are mostly conventional
journalists, many governments including the Federal Government
now have new/social media advisers. It, however, appears that political parties still give more attention to the old media than the
new media. There is no doubt that the political parties, governments and members of the ruling and corporate elite recognize
the power and influence of the new media. They, however, view
its existence with a lot of fear and trepidation. Their inability to
control the online exchanges may be a factor in this regard. Also is
the fact that the traditional media are still regarded as influential.
What appears to be the pioneer internet-related law in the
country came in 2015 when Nigeria enacted the Cybercrime Act
of 2015. It objectives include providing “an effective and unified
legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the prohibition,
prevention, detection, prosecution and punishment of cybercrimes in Nigeria… ensure the protection of critical national information infrastructure… promote cyber security and the protection
of computer systems and networks, electronic communications,
data and computer programs, intellectual property and privacy
rights”. The seven-part Act focuses on the Protection of Critical
National Information Infrastructure, Offences and Penalties, Duties of Financial Institutions, Administrations and Enforcement.
The remaining parts are Arrest, Search, Seizure and Prosecution as
well as Jurisdiction and International Cooperation.
Strangely, before this Act became a law, the government of
President Goodluck Jonathan awarded a USD 40million ‘internet
spy’ contract to an Israeli firm, Elbit Systems. The company was to
help spy on citizens’ computers and internet communications under the guise of intelligence gathering and national security. Earli-
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er in April 2013, researchers at Munk School for Global Affairs had
hinted that Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt were deploying surveillance
and censorship technology developed by an American company,
Blue Coat, which specializes in online security. The company was
to enable the government to invade the privacy of journalists, netizens and their sources. Its censorship devices use Deep Packet
Inspection, DPI, used by many western Internet Service Providers,
to manage network traffic and suppress strange connections. Another USD61.9million was reportedly set aside for ‘Wise Intelligence Network Harvest Analyzer System’, Open Source Internet
Monitoring System, Personal Internet Surveillance System and
Purchase of Encrypted Communication Equipment (Emmanuel,
2013).
It is, however, widely known that the Department of State Security, DSS, carries out surveillance of the media and takes action
in response to content the government considers inappropriate.
It could be recalled that in June 2009, the Federal Government
of Nigeria announced a USD5 million plan to support government-friendly web sites and prevent government-critical web sites
from influencing Nigerian public opinion. Approximately 50 “patriotic” web sites were scheduled to be launched before the 2011
elections (Open Net Initiative, 2009).
CITIZEN JOURNALISM: POWER TO THE PEOPLE?
One crucial aspect of the new digital technologies, which has
greatly altered and expanded the public sphere, is citizen journalism. Through different internet-based platforms and even the
mobile phone, ordinary citizens are producing and disseminating
journalistic materials (news, features, analyses, comments, photographs, cartoons etc.). Citizens’ eyewitness accounts of events are
now acceptable to conventional newspapers and television channels as part of their news. Citizen journalism, apart from eroding
the gate keeping agenda-setting and framing power of media organizations, have the potential of opening up the public sphere
thus enhancing the discourse power of marginalized groups and
challenging that of the power elite.
While the members of the political class have found such plat-
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forms as Facebook and Twitter ready tools to connect and engage
the citizens, citizens on their own have appropriated citizen journalism to promote some form of alternative and sometimes oppositional discourses. Though the definition of citizen journalism
has no settled boundaries (Goode, 2009) and continues to prove
contentious and even acrimonious at times for reasons shaped by
the perspective interests and motivation of the individual or group
advancing their preferred definition (Allan, 2013, p.92), it refers
generally to “direct news gathering and reporting by ordinary citizens — your neighbor, high school boys and girls, home-makers,
corporate middle management — using widely available digital
tools — blogs, websites, mobile and social media.” (Min, 2016,
p.570)
Though it is commonly accepted that citizen journalism is internet-based, Goode has rightly pointed out that “it does not begin
and end online or even digital interactive media” (Goode, 2009,
p.288). Going beyond the digital technology-centered definition
of citizen journalism, Banda defines it as “a rapidly evolving form
of journalism where common citizens take the initiative to report
news or express views about happenings within their community.
It is news of the people by the people and for the people” (Banda,
2010, p.26). As independent citizens, citizen journalists are not so
much constrained by the professional concerns of the conventional journalists.
Today, there are at least two registered associations populated
by online publishers in Nigeria. The Guild of Corporate Online
Publishers (GOCOP), describes itself as “a Nigerian, non-governmental, non-partisan, non profit making organization, borne out
of the growing need to ensure that online publishers uphold the
tenets of journalism in doing their jobs” (https://www.linkedin.
com/company/gocop-guild-of-corporate-online-publishers-) The
second, Online Publishers Association of Nigeria (OPA Nigeria),
founded in May 2010 assert that “…These discerning group of
trustees and founders recognized the shift in the mode and means
of social engagement; and understood the shifts, disruptions and
changes that may occur which would overlap with current laws

184

Lai Oso & Tunde Akanni

and rules guiding conduct and practice and therefore sought to
create a self regulatory body that would provide the means-tested standards for users and practitioners to operate by” (http://
onlinepublishersng.com/about_association.php).
Bloggers, indeed, consider themselves ‘citizen journalists’ and
believe they are better suited to provide the diversity that today’s
democracy needs than traditional journalists. They pride themselves on being the ‘watch-dog’ of the traditional watch-dog media. Beginning in 1990, bloggers are largely self-motivated and
today run into millions, ranging from rants by teenagers to loosely
disguised product advertising, from political commentary to news
reporting (Burkholder, undated).
Jurrat (2011, p. 9) notes that citizen journalism can range from
commenting on an existing news piece to publishing an article,
podcast, photo or video on a personal blog or on Twitter, a dedicated citizen journalism website like the Huffington Post or on
YouTube, or on interactive websites that work as extensions to
mainstream media, such as Cable News Network’s (CNN) iReport.
On sites like CNN iReport, editorial gate keeping is left to the audience: uploaded content will be published unedited as long as it
is considered news (as distinct from advertising, for example) and
respects principles of taste and decency. Other sites, such as the
South Korean OhMyNews.com, only fact-check hard news contributions before publishing them; and then there are websites that
operate like a traditional newsroom, also called pro-am ventures,
such as the Huffington Post, where professionals edit all-user-generated content (UGC) before publication.
Politically inclined ones like the renowned Youdecide2007.org
provided the enablement to interested individuals to report on local electoral contests in Australia far beyond what the mainstream
could do. Most prominent, perhaps, was the visibility it earned
political activities and issues in remote areas including the northwest Australian electorate of Kalgoorlie that may otherwise never get featured by the mainstream media. Citing Coleman (2009),
only political junkies may likely have the commitment it requires
to run political websites such as Youdecide2007.org and myHei-
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mat.de typify (Bruns, undated)
There are basically two types of citizen journalism; institutional and non-institutional (Banda, 2010, p.28). The non-institutional
places the individual at the center of the content production process, which “readily lends itself to different forms of social networking, where private citizens use a combination of platforms to
generate content and disseminate it as widely as possible.” The
almost free and unfettered access to the cyberspace has greatly
enhanced this type of citizen journalism.
On the other hand, the institutionalized variety thrives within
an organizational setting with some level of organizational constraints. It must also be noted that these two types could be regarded as polar ideals. A news website could start as a one-man
endeavor and over the years, become more institutionalized as it
becomes more commercialized and acquires more resources. It is
also in this context of the political economy of citizen journalism
that Goode has cautioned against restricting this genre of journalism “to sites that are set up explicitly as alternatives to ‘mainstream’ or ‘traditional’ journalism (Goode, 2009, p.1289).
The traditional news media run by professional journalists are
now involved in some form of citizen journalism through inviting
citizens to send stories, comments and pictures which they print/
air as part of their normal news menu. In Nigeria, we have examples of the Punch newspaper which created a page “for readers
to create their own news.” The page is labeled “My News.Com
(Salawu, 2011) and Channels TV which has I-Report segment on its
main news at 10:00 p.m. featuring eye witness accounts of events
and photographs from members of the public. The Nation has just
invited citizens to send in eye-witness reports for publication in
the paper (The Nation, Saturday, June 10, 2017.
Furthermore, almost all online versions of the main newspapers in the country have features that enable news-readers to
comment on stories and/or share such stories through Twitter,
Facebook, e-mail, Google etc. The point is such user generated
contents enhance the participation of citizens in public discourse
which is one of the main characteristics of citizen journalism and
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the public sphere. Many readers now read their news online. Radio
and television have shed their earlier Yorùbá name of “asòròmágbèsì1” as listeners and viewers can now respond to them in real
time through the Internet enabled devices.
Some of the country’s online newspapers like Premium Times,
Cable, will also fall under the institutionalized citizen journalism
category. However, the non-institutionalized type has mushroomed over the years. According to a report, there are about
120 of such sites “based on Nigeria content and largely controlled
by Nigerian citizens at home and in the Diaspora by 2009” (Dare,
2011, p.21). In a recent study, Olukotun listed 40 Nigerian online
news publications (Olukotun, 2017, p.9). Some that readily come
to mind include the Nigerian Village Square, Nairaland and Linda
Ikeji which hardly bother about journalistic rules and routines but
attract millions on regular basis. The Linda Ikeji variety seems more
interested in materials like scandal, celebrity and sensational news
that will attract audience and boost their commercial prospects.
This category will also include the highly popular and controversial platform, Sahara Reporters, which was established in 2006 by a
former student union activist, Omoyele Sowore. From the beginning, Sowore never pretends to any journalistic professionalism.
He is more of an agitational anti-corruption crusader in the tradition of the muck-raking journalism of old. In the words of Dare,
Sahara Reporters, as a citizen journalism website, makes no pretence
about its philosophy of aggressively exposing corruption, using ordinary citizens as foot soldiers and sources of information and content.
(Dare, 2011, p.30)

Of course, like all news organizations, it justifies its existence
and style of practice by an appeal to the public interest. Its editorial policy, inter alia, states: “The forum’s major aim is to empower
all citizens of various African nations to actively demand and defend their democratic rights. Our journalistic mission is to beam
a critical searchlight on the people and practices that undermine
and subvert the democratic process” (quoted in Dare, 2011). This
claim to social service is part of the ideology of professionalism.
Reiterating its commitment to some of the professional ethos
1

The one who speaks without getting a reply.
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of mainstream journalism, it declared on the day it was launched
in New York:

It is a unique organization, comprised of ordinary people whose only
mission is to seek truth and publish it without fear or favor. This means
that apart from the team of professionals running its affairs, Sahara
Reporters is also an umbrella for anyone who has something to say and
seeks an avenue to say it, as far as what he/she says is verifiable and
ascertainable as true and the information there in, is the public interest.

There is no doubt that citizen journalism via the internet has
enriched not just democratic politics in the country, but the practice of journalism itself. The online media as exemplified by Premium Times, Cable and Sahara Reporters have revived investigative
journalism in the country. In an interview, the Editor-in-Chief of
the online medium, the Cable, Simon Kolawole, recounted that
the conventional media used to thrive on investigative journalism in the 1970s and 1980s. Sunday Times, Guardian on Sunday,
Newswatch, TELL and several others used to devote resources to
investigations. “Online journalism is bringing that back. The height
of this was counting Premium Times as one of the consortium
of global newspapers that won the Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory
Reporting in 2017. Beyond this, citizen journalism has deepened
and widened the journalistic net to embrace more actors and voices. It has further liberalized access to the public sphere. For the
Editor-in-Chief and Chief Operating Officer of Premium Times,
Musikilu Mojeed, liberalization of access to information is critical
to the building of a better society where fundamental judgments
by citizens is based on well-informed state of mind. Liberalization
is the most significant value online journalism has added to the
“market place of ideas”. According to him, information about governance, society and their interaction is no longer the exclusive
preserve of the rich and powerful. Online journalism has demystified information sharing, cutting down the cost of information
distribution and acquisition while delivering at a faster pace than
traditional sources. Such is the extent to which Premium Times
subscribes to the liberalization philosophy that it has created a
WhatsApp group on which it simultaneously shares opinion articles published on its website. This enables members of the group
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to comment freely on issues raised without having to reach the
website.
Kolawole is also of the view that online is forcing the traditional
media to be more creative in news delivery. Most of the stories
are broken online every minute so the newspapers have to find
new ways of saying the same thing”. He further noted that the
online media regime’s peculiarity of enhanced interactivity has led
to i-reporting which is quite helpful especially as there was a limit
to which resources available to them could take them. Such is the
extent to which the said interactivity had been beneficial that the
Cable had received e-mail messages that specifically drew attention to certain issues, sometimes hinting on corruption and abuse
of office. Some have also alerted them to wrong use of photos or
some other inaccuracies.
The liberalizing trait of the internet applies as much to activist organizations as it is to the mass media. Civil society leaders across civil rights advocacy, anti-corruption and digital rights
campaigns as well as environmentalists in Nigeria reckon strongly
with the digital public sphere that the internet is.
The digital rights campaign organization based in Kano, Centre for Information Technology and Development, CITAD, for instance, has many Facebook profiles dedicated to different aspects
of its work. These include “Peace Now” which is dedicated to
peace campaign. Another is the “Friends of CITAD”, which is a
general platform on issues concerning CITAD. A third one is the
“North East Education and Development Forum”, which deals with
CITAD’s activities with the education sector in the north east of
Nigeria. There are still some others dedicated to various issues
such as the organization’s mentoring program, the peace clubs,
hate speech countering and so forth. CITAD also has at least three
Twitter handles. These are @ICTAdvocates that focuses more on
ICT related issues; @CITAD3, which deals with peace building and
anti-hate speech campaign as well as @NE, which deals with engagement with peculiar issues of the conflict-ravaged north east
of Nigeria. All of these platforms according to the executive director, Yunusa Yau, have “helped us get out our messages to the
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audience, engage people with what we do and aid our advocacy.
For instance, we have a monthly social media peace messaging
campaign whose aim is to get young people to send out peace
and anti-hate speech messages than just waste their precious
time on chatting.” CITAD particularly appreciated the immediacy advantage of the online environment because “the immediacy
offers a tool to engage your constituents. They tend to feel part
of your program because they get to see and listen as they are
taking place. This deepens participation and a sense of ownership
by constituents to an organization. It also promotes openness that
is needed for developing a robust democratic culture in organizations. Multimediality means that conventional media is challenged as whereas before you needed to listen, watch and read
before you get a comprehensive sense of event; now everything is
available in one medium. Newspapers and broadcast stations with
their processing of events and products before they are let out to
the public are challenged as more people are looking for more
immediate events.”
The use of digital platforms has not been any less resourceful
for the anti-corruption advocates and environmentalists. Nigeria’s
foremost environmental group, Environmental Rights Action, ERA,
had no fewer than 400 followers on Twitter in addition to 7,272
friends on Facebook, according to its Head of Media, Philip Jakpor. He added that the multiple platforms available online had
also helped the organization in maintaining close proximity with
different classes and age groups in the society. “We engage with
the older people in the society on Facebook and the younger on
platforms like Twitter” he added.
For the anti-corruption campaigners, digital media have been
particularly delighting for “helping to demystify political elites’ exclusive ownership of the media to historically control traditional
media through censorship…” declared, Olanrewaju Suraju, chair,
Civil Network against Corruption, CSNAC. “These digital platforms
are the mainstay of our advocacy for reforms and public mobilization for engagement of government and public space” he added. CSNAC preferred Twitter because it can easily be linked with
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Facebook thus providing access to two platforms simultaneously.
WhatsApp, however, seems to have caught the fancy of many
virtual and real groups availing members with access to information as well as the opportunity to ventilate their opinions. For the
intellectuals for instance, examples include the “Proudly Chevening” and the “Network of Seminar Scholars”. While the former is
exclusively set up for the alumni of the British Chevening Scholarship scheme, the latter is open to Nigerian intellectuals both at
home and in the Diaspora.
Although this age of convergence of media genres has heightened citizens’ expectations, a number of news media are still
struggling to do multimedia delivery of their output. For the Premium Times, according to its Editor-in-Chief, “online newspapers
such as ours serve a critical role in society as the most effective
information bridge to people with lower economic power. This
demography represents the bulk of our society and we owe an
immediate duty to serve this community with factual stories. Serving this role effectively demands the use of multimedia strategy, allowing readers the opportunity to interact with our stories
through different entry points.”
The digital media platforms have substantially extended the
terrains of the media even as they have enabled the spheres of
their engagement with audiences spread around the world to
bourgeon almost limitlessly. A global public sphere has emerged
through such channels as CNN and the new media. Interestingly, an average news platform available online with the relevant
resources can deliver multimedia information materials thus redefining the traditional categorization of media genres along the
print and broadcast tracks.
Humanity’s seemingly insatiable yearning for information and
engagement with issues arising therefrom have become manifest by the enhanced digital technology capacity of the media, by
the prompt, self efforts of civil society organizations to constantly
bridge up with their members and others as well as the media
which used to serve as the only channel of reaching out to their
adherents.
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A major challenge inevitably deriving from this new era of digital sphere, however, is the crisis of quality that audiences will have
to contend with more than ever before and probably beyond
imagination.
Between the public sphere of the medieval era in Europe and
the contemporary version variously labeled virtual sphere, digital
sphere and so forth are far reaching similarities and differences.
While the former, as espoused by Habermas (1989), provided for
physical relationship between participants, the conspicuous disregard for physical presence in the digital version does not affect
participants’ involvement except for certain understandable variables. Indeed, the fact that interested participants do not necessarily have to mobilize some unusually tasking logistics beyond the
computer hooked to internet to get involved is a lot incentivizing.
This situation also helps to nurture whatever form of democracy
any society is able to run among those identified by Pinkey (1993).
Such is the liberalized access to information, and the consequential engagement with it has been recurrent and unmistakable that
they now instigate quick actions and/or reaction from those concerned, both in government and in some other realms.
Perhaps the most interesting in the digital sphere is the extreme
extension of the operational terrain of journalism practitioners in
which they now face stiff competition from sheer enthusiasts who
require little or nothing to publish information. The report of the
recent edition of Columbia Journalism Review journal cited earlier
has manifested most amply in this clime. Commissioned persons
and others now share media contents across platforms leaving
producers with little or no control thus undermining their verifiability. Worse, the susceptibility of the transmitted and retransmitted information materials to manipulation is highly plausible.
The end result of this is the increasing incidence of fake news.
Fake news is probably the most disturbing issue on the internet today as reflected in the concern expressed by Prof. Lee in
his statement commemorating the 28th anniversary of the worldwideweb. Sahara Reporters, which had its account suspended by
Facebook itself, had to contend with a counterfeit version at some
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point. Incidents of hijacking of Facebook accounts or unauthorized duplication or replication are also common, thus leaving
news media platforms and civil society organizations at the mercy
of mindless charlatans who may get away with some havoc before
they are found out.
Conclusion

It is curious that for a nation of normally voluble and verbally talented
people, we seldom hold genuine dialogue among ourselves. Threats,
recriminations, diatribes, infantile, tirades, hate-suffused ethnic propaganda and summary state clampdown have become the currency of
personal and group exchanges as well as the denominator of national
dialogue (Williams, 2017).

The inception of the digital public sphere in Nigeria, as in other
parts of the world, is a consolidation of some evolving socio-political and technological progress which became more noticeable
in 1990s as the continent of Africa endured the third wave of democracy. As the broadcast media opened up to the participation
of private players, the internet, cell phone and other ICT platforms
came into being to further open the public sphere for wider access
and participation by the citizens. The liberalized and pluralized
public sphere has no doubt fundamentally altered the environment and instrumentalities of public communication and democratic politics.
Convergence has enabled the conventional media to insert the
voices of the ordinary people into the media space. Talk radio has
proliferated while most public affairs programs on radio and television now include call-in segments. This has no doubt strengthened the feedback loop in the communication circuit; in a way
making the audience more active in the political and democratic
processes.
While we acknowledge the potential of ICTs, particularly the internet to enlarge the public sphere and give voice to more people
in the society, we deplore any attempt at any notion of technological determinism. The media, both old and new, may be powerful;
they seldom act on their own. As Barrie Axford once remarked the
fact that all politics now subsists within space or frame of electronic media (Castells, 1996) does not negate the claim that agents are
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active in the construction of their own world (Axford, 2001, p.2).
To borrow a statement from an American scholar, there is a great
distance between the passionate and acrimonious debates in the
new media and political action (Schudson, 1995, p.27). He further
explains that “Political activity leads people to follow the news.
News does not ordinarily lead people to political activity”. In fact,
the virtual debates and discussions among anonymous debaters
and discussants can really become, to borrow Haberman’s phrase,
“tranquilizing substitute for action” (Habermans, 1991, p.164).
In the euphoria of the moment, many techno-utopians may
tend to forget the historical fact that “technologies tend not to
be determinative but rather are conditioned by what is going on
in the society in which they grow....” (Barber, 1998). Debates and
conversations may be required for democracy. They are not sufficient. Talk, as the saying goes, is cheap. Nigerians love to talk a
lot and this is clearly evident in the digital public sphere. But as
Michael Schudson has aptly expressed it,
Current preoccupation with the media mistakes the public parlor of loquaciousness for the heart of society. The life of a house is more often
to be found in the kitchen or the bedroom. Still, we judge ourselves and
are judged by others on the quality and character of talk in the public.
(Schudson, 1995, p.24)

This raises the issue of the prospect for social action that internet activism can generate and sustain.
It is unhelpful to unhinge the new media from the social structure and existing configuration of power. The media, either old or
new, do not exist in a vacuum. Social and material conditions within which people live their daily lives are crucial in any discussion
of the role of the media in politics and society. Media access and
consumption are regulated by the existing distribution of power
and other social resources. The new media would not be an exception. We must also note the importance of local social context.
The media and their possible effect/influence do not operate in
a vacuum. While noting the significant role of the social media in
the Egyptian revolution, Eltantawy and Wiest, however, observed
that “we must consider the powerful influence of outside condi-
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tions, particularly the social, political and historical contexts of the
movement as well as the availability and interplay of resources
(social media and others) and the actors’ efficacy in utilizing available resource to meet their goals” (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp.
1218-1219). Likewise, Comunello and Anzera cautioned against
technological deterministic framework for contextualizing the role
of the social media but rather “we should consider the complex
interactions between society, technology and political systems”
(Comunello and Anzera, op. cit, p. 465). In this wise, it is unhelpful to consider to conceive the power of the media without taking into account the issue of human agency and other prevailing
social conditions. As Warschauer like many critical scholars has
also remarked, “technology must be situated within underlying
unequal power relationships that exist in society.” (Warschauer,
2003, p.209)
For the digital public sphere to fulfill its potential and not fall
into the same trap as the conventional commercialized media, the
people as agents and social actors must acquire the right type
of knowledge and democratic etiquette. For now, the nature of
debates and conversations on the new/social media among Nigerians is hardly edifying and democratic. Just like they exist in
the traditional media, the conversations and debates are cantankerous, unruly and hardly meet Habermas’ criterion of reasoned
argument. The divisive and parochial factors; ethnic, regional and
religious affiliations that are so evident in media discussions and
debates are replicated on line. The character of debate staged in
the Nigerian media was appropriately described by a newspaper
columnist,
... in the best of times, brash and sensational; in the worst, just on thinking, arrayed along ethnic, regional or even religious lines; and in-between and irredeemable lover of sensation, that though push copy
sales, retard society (Hardball, 2017, p.48).

Another columnist and journalism scholar, Olatunji Dare has
also observed the unruly tone and tenor of public conversation on
the Internet. According to him,

Reading comments on Nigerian news on the Internet sites frequented
by Nigerians, you would think the constituent groups are engaged in a
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war of attrition. Nothing is sacred any more. Vileness has become the
standard of elocution (Dare, 2017, p.48).

Many scholars have also expressed the fear that the multiplicity
of public spheres created by the internet may lead to fragmentation of the public. The internet, it is argued, connects us as discrete
units in an electronic coherency, while isolating us socially ...” (Ake,
2000, p.28).
It is argued that if the old media, especially public service broadcasting, through their programming, had centripetal social impact
by binding members of society together, the “new media environment is more likely to have a centrifugal impact, facilitating social
and cultural fragmentation (Hodkinson, 2011, p.184). The internet is considered a centrifugal and fragmenting medium with a
poor chance of offering a meaningful public sphere (Moyo, 2009;
Haywood, 1998). The celebrated pluralism ushered in by digital
media technologies has led to what Michael Tracey called “retribalization” of society (Tracey, 1998). Elaborating on this tendency,
Hodkinson has argued that:
A ... difficulty with optimistic proclamation of an online public sphere
revival is that, at the same time as introducing greater interactivity into
everyday use, the vastness and diversity of the internet seems liable to
have a fragmentary effect even more concentrated than that of digital
broadcasting. Rather than encouraging people to share content with
or engage with diverse groups of others as part of broad publics, the
ability to choose exactly what or who to engage with seems more likely
to result in pursuit of particular interests and association with narrower
groupings (op. cit, p.189)

The scholar identified two main implications of this tendency.
First, is the possibility for internet users to avoid matters of public
affairs and political controversies! According to him, for people
with previous little interest in such matters, the internet makes it
easier for them to “opt out of the broader public sphere in favor
of their existing interests.” Second, for those who use the internet
to learn about or engage in political discussions, they often “seek
out content and other users that cohere with existing perspectives” instead of engaging with “diverse forums oriented towards
broad cross-sections of society”. This argument echoes the old
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argument of the reinforcement effect of the media.
As Oso (2012) has remarked, the anonymity offered by the internet and social media can confer on some people power without
responsibility which, as they say, is the power of the prostitute.
Such anonymity and the openness of the internet make the new
media platforms amenable to being used to manipulate and misinform the public. As McQuail has remarked, “... large scale public
support and approval can be bought without much risk of discovery” (McQuail, 2013, p.191). The phenomenon of fake news that is
becoming very prominent on the social media is a case in point.
Of recent, the Federal Government and many Nigerians have
expressed concern over the use of the social media and other Internet platforms for the dissemination of hate speeches and fake
news. For instance, a fake version of President Buhari’s speech at
the 2017 United Nations General Assembly was disseminated on
the same blogs including the popular Linda Ikeji. The threats and
counter threats being issued by various agitational and separatist
groups mushrooming in the country litter the digital public space.
Certain things must attract our attention about the viability of
the digital public sphere. First as many scholars have argued, is
the tendency of any ‘new’ media to go the way of the old after all
the initial enthusiasm and euphoria must have settled. This has
been the fate of radio and television. This tendency is of course
the outcome of the ability of the powerful to incorporate such
‘new’ media as part of its ideological apparatus. The second thing
of worry is the pernicious effect of commercialization. Habermas’
idea of re-feudalization addresses this. The commercial logic has
the tendency to push the media towards the safe mainstream
strand of public debates and in the extreme toward soft/human
interest stories and sensationalism that have little or nothing to do
with public affairs. While it may be very difficult for the powerful to
capture or colonize the digital public sphere because of its peculiar open architecture, the ever expanding impact of commodification and commercialization may render many of the ICT-enabled
platforms ineffective as organs of public sphere.
To take full advantage of the digital public sphere, we need to
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return to some of the original ideas postulated by Habermas. The
public sphere must not just be spaces for ethnic, religious and
oppositional politics. This has been the main bane of the conventional media in Nigeria. The digital public sphere must be rescued
from going that way.
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6
Television and Nigeria’s Democratic
Aspirations
By Yinka Esan
Introduction
The attainment of democratic functions has often hinged on
features of modern society like the mass media. Members of a
democratic society should have a voice and expect to be heard, either directly, or through some form of representation. Democracy
requires that public policies and collective actions are not the exclusive preserve of a few. There should be universal participation,
so that all members of society have a say in public deliberations,
over matters of mutual concern. Both require representation or
mediation. Citizens should be equipped to hold accountable
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those who are official custodians of power. This assumes that
there is openness in society and free flow of information. Modern societies are complex, consisting of large populations. With
social distances and isolation, society cannot rely solely on personal interactions that were characteristic of traditional societies
to function. Herein lies the importance of the mass media for any
system of governance – be it authoritarian or liberal democratic.
Ideally, in a liberal democratic system, the media should be free to
perform these roles. It is important to examine how well the media
adapt to fulfill core notions of democracy as societies evolve. In
this chapter, our attention is focused on television broadcasting
and what roles it plays in the attainment of Nigeria’s democratic
aspirations and maintenance of its democratic culture. In discussing this, we consider what mission was assigned to television, how
well aligned the mission is with democratic principles. Has it fulfilled this mission, or has it been held up from doing so – by whom
or what?
Media and the Democratic ideal
As a mode of governance, democracy works on principles of
self-determination. With democracy, it is assumed that all members of society, not merely particular elements or groups, are adequately endowed with ideas. These ideas are required to access
resources intended for the wellbeing and prosperity of the society.
Ideally, democratic societies should offer scope for universal participation. This is the junction where media and mass communication meet with governance.
Davis (2010, 84) provides a summary of the normative ideals set
out for media and public communication in democratic societies.
They are to provide objective and widely available information,
ensure the accountability of the powerful (institutions, organizations and individuals), offer access to a wide range of perspectives
and viewpoints, constitute an arena for rational deliberation, and
debate on issues of common interest. This space should be as
Habermas (1989) had proposed of the public sphere: accessible to
all citizens, and conducive to informed, coherent, and rational discussion, without any fear of reprisals. Here, citizens should engage
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with public issues, armed with appropriate and adequate information. Quality decisions arrived at in the public sphere are crucial to
the stability of society, and without these, development could be
stifled. Transparency in decision making, and consequent regard
for the consensus of opinion arrived at within groups, evoke confidence and encourage compliance with recommended appropriate actions (Saeed, 2009; Pettit, Salazer & Dagron, 2009). As argued above, such universal participation expected in a democratic
society is hardly feasible when information flow is restricted or
lopsided. Media professionals have to act as representatives for
the wide range of people whom they serve. Guarantees of freedom that apply to citizens should apply to media professionals in
greater proportions. The media should be free to operate (access
information, seek clarification, raise and contribute to debates)
without fear of reprisals.
A structure proposed by Christians et al (2009 cited in McQuail
2013) sets out four normative roles of the media in a democratic
society. Media roles are monitorial, facilitative, radical and collaborative. The collaborative role acknowledges the importance
of media working with other key social actors, the need for interaction and mutual dependence. The radical role calls media professionals (journalists in particular) to a higher pedestal. By their
superior training, they are to recognize imminent dangers, alert
and prepare society for such eventualities. Media professionals,
regardless of the genre in which they work, are the sentinels or
watchdogs of society. In the facilitative role, media provide adequate, meaningful and relevant information as discussed above.
They ensure that the various groups get necessary information
required to make appropriate decisions about matters concerning themselves and others. The monitorial role involves the documentation of information about current and topical events relating to governments and private individuals whose actions are
consequential in society. Such documentation is to ensure that
the powerful are accountable. Though it overlaps with the other
three, McQuail suggests a primacy of this role, [almost as a precondition] for democracy: “In its fullest expression, the monitori-
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al role appears well-suited to the needs of a democratic political
system, provided the conditions of independence of monitors’
from power holders are met and there is freedom to express
unwelcome ideas and transmit uncomfortable information”
(2013, 108) [my emphasis]. To be effective, the media should be
free of all encumbrances. The question then is to see if they are.
Has Nigerian television been free to be a watchdog, or has it been
captured by the powerful who it should be monitoring? Given
that government determines the orientation of service, and parameters of operations, there is a tendency to regard government
as being the powerful to be monitored, and state impositions are
commonly considered as encumbrances to the media. However,
it is in understanding the media performance that further restrictions affecting the media can be seen.
In practical terms, the task of informing, explaining, clarifying,
and harnessing diverse views held by members of society is the
challenge for media. The media then have to harvest [and advocate for] ideas that are in the best interest of all. The media should
facilitate a remembering of past events, and recognition of links
between different events and utterances. Without the freedom
to do these, the monitoring role is likely to be compromised. The
overall burden rests on the entire media system, which consists of
a variety of media operating within national settings along with
those operating transnationally. The specificities of each society
determine what media mix works best and for which particular
task. Media systems involve different firms, with different ownership structures and modes of governance; they consist of sectors
usually differentiated based on the technology in use, and in some
cases, the types of service offered (McQuail 2013, 119–120; Hallin
& Mancini 2010, 2004)). Typically, media systems consist of print
media and audio-visual forms (terrestrial and satellite enabled radio and television broadcasting,). These remain dominant even
though new message forms disseminated through new platforms
[internet enabled, online media including video on demand and
social networking sites] have gained much ground. These newer
media are distinct. Inspite of the massive audiences that they at-
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tract, they are largely fragmented spaces constituted around particular interests. Mass media still constitute a broader space for
diverse identity groups who are engaging with common concerns.
Radio and television had been saddled with this responsibility
since they were deemed to be more effective in cutting across the
social spectrum. Informed at the time by an assumed scarcity of
airwaves, broadcasting was regarded as a public resource to be
strictly regulated. British public service broadcasting was instructive – public interest was paramount, but from its inception, television in Nigeria also adopted the commercial orientation. Though
Western Nigeria government, owners of the pioneer station, had
foreign partners briefly, ownership of broadcast stations in Nigeria
was restricted to government. Broadcast reached far more audiences than print media messages whose audiences had to be literate (hence elitist). Broadcast stations were free-to-air thus more
conveniently accessed. Citizens were to be well equipped to participate meaningfully within the public sphere as expected within democratic cultures. The broadcast industry was charged with
this task. In the following section, we shall examine how television
fared in this mission.
Engaging Audiences
Television, like other mass media, is a feature of modernity. At
inception in Nigeria, it was urban-based and professionalized, so
service was distant from grassroots audiences. That was the first
layer of disconnect but there was another. In a country as populous and diverse as Nigeria, coordinating a range of ideas located
at the grassroots in various regions of the nation is a challenge.
In the early days, stations were few; each in its designated market
had to cater for ethnically, linguistically and socio-culturally diverse audiences. There were inevitable compromises in representation, and once novelty of the new box had waned, the issue of
particular identity groups did arise. The challenge of expressing
differences was muted by the authoritarianism and unitary command of military rule. Then emphasis was on unity, rather than
difference. Not so in the democratic dispensation that resumed in
earnest in Nigeria in 1999.
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For many voices to be heard as required in a healthy democratic society, a pluralistic media arrangement (or a simulation of this)
is desirable. Such a simulation was evident in the British public
service broadcasting model. At its inception the BBC then offering
only radio service was a commercial entity (product of the cooperation of receiver set manufacturers known as British Broadcasting Company). It became the British Broadcasting Corporation
in 1927 when it became a public service broadcaster. There was
no domestic competition then, even though signals from pirate
broadcasters aroused audience discontent to some of BBC’s paternalistic fare. The mission for British public broadcasting service established under BBC’s first Director-General John Reith, is
often summed up in three evergreen words – inform, educate,
and entertain. Yet these have had varied emphasis. In its first incarnation, British public service broadcasting was set to establish
standards for society through programming – trust, uniformity in
cultural outlook and a distinctiveness that reflects national identity. News and such factual genres may have been appreciated for
the impartiality and objectivity, but to some audiences, entertainment fell short compared with the pirate radio service. This was
before television which was introduced whilst the BBC maintained
a monopoly in British broadcasting.
The monopoly on television gave way to a public service duopoly when ITV was established in 1955. In spite of its commercial
operations, emphasis remained on setting high standards. Distinctive service was maintained. Rather than counterprogramming
expected in a strict competition, ITV and BBC in the early days
juxtaposed similar programs so viewing audiences regardless of
which channel they tuned to would be exposed to similar genres /
content in society’s best interest. With several independent commercial licensees operating in different regions and across the nations –England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, television
was brought even closer to the people. Similarly, BBC created its
second national TV channel (BBC2); existing BBC regions were reconfigured to improve the challenge of regional representation.
Renewal of BBC Royal Charter every 10 years offers opportunities
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to review and refine public service broadcasting as service adapted to new social and technological realities, including the current
deregulated regime. For example, Channel 4 introduced in 1982
as a self-funded, commercial though not-for-profit public service
broadcaster had a remit to innovate, develop the independent
production sector and reflect cultural diversity. This helped improve representation of minority groups and others on the fringe.
From the onset, the BBC placed a high premium on quality programs, in order to improve the taste and outlook of the masses.
Pluralism had to be accommodated within existing limited channels (Keane, 1991). Statutorily, Britain’s public service broadcasters were minded to offer opportunities for inclusion of diverse
social groups through a service that sought to be objective and
impartial, with a varied diet of programs that catered for audiences drawn from a broad social spectrum. This remained even after
revised views on scarce public airwaves as convergence of television with other delivery platforms expands opportunities. Britain
continues to review its conceptualization of public service in this
dynamic media environment.
Proper pluralism is enabled in the liberalized era. Though commercialized, digital broadcasting allows different groups to aspire
to self-expression through dedicated channels. However some
argue that these developments jeopardize laudable principles of
public service (Cushion, 2012). The jury is out on how desirable it is
to have a mushrooming of media channels for diverse interests or
groups; the question remains whether the public should engage
in these public sphericules or if it is better to convene in a public
sphere as national channels once were (Gitlin, 1998).
It is often argued that when media are closer to the audiences,
they are more efficient. Proximity can be viewed in terms of physical and cultural location of media operatives to their audiences.
Thus, national broadcasters operating at regional or national centers, distant from grassroots audiences, tended to be less efficient.
This reasoning is evident in the trajectory of British broadcasting
discussed above. Decentralized media were likely to be more
faithful in tackling the concerns of local audiences; especially if
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close proximity meant that the audiences could easily access or be
accessed by stations. It will be even better if the stations were run
by those who truly represented their targets, by being sensitive to
their cultural or distinct positions.
Initially, high costs and complex technical requirements of operations prevented Nigeria’s television industry from being as local as the ideal argued above. Instead service was centralized;
stations were owned and funded by regional (later federal and
state) governments. This was consistent with views that regarded television as a national (perhaps global) medium (Katz, 2009).
Since conditions (technological, economic and political) fostered
liberalization in the 1990s, global television service (like CNN, Sky,
Disney, DSTV) has become regular.
Television is well suited to delivering national and even global audiences to share media spectacles. Long before deregulation, audiences from around the world joined to watch the moon
landing (1969). More recently, global sporting meets (World Cup,
Olympics), inauguration of American presidents, wars, and global
disasters have graced screens in homes around the world simultaneously. Television has thus lived up to its metaphor as a window
on the world. It has always been susceptible to international influences, due to prevalent business models in industry. A good proportion of television programs were distributed transnationally. In
the case of Nigeria, the flow was unidirectional, from predictable
Western sources (USA, Britain). In 1962, third year of operations
on Nigeria’s first television station, the hours of transmission were
limited yet 75% of entertainment programs were foreign (Ikhime,
1979: 40). So TV audiences were always subject to global influences, though locally produced output in other areas was high
- public enlightenment 87.7%, News 100%. The figure for local
news production masks reliance on wire copy and newsreels from
international news agencies (Paterson, 1998) which showcased the
practice of western democracies ostensibly raising aspirations. In
this, television was more like a mirror through which audiences
could refract their prospects in life and compare with what they
could see of others. As noted by Barker (cited in Chadha and Ka-
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voori, 2010), stations like this could not contribute to global flow
of information. Local producers and audiences alike had always
contended with the acculturating impact of international broadcasting. It can be argued that such exposure was good for rousing aspirations for the dividends of democracy, but frustrating for
audiences who lived under successive military regimes. In time
the balance was altered. By policy, local productions, which articulated concerns of the government and the people, increased.
Yet consistent with military rule, government-controlled television
was used more as a notice board. There was little room for expression, dialogue or participation as expected in a democratic
culture. This varied in different genres of television as will be discussed hereafter.
The summary of the foregoing argument is that the ultimate
goal of the media in a democratic society is to foster participation
of the different members of society, and enable informed decision-making at private and public levels by citizens, regardless of
their physical or social distance to the centre. For the medium to
function successfully in the set ideals, television should be organized in such a way as to offer ordered access to receive and generate relevant messages. This argument will be reviewed using a
selection of stations and programs, to demonstrate how television
attempted to help the nation fulfill its democratic aspirations.
Audiences are here regarded as citizens who exist in a range
of spaces—local, national and global. In these spaces, audience
identity is still shaped by different markers—education, age, gender, income, and occupation. Ethnicity, nationality, and religion
are also relevant. In this chapter, we consider how equitable the
prospects of media access are for different groups. We also consider how effective television is in serving these groups, and if it
can be a platform for rational debate between diverse groups. In
deliberating these arguments, we aim to see if television is able to
foster a democratic culture. Does it serve as a watchdog or is it a
captive to the challenge of serving a diverse audience.
The broad and multi-dimensional nature of these questions
makes it imperative to consider the history and texts of the me-
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dia institutions. To properly understand television—a familiar and
ubiquitous medium, it must be considered in its context. It is reductionist to conceptualize television as a simple technological
device. Similarly it is misleading to focus simply on the social context of its use. As has been eloquently argued (Williams, 1990;
Winston, 1995, Winston, 1998), television is as much a technology
as it is a product of the context in which it is used, the custodians
of the technology (producers), and those who consume the medium (viewers, advertisers). This complex mix of factors within the
historical context of the medium must be acknowledged (Kackman, 2011). Already the issue of ownership and authoritarian orientation of the military has been brought into the frame.
Nigerian Television Service – Growth in Context
Nigeria’s journey to democracy has been long and arduous.
Television was involved in this quest from its inception, if the story
is taken from the first republic. The first television service was introduced just ahead of independence, in 1959, by the Western region, an administrative area in Nigeria, and given priority as a strategic medium for communication. By independence in October
1960, the Eastern region had also established a service. Less than
two years later, in the first quarter of 1962, the remaining administrative regions—Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory, Lagos, also had their television services. Television is thus a
feature of postcolonial and aspirational modern Nigeria, with the
quick adoption of television services after independence suggesting that no region wanted to be outdone (Esan, 2009). Television
was a novelty—coming after print media (newspaper, magazines/
periodicals) and radio (with the rediffusion service), each of which
inspired how television was adopted for use.
Newspapers had served the educated elite, who in different
ways sustained the newspaper business. Although some were
press barons and others were contributors, many elites were merely patrons—advertisers, regular subscribers, or readers who kept
the business alive. As it was in the United Kingdom, newspapering
in Nigeria was largely within the private sector. Leading political
activists involved in the struggle for independence (notably Azik-
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we and Awolowo – see Uche, 1989) were newspaper proprietors.
Alongside other services rendered in the press, print media constituted the space for the struggle for independence. Anti-colonial
sentiments, the merits, schedule, and agenda for independence
were debated on the pages of newspapers. Thus, an appreciation
of debates and political discourse was established. With this, political activists recognized the power of the pen; newspaper was
a space for agitation and Nigerian leaders learnt to place a high
premium on establishing newspapers through which they could
speak to the governed—establishing unidirectional means for information dissemination.
Broadcasting allowed messages to reach mass audiences
across vast distances, in a range of predominantly domestic spaces—usually in the convenience of their homes. Messages were
received simultaneously, by far flung audiences, as immediately as
when transmitted. Certain messages, such as the news and Grade
A shows, were even delivered in real time, as live broadcasts. Unlike radio, which is cheaper to acquire and easier to operate, television is expensive, more elitist, and distant from rural audiences,
who constitute the bulk of the Nigerian population. Those visionary leaders who introduced the medium were undeterred by such
limitations when they invested in television, even when it was a
novelty in other nations. At inception, most television services
in Nigeria were extensions of existing radio services, as was the
global trend (Katz, 2016). This pattern was replicated in the era
of deregulation, as private broadcasters tended to rely on profit
from radio operations to keep their television service afloat. The
synergy within broadcasting was possibly due to shared technology. Both media rely on the conversion of sound, and light in the
case of television, to electric energy, in order that moments can be
captured, processed, and disseminated through public airwaves.
These similarities in the broadcast process meant that there could
be a symbiosis of operations—staffing, administration, programming costs could be shared. The joint management of services
helped establish institutional cultures, as did elements within the
cultural contexts of the target markets. These institutional cul-
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tures, along with ownership are indicators of the power relations
behind media messages, and possible impediments to service that
foster attainment of democratic aspirations. Key among these elements is staffing and the resource base from which programming is drawn. This addresses questions such as whose stories
are told and what language is used. Cultural indicators seen in the
education, ethnic origins, gender, and inferred or declared political affinity of the staff, are as important in defining the power relationships within the media organizations, as well as the relationships amongst audiences, between them and the stations. Staff
interpretation of their mission is often informed by their loyalties,
whether to slavishly pursue an agenda or creatively subvert this,
(for example, with their countenance, in jokes, or camera work).
The proliferation of stations that happened after the creation
of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) by military decree in
1977 should be regarded as crucial in the quest for democracy.
Television was brought closer to more people. It was due to the
politicking of the time yet the move was arguably part of plans to
consolidate the nation. The political upheavals of the 1960s, especially the civil war (1966–1972), necessitated a reorientation of the
mission for television. The new emphasis was to foster national
unity, rather than difference (distinction) inherent in the regional
services that existed at the onset. Exigencies of national life accounted for more stations being established around the nation.
Military rule with its unitary command persisted. New states had
been created out of the three-regional structure. Stations had
to be established in each state in the federation, and subsumed
within a common framework. This policy set the course for proliferation of widely dispersed government funded stations. Stations
increased as new states were created to bring government closer
to the people. This is similar to the BBC action which increased
the number of regional centers in England from four to eight in
recognition that the English nation was less homogenous than
other British nation-regions – Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (BBC 1969). In this was an acknowledgement that designating
market boundaries should consider both technical and sociologi-
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cal factors. UK is instructive, though it is not as diverse as Nigeria.
Station proliferation made NTA the largest television network in
Africa, consisting of stations in closer physical proximity of audiences. Yet there was widespread dissatisfaction with its factual
programming in particular. Seen as its master’s voice, television
appeared to evoke cynicism not confidence.
Television in Nigeria was undoubtedly a critical tool for nation-building. When regional autonomy and rivalry that had characterized the early years gave way to the unitary focus, a federal system with a strong centre emerged in television governance
too. NTA central authority determined the thrust of programming.
National priorities constituted Grade A broadcasts; stations had to
suspend locally scheduled programs to hook up to the national
network. Prime time was reserved for national programs. These
were centrally commissioned and foreign programs centrally acquired. Representation of federal character was a strategy employed to foster understanding and unity. As priorities of stations
were negotiated within the context of the nation, the advantage
of their proximity to the grassroots was necessarily compromised.
These developments had implications for how well television services articulated voices of different audience groups in the nation
and became evident in television’s failure to reflect the national
mood in years leading up to the third republic. Viewer apathy
to news and factual programs from government-owned stations,
negotiated readings of media texts revealed audience disgruntlement. Nigerians’ disillusionment with military rule and their
strong yearning for democracy was attested to by voters’ behavior in relation to the aborted 1993 elections. Although this was
palpable in the press and on radio, television’s role in addressing them was questionable. That existing television stations were
within the stranglehold of governments was amply demonstrated
through news and government-sponsored public notices. Television sang its masters’ tune. Professional call of media managers
and audience interests were subordinated to government’s (Esan,
2009, p.139). This imbalance was hardly consistent with normative
media ideals though in principle service continued to be aligned
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with laudable visions of the founding fathers. But while television
succeeded in disseminating information, it also generated disaffection towards government, even by its omissions.
Subordination of audience interest was contrary to expectations of the public service orientation. Television’s performance in
actualizing Nigeria’s democratic aspirations was gravely compromised. Government patronage, which guaranteed capital funding,
held this medium captive. Nowhere was this more evident than in
state-government owned stations which were established during
the second republic. Government control in these was as in the
NTA which they were set up to challenge. In the case of Lagos
Television, for instance, the semblance of independence built into
governance of television stations was removed. Rather than being
a government parastatal run by public servants headed by a general manager and answerable to a board, the staff are regarded as
civil servants, headed by a chief executive (permanent secretary)
answerable to the state governor through the commissioner for
information.
In no other genre was government stranglehold most obvious
than the news – the most privileged and most frequently featured genre. Defined narrowly by operationally shackled television news managers as what important people do, news brought
government officials into sharp focus. Audiences were inundated
with images of leaders - their private and public lives. They even
managed to encroach into lifestyle/entertainment shows. Television remains a mirror on the world, a court of public opinion,
purveyor of faiths, and a social diary. Although consistent with
traditional lifestyles, the drive for funds amplified the importance
of these television forms on program schedules. Since programs
(even news) were commercialized, stations relied on the revenue
from these shows. Regular scheduled programs would even be
shunted in favor of sponsored shows. Pleasures of viewing were
thus unpredictable.
Tabloidization – a penchant for gossip, sleek living and celebritification on television was consistent with global trends. The
humble social diary, which parades private celebrations of the af-
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fluent and the powerful, has been elevated. The genre has since
multiplied across television schedules. Bisi Olatilo Show, which
prides itself as the leader of the pack, delights in its showcase
of quintessential taste and folks with pedigree. This genre is an
inadvertent social commentary, an informal (even inadvertent)
monitoring of the powerful revealing the incongruence of their
lifestyles compared with the reality of the masses. Television helps
to expose those living better lives despite biting economic recession. It is thus likely to generate disaffection against the powerful
and the media tightly controlled by them. In its failure to properly
address these issues, television may be deemed by audiences as
agents of frustration – a sentinel that raises alerts, yet is unable
to drive away intruders. In this case it is a captive to commercial
interests.
Without government involvement and policies in television,
the number and location of television stations could have been
severely limited. Tested and proven government markets paved
the way for the commercial intervention by private entrepreneurs,
whose arrival marked the third phase of television broadcasting
in Nigeria. This liberalized regulatory regime was also consistent
with global trends and with the mood of the nation. The era of
global deregulation, entrenched in the 1990s, marked a departure
from the stranglehold of terrestrial broadcasting (Hong & Hsu,
1999). The introduction of satellite transmission led to new modes
of transnational broadcasting, with the incursion of notable transnational media corporations (TMCs) like BSkyB in the UK, and the
global operations of CNN, MTV, StarTimes, and the African-focused DSTV, into sub-Saharan Africa. This was characterized by
intense commercialization, sleek aesthetics, competitiveness,
and cultural homogenization with the replication of formats, or
franchised brands. Although the prohibitive cost of broadcasting
in Nigeria was a deterrent for private ownership, the enterprise
remained alluring. The statutes were changed to permit private
broadcasting in 1993. Private radio was quick off the block. In
reality, privately owned television stations only materialized in
1995, with the establishment of Channels TV, the first Nigerian
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news Channel. DAAR Communication’s Africa Independent Television (AIT) came on air thereafter, in 1996. Several more independent channels have since been established across the nation.
Earliest among these were Lagos stations such as DBN, MITV, Minaj, Silverbird TV, along with Channels and AIT. They stood out
for their innovation in different aspects of programming – sports,
indigenous entertainment, foreign content, local drama, audience
participation shows and news. Success was short-lived for some
but newer players like TV Continental, and later TVC News now
dominate the scene. In its current democratic dispensation (post
‘98 era), television remains largely urbanized but so has a higher
proportion of the population. Since 1960, population density has
increased, from 49/km2 to 297/km2 in 2017(World Population Review, 2017).Urban centers have also increased and spread widely
across the nation, thus justifying television’s urban focus. Similarly
global migration justifies extension of television service to audiences in the Diaspora. These appear to be indices of a progressive
democratic culture, yet it is in the impact of such services that
progress should be assessed.
Social impact of Television
Technology and participation
The impact of television in society is driven by a combination of
factors - political, economic, social and cultural factors, along with
the prevalent technologies in operation. Regarding technology,
the first dimension to consider is its intrinsic (technical) properties.
The fact that television is an audio-visual medium determines its
messages and how they are received. The nature of the audiences, and their social milieu, further commend the use of the medium, which lends itself to a population who would prefer to see, to
believe.
The ability to demonstrate action or vicariously transport viewers to witness events and outcomes for themselves, are properties
of television that align with the manner in which audience needs
can be met, and their values negotiated. Differences in the social
context of audiences — their educational attainment, gender roles,
domestic situations, and daily lifestyles — affect their disposition
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to viewing (Esan 1993). Consequently, the ability to properly decode broadcast messages is also affected. When this ability is not
uniform in audiences, television cannot be equivalent of the ideal
public sphere. The assumed equality of experience in the sphere
becomes a mere illusion. However, its edge in communicating
with unschooled audiences remains. Being akin to oral cultures
with which they are familiar, broadcast messages communicate
better with illiterate audiences. Where the reception facilities are
available, these messages reach them directly, whereas newspapers cannot. Even those with little or no educational attainment,
received messages that they saw and heard!
Technology is required to produce and communicate television messages. The broadcast chain consists of various components, of which, transmitters are most crucial since their location
determines the extent, scope, and clarity of reception, and they
are most expensive. Production equipment includes cameras, recorders, microphones, mixers and editing suites. The cost of this
hardware, even without reckoning the cost of intellectual property, makes television an expensive mass medium. By far the most
visible technological elements in the business of television are receiver sets, the cost of which is borne by the consumers. Television
requires the highest investment for information and communication. The cost and capability of receiver sets inform the viewing
experience, meanings, and pleasures derived. These technological
factors impact on the availability, ownership and access required
for democratic culture.
As with other innovations in their infancy, the cost of television receiver sets was higher than the larger proportion of the
populace could afford. In the 1960s when television service was
new to Nigeria, TV sets were priced out of reach of most citizens.
Unlike radio, which was generally more affordable, especially with
the availability of low-cost portable transistor radio sets, television was primarily elitist. Ownership of television conferred status;
it was a desirable item of furniture, even among the lowly-paid,
many of whom went on to acquire sets as soon as their economic circumstances permitted. This was the case of civil servants,
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who got an upward review of their salaries made effective retroactively. Known as the Udoji award, this windfall-payment of unexpected salary arrears had a multiplier effect that was felt even in
rural areas. Some families acquired TV sets to end the indignities
associated with their reliance on sets owned by more fortunate
neighbors. An influx of imported and locally assembled television
sets helped to make them more affordable, further increasing the
number of sets in circulation, and expanding the audience-reach
of television. Gradually, the practice of congregating around the
neighbors’ sets, or watching through neighbors’ windows out of
necessity reduced. Communal viewing persists in the new millennium for other social reasons constituting sites for discussion of
messages.
Another technological dimension affecting television operations and reception is the limited supply of electricity. The issue in the earlier days was that this essential social infrastructure
was restricted to urban areas. Distribution of electricity has since
been extended to many more communities than in the 1960s,
but national electricity supply is sporadic. Households and businesses had to rely on generators at great costs. In television it is
a considerable proportion of required operating costs, arguably
a distraction from the core business. For viewers, the supply of
low cost versions in the 2000s meant more people could generate
electricity for their subsistence economic activities. Consequently
televisions sets could also be powered from homes and places of
work – shops, reception areas, waiting rooms, restaurants - such
enterprises conducive to communal viewing. Number of receiver
sets in circulation had increased making the medium less elitist.
Its ability to reach the teeming population had improved. Riding
on the success of the burgeoning music industry and film industry, (Nollywood), which television helped to create, more television
programs were created to align with popular cultural beliefs and
outlooks. These developments are double edged when considering media’s contribution to a democratic culture. Arguably, access
to media messages is the first step towards meaningful participation. In that regard, these are progressive. However, there is the
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matter of content – do accessed programs constitute a distraction
or facilitate quality engagement? Some clues to answering this
question lie in other ancillary technological devices.
Key features in television’s timeline are development of domestic devices which gave viewers more control, for example time
shifting devices like the video (later DVD and other hard disk) recorders. These altered the manner of viewing, reducing enslavement to TV schedules. In other climes, these devices meant that
viewers could record their favorite shows in order to watch them
at more convenient times, however social infrastructure described
above, prevalent lifestyles and time pressures undermined this.
In reality though, these devices meant audiences could reorganize their own viewing pleasure. Opting out of terrestrial broadcast, they could watch programs of their choice – home videos or
DVDs bought or hired from video clubs for instance. Later devices
such as set top boxes (cable/satellite) facilitated more convenient
distribution of options, though at the cost of subscription. These
helped extend exposure to other local and globally located public
service stations. Audiences were thus able to subvert public service broadcasting that they deemed irrelevant. In the process they
had also missed items that may have been relevant.
The role played by the humble video cameras in enhancing the
democratic culture should also be noted. Its domestication was
due to supply of affordable and user friendly designs. The number
of people who could make or contribute to television programs
thus increased. TV programs were once produced by highly skilled
professionals, often studio-based or in limited outdoor locations.
The arrival of the VHS camera (home video recorders) broke down
those restrictions. Initially, recordings by audience featured in limited entertainment shows—You’ve Been Framed (UK) America’s
Funniest Home Videos (USA). Roving camera reports were also
included in shows like Candid Camera and Beadle’s About (UK).
Nigerian audiences were privy to these precursors of produsage
- a term referring to user generated content (Bruns, 2007). In Nigeria, it became standard practice for videographers to record private functions for private consumption. Eventually some products
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were broadcast, incorporated into social diaries, or in news and
enlightenment programs. These practices raised the importance
of spot assessments, interviews, and eyewitness reports. When
mobile telephones got converged with cameras and internet facilities, consumers knew what to do.
In the early days, there was little room for public participation
in televised programs. Except when picked up in the press or
from limited studio audience, audience reaction went unseen. No
wonder television news was regarded as little more than a notice board, a town crier, which could not field questions making
some audience members indifferent to civic duties. (Esan, 1993).
Factual programs on television in particular consisted of talking
heads—radio with pictures. In time, the situation improved with
formats including discussions, use of vox populi segments, and
studio audience participation. These formats, especially those
relying on experts drawn from limited pools of available human
resources undermined broad based representation. The trend improved when global satellite mobile (GSM) phones flooded the
Nigerian market. Interested viewers could elect to participate in
the televised discussions. Though mobile telephony was in circulation in the 1990s, it was not widely available till the 2000s.
Nigeria was reported to have the fastest uptake in mobile telecommunications services (Okafor, 2016). Based on NCC data, it is
claimed that in July 2016 there were approximately 150 million
active mobile GSM subscribers, as opposed to around 2.2 million
in 2002 (Oxford Business Report, 2016). Access to phones enhances public participation when stations create those opportunities.
Independent television stations being leaner and more innovative were quick to create these opportunities which had previously
been jealously guarded in government owned stations.
The scope of produsage is much wider now since the convergence of mobile telephony with communication devices. Smart
phones are now miniaturized production suites; users can record,
process, disseminate and store messages. Democratized access
to such devices (phones, tablets, Ipads) is a key development. It
demonstrates interdependence of both technological and social
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dimensions of television - that technological capabilities only become meaningful when they can be accessed and used. It further
attests to the importance of political, economic, and social context. As Williams had argued, by acknowledging both technological and socio-cultural dimensions of the medium, we gain more
robust perspectives of the way television has aided the quest for
democracy.
Convergence with other media technologies and social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube) has facilitated wider coverage, and enhanced participation in novel ways
– audience phone in, other forms of live contributions to shows,
redistribution of segments of shows, and through this (viral messaging of video segments, or documentation in public space like
YouTube) a public memorialization of televised moments. Acknowledging these brings more agencies (people and institutions)
under critical scrutiny. So it can be argued that the collaborative
role of the media has been enhanced. A broader definition of
those who monitor and those who are to be monitored now applies. Scholarly and professional attention can thus be challenged
to reconceive the concept of the powerful - look beyond usual
government office holders that had hitherto been the obsession.
This is most enabling for monitoring the powerful, arguably the
most critical role of the media in a democracy (McQuail, 2013,
p.109).
Assessing Content
Having looked at the technological dimension to television,
and demonstrated how this is compounded by political and economic factors, in this section, we shall examine how its forms have
enhanced or impeded television in the execution of its mission
to help establish /maintain a democratic culture as consistent
with the aim of public service broadcasting. Drawing a sample of
genres to consider returns us to a longstanding debate on media
forms and formats. It is based on the legitimacy of a conventional
hierarchy of programs. Implied in this is an indication of the quality of the programs, the value of taste groups, (social divisions of
the audiences) who consume particular programs. Programs like
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the news have been regarded as serious, consumed by the elite
(Sparks, 1991). The genre has commanded much professional and
scholarly attention. Others, particularly entertainment programs
with mass audiences, are often denigrated as being trivial. In the
final analysis, media texts have to attract the right size and type of
audience to be viable.
Being the later arrival on the media scene, television built on radio’s success, adapting its successful message forms—news, talk,
music, and drama. The medium also borrows ideas from books,
theatre, film, and indigenous media that had preceded it. Perhaps
due to the tendency for television service to be sustained by entertainment, television was once not regarded as a worthy academic
enterprise (Dayan & Katz, 1994). Scholarly attention was reserved
for genres in the purview of political communication (news, documentaries) and education (schools, broadcast). Yet, viewing schedules were sustained by genres such as situation comedy, drama,
variety shows, and children’s animation. These genres have since
attracted critical attention, especially as they have proven to be
commercially viable.
Stratification of genres is relevant for another reason - it is reflected in allocation of resources. Genres deemed more serious are
privileged in resources for production and dissemination - money, talent, facilities, even slated airtime. The pleasures of certain
audience segments are thus better guaranteed. Such audiences
are likely to be better engaged with issues. Poorly resourced and
poorly researched programs tend to generate audience apathy.
In program commissioning, ideas development and production,
media institutions themselves need to adopt inclusive strategies.
Regardless of statutory assignments, stated missions or covert
agenda of owners and staff, audience pleasure is television’s ultimate goal. That being so, programs (as with good dramas) should
be engaging even if participation is merely vicarious. Audiences
can be supported to use their imaginations – contemplate solutions to problems confronting them. A narrow interpretation of
participation leads to an underestimation of such genres. Conversely, setting too much stock by the relevance of certain genres
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like news, for example, in the coverage of electoral campaigns,
leads to over emphasis on news. In reality, audiences experience
media messages in a flow. Though electoral campaigns occur only
periodically what happens before and after elections are interesting. Newscasts may lack the scope for continuity, yet to be efficient
in television’s normative roles; other formats that enable analysis
of background, context and implication of issues are required. A
variety of news shows now exist with audience participation built
in. They contribute to the fulfillment of television’s obligations of
ensuring that citizens are responsible, well informed, and motivated to properly appraise available range of viewpoints, in a controlled environment devoid of rancor and bitterness. Audiences
are now more than targets to be delivered to advertisers. Their
views are being tapped in manners akin to the collaborative role.
The popularity of their concerns also helps set program agenda.
Phenomena from social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram) now inspire issues covered in the media.
In Nigeria, news has always been central to TV schedules as
evident in a sample of published schedules from WNTV. (Ikhime,
1979). The broadcast day usually started and ended with the news.
Slots for a major newscast featured in the course of the evening.
News accounted for almost one hour of a six-hour long broadcast
day on WNTV in October 1962. In later years this pattern persisted on newer stations including slots for news in brief segments in
English and Nigerian languages dominant in designated market
areas. The longest slot was always reserved for news reports from
home and abroad. The slot for news kept increasing over the years
– from 15 minutes reserved for the main evening news on WNTV
in 1972, to 45 minutes devoted to 9 o’ clock news on NTA network in the 80s. News is still central in the post 1999 deregulated
era, by which time independent television stations had emerged.
The broadcast day was longer, stations were transmitting almost
round the clock, and the privileged status of news was evident on
the schedules. News had slots across different times of day. Two of
these independent stations are specialist news providers – Channels and TVC News. Although AIT has mixed programming, its
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news content is still as dominant as found on government-owned
stations. This increase broadened the scope of coverage and facilitated innovation in the definition and treatment of news. There is
now decent attention to other aspects of living (Health, Art, Law,
Lifestyle, Environment); Politics, though Economy/Business, and
Sports remain prevalent. The range of voices being heard has increased as each station found its stock of experts. Pluralism has
generated competition; stations work to attract and deliver the
right type of audiences to advertisers, by delivering reliable and
relevant information. Their slogans and station promos reflect
their mission. AIT - “Sharing the African Experience”, Channels TV
– “Your Home for News”, TVC News “Through African Eyes. First
Accurate and Reliable”. Implicit in this is a commitment to present
distinctive narratives in the global arena. While serving local audiences, stations also had eyes for global audiences. Local stories are
being picked up by transnational broadcasters like CNN, BBC and
others. The stakes are higher in a globalised economy and professionalism is rewarded. From the start of its operations, Channels
committed to delivering a fresh perspective in news. It promised
to maintain balance, going beyond the jaded view of stories having two sides, acknowledging instead the multidimensional nature
of issues. Through a 2017 station promo it commits to following
stories. In this is recognition that news should be more than reports of moments signaled in the headlines. Back stories are essential for audience appreciation of headlines. The rhetoric in the
promo invites audiences along with the station to take the long
route if they are to fully appreciate issues. “. . . We follow the story
because the need to know never changes. We don’t have all the
answers, but keep our eyes open to keep our minds open. . . We
follow the story because we are part of the story.”
On one level this attests to a station being responsible, but on
a deeper level it urges audiences to be responsible too. It illustrates broadcasters fulfilling their radical role and is indicative of a
more collaborative culture emerging in television news. Promos
from TVC News bring this into sharper focus. They stress the importance of engagement, analysis, and interpretation and have in-
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novative approaches for delivering these. Besides usual strategies
employed in producing television news (careful coordination of
correspondents, strong, personable and respected anchors) TVC
employs other formats and taps into opportunities offered by its
multiplatform operations to make this possible. Audiences are
invited to be involved through social media platforms like Twitter,
to keep abreast of developments –to “follow, engage and share”.
Such dynamism empowers viewers and strengthens the democratic culture (locally and globally) in a post-CNN, 24-hour rolling
news era. At a time when so-called fake news and hate speeches
demonstrate the licentiousness occurring in less regulated social
media spaces, access to authoritative professional and reliable
television sources via these platforms is salutary.
Innovation in the broadcast media can be attributed to the improved training and exposure of broadcasters. Audiences have
also become more sophisticated, having higher expectations of
television services. Globalisation that characterized the deregulated era has been long coming. Besides broadcasting foreign
content, formats of foreign shows were adapted for the Nigerian
audiences. In the 80s, Lagos Weekend Television (fashioned after
London Weekend Television), a marathon (24-hour, weekend) service was introduced by Lagos Television in the short lived second
republic. NTA 2 also pioneered a breakfast television talk show,
“Morning Ride”. Magazine style, the show included a variety of
segments—bite size reviews, analysis, and discussion of topical
issues and events. A digestible, entertaining live talk show, with
studio guests and a phone-in segment, it was lively but did not
conform to NTA’s usual strict restrictions imposed due to concerns
for security and national priorities. Yet an exception was made.
Federal government funded NTA was responding to competition
from LTV, a station controlled by the rival party. This design exemplified results of staff exposure to global trends as confirmed
by the creator /producer /presenter:
“Every vacation … I had the privilege of going abroad, watch a lot of
[UK] TV shows …. I saw TV as it should be, so when my colleagues were
just learning the ropes, I had already been honed in a way by [viewing
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professionals like] Michael Aspel, Eamonn Andrews, and all the shows,
[such as] TV AM, and I saw that there was a need for us to establish
something that was going to capture the imagination. Remember in
those days, 85 / 86, NTA in the mornings were transmitting documentaries on earthworms, tomatoes and all sorts of things, grasshoppers .
There was no life, and I felt that we needed to seize that morning belt,
and I felt there was a need to be able to capture the imagination of
people …”
(Danladi Bako in Interview with TVC This Morning July 2017)

The format was initially regarded as a risk because the unpredictable nature of contributions from audience who phoned-in to
a live show necessarily compromised usual strict editorial controls.
Morning Ride’s success opened new prospects, offering a voice to
the unseen public, and getting direct feedback from them. The
format strengthened the media in their monitoring function. However it was in the post 99 era that it flourished; the convergence
of television with other platforms and new modes of communication (phone calls, email, Twitter) really enhanced this development. The format has since become a standard feature on both
independent and government owned television stations. The talk
show format has become a workhorse being refined by new entrants into the market—AIT’s Kakaaki, Channels’ Sunrise Daily, and
TVC’s TVC Breakfast.
These shows offer more comprehensive and in-depth engagement with topical concerns than had been previously possible.
Whereas standard television programs were 30 minute packages, newer shows were easily multiples of this. Kakaaki (AIT) runs
weekdays for three hours from 6:00 a.m. till 9:00 a.m. NTA’s AM Express ran for180 minutes, taking audiences on whistle-stop tours
of the nation. Channels Television’s Sunrise Daily runs for 90 minutes. Anchored by a panel of three hard-nosed interviewers noted
for their adversarial style, the show occupies a niche consistent
with the reputation of the originating institution - the first specialist news station in Nigeria. It is the station’s “hard-hitting flagship
news and current affairs program. It asks the crucial questions and
gets behind the stories that make the news-from political leaders, corporate decision-makers to everyday individuals of note.”
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[emphasis mine]—Channels Television website.
The emphasis in the quote confirms as noted earlier, that the
broadening of attention beyond government functionaries to individuals strategically positioned to impact everyday living is a dividend of deregulated broadcasting and democratized media. On
6th March and 28th May 2016 for example, electricity distributors,
teachers, women and children advocates were featured. Longer
transmission days created opportunities for more content and
chances to incorporate similar novel accessible formats to address
different audience groups. Segmented by interests (politics, business, sports), language (Yoruba, Igbo), age (youth) gender perspective (women), shows like Journalists’ Hangout (TVC), “Patito’s
Gang” (Channels), “Mini Jojo” (AIT), “Your View” (TVC) are worthy
examples. Longer transmission days also legitimized repeat transmission of shows which made viewing more flexible.
Factual programs aside, Fiction has a role to play in the fostering of a democratic culture. Entertainment dominates television
schedules for good reason – they are social lubricants attracting
and keeping audiences happy in between broadcast of factual
(graver) fare. Yet entertainment can also have serious consequences, helping to shape audience world views. Concerns about early
television’s dependence on foreign shows like “I Love Lucy”, “Perry
Mason”, “Little House on the Prairies” were based on the fears
of potential acculturation. Simply put, audiences could become
disgruntled with lived realities when mediated experiences offer
realities deemed better than theirs, especially when no tangible
paths to rectify their realities are offered. There are more serious
economic, cultural and political implications of this. For this reason, transnational media texts ought to be culturally relevant, raising aspirations without creating frustrations.
Programs should respect peculiar sensibilities of audiences,
adapt existing oral cultures, adopt fare suited to perceived tastes
and aspirations of local audiences. Central to television’s response
to serving its diverse ethnic identities is the question of language.
Imposition of a dominant hegemony manifests first in the use of
language. Since it was expedient to use the most widely spoken
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dialect or language, minority groups tended to be marginalized
within a centralized designated market area. Whereas national
radio was able to transmit news summaries in English along with
several Nigerian languages—Edo, Efik, Fulfulde, Hausa, Igbo, Izon
(Ijaw), Kanuri, Tiv, and Yoruba—national network television was
often restricted. Selected local languages were better accommodated within decentralized television news services. Even these
lacked depth and failed to cover the range of existing groups due
to the extreme linguistic diversity of the country. Entertainment
and enlightenment programs, which were charged to transmit cultural heritage were better able to reflect diverse cultures. Drama
with its scope to present a range of characters was better suited
to this role. Characters in serial dramas, like “Village Headmaster”,
depicted different ethnic groups and facilitated the imagining of
a variety of locations. For example, Amebo, the village gossip’s
references to Ahoada, brought to limelight areas then less well
known (Bayelsa State). Similarly, music and dance programmes
drew on cultural troupes from across the nation. In the case of
NTA’s “Nigerian Dances”, audiences were introduced to existing
cultural diversitythough in time, dancing seemed out of place in
the face of other pressing national needs.
Addressing burdens of representation was part of the remit for
NTA’s Programmes directorate. Its successful drama programs to
that end include “Cock Crow at Dawn”, “Samanja” (North/Middle
Belt), “Masquerades”, “Icheoku” (South East), “Koko Close”, “Sura
the Tailor”, (South West), and “Hotel de Jordan” (South South/MidWest). Featured on the network service, these shows transported
audiences across the nation and were more than passing fancies.
Perhaps more than politically explicitly charged current affairs
programs, the dramatic genre helped audiences to confront and
explore contrast and similarities in issues of living. They gave context to differences, and raised common issues of concern. On this
score, NTA programs deserve credit for laying the foundation in
the eighties - presenting diverse slices of national life. This tradition persists, through independent television stations, Nollywood
and independent producers which supply content to television.
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Use of appropriate local languages attracted large audiences
and enhanced participation especially where communal viewing
occurred. Dramatized storytelling (fictional) like “Feyikogbon”,
“Super Story”, in-depth features of odd occurrences unlikely
to make the news “Nkan Mbe”, ombudsman /counseling programmes like “Gboromiro”, “Mini Jojo” had strong water cooler
effects offering talking points carried beyond viewing experience.
Schedules had other bankers for specific audience segments.
Children watched locally produced shows, alongside foreign cartoons, action hero series and adventure series. Liberalization in
the post ‘99 era offered access to more foreign channels. Disney programs like “The Suite Life of Zach and Cody” or “That’s So
Raven” may have outmatched attention to local productions on
Africa Magic channels. In any case, middle class parents tended to
regulate viewing of Africa Magic more strictly.
Africa Magic is a suite of channels on DSTV, carrying content
produced for Africa by Africans. DSTV is a subscription funded satellite distribution television service, a continental initiative owned
by Multichoice. Its operations involved redistributing the products of other transnational media corporation (TMCs) including
Disney, Cartoon Network , news and movies channels from across
the world – Africa, America, Europe, Asia - China, and India. It offers audiences a choice of fare beyond what national broadcasters provide. Once synonymous with Nigerian movies notoriety for
negative portrayals, children’s viewing of Africa Magic was strictly
regulated but its operations are now more diversified as seen on
its seven channels. They carry local language productions, popular serial drama like “Tinsel”, “Jacob’s Cross”, and “Shuga”. Some
are collaborative productions involving Nigeria, South Africa and
Kenya. Aiming to offer the best in entertainment, Africa Magic
commissions original shows, draws on franchises (Deal or No Deal
Nigeria, Big Brother Naija), adapts formats (Africa’s Young Entrepreneurs fashioned after BBC’s Dragon’s Den). Globally franchised
entertainment formats were also popular on terrestrial television
in the post ‘99 era. High stakes in competitive formats like -Who
Wants To Be a Millionaire, Big Brother (Africa), StarQuest, Nigeria’s

234

Yinka Esan

Got Talent promoted a voting culture. Outlook and lifestyle of different generations of Nigerians may have directed their affinity
and exposure to these. Where it occurs, engagement with such
shows may strengthen inclinations towards democratic participation.
Comedy as a form has since evolved from the days of halfhour comedy dramas (“Alawada”, “Icheoku” and “Samanja”) with
their comic characters, slapstick style and focus on human foibles. Comedy skits and stand-up comedy with its irreverence
now abound (Ali Baba, A Y Show, Princess, Basketmouth, Helen
Paul, and Mr. Patrick). These characterize the post ’99 democratic era. The genre offers new spaces for audiences to reflect on
their situations. These candid appraisal of socio-political trends,
and open lampooning of the powerful are features of a flourishing democratic culture. It is consistent with Bahktin’s celebration
of the carnivalesque – liberating spaces in folk culture (like the
carnival) where authority is temporarily inverted. New order can
be broached here and the powerful reproached without fear. Such
absence of reprisals is an advantage of comedic forms. Once overlooked, the power in the genre is now recognized and may be under threat of being hijacked by the powerful. Performers are hired
to entertain the wealthy at private functions and during political
campaigns. Such patronage could become stifling.
Music also flourishes on television as programs and as fillers.
Yet recent preoccupation with love songs, relationships and the
consumerist culture that trendy musicians promote, may have watered down music’s contribution to democratic aspirations (See
top ranking songs in the charts e.g. Popular Naija Songs: Top 30
2016; Africa Charts - Official Top Music Videos Nigeria 2017; Official Top 50 Songs Nigeria 2017). However, the potential for incisive social commentary from music videos, such as Lagbaja’s 200
Million Mumu – The Bitter Truth (2012), should not be discounted.
Indeed Eedris Abdulkareem’s track, Nigeria Jagajaga (2004), was
deemed so abrasive, that it was outlawed, even in a democratic
dispensation. These examples are reminiscent of Fela Anikulapo
Kuti’s Afrobeat style, which remains relevant and popular, though
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it met with stiff resistance from the military rulers of his time. The
contrasting experiences attest to shifting cultural paradigms. The
potential of other musical genres like Juju to foster serious reflection and enhance the democratic culture has also been demonstrated. A classic example is Onyeka Onwenu and Sunny Ade’s
collaboration, Wait for Me (1985), used to promote positive reproductive rights behavior. It illustrates the hybridised genre, infotainment that has since become more prevalent beyond musical
genres.
Conclusion - Democratic Forms on Nigerian Television
Television helps exhibit life and lifestyles and thus helps to establish the political agenda. Its ability to represent diverse groups
may lie in its treatment of matters of interest, employing the right
format as appropriate for target audiences. Traditionally television programs may be classified broadly by a station’s organizational structure—Public Enlightenment, Entertainment, News,
Sports and Current Affairs. These classifications matter to the end
that they determine resource allocation—both financial and human. With proliferation of channels, including specialists (niche)
channels, the need for competitiveness and innovation, program
classifications have broadened the scope of audiences served. Nigerian media, which had relied on the elite in society and the “serious” genre (news and current affairs), to deliberate on and convey
political information, is now reaching out beyond those. There is
evidence to suggest the democratizing of television service. This
may be attributed to the mix of factors—technological, economic,
socio-cultural, and political—discussed above. The tendency towards discussion, concurrent dialogues, and, principally, the ability
to participate directly, makes television more than a notice board
as it used to be. With formal moderation of its space, unlike social
media, television is a platform for reasonable and rational debate
between these diverse groups.
Media roles have been variously defined, but it can be argued
that the ultimate goal for media in a democratic society is to foster
participation and informed decision making. Messages must be
relevant, and audiences ought to have ordered access to contrib-
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ute views that can be rationally considered. Nigeria is richer for
access to diverse (global and local) perspectives, and media are
making bold strides towards building an inclusive society. Widescale coverage was the first step in guaranteeing access for wider
segments of the population. This is now in place. With its fragile geopolitical context, the Nigerian television market should be
segmented mindful of complex identity politics. Education, age,
income, occupation, and gender aside, ethnicity, nationality, and
religion remain much more sensitive markers. Balancing the need
to be distinct with the imperative to belong remains a challenge
to television’s impact.
Televisual language and the medium’s genres commend it for
the mission of creating an enabling culture for Nigeria’s democracy. Audio-visual forms were often readily recognizable when
stations got their formula right. Successful formats have been
reminiscent of familiar forms yet fresh enough to be engaging.
However the assumed success also relies on audience ability to
properly decode the messages. Where there is shared affinity
between producers and audiences, nuances in the codes of political communication will be accessible. Even when individuals
have gaps in their decoding skills, having others who were familiar
with the codes means they could be easily supported to interpret
the message. Not so when messages are technically or culturally
distant from generality of the audience. This is one advantage of
the increased opportunities for more members of the audience
to have direct access, even dialogues with producers and other
members of the viewing public. In other words, it is an advantage
of media convergences and emerging cultures.
Television has come a long way since the authoritarian control
maintained under the military. Both the organizational structure
and program designs were inhibiting. The vibrancy of public discussions conducted on varied TV shows since the opening of communication floodgates contrast sharply with previously observed
political apathy in sections of society, and resentment among the
voiceless. This broad based participation in demanding accountability of powerful groups is empowering. Surveillance of society
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is now collaborative, and not left to professional intermediaries.
Consequent to the new narratives, new heroes and villains are being identified. Through its various forms, including dramas and
comedy, television helps viewers to see, imagine and re-imagine
their society. It thus contributes to building the informed citizenry required to make informed decisions. Changes in television’s
landscape are most encouraging. There is a commitment to interpreting current events, attempts to predict the future, and guide
the plans for same. Although it is not yet ideal, television does
frame the democratic culture and supports Nigeria’s democratic
aspiration.
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7
Talk Radio: A Democratic Tool for Citizen
Engagement
By Funke-Treasure Durodola
Introduction
Radio is the dominant medium and main source of information
in Nigeria (Freedom House, 2012; Akoh & Jagun, 2012), compared
to other forms of mass communication. It is considered Nigeria’s
most obvious and effective means of mass communication because of the immediacy of its impact (Akoh & Jagun, 2012), even
with the advent of technology and the incursion of new media,
notably Twitter and Facebook. A radio listening culture is prevalent in Nigeria perhaps because it is “most accessible and available
to the ordinary, non-literate Nigerian living in a rural area with
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unreliable electricity access” (InterMedia cited in AMDI, 2005, 15).
A 2008 survey submits that “three quarters of households” in
Nigeria own radio sets (ITU cited in Akoh & Jagun, 2012, 6) while a
2010 survey indicates that 43.5% of households in urban and semi
urban areas own radio sets (Akoh and Jagun, 2008).
In Nigeria, as it is prevalent globally, radio continues to converge with new technologies such as the internet and mobile
phones. New socio political dynamics such as live online streaming and podcasting continually emerge to keep radio alive as a
dialogical and participatory medium.
According to Gunner, Ligaga & Moyo (2011), across Africa, radio continues to “focus on the everyday” and still “engage with
moments of high national and cultural drama”. The unique ability
of radio to merge these two makes it a powerful and dangerous
broadcast medium.
Historically, in Nigeria, radio was used by British colonizers in
an ideological way. It was used to represent the interests of the
colonial class. They also used it to advance their ideas about culture and the political order to the indigenous majority. Years later,
radio also provided a powerful channel for state propaganda in order to constitute differing levels of political identity (Larkin, 2008).
The agitations about the exclusion of regional governments by
Nigeria’s colonial central administration, led to the development
of regional broadcasting and the transformation of broadcasting
in 1959 (Ladele, Adefela & Lasekan, 1979).
The Western Nigeria Television (WNTV) started in 1959, followed by the radio arm, Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service
(WNBS) in 1960 (Uche cited in Ariye, 2010:416; Ejiofor, 2002 cited
in Atoyebi, 2002, 7). The Eastern Broadcasting Service (EBS) started
in 1960 while the Northern region followed suit with (BCNN) in
1962 (Saulawa, 2001 cited in Atoyebi, 2002, 7). Regional governments wielded immense power and engaged in tribal invectives
until 1967 when civil war broke out. States then came into being in
order to “wither the powers of the regional governments and limit
the use of regional broadcasting services for propaganda and politics” (Atoyebi, 2002, 7). Twelve states were created, and each of
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them established their respective radio and TV stations (Atoyebi,
2002). Nigerian radio thereafter transformed from regional tools
in the hands of colonial masters to state apparatuses used by the
Federal Government (Larkin, 2008).
In most developing nations across the world including Africa,
the diversification of radio from the monopoly of state broadcasters is closely “tied to processes of political and economic liberalizations” (Fardon and Furniss, 2002, 3). This has created an array of
local community radio stations, where local issues are prioritized
and local languages are used. In Nigeria, this liberalization was
achieved through commercial radio stations.
The National Broadcasting Commission was established in
1992 through the promulgation of a decree, which brought about
“private participation in the ownership and operation of broadcast
stations” (Akingbulu, 2010, 12).
In appraising radio broadcasting in contemporary Nigeria, the
role of niche radio stations using indigenous languages must be
factored, especially for their role in heightening citizens’ cultural
identity evident in the surge in the use of indigenous languages,
including Pidgin English, by radio stations in the country’s major cities of Lagos, Abuja and Kano which reflect the multilingual
composition of Nigeria (Durodola, 2013).
Radio stations using indigenous languages offer governments
the opportunity to communicate their actions and policies to the
grassroots, the un-educated and the semi-urban population outside the capital cities in their languages. As Soola (2002) states,
radio is particularly relevant to the needs of the rural, marginalized
and disadvantaged poor. Radio is thus being used as a tool for
development across Nigeria, similar to its use in other developing
nations with a large illiterate population (Larkin, 2008). In Nigeria,
radio has evolved as a veritable tool for mass mobilization, national orientation and creation of awareness on a variety of issues,
including democratic governance and accountability.
How Radio Blossomed in Nigeria since 1999
The Nigerian broadcast sector was liberalized with Decree No.
38 of 1992 (Jibbo & Simbine 2003, 182). It paved the way for pri-
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vately owned radio and TV stations to begin operation. The decree also provided for a regulatory body known as the National
Broadcasting Commission (NBC). In 2000, FRCN was directed by
the Federal Government of Nigeria to operate FM stations at various state capitals. That same year the broadcast sector was privatized, paving the way for ownership and operations of broadcast
stations by individuals. Another expansion drive for more stations
started with the FRCN and NTA at the beginning of the millennium
(Akingbulu & Bussiek, 2010).
By 2009, 17 years after liberalization, the industry had developed such that there were “more than 394 stations and an annual
advertising revenue estimate of about 2 Billion Naira” (NBC, 2009).
This informed the need to allow alternative networks in the industry, more importantly however, the plurality of broadcast was
informed by “the size of Nigeria, culture, her religious diversity,
commercial and national interest” (NBC, 2009).
The Evolution of Talk Station Formats in Nigeria
Nigeria has a duopolistic state broadcasting system, with stations owned by the federal government and state governments
(Akoh and Jagun, 2012; Akingbulu, 2010; Mytton, 2013; Bolarinwa, 2011). The two forms compete “in providing news and current
aﬀairs content, especially when the political aﬃliation of the state
administration diﬀers from that of the Federal government” (Akoh
& Jagun, 2012, 28). The Federal Government owns the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) network and the Voice of Nigeria (VON) “which provides Foreign Service broadcasts” (Bolarinwa, 2011, 1). The monopoly of the FRCN, which is the broadcaster
mandated to “perform a federally deﬁned broadcasting function,’’
does not cover state radio broadcasting (Akoh & Jagun, 2012, 28).
Each state has its own broadcasting corporation, which provides
both radio and television services (Akoh & Jagun, 2012). These
broadcast in English language and the predominant indigenous
language(s) of the state. They relay the National Network News on
the Federal government-owned network, thereby contributing to
the federal radio broadcaster’s widest reach in the country (Akingbulu, 2010).
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Talk radio in Nigeria was pioneered by the FRCN Network, a
public broadcaster turned state broadcaster, which has grown
in dimensions and scope since 1932. After privatization, Daar
Communication’s RayPower FM emerged as the alternative radio
platform, especially to counter government’s views and position
on sundry issues. Early in its existence it established itself as a
formidable platform for holding the government accountable to
the people. It was thus seen as a people oriented platform, performing the role of a watchdog in Nigeria’s emerging democracy,
without the limitations of a state broadcaster. Somide (2017) says
Daar Communication’s radio has since evolved into a radio network broadcasting across Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
Although owing to issues bordering on political economy, arising from its owner’s involvement in partisan politics in 2015, which
resulted in money laundering charges (Balancing Act, 2010), the
sense of ownership of the station by the people and credibility has
waned, particularly its television arm, AIT. However, Raypower FM
continues to produce participatory programs that enjoy listenership and patronage.
The Nigeria Broadcasting Commission (NBC) in 20 years licensed 402 operational broadcasters, 123 of them were privately
owned. There were also 233 radio and television stations owned
by the FCT, federal and state governments, as well as 46 cable stations (PM News, 2012). Talk radio stations in Lagos include Radio
One 103.5FM, Nigeriainfo, Brilla FM a niche sports station, LagosTalks owned by Megalectrics Ltd and WFM, a talk station for women. Most radio stations in Lagos and indeed Nigeria operate the
general format of broadcasting, combining talk and music.
The Impact of Radio on Citizenship & Influence of
Talk Shows on Citizens in a Democracy
An impact study about three local community radio stations
in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania submits that radio stations have
significant effects on enlarging the public arena for citizens to
be heard in public on matters of priority public concern. It also
states that the ability to harness local information and use them
for information and decision making improves significantly with
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broadcasting from radio stations. It further states that citizens experience an increased sense of dignity; and that citizens are opportune to catch sight of themselves as a public and to discuss
issue of public interest.
According to the study, radio, used in this manner, evolves into
a tool used by the citizen in holding political leaders to account.
This makes citizens become active participants and contributors to
the debates around elections and governance. Erichs (2007) posits
that the media can continue to play an active role in the building
of public opinion by widening the variety of voices heard. This is
the rationale behind using the BBC media Action Town Hall meeting Format of discussion to bring about inclusion in governance in
Nigeria. This usage cuts across talk radio stations in Nigeria.
Erichs (2007) states further that the media generally can
strengthen the capability of citizens to be agents of change by
holding actors in power accountable to the general public. It can
contribute to the strengthening of citizenship by supplying participatory opportunities to have rights and citizenship practiced in
real life.
Carey (1995) states that to be a citizen is to be seen and heard,
and to have a public life. Media audiences participate ritually in
meaning construction. Both vocal and visual communication
channels of radio and television make communicating individuals
into personalities with a voice, a face, a character and a history, personalities with whom recipients can sympathize or empathize, whom they can like or dislike, detest or revere (Thompson
1990:228, original emphasis). This results in valorization (Deacon
et al, 2007).
In the age of interactional communication on both mediums,
made possible by ‘technological production and diffusion’; they
create the same effect or response from callers, citizens who are
seen as vocal in their response to ‘hailing’ by radio station regarding issues of common interests in a democracy. These are known
by their voices, more so by their consistent contributions to various issues raised by radio stations, day in, day out. This accounts
for the popularity of talk show presenters and anchors and the
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subsequent popularity of their shows.
In the regional politics of Nigeria in the 60s, radio was a vital tool for information and mobilization, for both primary and
secondary engagements of the citizen. It was also used inadvertently to incite violence. Babarinsa (2003) documents the Western
Nigeria elections of 1965 conducted under a civilian regime led
to a revolt against the regime of Chief Ladoke Akintola, tagged
‘wet e’ due to the negative use of radio. He also gives a personal
account of the coverage of the gubernatorial elections in Ondo
State between Akin Omoboriowo of the National Party of Nigeria
and Adekunle Ajasin during which Radio Nigeria, Akure and Ondo
State Radio Corporation were used by both parties to fan the embers of violence (Babarinsa, 2003).
In the aftermath of the annulled presidential elections in 1993,
radio played a prominent role, at some point evolving into an oppositional tool by civilians to combat military rule.
In the fourth republic, there were landmark political developments in Nigeria which were heralded on radio and then further
analyzed and debated in the court of public opinion on talk shows.
I present two instances of media organizations that played the
role of a watchdog in democracy in contemporary Nigeria. These
are Radio Nigeria, notably breaking the news about the abduction
of former Governor of Anambra State, Chief Chris Ngige, to the
nation; playing a major role in the return of Governor Peter Obi,
of Anambra State through the coverage of the court case; policing
the 2007 election through effective and objective reportage, the
BBC Media Action’s Town Hall discussion format about inclusive
engagement of citizens, in partnership with several radio stations
across Nigeria and the watchdog role of BBC Hausa Service in
Northern Nigeria.
Radio Nigeria and its Role as a Watchdog in the
Fourth Republic
Public broadcasters in Nigeria as represented by Radio Nigeria
(FRCN) and Voice of Nigeria and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) presently account to the executive arm of government
across the tiers of government instead of the public through the
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legislature. These modes of operation negate the declaration of
the principles of freedom of expressions in Africa (BBC cited in
Akoh and Jagun, 2012, p.27). This projects these public broadcasters as a captured media, government’s mouthpieces which
routinely report government’s activities without an agenda to investigate corrupt practices or hold government accountable. This
is the case with state owned broadcast services controlled by sitting governors across Nigeria. The courage to then report a sitting
governor in Anambra State on national radio was redeeming for
Radio Nigeria. It remains a reference point in Radio Nigeria’s recent history.
Ononye (2017) in her personal account as the Head of Reportorial at the Radio Nigeria headquarters says the first contact on
the issue was with an aide of the then governor of Anambra State,
Dr Chris Ngige, who hid in a bush for fear of being found out.
He gave the account of how the former governor was abducted
amidst sporadic shooting, in an interactive on the Radio Nigeria
Network. The then DG alerted the PDP secretariat in Abuja, which
was oblivious of the development. These two acts checkmated a
civilian coup, which could have resulted in the swearing in of the
deputy as acting governor. The Chief Judge of the state heard
the news on the 4pm Network News of Radio Nigeria, which stated that the national leadership of the PDP was not in support of
the development. That stalled the ‘installation’ of the deputy and
eventually the governor was restored.
It turned out that the abduction was the result of a tussle between a political Godfather and his candidate (Dawodu, 2015).
“The impact was such that, something like that had never happened before; people were worried, nobody actually knew where
the governor was or what was happening; there was great panic in
the environment. The impact was multifaceted. Radio Nigeria was
able to, as a leading light break the story (Ononye, 2017).
In the context of the watch dog role of the media, “The FRCN
was doing what it was supposed to do; we broke a story that occurred; that was what we were supposed to do, we didn’t do it because of the governor, we did it because it was our responsibility
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to do so” (Ononye, 2017)
The unbiased coverage of the 2007 elections by Radio Nigeria
is another instance of how a state owned radio network operated
72-hour election coverage, with live streaming and deployment
of a large contingent of reporters across Nigeria. The election was
considered one of the freest and fairest in Nigeria’s democratic
history. FRCN reporters reported from polling centers and stayed
until election results were announced (Okere, 2017).The election
ushered in President Umar Yar’Adua. The coverage was acclaimed
in the country’s broadcast history as a pioneering, pace setting
and objective reportage, contrary to widespread belief that Radio
Nigeria was a captured media.
Another significant contribution in Radio Nigeria to democracy
is the creation of the talk show, ‘The President Explains’ during
the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. “The
idea that Chief Obasanjo speaks with the generality of the people on his programs and policies via Radio Nigeria was born, running in the process, 15 editions of robust engagements and uncensored interactions with every category of the populace in a
monthly program known as The President Explains” (Aloko, 2014,
p.1).This talk show anchored by the President of Nigeria during
which he engaged the citizenry became quite popular. It was a
phenomenal talk show bridging the gap between the government
and the governed without an intermediary.
Okere (2017) states that ‘The President Explains’ was a very important watchdog platform that Radio Nigeria instituted during
President Obasanjo’s administration; and there were major breakthroughs achieved through that program within those years.
The BBC Media Action in Nigeria produces a range of talk programs including drama, town hall discussion formats and interviews to educate Nigerians about democratic governance. These
include voter rights, rights as citizens and active participation in
democracy. The organization has achieved this through partnerships and collaborations with radio stations across Nigeria.
Lewis & Booth (1989) make a clear distinction between public
service broadcasting and commercial broadcasting. They state that
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while the former should be in “the business of selling programs
which inform, educate and entertain, to audiences”, the latter is
expected to sell “audience to advertisers” (Lewis and Booth, 1989:
99). The boundaries of the basic functions are, however, blurred
in Nigeria; the context of FM broadcasting is such that Federal
Government-owned FM stations in Nigeria compete with privately
owned FM stations for revenue from advertising (Akoh & Jagun,
2012). Daar Communication’s RayPower and Radio Continental
are examples of such commercial general format radio stations.
Political talk shows on both stations are further analyzed in this
chapter.
Understanding Talk Radio
Talk radio stations operate and function as niche stations, carving out particular tastes for their fragmented listeners. Radio stations, including those which operate the general format have specific programs through which they function as watchdogs, playing
a role of the umpire between the government and the governed,
in the society. A large number of radio stations in Nigeria belong
to this category. They include Raypower Fm, Eko FM, City FM and
more.
Talk radio stations may not necessarily churn out reportages
in the news form. Tettey (2010) cited in Gunner, Ligaga & Moyo,
(2011, 9) states that such radio “ensure that issues do not die with
the news cycle, but can be kept in the public realm and in the public consciousness for some time”. He argues that talk radio “moves
the debate beyond the monotony and fleeting nature of “current
news and passing public interest”.
Talk is contextually defined, and media talk, irrespective of the
medium, involves different discursive relations in different forms
of context. Social divisions are displayed, intricately enacted and
confronted in televised talk (Deacon et al, 2007). This works for
radio as well. In Lagos, Nigeria, these social divisions are obvious
in the programming and target audience of stations such as Bond
FM, Radio One, Nigeria Info and Wazobia FM. Some programs
attract certain people from particular social classes, because they
see themselves reflected in the content, or they can identify them-
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selves in the programming. Talk in the media is conditioned by
the genres and types of programming in which it occurs; there are
differential gradations (Deacon et al, 2007:286).
In the broadcast media generally, the site and setting of a talk
program are created in a sustained and thorough going manner
such that it reflects certain realist representations of social life
(Deacon et al, 2007). This is attractive to the listener and sustains
his interest and participation actively or passively in the program.
“Where talk takes place and with whom, can influence considerably
what it accomplishes, and how” (Deacon, Pickering, Golden, Murdock,
2007, p.286).

Talk on radio can be monologic or dialogic or a combination
of both. It is monologic where one person speaks to many listeners, as in a lecture or speech. It is formal, even where what is said
or heard has a familiar structure. This manifests on radio as news
commentary or news analysis as is the case on the Radio Nigeria
Network News. It is sometimes the intro of a program, the monologue, as is the case with Kubanji Direct on Radio Continental or
Issues in the News on FRCN’s Radio One. Dialogic talk is a process
of interaction between two or more people. It can be informal
and familiar, formal and unfamiliar and have variants of the two.
This is dependent on those involved and the context of interaction
(Deacon et al 2007). Talk shows combine both to elicit a robust
engagement from the public.
Talk Shows
“The right and ability to participate as listener and speaker in public
debates is essential to competent citizenship” - John Dewey in Peter
Erichs (2002) cited in Erichs (2007).

Participatory program formats in radio and television are the
norm in many countries today. One of such participatory formats
is talk shows, which has made the public arena more inclusive
(Erichs, 2007). It has given poor people and other previously excluded citizens the access, representation and voice needed for
participation in a democracy. Tettey (2010) says talk shows often
heighten public awareness of specific issues concerning minority
and the marginalized social groups and issues.
In analyzing the verbal encounters of a radio talk show, in the
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book Confrontation Talk (1996), Ian Hutchby reveals how power is
instantiated, at a micro level, in what is said, and argued between
participants in institutional settings.
There are two types of discussion talk shows. There is the populist TV discussion program which results in tabloidization. It is the
construction of ‘the public sphere as a sort of spectacular circus
show, it is characterized by intense vocal contests, often leading to
the open expression of vitriol and abuse. It is an unrestrained form
of talk, and it delivers premium entertainment value. The second
type or format is the televisualization of academic talk, which is
to ‘the public sphere as a professor’s living room on air’. It is a
restrained form of talk, characterized by having ‘university dons,
writers, and politicians explore differences of views about given
topics in a generally sedate and sequentially ordered fashion and
in a manner of mutual absorption in ideas raised’. Other forms
are constructed in between these two types which correspond to
stratifications of social class, status and educational background
(Deacon et al, 2007).
Another is the radio magazine which takes different forms,
styles and genres. It is a format of program in which the presenter’s links provide the logic of why all the different items in the program are provided (Ali, 2008). Examples include breakfast shows
and popular magazine talk shows like the Ellen Degeneres Show
and the Oprah Winfrey show in the United States; Soni Irabor Live,
Kubanji Direct on Radio Continental, Talk Nigeria on Radio Continental, This Morning, Wake Up Naija and Nightline with Funke
Treasure on FRCN’s Radio One 103.5FM, RayPower’s Political Platform and Fact File.
These popular talk shows, characteristically, elicit discursive participation from citizens and promote inclusion through interactive
sessions. Such talk programs also exist in indigenous languages
and pidgin.
Broadcasting reproduces the world as ordinary but that seeming obviousness is an effect. It is the outcome of a multiplicity of
small techniques and discursive practices that combine to produce that deeply taken-for-granted- sense of familiarity with what
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is seen or heard(Scanell 1991, 8). One of these taken for granted
practices is the act of talking which is reproduced in the studio.
The features of which are similar in reality and in the simulated
space of broadcasting Deacon et al (2007) state that the features
of talk are turn–taking, topic maintenance, establishing transition
from one topic to another, offering appropriate forms of initiating
and terminating talk. It is pertinent to note how these features
come into play in a show host’s engagement with citizens.
Political Talk Shows in Indigenous Languages &
Pidgin English
In Lagos, there are four radio stations broadcasting in indigenous languages. They are: Radio Lagos-Tiwantiwa, FRCN’s Bond
FM, FRCN’s Choice FM and lastly Daar Communication’s Faaji FM.
In addition, there are two NigP radio stations bringing the number
to six non-English language radio stations out of the 26 radio stations (NBC List, 2013) in Lagos city. On RayPower’s Faaji FM, “People who find it difficult to express themselves in English during
‘Fact File’ or ‘Political Platform’ find it easy to express themselves
in their local language, the Yoruba language on ‘E gbe yewo’ (Somide,2017).
NigP radio stations, which developed in Lagos, a city originally populated by Yoruba-speaking Nigerians, caters for the needs
of non-Yoruba-speaking indigenes in the metropolitan city. They
also address people from the different ethnic groups in Nigeria,
who are not necessarily educated. These NigP radio stations have
thus become quite popular and have expanded from Lagos to
other major cities in Nigeria (Durodola, 2013).
Radio One’s pidgin breakfast show, ‘Wake Up Naija’ continues
to be a participatory talk show that encourages citizen engagement. The station like Wazobia FM liberated a previously marginalized majority through its language of communication. Soola
(2002) submits that
Wazobia FM activated a “community-specific and situation-relevant” radio station which is also “dialogic and participatory”
(Soola, 2002, p.24).
In a series of interviews with hosts of Talk Shows in Lagos, Ni-
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geria, I interrogate the thinking behind these programs, whether
presented in English or indigenous languages; and how they have
functioned as watchdogs in Nigeria’s emerging democracy in a
series of interviews with show hosts.
Analysis of Interviews with Talk Show Hosts
Radio is used as a tool of subversion under military and dictatorial regimes. It is difficult to achieve or sustain that under a democratic dispensation. Tettey (2011) writing about talk radio and
politics in Ghana states that the increase in ‘non-state controlled
radio stations in several countries has led to a vibrant, pluralistic
and competitive radio landscape. And this has led to the expansion in the media spaces available for the expression of citizens’
preferences and perspectives. This is reflected in an interview with
Ambrose Somide, the director, Radio Services, Daar Communications.
RayPower 100.5 FM
There are two political talk shows on the radio station, Fact File
and Political Platform. Fact File is as old as RayPower FM. It runs
between 8.30 and 9.00am, weekdays. Political Platform, which
started from Lagos and used to last for 15mins, now runs between
9.15am - 9.45am weekdays on the RayPower Network which covers Nigeria. Media research and monitoring reveal that those are
the two key programs on the RayPower Network that shoot the
listenership up (Somide, 2017).
Political platform is managed by the political desk in the newsroom, headed by Austin Okhiria Agbonsurenmi, who is the lead
anchor; there are four other presenters from the political desk,
two ladies and two gentlemen. They “look at topical issues in the
news, that people are talking about, take reports, bring in a guest
to comment and analyze, either on phone or in the studio, do a
bit of analysis themselves looking at different angles. Phone calls
are not allowed on the program; they rely on feedback via letters, emails, text messages in the course of the program (Somide,
2017).
The program has a huge influence on its listeners and could
be said to have contributed to shaping civic competence among
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citizens:

“we have some people who can lay claim to part ownership of the
program because of the length of years they have been listening to
the program and following it; they feel like a part of that program”
(Somide., 2017:2).

Listeners on the program thus have a sense of ownership. Ross
(2004) says participation in talk radio reflects active agency, which
is critical for ‘growth, consolidation, and sustenance of democracy’
(Ross, cited in Tettey, 2017, 21):

“whenever, due to technical issues, we fail to run Political Platform on
the network. . . as I said, the program originates from Abuja. . . you will
see people calling in, cursing because the program is a no holds barred
kind of programme where people, the presenters, the analysts and the
guests express their opinions freely on any subject” (Somide, 2017, 4).

Sometimes RayPower runs afoul of the rules and regulations
guiding utterances on radio in the bid to accommodate all shades
of opinions:
“It’s very engaging, although at times they talk themselves into trouble
and this has put us at loggerheads on a number of occasions. I have
had to visit NBC (the National Broadcasting Commission, the regulating body for broadcasting) several times for views expressed, guests
featured, content of the program and all of that” (Somide, 2017, 1).

It is a documented fact that talk show hosts represent particular
political interests. Issues treated on Fact File and Political Platform
and statements from high profile guests, however, continue to
make the front pages of newspapers the next day.

“ I recall one particular edition (Fact File) where I interviewed the current Minister of Communication, Adebayo Shittu, That was when there
was this proposal, by ‘telcos’, that was endorsed by NCC for increase
in data rate. . . and I asked him if he was aware of the development…
He said that has not been discussed with him. He was not aware; he
was just hearing this for the first time on radio. The question I put to
him was, “are you really in charge of communication? Because if something has been endorsed by an agency under your watch and you are
claiming on radio that you are just hearing for the first time, are you
really sincerely in charge? And he said one or two things that made the
headlines the next day in the newspaper” (Somide, 2017).

Media production should be carefully linked to the uses, meanings and values made of the media products consumed (Deacon
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et al, 2007). The meanings made by some citizens are as divergent as the views expressed on the two programs are varied. Somide (2017) says at a point during the Jonathan administration,
the presenters were accused of being quite biased, and serving
the interest of the PDP; and that many times, the present Minister
of Information, Lai Mohammed, who used to be the spokesperson for the APC then refused to go on that program. Even after
winning the election and President Buhari took over government,
presenters of ‘Political Platform’ are accused of playing the opposition card and being the mouthpiece of the PDP (Somide, 2017).
This situation on RayPower’s talk show validates the assertion that
political talk radio offers a ‘facade of a deliberative public sphere’,
a thin public sphere where the media operates as a billboard of
opposing viewpoints as against a space for proper debates and
analyses of issues (Tettey 2011, p.26):
“And that’s a long battle that we’ve been fighting. And when people
say you are too biased, some would also commend them to say you
are bold, you are courageous in taking the government up on some of
these issues” (Somide, 2017,4).

As in other parts of Africa, talk show hosts in Nigeria functioning in their professional role of watchdogs continually struggle to
strike a balance between being disinterested parties in discussions
and debates and facilitators of objective analyses of issues (Tettey,
2011).
Radio Continental, Lagos
Another talk show that has a huge followership on radio in
Lagos is ‘Kubanji Direct’. It is a news magazine on which topical
issues from politics, economics to sports are discussed. It is general interest, but as the occasion demands, it delves into politics
and political issues. It is anchored by Jones Usen known as Citizen
Jones on the program. He has been the anchor since 2012 when
the program attracted sponsorship from a household brand in Nigeria The program starts with a prologue that sets the tone of the
program and then the guests take over, the two guests usually
don’t agree (Usen, 2017).
‘Kubanji Direct’ airs on weekdays, at 7pm, the prime time for
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major radio networks, as a ‘creative alternative to them’, especially
to compete with Radio Nigeria which relays a Network News and
program at that time (Usen, 2017:1). Citizen Jones treats ‘topics
that are not common to radio stations in Lagos and around the
environment:

“I swim against the tide, when it is fashionable to latch on to a particular
subject matter in the country; I come from a different plan. I approach
issues that ordinarily would have been forgotten by the listenership. So
I don’t go with the flow. I try to be different” (Usen, 2017, p.2).

This is instructive, and in tune with the characteristics of talk radio, which is to ensure that issues are kept in the public realm and
in the public consciousness for some time. Usen (2017) reiterates
that the essence of radio is to provoke and stimulate debates:
“Just bring these issues to the debate and allow the listener to make up
his mind. As far as that goes, I would imagine I take on issues that are
germane to the listenership and so participation is keen” (Usen, 2017,
p.3).

Tettey (2011) says this approach makes it difficult for the subject of a news stories or even public officials to ride out an issue
with the hope that it will die with the news cycle.
Talk radio is live and so instant feedback is another characteristic of talk shows. Tettey (2011) states further that phone-ins are
the main vehicle through which citizens participate in talk programs. Usen (2017) agrees with this assertion. He offers that on
‘Kubanji Direct’:
“The social media engagement would tell you that sometimes when
we open the telephone lines, it is surreal and I would say the traffic is
stimulating” (Usen 2017:3).

Usen (2017) talks about the peculiar democratic experience in
the country, arguing that, the failure of leadership necessitates
that the people must be engaged. He asserts that although the
issues are there, they need to be provoked and so citizens rely on
radio (Usen, 2017):

“Radio is not just the king of the electronic media due to its blind nature but a personal medium too, so they (citizens) tend to yield to any
radio station that gives them what they want” (Usen, 2017, p.3).

And the peculiar democratic experience arose from the disap-
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pointment about the rulership of the political class and the fact
that ‘the military severed the bridges we had built overtime, so
radio comes in to provide the succor’ (Usen 2017, p.3).
In his analysis of the verbal encounters of the radio talk show,
Hutchby (1996) submits that there are various ways in which power relations are given form, reproduced and resisted. Participation
on ‘Kubanji Direct’ is keen as with most talk shows, although Citizen Jones has not featured too many women as guests. In terms of
engagement, a sizable number of women call in once the lines are
thrown open; more call in when the programme ends to engage
with the presenter (Usen, 2017).
Soni Irabor Live
Soni Irabor Live was initially on NTA and AIT from February
1997 till April 2010. It was a general interest talk show with a focus
on public officials and public intellectuals. Political party presidential candidates like Basorun MKO Abiola, Baba Gana Kingibe, Tom
Ikimi and cabinet ministers appeared on it. His interview with former Minister for Information, Walter Ofonagoro, was serialized in
Weekend Concord of Dec 23, 1995. Soni Irabor Live radio version
started in June 2011 on Inspiration FM and continued as a general
interest show. It, however, prides itself on dealing with political
issues before human interest. Foremost political personalities like
INEC Chairman, Attahiru Jega, when INEC was preparing for the
2011 elections and also in 2015, prominent political figures relentlessly featured included the INEC Chairman, Attahiru Jega, Governor of Lagos State, Akinwunmi Ambode and a number of other
government functionaries (Irabor, 2017).
Soni Irabor also pioneered the presentation of Radio Link, an
audience participatory talk show on the Radio Network which he
hosted for a year and half and stopped presenting in 2000. Radio Link was credited with getting debt paid to Nigeria Airways.
(Irabor, 2017:3) recalls another watchdog moment in 2000 “when
President Obasanjo raided Aguleri, they (Radio Nigeria Management) tried to stop me. We had to tone down the reactions.”
During the military regime, he was invited by the SSS and detained for seven hours for making a statement about the Structur-
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al Adjustment Program (SAP) on Radio Scope.
In the beginning of the fourth republic, an interview talk show,
‘Media Chat’ was created for President Obasanjo to field questions
from the media. It was a multiple interviewers and one interviewee format talk show, which was jointly produced and presented
by Nigeria’s public radio and TV, Radio Nigeria and the Nigerian
Television Authority. It had no feedback channel of a phone –in.
Soni Irabor interviewed the new democratically elected Nigerian
President Olusegun Obasanjo, who heralded the fourth republic in
Nigeria, four times on ‘Media Chat’.
Free expression is critical in fostering and consolidating democratic governance (Tettey, 2011), yet the Nigerian media strive
to achieve it in successive democratic governments. Irabor (2017)
recalls the dismissive and sometimes combative responses of
President Obasanjo then when asked questions bordering on
governance in Nigeria on Media Chat and how they managed it.
Although they backed down eventually, the interviewers still asked
hard questions. One was about the police force, the many contracts being awarded for developments and how the new president told him off saying: “ are you their lawyer?” (Irabor, 2007, p.3)
Conclusion
The media space is agog with talk shows in English and indigenous languages, helping citizens to make meaning of political
developments and issues; and creating a deliberative democracy.
Radio has for long played a major and definitive role in Nigeria’s
democracy, in alignment with Castells (2007) who says the media have become the social space where power is decided. The
media have a democratic mandate to scrutinize political power
in line with their role as the fourth estate of the realm. The mandate arose from the normative functions of the press, to represent
public interest by making it possible to hold powerful actors in the
society accountable to the public.
Although, radio stations and talk show hosts have become increasingly partisan, as Tersmeden (2007:133) argues, journalists
cannot become silent for fear of criticizing a government they
support. To do so is to abandon their watchdog role in society.
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In Nigeria of the 80’s, radio played a vital role in engaging the citizenry about government’s policies and developmental projects.
Federal government-owned agencies like MAMSER and the National Orientation Agency; and initiatives like Better Life for Rural
Women and Family Support Program were powered using radio
as a tool.
A Department for International Development, UK White Paper
2006 states that the biggest difference to the quality of governance is active involvement by citizens. It affirms that politics is
the only thing that can, in the long run, “transform the quality of
decision making in developing countries and the effectiveness of
the States”.
Contrary to the claims that radio is a dying and forgotten medium, in relation to advancement in technology through new media, radio has continued to adapt to changing circumstances. It
continues to be relevant for new kinds of imagining the self as
an individual and citizen (Gunner, Ligaga and Moyo, 2011), just
as the utilization of indigenous languages is equally continually
relevant in engaging citizens on programs bordering on politics
and governance.
Since the traditional role of the media in a democracy is to continually challenge the authorities and bring about an awareness of
democratic values (Tersmaden, 2007), Nigerian radio stations have
continually held this up not only in their coverage and reportage
of developmental issues in the fourth republic, they have consistently done so through an array of talk shows.
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8
Media and Diversity Reporting of
Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria:
A Perspective
By Nathaniel D. Danjibo
Introduction
There is a relationship between ethno-religious violence and
the media in Nigeria. For most Nigerians, these stories are heard
only on radio, television and newspapers; and Nigerians react and
relate to the stories depending on how the media frame their reports. The media, therefore, serve as the mouthpiece and ears of
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many a Nigerian. In the same vein, the media also play a vanguard
position in governance by letting the public know what government’s activities are all about and by conveying to the government
the desires and aspirations of the public. The media thus become
an integral part of society in facilitating mutual understanding
between the governed and the government(s). However, “While
conflict discourse systems and their interrelations of opposition
and alliance can be identified in individual conversations about
news, it is more effective to concentrate on media content as an
indirect method of observation because of the unique fast moving feedback involved in daily journalistic production” (Arno, 2009,
p.6).In times of tension and actual expression of conflict, people
rely on the media to act and react, just as people become emotional when media reportage is deemed highly sensational.
It is observable that a lot of items reported as news are in fact,
pseudo-events that are simply created for the media, which otherwise would not have taken place. This is a bit complicated. The
question is-could there be any reportage of an event considered
not to be a news item? This brings us to the place of ethics in media reporting, where a journalist has to make discretionary decisions on whether or not to report particular news items in the face
of its devastating effect on the general public. This is why Sharkey
(2003, 20) suggested that:
Reporting only what you see, might not, on first hearing, seem like
such a bad thing. It sounds like a basic definition of objectivity: factual,
unembellished coverage. But good journalism includes an appreciation
of nuance and an ability to place ‘what you see’ in a broader context…
it also demonstrates that there is a difference between seeing and understanding.

A good deal of what the media report about conflicts center
on what is seen without adequately investigating the root causes and the consequences thereafter. In some dire cases, a lot of
hearsay and speculation is passed for news. Moreover, Grimes,
Husken, Simon and Venbrux (2011, 5) were of the view that “Mediatizing conflict spreads it”. In other words, spreading news items
in the media about conflict and violence only helps to exacerbate
conflict, especially in the manner in which conflict cases are re-
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ported with strong adjectives without due consideration for the
after effect. Accordingly, the phrase ‘mediatized conflict’ “is used
to emphasize the complex ways in which media are often implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about
them” (Cottle, 2006, p.8-9). Moreover, media profession in Nigeria
has a lot more to do with ownership, business, politics, ethnicity
and religion than strict adherence to the principles of ethics and
morals. Dautrich and Hartley (2011, 137) observed: “As with other
institutional actors, the professional norm of journalists, editors
and producers have an impact on their actions.”
Ownership of the media has a great impact on media reportage
in the sense that the ownership guides what is publishable and
what is not publishable. In other words, news and editorial publications are dependent on the owners’ interests; in our setting,
they are also largely dependenton the owners’ ethnic, religious
and political leanings.. News reporters and editors are constrained
to tailor their works to please the owner. This development colours reporting and weakens the appeal of media products as fair
and comprehensive accounts of goings on. Isola (2010, 12) aptly
captures the point about media ownership and economic interest
when he wrote:
Economic and ownership influence also tend to affect the actions of the
media…. Journalists are mostly employees who are strongly influenced
by those who own and control the media. Like other employees in the
capitalist enterprise, journalists are subjected to direct economic power
of media owners. The fact that most news media organizations are constituted as lucrative capitalist enterprises, whose owners play key roles
in the domestic economy and politics, sometimes turn media owners
and their employees into pro-systemic individuals.

Two other variables that cannot be ignored in the analysis of
media reportage in Nigeria are the issue of corruption and poor
remuneration of the workers in the media industry. The poor, irregular and sometimes non-payment of workers in the media industry has negative effects on media reportage as most reporters
and editors would have to go an extra mile to make ends meet.
That extra mile is not often decent or honorable. Indeed there
are reports of some media owners boldly telling their workers
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to utilize their identity cards as meal tickets. This immoral and
unethical conduct tacitly encourages corruption to be part and
parcel of the media industry and de-emphasizes the role of ethics
in media reportage.
Ethnicity and religion are not new concepts in Nigeria’s political development. For a long time, the Nigerian people have been
defined and have defined their identities based on ethno-religious differences (Suberu, 1996; 2004; Campbell, 1997; Nnoli,
1980; 1995; Osaghae, 2001; (Sklar 2004; Young 1999; Nnoli 1980;
Osaghae 2002; Horowitz 2000; Kukah 1994; Kastfelt 2004; Falola
1998). Often times we are misguided by a wealth of literature that
tends to segregate the Nigerian state into two distinct social categories of the Christian south and the Muslim north, and this false
categorization has helped to heighten mutual suspicion between
those in the south and those in the north of the country. Nigeria
is both a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, and there is no
doubt that ethnicity and religion have impacted negatively on the
body politic of the Nigerian state with enormous consequences
on both human lives and properties. This, in fact, tends to negate
the cardinal principle of most religions to promote peace in human organizations.
There was the broad assumption that both ethnic and religious
conflicts were a characteristic of military regime, but contemporary
experience, the world over, has shown the contrary. Huntington’s
Clash of Civilization was to portray the emergent conflict between
the Arab and Western worlds based on religious undertones. Today, terrorism and the fight against it have derived their justification from religious beliefs. We can, therefore, assert that both
ethnicity and religion have become catalysts of conflicts among
new and old democracies.
Nigeria transited from military to civilian rule in May 1999. There
were high hopes that the new democracy would offer prospects
for better governance, including bringing about peaceful co-existence among different ethno-religious groups. Unfortunately,
shortly after the country embraced democracy in 1999, Nigeria
was confronted with the enigma of ethnic and religious conflicts.
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This study focuses on analyzing major ethnic and religious conflicts that have occurred in Nigeria since 1987, with the intention
of providing lessons for Nigeria’s media professionals on how to
investigate and handle the dissemination of news items. Such conflicts as the Shari’a crisis; the Yoruba-Hausa Sagamu/Kano conflict;
the Miss World religious crisis; the crises in Jos; and the ethno-religious crisis in Maiduguri, Kontagora and Onitsha as a result of the
cartooning of the prophet of Islam in Denmark, and the effective
way in which Boko Haram uses the media shall be our cases for
discussion.
Media Role and Functions in Conflict Reportage
Media can be defined as “the paths, ways or means through
which messages are disseminated. They are the channels through
which information are (sic) passed across” (Sadeeq, 2006, p.249).
Defleur and Dennis (1981, 148) defined mass media as “devices
for moving messages across distance or time to accomplish mass
communication”. The media have a great role to play in the life of
a nation and its people. As the name suggests, the media are the
intermediary between the people and the state and vice versa.
The functions of the media in a society are unquantifiable. Apart
from providing information and knowledge, the media serve as
the voice of the people. Lord Bingham of the British House of
Commons summarizes the functions of the media thus:
In a modern developed society it is only a small minority of citizens
who can participate directly in the discussions and decisions which
shape the public life of that society. The majority can participate only
indirectly, by exercising their rights as citizens to vote, express their
opinions, (and) make representations to the authorities from pressure
groups and so on. But the majority cannot participate in the public life
of their society in these ways if they are not alerted to and informed
about matters which call for or may call for considerations. It is very
largely through the media…. The proper functioning of a modern participatory democracy requires that the media be free, active, professional and inquiring (cited in Welsh, Tom, Walter Greenwood and David
Banks, 2007, p.3).

Generally, the media are regarded as the Fourth Estate of the
Realm because of the vanguard role they play. They exercise oversight functions over the activities of the three arms of government-
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the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, but also inform the
government about the pulse of the people whilst educating the
people on government’s plans and activities. So, the media have
a noble and crucial role in the political and economic development of a nation. Information is vital; it can build and it can destroy a nation; stabilize and destabilize. People and nations go to
war because of information and people and nations also become
friendly because of information. And it is in the media that information usually has a free reign. As (Nwosu, 1990, p.31) observed,
the mass media “help people to find new norms and harmony in
periods of transition, change the power structure in the society by
giving knowledge to the masses, create sense of nationess (sic),
lead to increased political activity or participation….” In the same
vein, McQuail’s description best captures the role of the media as:
Windows that enable us to see beyond our immediate surroundings,
interpreters that help us make sense of experience, platforms or carriers that convey information, interactive communication that includes
audience feedback, signposts that provide us with instructions….(1987,
p.52-53).

Bryant and Thompson (2002, 306, cited in Isola, 2010, p.8) listed
eight important functions of the mass media in a democracy:
1. Surveillance of contemporary events which are likely to affect citizens positively and negatively
2. Identification of key social and political issues
3. Provision of platform for advocacy for causes and interest
4. Transmission of diverse contents across the various dimensions and factions of political discourse
5. Scrutiny of government officials, their institutions and other agencies
6. Giving of incentives and information to allow citizens to become actively informed participants rather than spectators
7. Provision of principled resistance to external forces attempting to subvert media autonomy
8. Respectful consideration of the audience as potentially
concerned, sense-making efficacious citizens.
Ethics and the Media
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Ethics is a necessary and obligatory condition needed for the
proper functioning of the media in the society otherwise the media would evolve into channels of disseminating false information
and become anarchical and irresponsible in their activities. Here,
“Ethical thinking involves considering the effects of one’s actions
on multiple and distant stakeholders and on the integrity of a
larger community” (Carrie, 2014, p.4). What this suggests is that
no matter how captivating a news item is, it should not be disseminated if that would bring about a greater danger to the people.
And “Central to ethical thinking is impartiality, or disinterest: the
capacity to look beyond one’s own interest, feelings, and empathy
for close relations in order to make decisions in the interest of
a larger group, public or society” (Carrie, 2014, p.5). Accordingly, “Ethics should provide the journalist certain basic principles or
standards by which he (or she) can judge actions to be right or
wrong, good or bad, responsible or irresponsible” (Adelabu, 2015,
183). But to be able to do this, the media must imbibe the culture
of moral discipline. They must also demonstrate expertise in the
field by disseminating information that that is true and lucid, reliable and verifiable.
However, on the part of the Nigerian media industry, there is
a lot to praise and vilify the media for. Routinely, many Nigerian
media houses fall short of the standards of media practice with
regards to some ethical principles such as:
• Objectivity in reportage;
• Disseminating true and unbiased information
• Protecting national interest.
According to Sadeeq (2006, 258), “The reporters on the field
too are not left out of the bastardization of their media ethics.
Being the first gatekeepers, they choose what to write and what
to suppress based on their selfish reason and the gratification that
accompany such stories”. The distortion goes down the line as line
editors and title editors are no less guilty.
Diversity in Interests and Diversity in Reporting
Nigeria is ethno-regionally based. We moved from the First
Republic of four regions to the present 36 states, conveniently
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grouped into six Geo-political Zones in public discourse. At other
times specific reference and recognition is given to other political
entities such as the Niger-Delta and the Middle Belt regions. There
is also diversity in religious beliefs and identities with Christianity
and Islam as the two predominant and salient ones. In terms of
what we may refer to as “territorial politics”, Nigeria is again divided into North and South. The media industry is also caught in the
web because they are not just regionally, ethnically and religious
based, they also reflect these tendencies in their output. There is
reference to “northern newspapers” and “southern newspapers”.
This is to say that these papers speak and protect either the interest of the north or that of the south. Such papers as New Nigerian
and Leadership, mostly promote the interest of the north, while
such papers as the Guardian and the the Sun mostly promote the
interest of the south. There are also ethnically based papers such
as the Oodua News and Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo (Hausa- Truth is better than money) for the Hausa/Fulani. Each tries to promote and
protect its individual and group interests. Even the government
owned non-print media such as the Nigerian Television Authority
(NTA) seem to project the interest of the local states where they
have branches instead of being national representatives. For example, NTA and federal government owned FM stations in a good
number of states in the north do not allow for Christian programs
in the erroneous belief of protecting communal interests at the
expense of human rights and the overall national interest of the
people to freely practice their religion. Such media organizations
are guilty of pursuing a dubious Agenda Setting, which is predetermining what “issues are regarded as important at a given time
in a given society” (Umuerri, 2008, p.191).
Ethno-religious Crisis in Nigeria
Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society (Horowitz 2000; Young, 1999; Suberu, 2001). On ethnicity
alone, scholars have not agreed on the specific number of the
country’s ethnic groups. The number ranges from 250 (Otite 1990)
to about 370 (Osaghae 2006). There are predominantly three religions- Christianity, Islam and the Traditional African Religions.
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Of course, the cultural complexity of the country is as much as
the ethnic composition. The ethno-religious complexity of the Nigerian state was reinforced by colonial social formation that had
pitched various ethnic groups against themselves. First, there was
heightened competition for the control of the Nigerian state by
any of the three dominant groups- the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and
the Yoruba on one hand (Nnoli 1980; 1995; Mamdani, 2003) and
the problem of majority-minority relations with the latter crying
foul of marginalization (Suberu 1996; 1997; 2001;Danjibo 2005;
Osaghae, 2006). The bitter rivalry for the control of the Nigerian
state led to threats of secession by each of the dominant groups
at one point or the other, which culminated in the declaration of
the Biafran Republic by the Igbos in 1967 that eventually led the
civil war that lasted three years (1967-1970). The war was spiritedly fought to keep Nigeria one (Oluleye 1985).
In Nigeria, religion has continued to remain a potent catalyst
of inter-ethnic and group relation (Mu’azzam, 2001; Egwu, 2001;
Ilesanmi, 2001; Salamone, 1991; Alanamu, 2004; Otite, 1990) with
two dominant religions Islam and Christianity expressing high level of competitiveness (Falola, 1998; 2003; Ohadike, 1992; Udoidem,
1997). Unmindful of the fact that these two religions were actually alien to the Nigerian pre-colonial society, adherents of both
religions express fundamentalism as if these religions originated
from their traditional societies. For example, religion has caused a
divide between the north and the south that most scholars falsely
fractionalize the country into ‘Muslim north’ and ‘Christian south’
as if Christians are not in the north and Muslims are not in the
south. This fallacious divide has impacted negatively on inter-ethnic identities and group relations to the extent that every person
from the north of the country is often viewed as Muslim despite
the fact that there are numerous ethnic identities that are not
Muslims. The Igbos, for example, are generally seen as non-Muslims and are treated so; likewise the Hausa-Fulani are generally
seen as non-Christians and are treated so. Yet in the north, majority of non-Hausa/Fulani are Christians while a great number of the
Yoruba in southern Nigeria are Muslims.
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Religion cannot be ignored in Nigerian government and politics. During the regional governments, religion made a subtle encroachment in Nigerian politics to the extent that minority groups
in northern Nigeria who were mostly Christians were disenchanted with the way the Hausa/Fulani were using Islam to manipulate the activities of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). This
made the minority groups mostly from the Middle Belt to form
the Middle Zone League (MZL), which later transformed into the
United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), a political party of mostly
Christian minority groups to free themselves from the political/religious hegemonic activities of the NPC (Sklar 2004; Ksatfelt 2000;
2003). However, the question of religion came to light during the
Constituent Assembly of 1977/78 when the debate on whether
to establish a Shari’a Court of Appeal or not almost stalled the
constitutional process (Kukah 1994). In 1986, the smuggling of
the Nigerian state into membership of the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) by the Ibrahim Babangida military government
brought another religious controversy between the Christians and
the Muslims (Kenny, 2004; 1996).
Suspicious of the government’s intention with the membership
of OIC and disenchanted with the perceived plan to islamize the
country by removing Christian army officers from key strategic
positions and replacing them with Muslim army officers, some
young army officers led by Major Gideon Orkar staged a coup to
overthrow the regime of Babangida in 1990. Unfortunately the issue of ethnicity and religion was reflected in the coup when Major
Gideon excised some five northern states from the federation. As
a result of this miscalculation, the coup that was initially welcomed
lost the support of the majority of Nigerians (Kenny 1996).
Despite the influence of religion and ethnicity in the political
history of the Nigeria, we must recognize the fact that at certain
periods these issues were even tolerated. For example, the Buhari-led military government (1983-1985) had both the Head of
State and his Deputy, General Tunde Idiagbon as Muslims; likewise the duo of Moshood Abiola and Babagana Kingibe during
the 1993 Presidential election. If the Christians tolerated this, it
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was unlikely the Muslims would have. For example, the Muslims
protested vehemently, and even threatened to embark on a jihad
(holy war) against the Nigerian state if Muslims were not considered in the appointment to head the National Political Reforms
Conference of March 2005 after Justice Nikky Tobi and Rev. Fr.
Matthew Hassan Kukah were appointed as Chairman and Secretary respectively (The Guardian, March 13, 2005). To douse the
tension, President Olusegun Obasanjo had to appoint two other
Muslims as co-Chairman and co-Secretary. This clearly shows that
issues of religion and ethnicity are still very crucial and germane
in Nigerian government and politics and it is with this background
that we shall analyze ethno-religious conflicts and diversity in media reporting from 1999 till date, while drawing lessons for the
future.
Reported Cases of Some Salient Ethno-religious Conflicts in
Northern Nigeria
Ethnic and religious conflicts have a long history in Nigeria, but
the explosive nature of the conflicts manifested in the 1980s, especially after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program
(SAP). The introduction of SAP by General Babangida administration in 1986 and the attendant rise in poverty that followed suit
was linked to the violent resurgence of ethno-religious politics in
Nigeria (see, Jega, 2000; Okafor, 1997). Between 1980 and 2008
there have been unprecedented cases of ethnic and religious conflicts spread across Nigeria, and scholars and analysts are of the
opinion that deaths and destruction as a result of ethno-religious
conflicts from 1987 to 2017 have outnumbered those recorded
during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970.* It is not possible to
give a detailed discourse of all the ethno-religious conflicts that
occurred in Northern Nigeria, as that will be beyond the scope of
this paper. However, salient ethno-religious conflicts as the Shari’a
law crisis of 2000; the Miss World crisis of 2002; the crisis resulting
from the cartooning of Prophet Muhammed in 2006; and the Jos
crises of 1991, 1994, 1998, 2004, and 2008 will be discussed in the
light of media diversity in reporting.
The Shari’a Law Crisis

277

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

At the wake of ‘democratic’ rule in 1999, Shari’a controversy
became a very potent catalyst of conflict that led to the death
and displacement of several persons, apart from the destruction
of property. Shari’a means judgment in Hausa while in Arabic it
connotes the whole of Islamic jurisprudence that must guide the
life of Muslims in the society (Khuri, 1994). The complex issue is
how to practice Shari’a in a society of mixed religions, especially
in a democracy.
Addressing a large crowd that converged for the inauguration of Shari’a law on Thursday, October 28, 1999, Governor Sani
Ahmed Yerima of Zamfara State stated thus:
It has become pertinent that we wake up from this sorry state of slumber and live up to our responsibility to the Almighty in order to avoid
his curse…Let me make it unequivocally clear that we are not unaware of the multifarious nature of our society as a multi-religious and
multi-ethnic one and we do not intend to impose the Shari’a law on
the non-Muslims in the state as is being deliberately and mischievously
falsified by agents of blackmail” (cited in Oduyoye, 2000:1).

In the same vein, the Governor of Niger State, Abdullahi Kure,
reiterated the neutrality of the practice of Shari’a towards those
who belonged to other religions. Thus, according to Kure, “Certainly, it (Shari’a) will not pitch one religion against another” (The
Guardian, December 22, 1999). As it turned out, assurances by
both governors that Shari’a would not affect the non-Muslims was
rather unrealistic. In Zamfara State, for example, Christian women were subjected to trekking long distances as commercial motorcyclists were banned from carrying women, but also were not
allowed to enter vehicles designated for carrying Muslim women. Christian tenants were forced out of their rented houses by
Muslim landlords who preferred to have their houses vacant than
to accommodate Christians; Christians were forced to settle their
cases in Shari’a courts; and there were cases of kidnapping some
women to force them convert to Islam (interview conducted with
Mr. David Ishaya, the former Secretary of the Christian Association
of Nigeria, Zamfara State Branch).
No sooner the Shari’a law was launched in Niger State, than
Muslims loaded themselves in trucks from Minna and Kontagora
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towns and headed to Salka town inhabited by Kamberi people
who are mostly of the Traditional African Religion. It was on a market day in September 2001. Most Kamberi people brew beer from
their farm settlements and bring the liquor for sale on markets
day. The Muslims who arrived in trucks went round the markets
and started breaking the clay jars of the brewed beer. The Kamberis mobilized their folks and laid siege on the Muslims and massacred several of them (interview with Rev. Bulus, now Catholic
Bishop of Kontagora Prefecture). Sad enough, the media have not
devoted their attention to reporting the impact of Shari’a in Zamfara and played deaf ears to what had happened in Salka town
of Niger State, which did not even feature as a news item in any
media outlet.
The Kaduna Shari’a crises of February and April 2001 were the
most obvious because of the gravity and magnitude of conflict
experienced. Christians and Muslims almost in equal proportion
populate Kaduna State. Whereas the Muslims predominate the
north of the state, the Christians predominate the south. Like most
states in the north, the Hausa/Fulani are mostly Muslims while minority ethnic groups are mostly Christians and traditionalists. The
Muslims in Kaduna were pressurizing the government to adopt
and implement Shari’a like other northern states; the Christians
were opposed to Shari’a. Crisis ensued when the Christians embarked on a rally round Kaduna city to protest against the adoption of Shari’a. Some Muslims barricaded some streets and started stoning the Christians. Things got out of hand and the result
was the death of several persons, burning down of churches and
mosques and other properties. There were reprisal attacks on the
Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Onitsha, Umuahia and Owerri by the Igbo
in retaliation for the Igbo killed in Kaduna. The Tribune reported
that about 1,000 people lost their lives (see, Sunday Tribune, January 11, 2009, p. 19), while ThisDay reported that Shari’a claimed
over 10,000 lives (see, ThisDay, April 2, 2005, p.2).
Very disturbing, however, was the manner in which the media
handled the Shari’a Law issue. For example, The Punch newspaper
had a story titled “Shari’a: Advent of a Millennium Monster”
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(The Punch, Thursday, February 17, 2000, p. 12). This kind of reportage demonizes Islam as a religion and exacerbates tension
between Christians and Muslims because the media in Nigeria are
mostly seen as a Christian industry. The style of reportage also
shows great ignorance on the part of both the reporters and news
editors. Sharia law is not just intricately connected to the practice
of Islam but is the very basis of Islamic religion. During an interview with two Islamic scholars- Umar Koba and Nasiru Herge, they
made it clear that without shari’a there cannot be Islam, because
Islamic jurisprudence is the fundamental principle that covers all
aspects of shari’a. Moreover, the Penal Code operated by most
states in northern Nigeria today has its foundation in shari’a law
even before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria.
The Sagamu/Kano Crisis
The Hausa/Fulani had lived and interacted with the Yoruba in
Sagamu, a town in Yorubaland in present day Ogun State known
to be the harbinger of kolanut farming and trade for many centuries without any major friction. Unfortunately, July of 2000 turned
a dark month for the two groups. The Yoruba were celebrating
Oro- a masquerade dancing festival mainly for male initiates. In
Yoruba tradition and culture, only men are allowed to come in
contact with the Oro masquerade. Two Hausa women were said
to have violated the rules by insisting on seeing the masquerades.
Their arrogance infuriated the Yoruba worshippers of Oro who
took laws into their hands by hacking the two women to death.
The Hausa/Fulani in Sagamu protested the killing of the two women who were widely reported to be ‘prostitutes’ by the media. Violence ensued between the two ethnic groups and the end result
was the death of scores of lives.
The violence in Sagamu spread to Kano where several Yoruba
people were killed in retaliation for the ‘massacre’ of the Hausa/
Fulani in Sagamu (Alanamu, 2005).Oro is a Yoruba traditional African belief system, and the question is: should the belief system
be binding on peoples of other beliefs and cultures? If the answer
is in the affirmative in order to justify the violence, then what is
wrong in imposing shari’a law on non-Muslims in some states of
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northern Nigeria? Moreover, the Yoruba who teamed up to fight
the Hausa/Fulani in Sagamu were not just traditionalists, there
were Christians and Muslims also, which reinforces Insa Nolte’s
argument that the control of the economy of Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) depot and the overzealous intent
to deal with the Hausa/Fulani who ‘annulled’ June 12, 1999 elections were the remote reasons. An interviewee who witnessed the
violence in Sagamu and who is also an indigene of Sagamu was of
the view that bottled-up ethnic animosity was at the heart of the
conflict in the sense that though Oro is a traditional cult in Yorubaland, Christians and Muslims joined the traditional worshippers
as actors in the violence.
The November 21 Miss World Crisis
Nigeria was billed to host the Miss World beauty contest on
December 7, 2002. Most Muslims who saw it as the import of
Western immorality considered the Miss World beauty contest obscene. That opportunity came in hand when a female reporter with
the ThisDay newspaper, Miss Isioma Daniel asked what Prophet
Muhammed would make of the beauty contestants. Writing in the
November 16, 2002 of the ThisDay Daniel said “What would Muhammed (the prophet of Islam) think? In all honesty, he probably
would have chosen a wife from one of them (the contestants)”.
This certainly was provocative journalism, which did not take into
consideration the feelings of the Muslims and the reaction that
was bound to take place. The main issue was that the statement,
which was written in the holy month of Ramadan (Muslim period
of fast) depicted Muhammed as a womanizer, which was interpreted as an unacceptable sacrilege.
There were violent protests in the streets of Kaduna, Kano and
Abuja that led to the death of over 100 persons (see, The News,
December 15, 2008, p. 26). As a result, the contest was shifted
from Nigeria to London. The violence resulted from poor judgment on the part of the newspaper. Furthermore, the comment
by the Guardian newspaper that “The protesters chanting Allah
Akbar (sic) (Allah is the greatest) also passed a fatwa (death sentence) on the publisher of ThisDay, Mr.Nduka Obaigbena and the
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editor, Mr. Eniola Bello for alleged blasphemy of Prophet Mohammed in a recent publication was untrue in the sense that the fatwa (death sentence)was actually passed on Isioma Daniel and not
the publisher and editor respectively. Here again, the media was
trying to be emotive and sensational than report the actual facts
concerning the reportage (The Guardian, Thursday, November 21,
2002, p. 3.). According to an Anglican Bishop in Kaduna, what the
media should have concentrated efforts on was to question why
an Islamic Sheikh or cleric would issue a fatwa on Isioma in Nigeria- a country that had not adopted any religion as state religion;
or why did the Muslims in Kaduna and Abuja not seek redress
in the courts instead of taking laws in their hands by violently
demonstrating and destroying lives and property. These were the
real aftermath issues rather than dissipate energy on statements
that were emotional and non-factual.
The Danish Cartoon and Maiduguri Crisis
The Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in its 30th September 2005 edition, published 12 editorial cartoons of Prophet
Muhammed. Muslims across the world staged several protests
against the cartooning of the prophet of Islam. Muslims protested
in Lebanon, Iran and Syria and Gaza where flags of some European countries were burnt. In Nigeria, there were violent protests
by Muslims in Kontagora town in Niger State and Maiduguri in
Borno State where shops, churches and buildings belonging to
Christians were razed and several Christians killed. There were reprisal attacks and killings, particularly in Onitsha and Aba in Eastern Nigeria. What is interesting here is the fact that media did not
investigate the reason for the protest in Borno. At the periphery,
it seemed the Muslims in Maiduguri protested against the cartooning of Muhammed; but an interaction with a Professor from
Maiduguri who was close to the then Governor Ali Modu Sheriff
revealed the political undertone to the violence that greeted the
Danish newspaper cartooning of the prophet of Islam in Maiduguri.
The Professor said the violence in Maiduguri was actually
state-sponsored as the governor of the state needed to cause
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a distraction from stories that he was on the watchlist of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Political religion
became a handy instrument of distraction and destruction as
Muslim fundamentalists were mobilized to cause mayhem. This
violent group called the ‘ECOMOG’ and a large number of the almajeri (plural- street children attending Koranic schools) were the
ones that attacked Christians and churches to make it look like it
was the Muslims protesting against the cartooning of the prophet
of Islam. The cartooning of the prophet of Islam, therefore, provided an alibi that prevented Obasanjo’s watchdog, the EFCC from
clamping down on state officials in Borno State. The violence in
Kontagora was equally fierce but received scanty reportage by the
media.
The Jos Crises
The media have consistently reported the Jos crises of 1991,
1994, 2001, 2004 and 2008 as one of the combined forces of
religion and ethnicity on the one hand and that between the indigenes and settlers on the other. There are several ethnic groups
who originally inhabit Jos city while the Hausa/Fulani are regarded
as the settlers. The crises have their root causes in the quest for political and economic control of Jos North Local Government, which
is now predominantly occupied by the Hausa/Fulani. As noted by
Mavalla (2014, 101), “The cause of conflict in Plateau State was not
so much religious as the issue of the indigene-settler divide paradigm. The causes of the so-called ‘religious conflicts were…rather
socio-historical, ethno-political and socio-economic.” The Hausa/
Fulani influenced the creation of Jos North local government in
1991 and since then sought to displace the indigenes from the
political and economic control of the local government, a move
continually resisted by the indigenes (Best, 2007; Egwu, 2008).
Thousands of people have lost their lives and properties worth
billions of naira have been destroyed as a result of the crises, yet
the media have constantly reported the channels of vexation rather than the actual root causes.
The media have not been able to ascertain why the conflict in
Jos is between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenes and not be-
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tween the indigenes and non-Hausa/Fulani groups, but one central issue surrounding the incessant violence has to do with the
control of Jos North Local Government Area where the biggest
market and economy of Plateau State is located. The Hausa/Fulani
who are the predominant population in Jos North wanted to take
both political and economic control of the city, which has been
firmly and fiercely resisted by the indigenes most especially the
Berom. During an interview session, some of the indigenes raised
concern about the near universal citizenship accorded the Hausa/
Fulani in Nigeria over and above other groups. The question was
asked why was it possible for a Hausa/Fulani man to migrate from
Kano or Katsina or Zaria to Jos and seek to become the Sarki (local
chief), a local government chairman, a senator and aspire for other
higher positions as an indigene of Jos and difficult for a Berom to
go to Kano and become a local government councilor? Moreover,
the Hausa/Fulani are not the only migrants into Jos; the Yoruba,
the Igbo, Nupe, Auchi people and Igala and several other ethnic
groups live side-by-side with the indigenes without any form of
conflict. Why the Hausa/Fulani? These are questions that the media, academics, and policy analysts will need to find answers to.
The Shiites and the Clash with the Nigerian Army
December 12 and 13 2015 would ever remain sad days in the
history of the Shiite community in Zaria. The Shiites otherwise
known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria is led El-Zak Zakky.
Every year the group holds public rallies in major cities in Northern
Nigeria such as Kaduna, Zaria, Funtua, Kano and Sokoto where it
has some preponderance of followership. El-Zak Zakky has a long
history of radicalization beginning from his days as a student in
Ahmadu Bello University Zaria where he was instrumental to organizing series of demonstrations in the 1980s against the Nigerian
state. He later became the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, with
ties to some Middle East groups and leader of the Shiites who
certainly are at loggerhead with the dominant Sunni in Northern
Nigeria. El-Zak Zakky was said to have received his indoctrination
and funding majorly from Iraq and other Shi’a dominated Arab
countries.
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In their yearly demonstrations, the Shiites have constituted
themselves into Lords with flagrant disregard for the laws guiding
public conduct. They were known not to seek permit from the
police and not to allow anybody pass on major roads where they
conduct their rallies. On 12 December 2015, the Chief of Army
Staff, Lt. General TukurBuratai was on his way to pay a courtesy
visit to the Emir of Zazzau (Zaria) when the Shiites who were conducting their rally halted his convoy. A Brigadier General came out
of his car and pleaded with the Shiites to give way but they gave
deaf ears to the plea. Even when the security details of the Chief
of Army Staff wanted to take military action, the General pleaded
with them not to. The Shiites were said to have attacked the military convoy with sticks, clubs and machetes. The next day, soldiers
from 1 Division in Kaduna stormed the Shiite community in Zaria,
killing hundreds of the members. El-Zak Zakky was said to have
lost one of his wives and two sons, while he and another of his
wives were taken captives. There were conflicting figures about
the casualties. Whereas the Guardian on Sunday, of December 13
put the number of casualties as ‘unspecified’ the same paper later estimated the number of deaths to be 34 including the three
sons of El-Zak Zakky (The Guardian, Friday 20, 2005. The Secretary
to the Government of Kaduna State would later admit that 347
corpses were buried after the soldiers and the Shiites clashed (see
The Punch, Tuesday 12 April 2016, p.12). Yet, towards the end of
2016, Amnesty International came up with a more alarming figure
of more than 800 persons. ,
Boko Haram and the Kidnap of the Chibok Girls
The violent activities of Boko Haram terrorist group spanned
from 2011 to 2016 and too wide for the scope of this paper to
capture. However, the media succeeded in making heroes and
heroines out of the Boko Haram members by constantly referring
to the group as the “dreaded Boko Haram” and presenting the Nigerian state and its security forces as weaklings. On 14 April 2014,
Boko Haram abducted some secondary school girls in Chibok
community of Borno State. While the CNN and Al-Jazeera gave
the figures of the kidnapped girls as over 270, the Nigerian media,
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For example, two days after the abduction, The Punch reported
“Boko Haram abducts 100 schoolgirls in Borno” (The Punch,
Wednesday, April 16, 2014, p. 2).
Conclusion
The media will continue to play a very crucial role in the life of
the Nigerian state, and to a large extent, the media can be adjudged to have performed above the average. However, the Nigerian media are confronted with daunting challenges such as inadequate welfare for journalists, , constraining ownership interest,
ethno-cultural and religious bias which limit their effectiveness.
For as long as journalists are poorly remunerated, their commitment to higher ideals of professionalism will be compromised and
sensitivity to conflict reporting will be dampened. Media ownership in Nigeria is another issue that needs to be addressed in the
sense that it affects the independence and workings of the media
industry. Most owners of media houses find it extremely difficult
to detach themselves from the industry and reporters and editors
are unduly pressured to navigate the tightrope in order to keep
their jobs to the detriment of the news process.
One obvious major challenge confronting the Media in Nigeria,
however, is inadequate investment in investigative journalism
and the continuous training of journalists and media reporters in
this aspect. Media bodies such as the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation and the Nigeria Union of Journalists must lead the fight
in ensuring ethical journalism thrives and ownership does not become an albatross to the industry.
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9
Media coverage of Ethno-religious
Conflicts in Nigeria: Another Perspective
By Ayo Olukotun &

Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
Introduction
This chapter discusses media reportage of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic. It attempts to contribute to
the global debate on the character and impact of media coverage
of ethno-religious conflicts. From a wider perspective, it should
be noted that Nigeria, like many African and other multicultur-
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al states are tormented by frequent religious and ethnic clashes,
based on actual or manipulated identity claims. Globally, the role
of the media in shaping events as well as the reciprocal relationship between the outbreak of conflicts, disorders, wars and the
media representation of these, (Olukotun, 2011) constitute an important subject in contemporary analysis.
That is another way of saying that the narrative strategies and
framing which media employ in times of conflicts have bearing on
the trajectory and outcomes of those conflicts. Indeed, the growing popularity of conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigeria, which
trains journalists to be more conscious and aware of the consequences of irresponsible, flamboyant, partisan, and overtly biased
reporting is a proof of the recognition of the importance of the
reportorial frames of journalists in time of conflicts.
In Nigeria, there is a rough coincidence of ethnic and religious
cleavages, to the extent that the Northern part of the country is
predominantly Muslim, while the Southern part is predominantly Christian. To fill in the picture a little bit, there are pockets of
Muslim communities in Southern Nigeria, especially Yorubaland,
while there are scattered populations of Christian communities in
the largely Muslim North. In the North, Islam tends to be more
radical and fanatical, especially, with the advent of heretical and
fringe sects such as the Maitasine and Boko-Haram, which mount
crusades against the established religion adopted by the majority. Although, ethno-religious conflicts are frequent in the history
of postcolonial Nigeria, they gained more salience in the Fourth
Republic with the adoption of Shari’a by some states in the North,
and the more liberal atmosphere of a democracy, which allowed
freedom of expression.
Some of the salient conflicts in the period under study include
the February 2000 clashes between Christians and Muslims over
the implementation of Shari’a law in Kaduna, the 2002 clashes over the proposed hosting by Nigeria of a Miss World beauty
pageant, the 2008 clashes between Muslims and Christians in Adamawa state, as well as the 2010 clashes between Fulani Muslims
and Christian-dominated villages in the Jos area in 2010. In the
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last two years, coinciding with presidency of Muhamadu Buhari, a
Northern Fulani, there has been an escalation of attacks by Fulani
herdsmen and other groups on Christian communities around the
Middle Belt, South-East Nigeria, and elsewhere.
Regarding the media, it is, largely for historical reasons, dominated by the Christian South with a preponderant section of them,
located in the Lagos-Ibadan axis. The media-- print electronic and
digital--reflect fratricides and fractures of the nation state, to the
extent that Adebanwi (2002) could argue that Nigeria does not
have national media but, ‘Arewa media’, ‘ Nkenga media’ and
‘Ngbati media’ corresponding to the major ethnic division in the
country. Our narrative strategy is a case study approach, in which
we look in detail at particular ethno-religious crises with a view to
analyzing how the media, overwhelmingly located in the South,
more precisely in the South-West, report the clashes. We draw
upon primary and secondary data, including interviews with editors of newspapers as well as content analysis to tease out important trends.
SECTION TWO
Identity Conflict and Media Framing: Contextualizing the
Issues
The concept of identity derives from a Latin word (idem), which
connotes uniformity and continuity and belongs to the category
of essentially contested concepts in the social sciences, featuring
a confounding wide array of definitions. As is commonly quipped,
ours is the age of controversy deriving from different approaches
and disciplinary orientations over the concept of identity. A rough
and ready elaboration is to conceive of identity as a person’s mental image and expressions of their individuality or group affiliation.
It resides in the interstices of negotiation between individual and
socially determined roles, suggesting that it can be viewed as a
coterie of group affiliations that mark out the individual.
Obviously therefore, language, socialization and cultural attributes loom large in the appreciation of identity as socially constructed phenomenon; and it goes without saying that the media
in all its variegated forms are central to the construction of iden-
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tities. The repertoire of symbols, totems and ancestral myths from
which identities as cultural projects are constructed and reinforced
are supplied by the media, while in conflict situations antagonistic
factions draw upon and appropriate media narratives to shore up
their legitimacy or to reinforce their sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Kelinar, 1995). Class, gender, religion, and ethnicity furnish the basis for identities, and identity conflicts, although obviously in the
African context, given the particular ways in which nation-states
were constructed as colonial amalgams or experiments in political
cloning, ethnicity and religion are among the most contentious
and around which pitched battles, occasionally leading to the dissolution of states have been fought.
In Nigeria, as well as elsewhere, in Africa, study after study
have borne out the premise that the framing of media coverage
of identity conflicts directly affects the unfolding, trajectory and
prospects of eventual resolution of the conflicts. The inflammatory broadcast of Radio Kaduna, as well as the editorial slant of the
New Nigerian newspaper--a paper, which advertised its mission as
“telling the words and pictures of leading story of Northern Nigeria”-- direct to the genocidal killings of Ibos in 1966 in many parts
of Northern Nigeria set the fragile nation on an irreversible course
of conflagration. In her doctoral study on this period of Nigeria’s
media history, Doyin Abiola (formerly Aboaba) informs pertinently
that the press and radio of the North unleashed a campaign of
verbal hostilities against the South. These mass information media
were fully employed in denouncing the 15 January coup, rejecting proposals for unitary government and preparing the people’s
mind for the counter coup that was to come on 29th July (Aboaba
1990:9, 1979).
Of course, the hostility and war mongering of the Northern media was more than reciprocated by Eastern Nigeria Radio, as well
as the Eastern Outlook, as the media fissured trenchantly along
geo-ethnic lines (Adebanwi: 2002). In more recent times, the pictorial elaboration in August 1999 of the Hausa/Yoruba fratricide in
Sagamu, Ogun State, sparked off reprisal conflicts and mayhem in
Kano, Northern Nigeria. As Bamigbetan (2000, 96) informs on this
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score:

There were gory blood-chilling pictures of dead victims packed in
trucks and station wagons apparently being conveyed to the mortuary.
Although, there were no visible marks to indicate the ethnic identity of
the victims, the pictures serve the disruptive purpose of rousing hatred
between the divided. The result was the reprisal in Kano, which again
left several dead. Media analysts, considering the impact of the pictures, believed the editors should have exercised restraint in printing
the horrid scenes.

Elsewhere in Africa, the seminal culpability of Radio-Television
Libre Des Mille Collines (RTLM) and that of the Tutsi folk singer,
Simon Bikindi, in the genocidal killings in Rwanda has been noted
in several studies. As Craig (2006, 41) remarked:

Around the time of the genocide, the solid links established between
RTLM staff and their listeners became an operational framework for
mass murder. Inflammatory broadcast made on RTLM were clearly
linked to attacks on Tutsis and Hutu moderates alike, within the course
of everyday operations. RTLM staff provided the militias with list of
prominent ‘enemies’ (who were then targeted for assassination) and
provided a steady supply of anti-Tutsi folk music by popular artiste
such as Simon Bikindis.

Operating on tenterhooks, often on the edge of bankruptcy,
many media houses have several times lent themselves to recruitment as combatants in the many civil wars in Africa.
Our discussion is anchored on the theory of framing which
refers to various ways in which journalists structure or more accurately pre structure news and other media output by drawing
attention or giving salience to certain aspects more than others.
The theory is derived from the word ‘frame’ which refers to the
marking of boundaries in the same way as an image is demarcated
by putting a border around it. According to the Oxford Dictionary
of Media Communication (Chandler and Munday, 2011), frames in
media theory refer to “the ways in which representations function
to re contextualize (and thus change the meaning of) that which
they represent”. They go on to argue that frames are “particular
techniques and devices employed in representations as a means
of constraining interpretation”. In other words, news and other
media output are anchored by journalists, using selection strate-
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gies which are used to lead the audience to view their reports in
the light of the codes favored.
SECTION THREE
Media in a Divided Nation
In a plural and divided nation, such as Nigeria, there has been
a longstanding debate concerning the role, orientation, and geographical location of the media. This is particularly important, in
the context of analyzing media coverage of ethno-religious conflicts; for, obviously, the media, are not neutral institutions standing above society, but are embedded and implicated in the divisions that are dominant features of a polity. Hence, media location,
ownerships, and profile of the media have bearing on the frames
which they employ in reporting conflict. For example, in a formulation of the role of ethnicity, geography, and impliedly, religion in
the postures of the media, Oyovbaire (2001:35) argued that:

The Nigerian media is not complex, nor is it pluralistic. It is a locational
and institutional monopoly. The monopolistic complex of the media
is rooted and derived from its historical origins, advantage of market
forces and patronage in advertisement, professed hold of the industry
and the cultivation of a deep-rooted mindset or world-view of South
West.

In this conception, the dominant section of the media located in South-West Nigeria, are viewed as principally reflecting the
views of political actors and the perspectives of the majority of
citizens from that part of the country. Some go so far as to suggest that what passes as national newspapers are no more than
regional publications, which reflect the views and perspectives of
the people from that region. Regarding ethno-religious conflicts,
it is predictable from the above perspective, that the editorial slant
and coverage of these conflicts will be, in a broad sense, from a
Christian and somewhat secular perspective. It should be pointed
out, however, that location in the Ibadan-Lagos area, does not coincide with ownership, considering that the Niger-Delta area has
emerged as the dominant proprietors of major media institutions.
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Table 1: Ownership and Location of Major Media Institutions
Name of Media
The Guardian
ThisDay
Vanguard
The Punch
Daily Trust
The Nation

Location

Proprietor and State of Origin

Lagos

Nduka Obaigbena (Delta)

Lagos
Lagos
Lagos
Abuja

Lagos

African Independent Television Lagos
Channels Television

Lagos

Leadership

Abuja

Sun

Lagos

Alex (later Maiden) Ibru (Delta)
Sam Amuka (Delta)

Ogunsola/Aboderin (Oyo)
Kabiru Yusuf (Kano)

Bola Tinubu (Lagos)

Raymond Dokpesi (Edo)
John Momoh (Edo)
Orji Kalu (Abia)

Sam Nda Isiah (Niger)

Source: Research note

Obviously, from a Southern Nigerian perspective, the table
above bears out the dominance of media owners from that part
of the country although, this is not the same thing as saying that
Yorubas are the dominant proprietors as suggested by Oyovbaire
and others. Evidence that politicians of Northern extraction are
sensitive to this lopsided distribution of media in favor of the
South, was provided by Dr. Adbullahi Adamu, former governor of
Nasarawa State. Adamu argued in a lecture delivered to the Arewa
Media Group, entitled “Where is the Northern Press?” :

Is there something, I wonder that makes it impossible for newspaper to
survive in this part of the country? Perhaps, the answer lies in the stubborn refusal to appreciate the role news media play in the development
of societies and in the contest for power, particularly in a democracy.
The balance of power or the balance of terror is a stabilizing factor in
every society. I do not argue for a press war, I argue for freedom from
other people’s mass media in order that we may be heard. (Media Review, July 2005, p26)

Adamu’s remarks, it should be noted, were made against the
backdrop of the comatose state of the New Nigerian, the dominant
newspaper from Northern Nigeria, which however, did not go off
the streets until February 2012. It should be noted that since the
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advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, a number of newspapers
based in Abuja, with northern proprietors have emerged. These
include: Leadership, Daily Trust, People’s Daily and Abuja Inquirer.
These are complemented by private television stations based in
the North, such as, Desnims in Kaduna as well as Gotel Television,
which is owned by the former Vice President, Abubakar Atiku and
based in Yola. The bounce back of the Northern media is not substantial enough to cancel out the advantage enjoyed by media
located in the south, especially the Southwest.
Table 2: Major online News Publications
Name of Publication

Founder/ Proprietor

Premium Times

Dapo Olorunyomi

The Cable

Linda Ikeji Blog
Sahara Reporters
The Eagle Online
Freedom Online
Gbamji.com
Real News
Source: Research note

Ethnicity

Simon Kolawole

Yoruba

Linda Ikeji

Igbo

Dotun Oladipo

Yoruba

Omoyele Sowore
Gabriel Akinadewo
Dr. Ismaila Iro

Maureen Chigbo

Yoruba
Yoruba
Yoruba
Hausa
Igbo

As table two shows, the arena of digital media, as reflected in
online news media increasingly replicates the preponderance of
southern Nigeria proprietors. To the extent, therefore, that we can
speak of a southern Nigeria perspective, it reflects a more or less
Christian view point, influenced by advantages enjoyed in modern
and amenities relative to the North. It should be mentioned that
when ethno-religious crises break out, protesters often do not discriminate between various publications located in the south. As
the former editor, and later managing director of the ANN plc,
publishers of Nigerian Tribune Mr. Segun Olatunji, told us in the
course of researching this paper, when the Miss World Beauty
pageant crisis occurred in 2002:
Every Southern newspaper was taken to be This Day in the North. Our
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vehicles could not move freely and our members of staff were afraid for
their lives, we lost millions of Naira. We were careful not to pour fuel on
an already combustible station… so that we could to do business in the
north. (Interview with Segun Olatunji, August 3, 2017).

In other words, several southern newspapers suffer whenever the anger of protesters in northern Nigeria is directed at any
one of them. Of course, there are cleavages within what we have
identified as southern Nigeria, but these cleavages tend to pale
into insignificant or relative insignificance in the contexts of North
versus South ethno-religious conflicts. Evidence of divergent perspectives between the north and the south is offered in the tone
and tenor of editorial coverage of the Shari’a crisis by southern
newspapers. To take an example, the Guardian, which on Sunday
publishes a center spread, devoted to Christian religious issues,
employed such headlines as ‘Shari’a monster resurrects in Kano’,
and such expressions as ‘the Nigerian Taliban’. These were markedly different from the pro-shari’a articles published by the Kaduna-based New Nigerian.
In ending this section, it is important to remark that other
cleavages such as political, criss-cross the north-south divide in
the coverage of ethno-religious crisis. In other words, a nuanced
analysis will take note of factors such as professionalism, shifting
arithmetic in political coalitions and the emergence, through globalization of ideas that are broadly subversive of narrow and provincial worldviews. Agbaje (1992, 20) alluded to these criss-crossing tendencies when he argued that:
The press has found it difficult to rise above the personal, political and
cleavage acrimonies of the colonial and post-colonial state and society. Second, the press itself has been bifurcated along the lines of
the fissures delineated in these inter-personal, interparty, intra- party,
cross-cleavage and intra-cleavage schisms-

Hence, a southern perspective of media coverage, as previously argued, is not the same thing as the much talked about
Ibadan-Lagos press. But with respect to the northern media, it is
indistinguishable from newspapers located outside the SouthWest. Hence, for example, Mahmud Jega, former editor of the
New Nigerian evokes this generic description when he writes that:
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As far as I can see, among the biggest national newspapers, such as
the Guardian, Punch and Vanguard (all Lagos-based) regional slant is
most consigned to letters, columns and editorials. However, in troubled
times, it bursts out to front pages and is easily seen in news selection
and the drowning out of other news (Jega 2003, p.18)

This reinforces the tendency already identified, to view southern newspapers as maintaining more or less the same perspective,
with respect to their perception and reportage of ethno-religious
conflicts, many of which have their origins in northern Nigeria.
As will be shown, in the next section of this paper, there are differential reports corresponding to the north-south divide as to
the causes of ethno-religious crisis. To give an example, the clash
between the Oodua People’s Congress, a Yoruba security outfit
and Hausa immigrants in Idi-Araba in 2002, featured differences
between southern newspapers, such as the Punch and the Comet,
and Daily Trust located in the north. Specifically, the Comet, reported on its front page on February 5, 2002, that the crisis was
triggered by the refusal of a young Hausa man to pay for the use
of a public toilet in the area. On February 7, a front page story by
the Comet reinforced the trope of Hausas as aggressors, when it
wrote that:
Already some rich-resident-settlers in the Idi-Araba have been accused
of giving out arms to create more havoc in the area. One Alhaji Gulolo
who owns one of the beautiful houses in the area was said to have
given guns to some of the resident settlers. Equally, Alhaji Mohammed
who owns a popular house around Ifagbenro Street was said to have
given bows and arrows to the youth in the area. But several Yoruba who
fled the scene of horror said that the resident settlers always planned
for and relish communal violence.

A contrasting perspective was offered by Daily Trust which
painted the picture of the slaughter of Hausas by OPC members.
For example, it reported on February 4, that “when Daily Trust visited the area yesterday, many of the wounded northerners were
seen being taken to the Lagos General Hospital by Red Cross officials”. The story made no reference to wounded Yorubas. On February 5, Daily Trust sought to mobilize northern politicians such
as Senator Idris Kuta, who screamed “Do not push us to the wall”.
This northern frame was reinforced by an Op-ed article in the Dai-
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ly Trust of February 12 entitled “OPC: The limits of tolerance”. The
article said in part:

The latest massacre of the Hausas and other people of northern origin by the supposedly outlawed Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in
Idi-Araba and other parts of Lagos have indeed brought many of us to
the deepest limits of tolerance.

Obviously, therefore, what is at work here are divergent reportorial frames with respect to the media located in the south
and those located in the north. In the next section of this paper,
we elaborate more, through a case study of these divergent approaches.
SECTION FOUR
Narrating Ethno-religious Conflicts: Two case studies
As mentioned, in an earlier section of this paper, there is intertwining of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria, to the extent
that the country is in a sense divided, geographically into a largely
Muslim north, and a predominantly Christian south. This division
is accentuated by unequal development featuring a south, whose
antecedents are located in early contact with European civilization, through missionary influence, and a north that is in a sense
a replica of the Muslim-dominated countries of North Africa and
the Maghreb. Obviously, this sets the stage for a Huttingtonian
clash of culture, and indeed, of civilization. As Salawu (2009, 90)
puts it:
In Nigeria, due to its configuration as a nation, the strand of religion
is intertwined with that of ethnicity. The ethnicization of religion is reflected in the fact that whenever there is a religious uprising, people
from different parts of the country are always at each other’s neck. The
Igbos, for the fact that they are mostly Christians, are usually the object
of attack of Northern Muslims.

In view of this combustible combination of the competition
for resources including grazing land for Fulani nomads in a political context, the memory of past injuries, and the manipulation of
ethnic and religious identities by politicians , the Fourth Republic,
has witnessed scores of clashes between Christians and Muslims,
most of them pitching ethnic groups against each other. Table
three below, far from exhaustive, as it only covers the period be-
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tween 1999 and 2012, is indicative of the widespread nature of
these conflicts.
Table three: Selected cases of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria 1999-2012
No Date

State (s) Nature

Remarks

1

1 July 1999

Ogun

Violent clashes
between Yoruba
traditional
worshipers and
Hausa groups
in Sagamu,
Ondo state

The crisis originated from the
killing of a Hausa woman by the
Oro Masqueraders for violating
traditional rites.

2

22 July 1999 Kano

The casualty figure was not reported.

3

20 Dec.
1999

Kwara

Reprisal to the
Sagamu crisis
above

4

21-22
Feb.2000

Kaduna

5

12 Oct.2001

Kano
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Muslim fundamentalists
attacked and
destroyed over
14 churches in
Ilorin

Properties worth several millions
of naira were destroyed and unspecified causality reported.

Riots over the
introduction of
Shari’a

An estimated 3000 people died

Religious riot in
Kano

In protests against US invasion of
Afghanistan over Osama bin Laden. Over 150 persons were killed.
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6

7-17
Sept.2001

Jos

A religious
riot between
Muslims and
Christians in
Jos. Mosques,
churches and
several properties were
damaged or
torched. The
clashes started
on September
7 and lasted
nearly two
weeks, ending
on September
17.

The riot broke out when the Islamic Brigade attacked a Christian
woman who attempted to cross
a public high-way barricaded by
Muslim worshippers on Friday.
Over 300 people were killed.

7

16 Nov.
2002

Kaduna

8

22 Mar.
2007

Gombe

Muslim pupils
killed their
Christian
teacher Mrs.
Oluwatoyin
Olusesan.

The pupils claimed that their
teacher desecrated the Qur’an
while attempting to stop students
from cheating in an examination
hall.

9

21 Feb.
2009

Bauchi

26-30
Jul.2009

Bauch,
Borno,
Kano,Yobe

Ethno-religious
conflict at the
Makama New
Extension.

10

The Miss
World crisis in
which Muslims attacked
Christians and
churches.

Religious violence unleashed
by the radical
Boko Haram
sect on Christians.

The crisis was triggered by an article authored by Isioma Daniel, in
ThisDay newspaper, alleging that
Prophet Muhammed would have
loved to have the girls contesting.
Over 250 people were killed and
churches were destroyed

Over 11 people were killed, more
than 400 houses burnt, over 1600
families were displaced.
Over 700 persons killed, 3 500
persons internally displaced, 1264
children orphaned, over 392 women widowed, and several properties destroyed.
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11

17-20.
Jan.2009

Plateau

Resurgence of
religious crisis
in Jos

12

7 Mar. 2010

Plateau

13

22 May
2010

Plateau

Attacks by Fulani Muslims on
Christian-dominated villages
of Dogo Nahawa, Shen and
Fan in Jos.

14

29 Aug.
2011

15

26 Aug.
2011
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Police announced at least 320
killed, but aid workers and local
leaders place death toll at over
550. Over 40,000 persons displaced.

Over 500 people, mainly women
and children, were killed.

Attack on some
Christians who
were returning
from their place
of worship
along Bauchi
road in Jos

Reprisal attack by the Muslim over
the killing of 3 Fulani Muslims. At
least 1 person died while many
were injured.

Plateau

Clashes between Muslims
and Christians
at Rukuba road
and Farin Gada
in Jos during
the Ramadan
prayers.

No less than 20 persons were
killed, 50 injured, over 50 motor
vehicles and 100 motorcycles were
torched.

UN
House,
Abuja

Suicide bombing at the UN
House, Abuja
by suspected
Boko Haram
Islamists

23 persons (11 UN personnel were
killed and 12 non-UN personnel
were killed)
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16

5 Nov. 2011

Potiskum,
Damaturu and
Maiduguri

17

5-6 Jan.
2012

Mubi,
Adamawa state

Coordinated
attacks on
churches and
police stations
by suspected
Boko Haram
Islamists.

More than 90 persons were
reportedly killed, several churches
and police stations torched.

Suspected Boko 22 persons were reportedly killed;
Haram militants a dozen others were injured.
stormed a gathering of Igbo
Christians and
shot sporadically, killing over
a dozen and
injuring others
in apparent
execution of
an ultimatum
given by the
Boko Haram
Islamist sect
to Southern
Christians living
in the North to
leave.

Source: Adapted from Sampson 2012:112

To take the specific example of the violence that broke out in
November 2002, over the Miss World beauty competition, our
reading of media coverage of the event is that no newspaper,
either in the north or in the south, played an overtly instigating
role with respect to the outbreak of the crisis. Once it broke out,
however, coverage of the event followed a predictable pattern of
north-south division, as well as Christian-Muslim dichotomy.
The crisis was inadvertently provoked by an article written by
Miss Isioma Daniel containing a sentence considered to have been
blasphemous of Prophet Muhammad. The “offending article” published in the ThisDay edition of November 16, 2002 (pg. 50) had
Daniel say, “The Muslims thought it was immoral to bring ninety
two women to Nigeria and ask them to revel in vanity. What would
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Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would probably have chosen
a wife from one of them.” There is no evidence that the statement, tucked deep in the inside pages of ThisDay was calculated
to cause disaffection, let alone to spark off a deadly riot. It remains
unclear as the various editors interviewed in the course of writing
this chapter stated, whether the wave of destruction was a direct
consequence of the publication which would have been read by
only a few educated readers, or whether other factors, including
northern sensitivities to a “Christian” southern presidency, were
at stake. The outbreak of the conflict suggests, however, just how
tender the fabric of social and political life can be in a society at
the time, polarized by religion and ethnicity. Mahmud Jega who
edited the New Nigerian advanced six underlying causes of the
crisis:
Possible cause number one is genuine Muslim anger at a blasphemous
statement directed at the Holy Prophet of Islam. Second, is the pent-up
frustration of unemployed young men, failed WAECists, NECOists and
JAMBites, as well as successful holders of these certificates who could
secure neither jobs nor high school admission. Third, there were thieves
who were looking out for opportunity to loot. Fourth, there were plain
anarchists who were looking for the chance to burn, to maim and to
kill. Fifth, there were local city thugs who had one or two old scores to
settle with landlords, assorted creditors, former employers, and people
‘who do not assist other people’, a common allegation among the city’s
marginalized. And the sixth, there were political activists looking for an
opportunity to reduce the incumbent governor’s roller-coaster edge in
the race and prevent his cruising to victory, as it looks. (Interview with
Mahmud Jega, August 03, 2017)

A similar opinion that the publication for which ThisDay published several profuse apologies was only tangentially responsible
for the crisis was expressed by Mr Lasisi Olagunju, editor of the
Tribune on Saturday who said:
I remember my initial reaction to reports of the crisis was disbelief until our correspondent filed in a report confirming it. I believe the violence was an obvious over reaction by those who turned whatever
they found disagreeable in the report to an opportunity to kill, maim
and raze property of innocent people. The crisis, as I said before, was
just an excuse to commit unimaginable crimes by some people. Again,
it was easy to get foot soldiers for the mayhem because of the Alma-
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jiri system in the north which was/is also fallout of the acute illiteracy
among youths in that part of Nigeria. (Interview with Lasisi Olagunju,
August 03, 2017).

In keeping with that trend, the newspapers in the north and
the south adopted a positive tone to the reportage of the impending beauty contest. For example, the Nigerian Tribune in its
edition of November 9, 2002 published a featured piece entitled
“we are ready to host the world”. The article quoted one of the
organizers of the beauty pageant, Mr. Ben Bruce, who informed
the readers about the preparedness of the hosting company and
the provision of adequate security for visitors. ThisDay adopted a
similar, reassuring tone notwithstanding the Isioma’s article which,
as mentioned before, could not have been calculated to offend. It
is broadly the same thing for the New Nigerian, except that close
reading of its coverage in the days leading up to the crisis suggested a subtle undercurrent of opposition. This “opposition” was,
however, confined to letters to the editor, rather than to the paper’s opinion and news pages. For example, reflecting the tendency to criticize the event on religious grounds, the New Nigerian in
its edition of November 13, page 8, published a letter with the title
“Mrs. Obasanjo, stop this Beauty Contest.” Addressed to the president’s wife, the letter read in part “…exposing nakedness in the
name of parading women for beauty pageant is ungodly. Look at
it this way, would you in fairness to your conscience model in such
an event?” The point being made here is that there was no overt
indication of looming crisis in the papers in the prelude to the
crisis, save for the subtle hints of the New Nigerian. In this respect,
it should be recalled that newspapers are businesses which have
a stake in the preservation of the social order, and consequently
suffer severe destructions in times of conflicts.
On the reporting of the crisis itself, all the papers, especially the
ones located in the south maintained a stabilizing tenor. This pacifying posture was predictably led by ThisDay which almost daily
published apologies and sorrowful regrets on its first pages. For
example, in its edition of November 25, 2002 it published what it
called a further letter of apology from ThisDay chairman. It read
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in part “The last one week has been a nightmare for all of us at
ThisDay as we try to find answers to how all these have happened
… When we founded ThisDay in 1995, it was to promote peace,
order and good governance; it was to seek a better life for all the
people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Our ethos was not to be
offensive to any religion or to denigrate the cultural and religious
values of our people”.
ThisDay’s posture should be contextualized by reference to the
fact that its offices in Kaduna were burnt while a report in one of
the papers had it that by the 24th of November, 200 people were
reported dead and 4500 were displaced. As the riot escalated,
state security arrested the editor of ThisDay, Mr. Simon Kolawole.
In general, the New Nigerian located in the north, the area covered by the riot, maintained a stabilizing tenor as evidenced by a
front page story of Saturday, 23th November, 2002 entitled “Kaduna now calm after anti ThisDay protest”. However, it continued
not only to blame Thisday, but also convey the resentment and
reactions of its northern readers. This pattern can be illustrated
by its front page story of November 26, 2002 entitled “Zamfara
declares Fatwa on Isioma Daniel.”
The story quoted the Zamfara state deputy governor, Mamud
Shinkafi as saying that: “Like Salman Rushdie, the blood of the
ThisDay writer can be shed. It is binding on all Muslims wherever
they are to consider the killing of the writer an important religious
duty”. Considering that editors use front page positioning to set
agenda, the prominence of the story and its wordings could not
have been accidental.
Similarly, its editorial opinion of November 28, 2002 entitled
“A Case of many wrongs” went so far as to say that Isioma Daniel,
who studied in Britain should have heard of the author Salman
Rushdie and the worldwide furor generated by his blaspheming the holy prophet in his infamous book “Satanic Verses.” Such
words were certainly not calculated to de-escalate, especially as
there were fears that the crisis may spread to other northern cities
such as Kano, having already spread to Abuja. Similarly, Weekly
Trust in its edition of November 22-28 reported the crisis in the
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following words:

Ever since the idea of hosting the Miss World pageant in the country
was made public by its promoters, there have been indications that the
controversial beauty show may turn out to be an ill wind that would
blow the nation no good. Even before the staging of its grand finale,
which has now been shifted to December 7, a seemingly sponsored
publication on the licentious beauty parade has sparked off a violent
protest in the country.

The tenor of the report was one which appeared to justify the
unleashing of violence rather than regret it. Another example from
the Weekly Trust is that it lent its front and back pages of November 22-28 edition to news reportage, which instead of de-escalating would appear to be fueling the crisis. The front page story was
entitled “Kaduna on the Brink”, thus, more or less spreading the
message that further violence may be expected.
Our finding in this case study is broadly in line with other researchers conducted by scholars looking at other cases of ethno-religious violence. For example, in their study of media reportage of the Jos crisis of November 2008, Musa and Ferguson
2013:17 conclude that “the sample of reports by ThisDay and Daily Trust analyzed here differed principally, due to the fact that the
newspapers belong to two geo-political extremes in the country.
And this plays a major role in determining their choice of news
values and presentation.
The scholars, went on to argue that while there is no causal
relationship between media report and the outbreak of violence,
The reportage of the two newspapers differ due to their regional and religious affiliations; they used polarizing terms to make
the crisis a thing of ‘us’ and ‘them’; enemy images and stereotypes
were employed demonize the others; the audience were aware of
the such images to influence their impression on the other; ‘otherness’ is a major feature of cultural and political differences between the two divides, North and South, or Islam and Christianity.
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Table 4: Timeline

of Herdsmen and Farmers’ clashes 2012-2016

No

Date

State (s) Nature

Remarks

1

July, 2012

Plateau

Violent clashes
between farmers
and herdsmen

2

April 23,
2013

Benue

3

May 7,
2013

Benue

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Senator Gyang Dantong and
the Majority Leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly,
Mr. Gyang Fulani died in the
stampede that ensued while
attending the mass burial of
about 50 victims of attack by
Fulani herdsmen at Maseh
village in Riyom LGA.

4

May 14,
2013

Benue

5

July 5, 2013

Benue

6

July 28,
2013

Benue

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

7

November
7, 2013

Edo

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
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Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

10 farmers killed in an attack in
Mbasenge community, Guma
L.G.A by suspected herdsmen.
47 mourners gunned down by
suspected herdsmen in Agatu
while burying two policemen.

Over 200 herdsmen surround
Ekwo-Okpanchenyi, Agatu LGA
killing 40 locals.
20 people were killed in a
conflict between Tiv farmers
& herdsmen at Nzorov, Guma
LGA.

In retaliation to the alleged
killing of 112 cows, herdsmen
invade 2 villages in Agatu LGA
killing 8 villagers.
Attackers strike at Ikpele &
Okpopolo communities killing
7 and displacing over 6000
inhabitants.
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8

November
9, 2013:

Benue

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

9

June 2015:

Kwara

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

10

July 16,
2015

Plateau

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

11

September
2015

Delta

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

12

October 2,
2015

Ogun

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

36 locals killed, 7 villages overrun in an outbreak of fighting
between herdsmen and locals
in Agatu L.G.A.

Fulani herdsmen attacked
Motokun village, Patigi Local
Government Area, Kwara State.
The Oro-Ago community in
Ifelodun Local Government
Area of the state was also
attacked. Fulani herdsmen attacked Ninji and Ropp villages
in Plateau State and killed 27
persons. Also, the same group
reportedly murdered about 70
Christians.
Fulani Herdsmen attack and
killed farmers in Plateau.

an attack by some Fulani
herdsmen on the community
of Onitsha Ukwuani in Ndokwa
West local government area
of Delta State left about three
persons dead. A middle-aged
woman was raped and subsequently killed by three Fulani
herdsmen in Edo state.
Fulani Herdsmen raped, killed
Ogun Residents and Farmers.
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13

November
2015

Kogi

14

December
1, 2015

Delta

15

January 24,
2016

16

February
2016:

17

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Herdsmen invaded Ulaja and
Ojeh communities in Dekina
Local Government Area of Kogi
State and killed about 22 men
and women.

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Fulani Herdsmen kill a man
in Ofagbe community, Isoko
North council area of Delta.

Plateau

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

February 8,
2016:

Plateau

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Fulani herdsmen reportedly
killed About 10 persons in
Tom-Anyiin, Tom-Ataan, Mbaya
and Tombu in the Buruku Local
Government Area of the state.

18

February
11, 2016

Enugu

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

19

February
29, 2016:

Benue

20

March 9,
2016:

Benue

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
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Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Nigerian police DPO, 29 others
killed by suspected Fulani
herdsmen.

10 killed, Over 300 displaced
in clash between herdsmen
and farmers at Tom-Anyiin,
Tom-Ataan in Buruku LGA.

Herdsmen attacked Abbi
community in Uzo-Uwani LGA,
Enugu killing two siblings and
burnt houses, motorcycles.

Over 500 locals killed and 7000
displaced in an attack in Agatu
LGA by fulani herdsmen.
8 residents killed during herdsmen attacks in Ngorukgan, Tse
Chia, Deghkia and Nhumbe,
Logo LGA.
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21

April 5,
2016

Benue

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

22

April 8,
2016

Ondo

23

April 9,
2016

Edo

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

24

April 12,
2016:

Taraba

25

April 19,
2016

Oyo

26

April 25,
2016

Enugu

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen
Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

Violent clash
between farmers
and herdsmen

APC youth leader, Mr. Aondohemba Kasa and 3 others
killed in fresh Fulani herdsmen,
farmers’ clash in Benue.
Fulani herdsmen kidnapped
and killed Falae’s security
guard at his Ondo state farm.

Fulani camp was razed following the killing of a 64-year old
farmer, identified as Alex in
Edo.

Fulani herdsmen attack Dori
and Mesuma villages in Taraba,
killing at least 15.
A member of about 18 suspected herdsmen that invaded
farms in Lagun village, Lagelu
local council Oyo state, shot
Mr. Jimmy Aido.
48 killed, 60 injured by Fulani
herdsmen in Ukpabi Nimbo
community, Enugu state.

Source: The Guardian, April 29, 2016.

Interestingly, one of the issues that has generated animated
discussion as well as deepened ethno-religious polarities between
North and South on the one hand, as well as between Christians
and Muslims on the other, is the growing conflict between Fulani
nomads or herdsmen and farming communities in parts of Southern Nigeria and the Middle Belt. Table 4 illuminates the scale, intensity and fatalities involved in these frequent clashes. In the ensuing discourse, the media have been implicated to the extent
that they are sometimes accused of taking sides in the reportage
and analytical discussion of the events. For example, Odunlami
(2017) in an investigation of the editorial postures of two Southern-based newspapers, namely, the Punch and the Nation, came
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off with the conclusion that there was little or no sensationalism
or slanted coverage of the clashes by the two newspapers. Indeed,
following a content analysis, Odunlami (2017, 189) argued that:

Most of the publication on the Fulani herdsmen stories were displayed
in the inside pages of the newspapers. Only in very few cases were
the stories made front page items. The reason(s) for this may not be
unconnected to the fact of the recurrent nature of the crisis and its
reportage appears to have become routine and seemingly intractable
tragedies for which government has not been able to control.

Odunlami’s conclusion appears to have been based on overreliance on the counting of quantitative techniques of content analysis, which are obviously inadequate to capture the entire gamut
of the impact of media reportage. For example, it is obvious from
the increasingly heated discourse on the subject that journalists
and intellectuals of northern extraction are more and more sensitive to and irritated by what they regard as southern newspapers demonization of the Fulani and allegedly biased coverage of
the issues. For example, a journalist of northern extraction, Is’haq
Modibbo Kawu argues that southern media are guilty of hate
speech, stereotyping and sensationalism over their coverage of
herdsmen/farmers conflict. According to him, “In recent years, the
FulBe (another word for Fulani) people in general and Fulbe nomads in particularly have been regularly profiled within a pattern
of hate speech that endangers national cohesion in our country.”
(Is’haq Modibbo Kawu, “Media Narratives and the FulBe Normad”,
Vanguard, May 5, 2016).
Kawu argues that Southern media reportage of these conflicts
are influenced by their predominantly non-Muslim identities, as
well as their backgrounds of having been born in sedentary agricultural communities, which have been on the receiving end of
the frequent clashes. He maintains that the Punch, the Sun, the
Nation and Vanguard, all based in Southwest Nigeria are the principal culprits in these slanted narratives. Illustratively, he says that
“Even when the media reported the killing of 20 FulBe nomads
and over 80 cattle in Nassarawa state this week, the killers did not
have their ethnicity reported, they were only gunmen.” (Vanguard,
May 5, 2016).
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Obviously, Kawu’s position is characteristic of the postures of
northern, especially Fulani journalists, reacting to what they see
as biased reportage on the part of the Southern media. In earlier
years, in the wake of the crisis in Northern Nigeria over the Shari’a
controversy several northern journalists came down on the southern media reportage of the crisis.
For example, referring to the provocative characterization of
the Shari’a by the southern- dominated media in the aftermath of
the crisis of 2000, a senior northern journalist, Muhammed Haruna
went on record as saying:
I have never seen anything like the days since February 21 when violence broke out in Kaduna. Almost to the last, the media have portrayed Muslims and Islam as the sole and total villain of the piece. In
one particular edition of the Hallmark newspaper, Sharia was caricatured on three different pages as a vulture, a viper and a rampaging
demon (Olukotun, 2011, p.133).

Obviously, this is an issue that will continue to resonate in Nigeria’s political and cultural history, necessitating, as we argued in
the concluding section, intensive and focused training of journalists in balanced, fair and conflict-sensitive reporting.
SECTION FIVE
Conclusion
As previously discussed, our case study and others referred to,
do not suggest that the media on both sides of the fence, directly incited violence. Media, we argued earlier, are enterprises, and
the larger they are, the more stakes they have in the preservation
of political order, and the kind of predictability and stability that
will assure the smooth running of their businesses. However, as
soon as rioting and mayhem broke out, they adopted positions
and postures which suggest that they perceive the other side in
antagonistic terms. It is this aspect that Aliyu and Ferguson (2013)
referred to as enemy framing of issues.
It should also be noted that not only do the media and their
output affect the outcome of crises; they are also affected in their
journalist practice by contingencies arising from those crises. For
example, as Mahmud Jega told us “Editors had to be careful about
the way and manner they report the crisis in order not to become
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victims of an aroused populace (Interview August 3, 2017). In general, the sensitivity and vulnerability of Nigeria to ethno-religious
violence which assumed dramatic proportions in the Boko Haram
insurgency (the sect actually carried arson attacks on some newspaper houses they believed were hostile to them), suggest that
media personnel should be extremely careful in their report and
choice of words.
In this respect, training in diversity reporting, the avoidance
of stereotypes, sensational and inflammatory language, can be
of help here. That apart, enhancement of professional standards,
through training in objective reporting, as opposed to opinionated journalism can assist the search for less fractious journalistic frames. For example, Oso (2011) has lamented the shortage in
the Nigerian media, of factual and objective reporting and a slide
towards opinionated output. This can only make more daunting
the challenges of conflict reporting, in multicultural settings like
Nigeria.
It is often pointed out, and with good reason that there are
several meeting points between what good journalism seeks to
achieve, and the tool kits of conflict mediators. Obviously, by providing truthful and objective information about the protagonist
in a conflict, the journalist helps to establish a channel of communication between combatants and to narrow differences between them. In this respect, journalists need to be trained to frame
and define conflict situations, in ways that create common meeting points between opposing sides. This is to say that journalists
should not passively reflect their immediate environments, but
should come to terms with a journalism of nation building, which
avoids playing to the agenda of either side in conflict situations.
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OF RATTLE SNAKES AND GRAPES OF
WRATH: Rise, Fall, and Rise of Independent Media in Kenya
By Peter Kimani
Introduction

The Kenyan media are intricately woven in the narrative of the
nation’s political evolution. Through the years of single-party
autocracy, the media acquitted themselves well in safeguarding
the nation’s democratic space. As one observer summed it up
succinctly, the Kenyan media helped influence “the pace of political change and political liberalisation, in turn, facilitating media
growth, pluralism and relative independence.”
This article reflects on that historical epoch, and how the socalled “dividends of democracy” from the 1990s have problematized the practice of journalism in recent times, with specific attention to the eventful 2007 General Election that inadvertently led to
self-censorship, with far reaching consequences. In recent years,
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technological disruptions, falling circulation and dwindling advertising revenues have dealt the media with severe body blows.
Deft manipulations from the government dangling advertising
carrot have only served to undermine the media, but this may
only prove a temporary setback as a critical mass of phone-wielding citizens are democratising society in ways both complex and
compelling.
Without a doubt, 1991 was an eventful year for Kenya, Africa
and the world. Multiparty politics was re-introduced in Kenya—
after nearly 30 years of single-party autocracy under Kenya African National Union (KANU); Namibia hosted a watershed UNESCO
conference, the Windhoek Declaration— affirming free media as
a key plank in the construction of democratic and free societies.
And months earlier, in November 1989, the Wall of Berlin fell, effectively ending the Cold War to provoke a re-alignment of global
politics, with immediate ramifications in Africa.
While the confluence of these events suggest change was inevitable for Kenya and the rest of the world, there is consensus, as
Odhiambo (2002) argues persuasively, the Kenyan media helped
influence “the pace of political change and political liberalisation,
in turn, facilitating media growth, pluralism and relative independence.”
Ogola (2010) contests this view, arguing the relationship between the media and the state in Kenya has always been “largely
convivial and symbiotic,” due to the media’s reliance on advertising revenues from the government, and the resultant efforts to
control the media, resulting in a complex power play that has enabled and constrained media development.
According to a 2012 survey by the quasi-government agency,
Media Council of Kenya, Kenya enjoys a vibrant media environment with six major daily newspapers, 11 weekly magazines, 20
monthly magazines, 301 radio stations and 83 TV channels2. But
This number may have changed since, as new stations have been registered
and old ones shut down. For instance, in 2017, the Nation Media Group suspended its
Swahili broadcasting services, QTV and QFM. The Group also closed its tabloid, the
Nairobi News, in 2014, same year that the Standard launched its own tabloid, the Nairobian,that continues to thrive. The Standard also ceased publication of its bi-weekly
2
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as the Media Council report revealed, and Ogola reinforces in his
article, cross-media ownership vests these media outlets in a few
hands—most of these connected to powerful business and political elites. Ogola’s conclusion, however, is problematic, given the
efforts made by the media to resist overtures from the state over
the past 40 years.
This article pays particular attention to several phases of state
consolidation of media control that the media successfully resisted in 1991— when multipartyism was restored in Kenya— and in
2002, when the largely private media orchestrated another epoch
by helping route KANU out of power, after an interrupted 40-year
reign. This change of guard, media historians’ record, fortified media freedoms in unprecedented ways.
Two of the dominant media players in Kenya are the privately-owned Nation Media Group, referred to hereafter as the Nation,
which has multimedia interests in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda,
and The Standard Media Group, referred to hereafter as the Standard, that owns print, broadcast and online platforms.
Unsurprisingly, Kenyans ushered the 21st Century in a euphoric
mood. Nzioka (2003) says a Gallup International Survey in January
2003 polled Kenyans the most optimistic people on earth. But this
euphoria was short-lived. In March 2006, after a period of relative
stability and growth for the sector, the Standard was raided by
hooded State agents who carted away equipment and razed down
the following day’s paper. They also switched off transmission signal for the group’s TV station, KTN. Government agents alleged
the media group had intended to publish “embarrassing” reports
about then President Kibaki’s family, with Internal Security minister John Michuki making his infamous statement: “if you rattle a
snake, you must be prepared to bebitten by it.”3
The media fraternity pushed back to defend their hard-won
freedom. But over the next decade, government machinations did
County Weekly. The closure of all the outlets at both The Nation and The Standard was
blamed on lack of advertising revenues and a tough business environment.
3
The event was widely reported across the world, and condemned by Kenya’s
former Opposition leader and current President Uhuru Kenyatta: http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4765250.stm
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not bear the violence meted out on the Standard in 2006; rather,
the media have been dismantled with surgical precision through,
to use the inventive expression by the former editor of the Guardian, Rusbridger (2016) “fiscing”— which is an abbreviation for “financially-induced self-censorship.”
If this sounds sophisticated, that’s because it truly is, as journalists are emasculated without any laws being violated. The
sacking of one of Africa’s prominent cartoonists, Godfrey “Gado”
Mwampembwa from the Nation— the leading newspaper in East
and Central Africa—was perhaps the best indicator that media
houses were willing to sacrifice anyone or anything that threatened their bacon.
Gado, a Tanzanian who had plied his trade in Nairobi for more
than 20 years, aroused the ire of Tanzanian authorities after caricaturing then President JakayaKikwete being fed with grapes by
a bevy of beauties, appropriately named “Cronyism,” “Incompetence” and “Corruption,” among others—alluding to the ills that
beset the Kikwete administration—massaged and manicured the
near-naked king.
Other prominent editors, Chaacha Mwita and Denis Galava,
were eased out of the Nation and the Standard in 2014 and 2016,
respectively, for allegedly penning articles that did not go down
well with the Nairobi administration. Chaacha Mwita was sacked
from the Standard for sanctioning an article that imputed the
Uhuru Kenyatta administration was speaking out of the two sides
of its mouth—by advocating austerity measures while indulging
in opulence in a cabinet retreat in a posh hotel, while Galava’s
hard-hitting New Year editorial urging Kenyatta: “Mr President Get
Your Act Together this Year,” rattled the Nation to the core. We
shall deal with these claims at some length later.
Disruptions driven by technology have dealt the Kenyan media
with a body blow that prolongs the pain.
This paper assesses the tempestuous relationship between
Kenyan media and the government, and its implications on the
nation’s nascent democracy over the past 25 years. Given that the
Kenyan media are intricately woven in the nation’s political evolu-
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tion, we shall use election cycles to map out how that relationship
has evolved, for better and for worse, and its future implications
on media freedoms in Kenya.
This paper is structured in four main parts. The first two are
devoted to contemporary history of Kenyan media and the watershed 1992 General Election, when the media instigated great
social change. The third and fourth parts are devoted to the 2007
and 2013 General Elections, when the media capitulated under
pressure from inside and outside. The fourth segment also provides a conclusion projecting into the future.
For the purposes of this paper, our description of the Kenyan
media is restricted to print media which, since the beginning in
1902, have largely been privately owned. There is need, however,
to underline that in the pre and post-independence decades the
state broadcaster, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), and
its precursor, Voice of Kenya, was the dominant player that largely served the interest of the state and the ruling Kenya African
National Union (Kanu) and its propagation of what Ogola calls,
“nation-building” project.
Until 2002, when Kanu was routed out of power, broadcast media was a near monopoly of KBC. This means news bulletins almost
always dominated by news revolving around the then President
Daniel arap Moi and his coterie.
Kadhi and Rutten (2001) illustrate this absurdity by reminding
that in 1994, as the entire world waited with bated breath for the
prison doors to creak open to set free the world’s most famous
political prisoner, Nelson Mandela—after 27 years behind bars—
KBC’s bulletin still started with the news of Moi’s church appearance!
They explain that even the oldest private TV station in Kenya,
KTN, which was established in 1990, remained in the grip of the
Kanu power clique through its ownership. And journalists who appeared to forget were constantly reminded of that fact, as was
Rose Lukhalo, the day editor who was sacked on Christmas Day
in 1991 for breaking the news of the formation of the opposition
Democratic Party. Other KTN editors, Vitalis Musebe and Isaya
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Kabira were suspended in July 1990 for reporting anti-government protests.
Right from the start, Kenyan journalism was intricately woven
with the politics of the day. At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a press that had been weaned on British colonial journalistic
tradition and a segregated readership. Obonyo (2002) says there
existed “a three-tier system with the European press at the top,
Indian in the middle, and African at the bottom.” Farringer (1991)
says although the oldest mass circulating newspaper, the East African Standard, was founded in 1902 in Mombasa by a Parsee migrant, A. M. Jeevanjee, its shift to identify with the African cause
was painstakingly slow, as was its Africanisation programme. For
Abuoga and Mutere (1988) this racial undertone in the Standard
was expressly manifest as “a typical European people’s paper concerned with the happenings in Britain and urging subservience
to the settlers,” a theme that Farringer observes persisted after
independence.
This was the market gap that Kadhi and Rutten (ibid) say His
Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan, leader of the Shia ImamiIsmaili
Muslims in 25 countries— a fair number of them in East Africa—
sought to fill when he bought a tiny Kiswahili weekly, Taifa, from
Charles Hayes and his partner, Althea Tebbutt, and re-launched as
an English weekend paper in March 1960, the Sunday Nation. The
daily edition, Daily Nation, was launched in October of that year.
Ideologically, the Nation was diametrically opposite of the Standard as it outlined its desire to propagate the Africans’ viewpoint
and push for political independence for the colonised. Barely a
decade after its launch, the Nation overhauled its older rival in
circulation. Its success soon attracted politicians and their cronies,
who sought to wrest its control.
Loughran (2010) narrates those contestations in The Birth of A
Nation: The Story of a Newspaper in Kenya. He spent 12 years as
a senior editor on the newspaper, and records a most intriguing
battle that took shape in 1976. The setting was Nairobi, where the
Aga Khan was opening a $3 million Serena Hotel, presided over by
Kenya’s founding President, MzeeJomo Kenyatta.
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Loughran recounts, “Kenyatta addressed the Aga Khan directly:
‘This is my nephew, Mr (Ngengi) Muigai. He has just come back
from America and I was wondering if it was possible to find a position for him in your newspapers…” A rather startled Aga Khan
reportedly promised to look into the matter, but only after making inquiries. Loughran also notes Muigai was accompanied by
Kenyatta’s son-in-law, Udi Gecaga, then chairman of Lonrho East
Africa Ltd, owners of the Standard and the Nation’s chief rival.
Over the next few weeks, Loughran narrates, “it soon became
clear that the position he (Muigai) had in mind was the top one,
chairman of the holding company and publishers.” The Nation
managers were justifiably alarmed what Muigai’s chairmanship
would mean for the newspaper. “They (Nation editors) were even
more concerned about the political implications. The two (Muigai
and Gecaga) had close ties to the ‘royal court’ at Kenyatta’s Gatundu home, the Kikuyu power centre which appeared to wield more
power than Kenya’s elected cabinet; they were also members of
the Head of State’s own family…”
A unanimous decision was then made to reject Muigai’s chairmanship of the Nation, but how would that be conveyed to the
President without hurting his feelings, especially after the Aga
Khan had made, in the words of one Nation executive, a “vague
promise,” to look into the matter? Then chairman, Albert Ekirapa, is quoted in Loughran’s book explaining that the newspaper’s
board and senior management met with the Aga Khan in Paris and
drew up a list of potential backlashes, and how to counter each.
This included offering the newspaper for sale to the government.
This response was crafted as a communique from the Aga
Khan, in which he delicately informed Kenyatta that he regretted
Muigai’s chairmanship was untenable. He outlined, among others, readers’ backlash—and so potential losses to shareholders—
should it become public that the Nation and the Standard were
effectively “under the control of one group of individuals with a
consequent monolithic outlook…”
Loughran says the Aga Khan reiterated this message with a private call on the President weeks later, when he offered to sell the

325

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

newspaper if the Government was keen on it. Kenyatta reportedly
declined to buy the newspaper and conceded that the Aga Khan
had a point in seeking to keep the Nation free of government control. The crisis was over, after a six-month tense period.
Loughran writes that it soon became apparent how the Nation
would have been used to serve political interests when, in September 1976, the Standard headlined with a report from the President’s Gatundu clique that sought to circumvent constitutional
order from taking root. In the event of the President’s death, the
Gecaga-controlled Standard championed that the Constitution
should be changed to vest power in the House Speaker, not Vice
President Daniel arap Moi, who had deputised the elderly statesman for 12 years.
In the event, Moi succeeded Kenyatta in 1978 and as he sought
to consolidate his power, he orchestrated a systematic crackdown
on writers and intellectuals. The Kenyan novelist NgugiwaThiong’o
was detained in December 1977 (by Kenyatta) and his release in
late 1978 (by Moi) was only fast-tracked when Amnesty International adopted him as a prisoner of conscience. He later went into
exile.
An attempted military coup in 1982 unleashed a state of paranoia, claiming more academics and journalists, including the Standard’s Otieno Mak’Anyengo and Wahome Mutahi, who served as
Arts editor at the Nation. Mutahi chronicles his prison experience
in a novel, Three Days on the Cross, that captures the psychological and physical torture that detainees endured in the dungeons
of Nyayo House—a government building in downtown Nairobi.
The torture chambers of Nyayo House were opened to the public in February 2003, after Kanu’s ouster, as old detainees trickled
in to recall their stories of pain and suffering. Most survivors recalled the severe beatings at the hands of police officers, and the
endless hours in water-logged cells, naked, without food or water,
often surviving on their own waste.
Albert Ekirapa was at the helm of the Nation through this period
of turbulence: “All editors had stomach ulcers4,” he chuckled, add4
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ing that some editors, like George Mbugguss, had early sign-offs
to avoid the predictable calls from the Nairobi State House, seat
of the President. Ngotho’s (2017), recent recollections of the tricks
employed by Kenyan Nation editors to escape state harassment,
which often started with a call from the Big Man himself (former
President Daniel arap Moi) border on hilarity. Some left office early and dictated headlines from public payphones (to avoid the
office), locked themselves in and waited for things to cool down,
or simply went into hiding, as their juniors concocted cock-andbull stories to give to authorities.
But things would get worse before they got better. Through
the years of single-party rule, those expelled from Kanu could not
practice politics, but so many had been expelled to form a critical mass that demanded inclusion in national politics, key among
them former minister Kenneth Matiba, and former Nairobi Mayor
Charles Rubia. The two were arrested on July 4, 1990 to pre-empt
their planned rally. But fellow politicians organised another rally
on July 7, 1990 to protest the arrests.
Internationally, as Galloway (1992) recounts in Kenya Report,
that was broadcast on the British Channel 4 in 1992, Western donors had suspended $800m aid to pressurise Moi to re-introduce
multi-party politics and call for elections—confirming that the fall
of the Wall of Berlin in November 1989 had led to a reset of world
politics. Despotic rulers in Africa and the rest of the world who had
enjoyed backing by West powers due to their strategic position
during the Cold War, were suddenly left adrift. These external and
internal pressures were made to bear on the local media.
Ekirapa recalls the pressure that he faced through this period as
the country roiled through public protests that crystallized in the
riots of July 7, 1990, now christened the SabaSaba riots, memorialising the month and date they unfurled, leaving 20 dead, following clashes between police and protestors demanding change.
Ekirapa says while the Nation had been denied government
advertisement for years, its commercial success was buoyed by
its growing circulation and reputation for independent reporting,
so they were not under financial pressure to toe the government
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line. “There was no compromise,” Ekirapa maintains. “We were an
independent, private company and would report the events objectively.”
Ekirapa adds spies had infiltrated the newsroom to work as
drivers, some of whom lingered by the copier long after everyone
had left the newsroom to report what stories would be running
the following day. Those were hazards they could live with. It was
during this climate of fear, in December 1991, that multi-party
politics was re-introduced and a General Election called the following year 1992.
Quoting the Kenya Human Rights Commission report, Kadhi
(2001) estimates some “20 publications stood officially banned”
before the return to multi-party politics in 1991—including Beyond, a National Council of Churches of Kenya publication, that
was banned for exposing electoral fraud in the 1988 elections, and
the Financial Review that was banned in 1989 after exposing fraud
in government departments, among others.
Out of their ashes sprung Society magazine in January 1992 edited by Pius Nyamora, which saw multi-party politics as a harbinger to more freedoms to expose government corruption and human rights violations by police. While the big media newspapers
like the Nation or the Standard could escape direct government
censure, smaller entities like Society were not as lucky. Nyamora
was routinely harassed and his printer’s premises vandalised by
state agents. In 1992 alone, Nyamora was charged with 11 counts
of sedition and 30,000 copies of his magazine impounded. In an
interview with the British Channel 4 that year, Nyamora said he
thought the harassment was intended to drive him out of business, which the government ultimately did as he went into exile in
the United States.
Ironically, Nyamora (2007) says his publication and others under the rubric of “alternative press,” such as Finance and the Nairobi Law Monthly, helped fortify Press freedom for the mainstream
press that waited for smaller presses to break the news to gauge
government reaction, before they could act. For instance, Nyamora writes, when the doyen of opposition politics, JaramogiOginga
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Odinga announced he would form a new opposition party, National Development Party in 1992, the Nation and the Standard
snubbed the news, but started covering the news after Society had
ran the story.5
Nyamora, who previously worked as a reporter on the Nation
says he was emboldened by the protection accorded from very
unlikely quarters: the US ambassador Smith Hempstone in Nairobi, among others. Hempstone, a former journalist himself, gained
notoriety as the nyamachoma (roast meat) diplomat because he’d
go out of diplomatic circuits to meet ordinary Kenyans for an occasional bite. Hempstone insisted he was not supporting the Kenyan opposition but instead “supported democracy,” and routinely
addressed the Press in Nairobi to condemn the arrest of journalists and remind the Moi regime that the wind of change was blowing. Gachuhi (2010) writes that Hemptone often reminded that
Washington’s economic support would only flow to nations that
“nourished democratic institutions, defended human rights and
practised multiparty politics.” Hempstone chronicles his experiences in a memoir, The Rogue Ambassador.
Kadhi and Rutten (ibid) note one of the important publications
to emerge from that period was The People, a weekly tabloid that
first appeared on February 14, 1993 and was first owned by Opposition politician Kenneth Matiba, who claimed the mainstream
press was prejudiced against him as it was foreign-owned6.
Matiba’s statement raises interesting questions about the intersect of politics and democracy, which speaks to Ogola’s argument
above. This was probably the legacy of KANU, the independent
party that acquired the Nairobi Times in 1977 Kadhi and Rutten
(ibid) and used it to propagate party ideology. Ironically, Matiba
hardly used The People as a campaign tool as he did not run in
1997. The paper’s forte was penetrating investigative journalism,
but it lost its lustre when it started publishing daily.
For full details, see The Role of Alternative Press in Mobilisation for Political
Change in Kenya 1982-1992: Society as a Case Study by Pius MosetiNyamora.
6
At that stage, the Nation’s man shareholder was, and still remains, His Highness the Aga Khan, while the Standard was owned by Lonrho. Today, the Moi family
has a controlling stake at the Standard.
5
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Its fortunes dwindled further as Matiba’s fortunes declined. The
People is now owned and published as a free newspaper by Media
Max, a firm indirectly associated with the Kenyatta family, according to Committee to Protect Journalists. Media Max also owns K24
TV and several FM radio stations.
Nanjom (2012) notes the mainstream media in Kenya is dominated by about a dozen individuals— some of them politicians—
lured into the business by “potential commercial returns or likely
political harvest.” We shall see shortly what sort of “harvest” has
been possible in the past decade.
2007—Dividends of Democracy
The 2007 General Election provided a unique challenge for
Kenya. The Kibaki years had been defined by steady economic
growth, but the so-called “dividends of democracy,” characterised
by a mushrooming of electronic media, had been whittled by the
March 2006 attack on the Standard. In the preceding year, 2005,
the Nation had the rare of honour of an important, if uninvited
guest – the First Lady Lucy Kibaki— when she called at the Nation
Centre late one night to complain about the alleged bad press
that her family was receiving. Ironically, the First Lady waved a
copy of the Standard in her hand as she protested, implying she
may have gone to the wrong address.
Nationally, the 2005 constitutional referendum—an election
pledge that Kibaki was determined to keep—had left Kenya seriously fractured. This followed fissures in the cabinet, with senior
politician Raila Odinga breaking ranks with Kibaki to lead a brigade that decisively defeated the referendum.
Kibaki responded by firing half his cabinet. The renegades coalesced in the opposition Orange Democratic Movement and
promised to use the referendum as a “rehearsal” for electoral
victory in the forthcoming General Election, two years away. The
country was on the edge and individual media houses braced for
the hard task ahead of reporting the elections fairly. Inside the
Nation Centre, its management set up a tallying centre to monitor
the poll independently.
But nobody appeared ready for the troubles that followed that
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Christmas weekend in 2007. Claims of rigging by both government
and the opposition had dominated the campaign period, but voting was largely peaceful. Things started falling apart at vote tallying. A restive nation waited for results. The politicos assembled
at the national tallying centre in Nairobi and started expressing
their frustrations on live TV. When live transmission was banned
and journalists kicked out of the tallying centre, the tension hit
fever-pitch.
Soon after, the electoral commission chairman Samuel Kivuitu appeared on television to announce the incumbent had been
re-elected. President Kibaki was subsequently sworn in a hastily
convened ceremony at Nairobi’s State House. Violence ruptured
in city slums, before spreading to other parts of the land as protests against the election outcome evolved into a vortex of violence targeting those perceived as “outsiders” in parts of Nairobi
and the Rift Valley. In the end, some 1,100 were killed, including 30
women and children murdered in a church where they had sought
refuge. A further half a million were displaced.
Inside the newsrooms, media outlets were faced with a crisis of
their own. As Nation’s former editorial director Wangethi Mwangi
explains in A Newsroom Divided: Kenya, the Election Crisis, and the
Nation Media Group, a Case Study developed by Aga Khan University’s Graduate School of Media and Communications and Columbia University’s Journalism department, he noticed journalists
in the newsroom openly supported parties associated with their
ethnic communities.
There were two camps in the newsroom: one supporting President Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu, while the other supported opposition chief, Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo. And each group of journalists would cheer if tallies on different TV screens showed their
candidates were on the lead, or despaired when they were on a
losing streak.
When the Nation’s internal tallying centre collapsed, some journalists grumbled it was sabotage, insinuating editor Mwangi was
sympathetic to President Kibaki because they were both Kikuyu.
Mwangi’s deputy, Group Managing Editor Joseph Odindo, was
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presumed to be supporting Odinga because he was a Luo.
The Case Study documents the hard choices that the management was faced with, not just in saving its own reputation as a
credible news source, but also salvage its business from capitulation; and crucially, restoring relations that appeared eroded beyond repair.
The three challenges were entwined as editors could not edit
stories or videos from reporters they suspected were likely to
frame stories to favour their ethnic kingpins, or leave out aspects
that would weaken their community positioning – in disregard of
the laid-down editorial guidelines.
Odindo is quoted in the Case Study conceding newsroom operations were nearly crippled by this animus. “The circumstances
made it difficult for editors even to assign stories,” he said. “For
instance, political rallies were sometimes held in the vernacular.
That meant sending a reporter who spoke Kikuyu to a rally for
Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU). But then by definition, it
meant that they were likely to be politically aligned to support the
PNU…”
As a consequence, the Case Study continues, the Nation editors
were unable to tell if a reporter’s story slant was selected for its
news worth or to protect community/party interests. In some instances, Odindo says he resorted to comparing the Daily Nation’s
coverage with the stories in their competition, although that was
problematic as “he wasn’t sure if he could trust the work of their
reporters any more than his own.”
A few important developments followed, and somewhat curtailed media freedom in an interesting way. On January 3, as the
country teetered towards civil war, the three national newspapers—the Nation, the Standard and the Star joined hands and
published same story on the front-page: “Save our beloved country.” The report also appeared on the groups’ TV affiliates.
“Our beloved country, the Republic of Kenya, is a burnt-out
smouldering ruin,” started the punchy Op-Ed in the Nation. “The
economy is at a virtual standstill and the armies of destruction are
on the march in the Rift Valley and elsewhere. In the midst of this,
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leaders—who are the direct cause of this catastrophe—are issuing
half-hearted calls for peace from their hotels and walled homes,
whence they are conveyed in bullet-proof limousines…”
This Fanonian image of elite that tele-directs violence among
peasants was re-enacted by Kenya’s foremost author, NgugiwaThiong’o in a BBC report. “Frantz Fanon, the intellectual visionary
of the Third World, had long ago warned us of the dangers of
the ideology of regionalism preached by elite whose money can
buy them safe residence in any part of a country,” Ngugi (2008)
cautioned, concluding that no less entity than the United Nations
should investigate the violence in Kenya. This would come to pass,
as we shall see shortly.
The more immediate challenge, however, was how to continue
fair coverage of the tragic events without fanning the flames of
violence. “One of the questions we asked ourselves as the pictures
began rolling on television, you see people wielding machetes
and wooden clubs and stuff,” Mwangi is quoted in the Case
Study, “was how do you identify these groups?” He decided ethnic identities of those involved in the conflict would not
be named. This position was contested by some editors, the Case
Study reveals, who felt the decision “took the Nation outside the
realm of journalism and into diplomacy7.”
The Nation was not alone in this quandary. The Standard had
seen its circulation dip in Central Province (the region is predominantly Kikuyu) in the years preceding the 2007 General Election,
as it was seen as “an opposition newspaper.” This assertion was
not helped by the resignation in September 2007 by the Standard
managing editor ChaachaMwita to run for a parliamentary seat on
Orange Democratic Movement ticket8.
The Commission of Inquiry into The Post-Election Violence,
headed by retired South African judge Johan Kriegler, which examined how the 2007 General Election was mishandled, exoneratThe Case Study identifies Charles Onyango-Obbo, then executive editor of
AfricaReview.com, a Nation Media Group affiliate, among those who protested this
brand of journalism.
8
ChaachaMwita’s candidacy was quashed after it emerged another candidate
had presented a similar certificate from the Orange Democratic Movement.
7
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ed the mainstream media, but concluded “vernacular FM stations
contributed to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity and may have
incited violence.”
Mbeke, Ugangu and Orlale (2010) argue that the liberalisation
of the broadcast scene in Kenya was mismanaged as no regulatory framework was put in place when the sector expanded after 2002. As a consequence, many radio presenters lacked formal
training and programming was skewed towards entertainment.
This is a double-edged sword: Kimutai (2011) estimates 115 radio
stations reach 93 per cent of Kenyans, according to an IpsosSynovate survey, but this strength may not necessarily translate into
an enlightened public due to training deficiencies afflicting those
running the show.
Radio journalist Joshua arap Sang, who plied his trade at Kass
FM, a Nairobi-based outlet transmitting in Kalenjin, which is
spoken widely in Kenya’s Rift Valley, was hauled before the International Criminal Court (ICC) alongside five others, including
(current) President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto,
to face criminal charges at The Hague. Sang was accused as an
indirect co-perpetrator in the commission of crimes against humanity, murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population. He
reportedly used his popular breakfast show, Leen Nee Emet (what
does the nation say) to sow seeds of discord. These charges were
confirmed in January 2012 but terminated in April 2016—as did all
the other five cases. Maina (2017) writes that the ICC Prosecutor
FatouBensouda blamed the collapse of the cases on lack of State
cooperation, witness intimidation and disappearances.
Sang was not the only journalist consumed by post-election
violence; Nation insiders confirmed a senior editor was suspended
for making a midnight visit to the newsroom, with a politician in
tow, to alter a headline. An internal inquiry centred on who tipped
off the politician about the impending publication of an adverse
report, prompting his active efforts to have the headline amended. 9The editor was reprimanded for these transgressions but not
The report in question appeared on July 12, 2009 edition of the Sunday Nation, “Annan betrayed us.”
9
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sacked.
The Nation and Standard were forced to recall journalists from
bureaux that were seen as hostile. Among those recalled by the
Standard was Cyrus Kinyungu, who served as the newspaper’s bureau chief in Kakamega in Western Kenya—which was seen as an
opposition bastion and dominated by ethnic Luhya. Kinyungu, an
ethnic Kikuyu, said his work there became untenable as he faced
pressure from both inside and outside the newsroom.
“In the streets, we heard crowds swearing to harm members of
my own community10,” he recalled. “There were many stories we
could not cover because who do you verify with? With the same
people who were vowing to harm you?” he posed, adding even
his own colleagues were not helpful. “One of them said ‘this is a
revolution and sacrifices have to be made,’ implying I would be
sacrificed.”
Amos Kareithi, a Standard reporter in Mombasa was also recalled. In the Nation Case Study, Mwangi recalls a journalist broke
down on the phone and wept that he feared he would be killed
because he was not a Luo. He had been posted to work in Kisumu,
the Luo homeland.
International news organisations like the BBC encourage hiring of local correspondents to serve in their countries of origin
where they have extensive news contacts and deep knowledge;
wire agencies like Associated Press and Reuters, on the other
hand, prefer posting correspondents away from their own bases
to ensure impartiality. In the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 General
Election, it became anathema to dispatch a reporter to a bureau
away from their place of origin. The messenger had become being
distrusted to deliver the message. Or neither the message, nor the
messenger could be trusted.
But things were not any better on the national news desks,
where certain news beats, especially politics, became “personalised.” Top politicians would confide in their own kinsmen in the
newsroom. When other reporters were assigned those beats, the
politicos declined to make any substantive statements; news with
10

One on one interview, Nairobi, June 25, 2017.
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gravitas was still delivered to their preferred kinsmen away from
the Press conferences11. Ethnicity had become entrenched as a
news factor, and the 2013 General Election would be shaped by
the legacy of ICC, placing civil society, the media and the political
class on a warpath.
2013: History Repeating Itself
In his foreword to Nicholas Githuku’sMau Mau Crucible of War:
Statehood, National Identity, and Politics of Postcolonial Kenya,
Londsdale (2016) sees 2007 post-poll violence as a mirror of the
nation’s bloody past, when it revolved against the British: “Kenya
was a turbulent colony, a conquest state that sixty years after its
creation ended more bloodily than it began, with its conquerors’
brutal suppression of popular violence…”
Ironically, Kenya’s political elite looked back on the nation’s violent history, and the convulsions of 2007, not as an indictment
of its failure to entrench the rule of law, but as a renewal in the
nation’s quest for sovereignty, more so after the Commission of
Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) led by Kenyan judge,
Philip Waki, forwarded names of the six suspects to face trial at
the ICC.
The most eloquent exposition of this narrative condemning the
ICC as an “imperialist” machination came from Uhuru Kenyatta—
son of the founding President Jomo Kenyatta— who alleged that
his prosecution at The Hague for 2007 electoral violence echoed
his father’s own trial 50 years earlier, coining the catchy line: “From
Kapenguria Six to Ocampo Six. Luis Moreno-Ocampo was the ICC
prosecutor who initiated the process.
That may sound sacrilegious, considering that the freedom
icons known as “Kapenguria Six,” named for the remote location
in Northern Kenya where BildadKaggia, Paul Ngei, OchiengAneko,
Kung’uKarumba, Fred Kubai and Kenyatta, were jailed for agitating freedom, is a revered signpost in Kenya’s political and social
Such was the experience of this author during his tenure as Head of News
at The Standard between September 2008 and August 2011. A politician would call a
press conference but fail to state anything substantive if their preferred reporters were
not present. They would phone them instead, so it ultimately became counterproductive to send them to cover sources that chose whom to trust.
11
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history. The “Ocampo Six,” on the other hand, comprising Kenyatta’s son and five other suspects, were accused of undermining the
survival of the Kenya State by committing crimes against humanity, among others.
Kimani (2008) argues such a position is fallacious, considering
that Kenya’s independent leaders were complicit in accepting unfavourable terms that retained the stolen lands in the hands of
British colonial settlers. Landlessness was identified by the Waki
commission as one of the triggers of the post-polls violence in
2007.
Yet it’s easy to comprehend how some politicians were able to
harness the ICC cases into political capital: anti-imperialist rhetoric
has always found traction with the masses. As the Moi dictatorship
crumbled in the early 1990s and intellectuals and dissidents who
had fled to Europe and North America started streaming back
home to agitate for change, the idea that they and civil society
were serving their “foreign masters” became embedded in local
political lexicon.
Come 2008, the idea that the civil society was serving self-same
foreign masters resurged, more so after the Kofi Annan-led negotiations that brokered power-sharing agreement between Kibaki and Odinga resolved that perpetrators of post-poll violence
would be handed over to the ICC, if no credible local mechanism
was established. As Obbo and Mwiti (2011) argue, the confluence
of the ICC trials in The Hague and the Mau Mau reparations quest
for colonial-era atrocities in a London court, provided a perfect
convergence of history and the present, reshaping the future.
In the event, the opening of the ICC trials in mid-December 2010
against the so-called Ocampo Six was a culmination of monthslong posturing by politicians who chorused, “Don’t Be Vague, Let’s
Go to Hague,” resoundingly defeating a parliamentary push for
a Special Tribunal to try the cases locally. But the song changed
swiftly when it emerged that the ICC trials had been built around
evidence gathered by quasi-government agency, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. The commission was alleged
to have been working at the behest of western powers, mainly the

337

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

United States that was alleged to be pushing for regime change
by locking out some politicians from contesting.
Lough (2013) says the now-famous quip, “choices have consequences,” by senior US diplomat Johnnie Carson, “hammering
home the same point at least five times during a 40-minute conference call,” became a rallying point for Kenyatta and his running
mate, fellow ICC indictee William Ruto under the Jubilee Alliance.
They had dramatically turned the ICC and Kenya’s sovereignty into
a campaign issue, and canvassed successfully in the people’s court
to narrowly win the presidency.
The Jubilee administration has been a paradox. It aggressively
projected itself as a “digital” (young, modern and savvy) government to contrast the opposition that was presented as “analogue”
(old)—appropriating the lingo of the season as it coincided with
the 2013 TV transmission migration deadline, from analogue to
digital. Yet Jubilee tapped age-old politics of patronage and embarked on rolling back media freedoms that Maina (2017) explains
were “modelled on originals from Sani Abacha’s military dictatorship in Nigeria.”
The laws in question relate to the November 2013 Kenya Information and Communications (Amendment) Bill that was passed
in a record 30 minutes by 40 Members of Parliament, imposing
punitive fines of up to $200,000 for media houses and $10,000 for
individual journalists for breaching a government-imposed code
of conduct. Moreover, the Bill established the Communications
and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal, Shiundu (2013) that had been
“given sweeping powers to even attach property of journalists and
media houses to recover the hefty fines.” Worse still, the tribunal
was granted the powers to recommend the suspension and/or
de-registration of journalists, a function that is only performed by
professional associations.” Shiundu added.
That wasn’t all: The Bill went further to regulate how media
houses would make money by placing a curb on foreign advertising in local media. Predictably, the action greeted with uproar,
Shiundu (ibid) with the chairman of Media Council of Kenya, Joseph Odindo lamenting: “They (MPs) are retrogressive, dictatorial
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and they take this country back to the political Stone Age. We negotiated with these MPs and they have shown singular bad faith.
We will carry this battle to the next stage and fight every attempt
to deny the media of this country freedom.”
And sure enough, journalists paraded in the streets, with the
Standard running a series under the rubric, “Democracy under attack,” illustrated by dramatic images of scribes and photographers
with their mouths and camera lenses muzzled. The Kenyan opposition and freedom lobbies condemned the Bill as well, with former
Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka quoted as saying Nzau and Nzia
(2013) the draconian media Bills would soil Kenya’s image abroad.
Press freedom lobbies feared the move would set a bad precedent
for the region as Kenya was considered as a bastion of free press
within the continent. “The laws also set a dangerous precedent
for other East African countries which take their cue from Kenya,
traditionally a regional leader in the industry,” said Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) East Africa Representative Tom Rhodes.
Media freedom lobby, Article 19, further reported that new security laws allowed the “banning of publications, the arrest of vendors, and the arrest and detention of journalists on the grounds
of “compromising public safety, public order, morality or internal
defence, besides thefinancial and penal punishments … powers to
search media establishments, and seize equipment.”
Ngetich (2016) notes the media enjoyed some reprieve in 2016
when the courts declared the security laws unconstitutional, but
upheld the punitive law that imposes hefty fines on individual
journalists and media houses for breaching the government-sanctioned code of conduct.
But the government wasn’t done. It further introduced a centralised advertising agency that would determine where to place
advertisement, which Mathiu (2015) thought was “the biggest anti-press freedom project since 1902.” Government advertisement
accounts for about 25 per cent of Kenyan media’s total advertising
revenue.
The government’s advertising agency, Namunane (2017), was
inaugurated in February 2017, and was expected to publish all
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government jobs and tenders on the online portal, My.Gov, which
would then re-run the info as an insert in newspapers of government’s choosing.
But the government was not paying promptly even for advertisement consumed before the directive. The Nation’s Editor-in-Chief Tom Mshindi told Rusbridger the delay was “putting
a huge amount of stress on our bottom lines, our operational, our
cash flows, everything.”
Unsurprisingly, job insecurity is so prevalent, virtually all media
houses in Kenya—the Nation which publishes the Daily Nation,
the Sunday Nation, The EastAfrican and NTV, among other media
outlets in Eastern Africa; The Standard Group, owners of the Standard, KTN, among others; Radio Africa Group that publishes the
Star; Royal Media Services that own Citizen TV, have all retrenched
staff several times in as many years. As a consequence, understaffing is rampant and those who survived the purge are overworked.
This has impacted on the quality of journalism, particularly in investigations that are fewer and far between across all media.
As the executive director of the Media Institute David Makali,
told the Nairobi Law Monthly: “There are moments when you see
that the government pulls certain levers to obtain its desires – to
frustrate certain reporting so that it can portray a positive image
of itself… You can see some level of deftness in media manipulation; they’re sophisticated.”
Rusbridger (2016) observes sophistication as one of the hallmarks of “fiscing”—financially-induced censorship—the sort that
the Jubilee administration has perfected, as the following examples illustrate. Only months after taking charge, President Kenyatta organised a retreat for his cabinet at a swanky resort on the foot
of Mt Kenya. Ironically, the theme of the retreat was austerity in
public spending. Leading by example, the president and his deputy announced they would take pay cuts to keep down the bloated
public wage bill.
The March 14, 2014 Standard headline: “Austerity: How Government spent millions on luxury hotel,” therefore, was a public-interest analysis. The Standard reported that about $1m may have
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been sunk to host the 100-strong delegation for four days, this
being the cost of airfare, food and other expenses. To work out the
math, the Standard was guided by the amounts spent by its own
crew at the establishment.
Further, the report indicated the costs were inflated by a twoday extension—the initial plan was to shift the cabinet talks to the
nearby Sagana State lodge that would have cost virtually nothing,
since a budget is provided every year by Treasury.
“Investigations by The Standard unveiled a picture of a Cabinet that talks about inevitability of belt-tightening but seemingly
oblivious or negligent to ways public expenditure could be lowered much more easily,” the report concluded. The government
spokesman declined to comment, while the Finance minister
scoffed at the reporter in a text message: “Where did you get this
crazy figure from? Check with the accounting officer in the Office
of the President for correct expenditure.”
What followed this public-interest, fairly argued and balanced
story was, to use the minister’s word, “crazy.” As the Committee
to Protect Journalists recounts in its July 2015 issue, Broken Promises, insiders at the Standard reported that the State House had
called to remind that a $700,000 advertising deal was in jeopardy
if the newspaper maintained its strident tenor. ChaachaMwita, the
editorial director, offered to publish the government’s side of the
story. The government demanded an unreserved apology, which
was granted the following day.
But even that was not enough. On March 16, the newspaper
ran a Page 1 apology signed by none other than the group’s chief
executive Sam Shollei. We shall reproduce in its entirety because
it’s unprecedented in the paper’s 115-year history:
“In the Standard newspaper of Friday 14th March 2014,
headlined “Austerity: How Govt spent millions on luxury retreat”, the
Standard published the story that the government could
have spent more than Sh100 ($1m) million on a four-day retreat
by the President and his cabinet at the exclusive Mt. Kenya Safari
Club.
“After establishing the truth from State House, we agree the
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story had errors and inaccuracies. The truth that was published in
the Saturday Standard of March 15, 2014 is that the government
spent only Sh8.4 million. This low level of expenditure affirms the
President’s and his government’s commitment to cut down on
wasteful expenditure.
“The Board, management and staff of the Standard Group offer
[an] unreserved apology to the President, his deputy and cabinet
for [the] embarrassment and grief that this story caused them. We
at The Standard support the President and his cabinet’s resolve
to cut down on wastage, eliminate corruption and cut down on
government expenditure especially the huge wage bill that has the
potential to cripple the economic development of our country. We
made a mistake that embarrassed the President and his cabinet
and we apologise unreservedly to him and to the people of Kenya.”
The story has been withdrawn from all online editions. (Signed
- Sam Shollei - Group CEO, Standard Group).
The following day, March 16, 2014, Mwita and reporter Mark
Kapchanga, who filed the story, were fired and escorted out the
Standard Group Centre in Nairobi’s industrial district. Mwita has
sued the Standard for $670,000 damages.
In this climate of fear, a satirical column filed by this writer in
September 2014 was suspended. A note from the newspaper’s Revise Editor, conveyed the hysteria at the Standard: “While the satire is appreciated, the feeling among the five editors consulted
is that the general atmosphere we operate under is not yet free
enough to allow such a piece to go through (sic). It borders on
the dangerous at a time when the media is struggling to maintain
its right to express itself freely. That is the fact of the times we are
currently living in. Perhaps in another place or time…12”
Email from ‘Standard’editor Ruth Lubembe, September 25, 2014. The column
in question “Government assures laptop project is still on, elevated to Vision 2030
project, satirised government’s broken promise to deliver free laptops for school-children within its first 100 days in office. The project was scaled down to tablets, instead
of laptops, and delivered four years later. The satirical column, “Seriously Speaking,”
ran in the Standard from June 2008 to September, 2015. The last (unpublished) column was filed on October 2, 2015. The Standard’s Chief Sub-Editor phoned this author
to say the last column would be discontinued because editors were “uncomfortable”
12
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Around the same time, in January 2015, on the other side of
town, at Nation Centre, the Nation Media Group’s The EastAfrican
was temporarily banned from circulation in Tanzania, following the
publication of the now infamous caricature by Gado of President
JakayaKikwete.
The authorities immediately banned The EastAfrican from
circulation. The official explanation was that the weekly had not
complied with Tanzania’s regulatory requirements, despite being
in operation for over 20 years. In Nairobi, Gado, who had plied his
trade at the Nation for over 20 years, was suspended.
“I told Gado,” ‘this guy is literally asking for your head, right?’”
Rusbridger quotes Nation’s CEO Linus Gitahi as saying. “What we
do is we give him your head, in the sense that we give you a study
leave. If there was ever a time you wanted to write a book, this is
it.”
A week after Gado’s “sabbatical,” Rusbridger goes on, The EastAfrican published a grovelling apology for depicting the Tanzanian president in “a bad light...” The note concluded that the drawing “should not have been published except for a rare lapse in our
otherwise rigorous gate keeping process.”
Before the end of the sabbatical, Gado returned to work but he
had no job to return to. His contract was not renewed.
Another “gate keeping” lapse was blamed on a blistering editorial published in the Saturday Nation on January 2, 2016, which led
to the sacking of Nation’s managing editor for Investigations and
Special Projects, Denis Galava. Titled, “Mr President, get your act
together,” the editorial was a blunt assessment of the failures under the Jubilee administration, overseeing a corrupt regime where
insecurity and unemployment roiled the citizens.
Stewart (2016) says Galava conceded: “…Once the article started
trending online, I knew automatically that the political and business class would be upset.” His fears were confirmed soon after
with its critical tone. A request to write a farewell to readers was rejected. The satirical
column was a carry-over from “Monday Mix”, another satirical column inaugurated in
the Daily Nation by this author in 2005. In the column’s 10-year run, which included
the entire Kibaki presidency, those two were the only instances when the column was
censored, and ultimately discontinued.
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when an official from the Nairobi State House phoned, demanding: “Why is the Nation declaring war against the President on the
first day of the year?”
Galava got an answer the following week. He was suspended
and later fired for allegedly not submitting his piece to internal
vetting mechanisms. He is challenging the dismissal in court. In
an affidavit filed before the Labour and Employment Relations
Court in Nairobi in mid-March 2016, Galava states he had filed 476
editorials and two page-one comments over the years, following
“the standard format in these cases and in the present case [and]
not once had questions of procedure been raised.”
The Sunday Nation’s Investigations Editor Andrew Teyie, who
was declared redundant in mid-2016, is also challenging his sacking, claiming he was edged out for his diligent probing of scandals
at the National Youth Service, where some $18m was swindled by
State officials, and Eurobond, a sovereign bond that Kenya’s Auditor General claimed some $1b remained unaccounted for.
The story is the same at KTN, where investigative journalist
John-Allan Namu left in 2015 to protest shrinking freedom. According to Mahugu (2017), Namu felt “over these five years, the
government has been very thin-skinned on stories that affect it.”
Consequently, he and other investigative reporters were faced
with “consistent pressure,” at times taking an ethnic bent.
“We would stick out our necks, go and do a good story, but the
criticism, condemnation, much of it unwarranted, discouraged us.
We would be told that we were anti-government, hated Jubilee,
hated Kikuyus etc.”
One of Namu’s stories that elicited the government’s ire was
his March 2014 Inside Story re-assessing the 2013 General Election and the systemic failures and deliberate machinations that
appeared to suggest the elections were anything but free and fair.
Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis (2014) say such narratives are unpopular because they gesture away from an entrenched phenomenon
that the Kenyan historian, AtienoOdhiambo, calls the “ideology of
order.” Questioning election outcomes is discouraged, especially
if they are peaceful, to avoid triggering social conflagration. This
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was the legacy of “peace journalism” that media executives inaugurated in January 2008.
Namu and his associates now run Africa Uncensored, an online
news portal whose mission is “to investigate, expose and empower,” away the strictures of corporate-driven journalism in Kenya.
This could be the future of journalism in Kenya. With its investments in undersea fibre optic cable, internet is fairly cheap and
speed high. A recent BBC report says Kenyans enjoy faster mobile internet speeds than Americans. According to The Economist,
Kenya’s exports of technology-related services grew exponentially
from $16 million to $360 million between 2002 and 2010.
If there is any evidence for such optimism, it came in August
2016 when, Mutiga (2016) says the CNN dispatched its executive
to apologise for the news cable’s claim that Kenya was “a hotbed of terror,” insinuating that President Barack Obama was at risk
when he visited his father’s land in July 2016.
Afro-pessimism is entrenched in western narratives of Africa,
probably predating the days of slavery and colonialism. That the
news cable beat such a hasty retreat and offered a grovelling apology intimates a shift in the balance of power: a critical mass of
millions of Kenyans armed with mobile phones had mobilized sufficient leverage to challenge a major western news organisation,
and secure a rare retraction.
This means start-ups like Namu’s Africa Uncensored, transmitting content on phones, could be on equal footing with other media in Kenya and beyond, in the battle for the hearts and minds of
an evolving audience. The government censor may have to re-calibrate where and how to place their monitors.
Conclusion
Kenya’s democracy has evolved over the past 25 years, for better and for worse, and the nation’s robust media have acquitted
themselves quite well. This was true in the 1990s, when journalists
contributed to the campaign for the restoration of democracy and
multiparty politics. In the early years of this century, the Kenyan
media showed a measure of complacence, before their guard was
forced back up by the violent raid on The Standard in March 2006.
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The Kenyatta administration, which succeeded Kibaki’s, has
been decidedly sophisticated in its “silent” though effective emasculation of the media. It is arguable that the media may have been
complicit in extending its hands for shackling through well-intentioned but problematic overtures in maintaining peace without
addressing the underlying issues that triggered the violence in the
first place in late 2007 and early 2008.
Kenya’s investments in the technology sector, however, have
led to an empowered citizenry and reorganised ways in which information is gathered and disseminated, especially using mobile
telephony. This, it is safe to predict, is the next news frontier, and
start-ups and other fringe news portals are likely to problematize
power relations between media barons and the State, and provoke a reassessment in the way censorship is/will be exercised in
the near future.
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MEDIA AS WATCHDOG:
The Ghana Experience

11

By Kwame Karikari
Introduction
The media’s watchdog role in Ghana since independence in 1957
has been tenuous as a result of the country’s checkered political
experience dominated as it were by a variety of anti-democratic or
authoritarian, governments exemplified by one-party, “no-party”
and military regimes. It was a political experience characterized
by an inherently congenital aversion to citizen expression of independent or dissenting voices. The ensuing suppression of critical
or differing voices was highlighted by the banning of independent
press, harassment and imprisonment of unyielding editors, publishers and journalists. These led to a situation popularly designated as a “culture of silence” in which the subordinated press and
broadcasting attracted metaphors such as “lap dogs” or “guard
dogs” of the regimes.
Africa-wide popular strivings for democratic reforms of the late
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1980s-1990s, produced in Ghana, as elsewhere on the continent,
new conditions for plural political participation and expression of
multiple voices. In Ghana, two of the most enduring outcomes of
the restoration of constitutional governance since 1992 are: multiparty political contestation for state power on one hand and,
on the other, a vibrant landscape of unbridled media. Unfettered
private commercial, community and quasi-public state-owned
outlets make up a mix of hundreds of print, broadcast and online
mass media.
The far-reaching nature of freedoms guaranteed in the 1992
Fourth Republican Constitution has enabled a dynamic environment of citizen speech and expression and a nominal plurality of
media and practitioners. It is an atmosphere in which nothing secular or temporal appears sacred to the media, and in which media
voices appear to have no limits or any restraint by any power or
authority. The exuberance of media, however, has quite often attracted public complaints of excesses. All told, the media under
the Fourth Republic have made significant contributions to protecting citizens’ rights and consolidating and strengthening democratic governance and culture in the country, through a generally outspoken watchdog role performance. However, on balance,
proprietorial influences or interference, political and or economic
patronage, “brown envelop” (unethical) journalism, and limitations of technical professional and institutional capacity threaten
to encumber legitimate and an even more effective watchdog role
performance.
In this paper we examine the watchdog functions of the Ghana
media against the background of national and international acclamation of the country’s press freedom credentials. Under these
widely acknowledged conditions of freedom, the media would be
expected to establish their relevance and legitimacy by functioning as guardians of the public interest and citizens’ rights. As Curran (2011) noted, to pursue relevant social justice reform agenda,
media ought to be imbued with a high sense of commitment, a
“disciplined moral passion, hard work and intelligence …”…a “robust independence.” Do the Ghana media exhibit these qualities
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in their watchdog functions? Who do they watch? What do they
watch and for whom? For whose interests? Do the watchdogs
have a master or masters? Who is it or who are they? What does
the master have that must be watched and protected?
This paper seeks to find answers to these issues within the context of the general environment that shape the nature and functions of the media. Thus, the paper will explore the historical, legal,
political, economic, cultural (i.e. media practice) contexts in which
the media operate. It is important, for example, to find out about
the ownership system of the media and how independent or otherwise they are from the state, political structures and centres of
social and political authority and influence. It will make a broad
overview of media practice and performance and examine how
they exercise the watchdog functions in promoting and protecting democratic governance. It will conclude by assessing selected
case studies of specific social justice watchdog campaigns initiated by particular media organizations as they represent different media ownership types; state-owned, private commercial and
community. This will include interviews with media leaders from
these backgrounds to ascertain their articulation of the watchdog
functions they engage their media in.
The study focuses on the watchdog activities of newspapers, radio and television stations. It did not look at such functions of new
media, that is, internet and social media outlets for news and public information. In Ghana, the internet and social media constitute
significant sources of news and information for growing numbers
of citizens. In studies cited below they surpass newspapers as the
preferred sources of news and information after radio and television. As news sources there are two categories of online (internet
web-based) news and information channels. The first consists of
the internet or online editions of broadcast and newspaper organizations. The second comprise independent online news publications. They were not included in the study because the first
group only published online what they put out in newspapers or
broadcast on radio and television. In the second case, none of the
independent online publications has engaged in any noteworthy
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watchdog functions beyond publication of news – a lot of time
including stories picked from the traditional media channels – and
readers’ comments and opinions.
The objects of watchdog functions
In a democracy, the media’s watchdog role functions define
their essential relevance to society. These activities constitute the
processes by which the media give meaning and significance to
their fundamental responsibilities of promoting or protecting the
public interest. In young or so-called emerging democracies, institutions of governance are generally weak, the culture of democratic life is only in the process of maturation, and the capacity of
civil society as a bulwark against threats to democratic governance
tends to be tenuous. It is in this condition of general vulnerability
that the media’s professed critical role as an indispensable institution for democratic consolidation becomes most wanted. Thus,
it is by engaging in watchdog functions that the media play best
their roles as protector of the weak, defender of social justice and
democratic institutions, and promoter of the public interest and
national development aspirations.
Media watchdog functions targeting social justice concerns
must invariably and inexorably lead the media to take a stand in
thedefense of one or other section of society. Yet, for their interventions to merit the attributes of watchdog role functions, the
media activities as such must be devoid of partisan political motives or some self-serving sectarian pursuits.
And the watchdog role function is always an act of exposure
of issues of public interest. As such it is relevant if these activities
include and involve advocacy for redress or change. It must call for
action. To be effective, therefore, media watchdog role activities
are distinguishable by the sustained – but not one-off – continual
broadcast or publication over a period of time of the issues of
contention.
As Tettey (2008) has reiterated, there is a temptation to limit the
focus of media watchdog role to “state officials and government
institutions to the neglect of other actors and centers of activity
whose actions have significant implications for good governance,
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democratic accountability and sustainability of democratic institutions and practices.” It would be a severe curtailing of the media’s
societal responsibilities if their watchdog functions were restricted
to monitoring government and its agencies only, to the neglect
of all those other institutions and agencies – non-state and traditional – that function in the public sphere and whose existence,
operations and activities impact on or affect, one way or the other,
the daily lives, well-being and welfare of citizens or the public.
As (Tettey, 2008) notes the resultant destructive impacts on the
lives of citizens occasioned by “the extensive opacity of government transactions in Africa ….” rightly deserves the media’s constant and unrelenting attention and exposure of government policies and programs and how they are implemented. Even then,
it would still be inadequate to limit interpretation of the media’s
watchdog role as only concerning “corruption” and abuse of power by government officials and agencies, but not as surveillance
of any sources of threats against the existential socio-economic
interests, needs and rights of the marginalized, poor and weak.
Media watchdog functions that do not address broad social justice reform issues are incomplete.
The Ghanaian media professionals interviewed for this paper
not only concur that the media have a responsibility to exercise
watchdog role functions; they all see their roles as an obligation
sanctioned by Article 162 (5) of the 1992 Constitution, which
states: “All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free
to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government
to the people of Ghana.”
However, even as the Constitution obliges the Ghanaian media
to exact accountability from the government, the media professionals do not consider government as the focus of their watchdog monitoring. The leading investigative journalist, Manasseh
Azure Awuni (2017), summed up the general perspective:
“I understand my role basically as holding the government accountable to the governed. But it doesn’t also end there. There
are also public or civil servants who hold positions in trust of the
people. Sometimes, even the private sector; we have to see to it
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that they perform their functions well in a way that does not shortchange the fortunes of our republic. So, that is what I understand
by the watchdog role of the media.”
For Ashigbey (2017), Managing Director of the largest newspaper group, Graphic Communications GAROUP Limited, it means
also that,
“In the media we need to give the voiceless in society a voice.
In our current context, we find that issues of poverty, of squalor,
disease, corruption are all things that plague us. And if we the
media only report on them and do not do anything, then we really
will not be part of the solution. The media is a vehicle for development, and we need to be seen to be relevant by saying the things
that the people want you to champion for them.”
Historical context
The newspaper was first introduced into Ghana (then called the
Gold Coast) in 1822. Radio was introduced one century later in
1935, and television in 1965, after independence. But it is only in
the last 25 years – that is during the Fourth Republic – that the
media have functioned without interruption in an atmosphere of
freedom from legal or political repression by the state. As with
post-colonial political governance generally, this is also the period in which the media have experienced the most stability and
growth. In other words, media development, freedom and independence have been casualties of the checkered political history
of post-colonial Ghana.
The socialist, one party regime of the First Republican government of the Convention People’s Party of President Kwame Nkrumah imposed state monopoly ownership and control on the
media. The situation was maintained and enforced by the authoritarian military regimes that dominated political power from 1966
until the Fourth Republic in 1992. The short-lived attempts at constitutional governance, the so-called second and third republics
(1969-71 and 1979-81 respectively) that interspersed the military
juntas, represented very brief honeymoons for independent private press resurgence.
The period of state monopoly and control of media represented
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what in the 1980s was popularly described as a “culture of silence”.
When direct censorship was not imposed, self-censorship was the
norm and editors saw themselves as part of the government machinery. Dissent or subjects contrary to or different from government perspectives, and generally forbidden in the society at large,
were anathema to the media. State-owned media were used as
vanguard arms in the arsenal of authoritarian rule. The only media
tolerated (press, since there was only state broadcasting) were the
“lap dogs” doing government bidding; guard dogs providing espionage about presumed subversives; and attack dogs condemning, discrediting, and doing vile propaganda against the political
opposition and critics.
The generalized suffocation of speech and expression over the
years, therefore, made the clamour for freedom of speech and
media one of the most urgent demands of the popular movement
for democracy in the 1980s leading to the constitutional reforms
of the Fourth Republic.
The media landscape today
As in most African countries the media landscape in Ghana today is characterized by a proliferation of media outlets representing a plurality of ownership. The print industry is made up of scores
of newspapers (National Media Commission, 2016) Unlike Nigeria;
however, in Ghana there are no news magazines worth the description. For reasons that have not been investigated, historically
news magazines have never thrived in the country. Similarly, there
are no newspapers published in any Ghanaian language. Historically too, apart from the church-sponsored newspapers from the
late 19th to mid-20th centuries, some state-sponsored experiments
in the 1950s-early 1960s, and a few scattered unsustained local initiatives here and there, Ghanaian language press has not been part
of the country’s mainstream media development traditions. There
certainly have never been noteworthy initiatives for commercial
or political press publication in any Ghanaian language. This obviously has implications for the scientific and cultural development
of the languages and for the active and educated participation
of the mass of the population in public affairs discourses. It does
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not also help to enhance enforcing downward accountability – as
envisaged in Ghana’s local government law on decentralization of
governance.
The broadcast sector is categorized by the regulator National
Communications Authority (NCA) into Public (state-owned), Foreign Public, Commercial, Community and Campus. Currently there
are 354 radio stations altogether in operation, out of a total authorized number of 481. There are 51 television stations in operation out of 93 authorized applications (National Communications
Authority, 2016).
Radio remains the most important source for news and information for the majority of the people in Ghana. Internet use is
growing so fast that it comes after only radio and television as the
next important channel for news and information for most people,
relegating the newspaper to insignificance. A nationwide survey
conducted by the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE)
(2014) found that 62.92%of people regarded radio as their primary source of news and information, followed by 25% for television
and 6.4% for the internet and social media. The newspaper represented a “Negligible percentage of 1.5%” followed by “Family
and friends” in order of importance as a preferred source of news
and information. These findings are corroborated by other surveys
conducted by other reputable non-governmental institutions. The
Institute of Economic Affairs (2016) confirms the same trend in
preferred sources of news and information by citizens.
A noteworthy point about the multiplicity of media outlets in
the country is that, though the capital, Accra, and the second city
of Kumasi have high concentrations of mostly commercial broadcast stations, there are radio stations in each of the 216 administrative districts of the country. There are television stations broadcasting from cities other than the capital as was before 2005 when
the first private television station started transmitting. Accessibility
to broadcast media is further enhanced by the fact that, because
of the geographical spread of radio stations, nearly every indigenous language or dialect can be heard on air. Until 1986, when the
state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) established
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a regional station in the then Upper Region and introduced five
of the area’s local languages for programming, only four Ghanaian languages (Akan, Ewe, Ga and Nzema) and Hausa were used
in broadcasting. This language diversity engenders wider popular
participation in media use for involvement in public affairs and for
enforcing public accountability and watchdog mandates.
Legal constitutional framework of media freedom
The much celebrated press/media freedom in Ghana derives
from the guarantees provided by the 1992 Constitution and some
legal reforms. But these have been achieved and sustained also by
active civil society engagement, particularly in the 1990s. Progressively over the post-independence period, “The 1992 Constitution
contains by far the most elaborate articulation of provisions designed to ensure the freedom and independence of the media.”
(Kotey, in Karikari & Kumado, 2000, p.35)
Chapter 12 of the Constitution, Articles 162 to 173, is devoted
to “Freedom and Independence of the Press”. It guarantees the
rights of journalists and media to function without state or other
external interference, with the provision that no media professional shall “be penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and
views, or the content of their publications.” Among many other
provisions, the Constitution abolishes censorship and establishes an independent oversight agency, the National Media Commission (NMC), with the mandate to promote and protect press
freedom, to “insulate the state-owned media from governmental
control” and, through a complaints settlement mechanism, protect citizens from media abuse. Elsewhere Articles 21 (1) (a) (b)
and (f) of the Constitution enhance further the media’s freedom
in provisions guaranteeing and protecting freedom of speech and
expression, of thought and the right to information.
The Constitution imposes obligations on the state media specifically to give political parties access to present their viewpoints
to the public, and to give to all presidential candidates the “same
amount of time and space” to present their programmes to the
public. For the particular purposes of this paper, the Constitution,
as stated above, unequivocally obliges all media, without discrim-
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ination, to play a watchdog role over government.
The Constitution’s “elaborate provisions” notwithstanding,
there have virtually been no reforms of the extant legislation that
over the years have been used to repress media freedoms. The
only exception is the fact that the Fourth Republic has rejected
and made unconstitutional the newspaper licensing law that had
been used since independence by the various authoritarian regimes to prevent the publication of independent periodical print
media. And the state, under the National Democratic Congress
(NDC) government of Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, continued applying some of these laws to repress the media’s newfound freedom in the early 1990s.
A major boost for media freedom, however, came in 2001 when
the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of President Agyekum
Kuffuor repealed the Criminal Libel and Seditious Libel provisions
of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The repeal of these laws, which
had been some of the pernicious instruments of suppressing press
freedom since colonial times, followed agitation for media law reform by a civil society coalition led by the Ghana Journalists Association. The issue was forced onto the 2000 election campaign
issues. The then opposition NPP adopted the issue and made it a
campaign promise. When it won the election it fulfilled the promise by getting the laws repealed, eight months into its first year in
office.
All the legal and constitutional regimes have ensured that, since
2001, no journalist has been arrested and or detained arbitrarily
and no radio station or newspaper has been closed down for what
they have published. However, precisely because there has been
no media law reform, media run the risk of falling foul with the
many pieces of legislation that still remain on the books. In this
period, the one legal instrument that has been invoked to limit
media expression is the law on contempt of court. The Supreme
Court, as well as courts of lower jurisdiction, have used it in ways
that have attracted public outcry and demand for its abolition or
reform.
The two most celebrated contempt cases slapped on the media
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by the Supreme Court related to journalists’ comments on election-related cases before the highest court. The first was in 2013.
The most recent (Supreme Court, 2016) resulted from highly opinionated comments, imputing the court’s bias, by three panelists
on a talk show programme discussing election-related cases before the Supreme Court. The three were staff of a radio station
(Montie FM) owned by leaders of the then ruling NDC.
The panelists’ verbal attacks on the court’s judges hearing the
case included threats of violence. The perceived unprofessional
acts of the radio panelists attracted widespread public condemnation. They received prison sentences for the criminal charge of
contempt of court. The three men were activists of the NDC campaigning for the reelection of the president, their party’s candidate, in the impending general elections. The candidate, urged
on by party leaders, therefore, used his constitutional powers as
president of the country, to give the three party propagandists a
reprieve from the court-ordered custodial sentences.
The Ghana media, meanwhile, have not been completely immune from reflexive harassment from errant state security operatives of the lower ranks. The Media Foundation for West Africa’s
monitoring of media rights violations has consistently indicted
operatives of the Ghana police and other security agencies of
abuses by way of physical obstruction of journalists’ work, seizure
of equipment, assault and arrests.
In many democratic societies nowadays, an important instrument that enhances the rights of citizens and media to exact accountability from state officials and agencies is the law on the right
to information (widely known as Freedom of Information act). The
“right to information” is among the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution (Article 21 (1) (f)). But ignoring 18 years
of popular civil society campaigns, governments of different parties and their parliaments have all refused to pass into law a Right
to Information bill first drafted in 2003.Equally, the various parliaments have been oblivious to nearly two decades of civil society
campaign for the passage of a broadcasting law, the bill of which
was also drafted in 2006. It is not farfetched to suggest that the bill
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on broadcasting has not been passed, and may never be passed
for a long time, because the commercial owners and politician
owners, would rather there were no regulation in the industry.
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
State-owned media
The state continues to own the largest circulating newspaper,
the Daily Graphic, and other print publications belonging to the
stables of two state companies: the Graphic Communications
Group Ltd. and the New Times Corporation. The state also owns
the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation which operates a network of
regional (i.e. administrative provinces) radio stations and the oldest television station, the Ghana Television, which transmits across
the entire territory of Ghana and is thus virtually accessible everywhere in the country. Although the state is the sole shareholder
in these media organizations, by the Constitution they are “insulated” from state control of editorial decision-making and professional output. To affirm their independence from state intrusions,
the independent constitutional oversight body, the National Media Commission, and not government, appoints the management
boards and the chief executive officers of the state-owned media
organizations.
Community initiatives
Officially the NCA counts some 89 radio stations as community.
But according to the Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN),
the association of the non-profit radio stations established and
managed by communities of rural, mostly socio-economically
marginalized populations, their actual members number 30. The
GCRN states that in the absence of statutory criteria some commercial interests are given frequencies under the guise of setting
up community stations but instead operate them as commercial
outfits. (Graphic Communications Group Ltd., 2015)
The commercial sector
In the highly competitive market of this multiplicity of media
outlets, the state-owned establishments hardly dominate audience shares. The ownership dynamics of the hundreds of media
operations in the private sector show a pattern towards a “con-
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vergence of business, politics and media” (Public Agenda, 2015).
Less than a dozen companies own the most influential private
commercial media – measured by numbers of outlets or networks
owned, geographical location, easy access to high state officials
and other segments of authority, and agenda-setting content
production. Among this are three categories of owners. The first
group is made up of investors solely set up for media business. An
example is the Multimedia Group, owners of the respected JOY
FM radio and TV and their other networks in and outside Accra.
The second comprises big businesses that have branched out
with investments in media. Examples include the Despite Group of
Companies and its network of radio and a television station. What
makes this company’s media significant, influential and with the
potential to command the largest shares of the audience is that
the networks broadcast in Twi, a language of the majority Akan
nationality (ethnic group?), which is also the most widely spoken
lingua franca across the country. Indeed the company’s UTV is
the first television station that uses exclusively an indigenous language, Twi.
Tobinco Pharmaceuticals Ltd., a leading pharmaceutical marketing and distribution company, owned by businessman Samuel
Tobin, is the latest entrant into the media industry in this second
category starting with Atinka FM and Atinka TV in Accra. Tobin
also owns Abii National Savings and Loans and Priority Insurance.
The third category is made up of media established by big businesses owned by persons with relations to the two dominant political parties. An example of this is the Excellence In Broadcasting
(EIB) Company, a recent entrant into the media market but expanding rapidly by setting up new establishments or by acquiring
existing ones. The flagship radio station in the company’s stable
of over a dozen broadcast outlets across the country is STARR FM
in Accra. The owner is Dr. Kwabena Duffuor, former Minister of
Finance (2009—2012) and, prior to that, Governor of the Bank of
Ghana under the NDC government of President J. E. Attah-Mills.
Dr. Duffuor’s primary business interests are some 15 companies
in insurance (Star Assurance), banking (Unibank), real estate and
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agribusiness.
TV 3, the first private commercial television station, is owned
by Media General. The company also owns radio stations in Accra,
Kumase and Takoradi. The company is the media subsidiary of the
First Group Company, which is owned by leading members of the
NDC (in opposition since losing the elections of December, 2016).
Although Dr. Duffuor is no more active in competitive party
politics for national office, he and Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom represent
very well the nexus of business, politics and media. Dr. Nduom, a
former Minister of state (2001—2008), is founder and twice (20012
and 2016) the presidential candidate of the opposition Progressive People’s Party (PPP). His media empire consists of about seven FM radio stations and three television channels. Though these
businessmen are politically well connected, the apparent orientation of their media organizations, so far, appears to be more for
commercial objects than for partisan political objectives.
Another politician with extensive investment in media is Kennedy Agyapong, a Member of Parliament and an outspoken financier
of the NPP. His business interests include about 14 companies,
and his network of media establishments comprise about half a
dozen radio stations and a television station. His radio outlets,
Oman FM in Accra and Ash FM in Kumase, openly do publicity for
the NPP. The other influential media in this category is the highly
respected Citi FM in Accra. The station is owned by a businessman
who is a key supporter of the NPP.
Edward Boateng, owner of the Global Media Alliance, which
owns over half a dozen radio stations, a TV station and cinema
exhibition outlets, is a key member of the now ruling NPP. He was
appointed ambassador to China in March, 2017, after his party
took office as victor in the December, 2016, general elections.
Media General, owners of TV3 and allied radio stations, forms
part of this nexus.
A common feature of the last two categories of media investors
is the extra-commercial uses they make of their media organizations. They ensure that advertisements from their business entities
are carried exclusively on their media networks. As their principal
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businesses grow, not only does the media industry provide yet
another opportunity for further expansion of their capital, investments in the media yield the additional value of advertising revenue, facilitate farther reaches into the consumer market and thus
expansion of the consumer base of the goods and services offered
by their business interests.
Although the advertising industry in Ghana has expanded considerably in recent years, access to advertising and sponsorship
revenue is far from fairly distributed. The state-owned media and
the dominant commercial ones cited above receive the lion’s
share of that resource. This is an important factor that makes it
difficult for the media to exercise public interest watch over big
business. For example, despite incessant public complaints, sometimes through newspaper letters to the editor and radio phone
call-ins, the media refrain from editorially criticizing poor service
quality provided by the telecommunications companies. Some
telecom companies have variously withdrawn advertising from
media in retaliation against perceived adverse news coverage. In
addition, many individual journalists are beholden to political or
commercial interests as paymasters. Besides, with so many of the
big players allied, through ownership, with political parties, the
media’s independent watchdog role functions would be essentially compromised, weakened or limited at best.
The party media
It would indeed be a curious, even strange, development if, in
this hectic atmosphere of political partisanship and media multiplicity, there were no media set up purposely for political party
propaganda. The party press has, since the anti-colonial period,
been an important feature of the private media. In the post-colonial period, whenever there was an opening for multi-party political contests during transitions from military rule, the party press
was a major instrument in the public discourses over the direction
of national affairs. In the Fourth Republic, since 1992, however, the
party press – as that formally owned, operated and managed by
a political party – has ceased to exist. Today, the party’s publicity is conducted by newspapers and radio and television stations
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owned privately by individual wealthy party members and leaders,
including members of parliament. Thus, the partisan media are
those set up or owned by individual entrepreneurs but placed in
the service of their parties for directly partisan propaganda and
voter mobilization. Party members and supporters form their principal audiences. The most notable and influential of these openly
partisan media are owned by leading members of the ruling New
Patriotic Party (in power 2001-2008 and since January 7, 2017),
and the opposition (since January 7, 2017) National Democratic
Congress (in power 1992-2000 and 2009-2016).
Small commercial stations in ‘rural’ districts
A good majority of the commercial radio stations, in cities or
in the district capitals, invariably also the provincial commercial
centres, are owned either by individual entrepreneurs of big or
medium-sized businesses or politicians. District towns with two
or more radio stations are not uncommon. Yet, though the proliferation of radio stations across the country is an index of the
country’s macro-economic growth and the growth of the middle
classes in recent years, the long term financial sustainability of
most of the mushrooming media owned by individual entrepreneurs is questionable. Advertising business and revenue sources
are concentrated in Accra and Kumasi. The smaller media organizations have limited access to advertising income. Interviews with
a number of such stations in 2015 paint a picture of a distressed
sector.10 In the medium to long-term, the vicissitudes of competition and limited revenue resources render many of these stations
vulnerable to closure or as fodder for acquisition by the emerging
magnates. Already, as is to be expected in a hectic competitive
market environment, some established radio or television stations
are selling off shares or entire establishments to non-media businesses. At the same time bigger media firms are swallowing up
some smaller outfits.
These dynamics show a tendency toward concentration in the
industry. Apart from such acquisitions, the bigger entities smother
the smaller establishments, especially those in the provinces, in
two other ways. The first is by “poaching” promising journalists
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and presenters/disc jockeys by enticing them with high salaries
and other lucrative inducements. The other is through free franchising of news and popular current affairs programmes to the
smaller stations – in what is described as “affiliation”. These affiliate or partnership arrangements expand the audience base of the
principal stations and, by extension, their advertising revenue. The
“affiliated” stations, on the other, are attracted to this arrangement because it provides them ‘national’ news and current affairs
Talk Shows and panel discussions – from and about the capital
and central government, as well as other important public affairs
programmes – which the “affiliate” or junior partner stations could
otherwise not be able to produce on their own.
The dominance of a small number of broadcast organizations
in the market betrays the appearance of pluralism of outlets and
of choices as projected by the official numbers. As at December
2016, ten commercial radio stations, eight of them based in Accra,
two in Kumasi, and including the two most popular partisan stations (Radio Gold for the NDC, Oman FM for the NPP), commanded 54.5% of the total audience in the country (Geo Poll Media,
2017). About five companies own these ten most listened-to stations. The same stations also have the highest ratings during peak
hours. The dominance in ratings is obviously enhanced by the system of affiliation with smaller stations in the regions and districts.
Through cross-ownership, some of the same companies that
dominate the radio sector also own most of the ten television stations which attract over 90% of the television audience in Ghana.
While the radio stations of the state-owned GBC do not feature
among the top pullers of listeners, its Ghana Television ranks fifth
in attracting viewers to its screen (8.5%).
These ownership structures reflect the political-economy dynamics that support or disable the normative watchdog functions.
For, elites and elements within the corridors of political, economic and social power tend to trump the objective determinants of
news and programme contents.
Tendencies toward control of media
According to Curran (2011), in a formally democratic context
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an important object of control of the media, in the absence of repressive legislation and or use of violent attacks, is to monopolise
the airwaves, drown out alternative ideas and opinion and sources
of information and news. The dominant political forces, organized
in their parties, have exhibited strong tendencies toward monopoly of the broadcast media through the control of the regulatory
system of spectrum governance. The governing board of the National Communications Authority (NCA), the body that manages
the frequency spectrum for all communications, is appointed by
the president. Its activities have attracted public criticism and suspicion that it is used to farm out broadcast frequencies disproportionately to politicians of a ruling party, their allies and cronies
to aid the particular party’s monopoly of the airwaves for their
political purposes. The parceling out of frequencies among party
cronies appears to have been largely pronounced under the government of the NDC especially during its 2009-2016 tenure.
A prominent media and human rights lawyer, Akoto Ampaw,
observed that, “… as and when this party [NDC] came into office,
it tended to allocate frequencies, through an opaque process of
licensing, to its cronies. The result has been a situation where politicians, either directly or through surrogates, own broadcast stations, which they then employ in a parochial and sectarian fashion
to champion their political ambitions.” (Graphic Communications
Group Ltd., 2015)
In 2012, public concern about an absence of transparency in the
functions of the NCA led some rights advocacy civil society groups
to form the Coalition for Transparency of the Airwaves (CoTA).12Coalition members proposed a link between “the opaqueness of the
frequency allocation process” and problems of unprofessionalism,
especially widespread sectarian partisan “venom and vitriol”, on
the airwaves that had attracted widespread public disapproval.
The coalition’s six-point objectives aimed at:
“a) promoting genuine pluralism of voices in Ghana’s airwaves
b) ensuring equity and transparency in the allocation and management of broadcast frequencies
c) advocating for the expeditious allocation of broadcast fre-

368

Kwame Karikari

quencies to genuine community radio applicants
d) helping to ensure the insulation of all broadcast media from
governmental control and interference
e) advocating for the passage of , and adherence to, a Broadcasting Law in keeping with international best practice
f) promoting an enabling legislative and regulatory environment for the above.” (Graphic Communications Group Ltd., 2015)
The key implications resulting from the lack of transparency in
frequency allocation are that the ruling party tends to control disproportionate sections of radio/television outlets, thereby tending to drown out opposing or independent voices. By denying
access to applicants whose loyalties are uncertain, the ruling party minimizes the number of outlets with the potential to engage
in independent watchdog activities. Another critical effect is that
community radio operators are squeezed out, thus weakening
pluralism and the voices of mainly rural citizens.
Media performance and watchdog implications
The pattern of ownership has shown a significant tendency by
the political elite to vie for control of the media to further their
political interests. However, the strictly commercial interest has
tended to dominate ownership and with it dominance of audience
attention and influence through content outputs. What emerges is
an appreciable autonomy of the non-partisan private commercial
and independent community media to perform watchdog roles by
probing issues of critical public interest and concern regardless of
the attitudes and preferences of local or national state authority
or non-state corporate or traditional interests. The partisan media
have only raised questions and played watchdog when they are in
opposition, and in relation to issues unfavourable to the rival ruling party. They must probe the ruling party for obvious reasons of
boosting their parties’ popularity and electoral interests. The partisan media are, as is to be expected, usually vociferous defenders
of their parties against all critics.
The autonomy of the non-partisan commercial and community
media to perform watchdog functions derives primarily from the
certainty of uninhibited civil society voices to make use of and
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protect the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression.
The prevalence of opposition parties exercising their freedom to
voice “opposition”, including mobilization of supporters for open
protest demonstrations, adds an important buffer for the media
to assert their autonomy. Moreover, the political elite share a
common interest in protecting the media’s freedom and independence. For, when in opposition, the parties utilize their partisan
media supporters to promote their causes, and can also depend
on the non-partisan commercial media for reliable and fair coverage of their activities and as platform for their viewpoints.
This is the environment by which the media’s performance
may be assessed. One of the important outcomes of the generalized public protection of the freedom and independence of
the media is that, despite the changes in government resulting
from elections, there has been no initiative to promote legislation
threatening the status quo. The media have, thus, the enabling
environment that enhances their potential to perform their social
responsibility of watchdog over all matters of interest to the citizens and their public.
In addition, the open space in which the media thrive, with its
attendant competition for audiences and relevance, encourages
improved professional standards and content quality. It also enhances innovative approaches to content format development.
Thus, progressively broadcast stations generally, but more especially the big non-partisan commercial houses, have improved
standards and introduced new content formats through all of
which they perform various aspects of their “monitorial role”, including “adopting an active watchdog stance”. (Christians, et al,
2009)
The more popular and widespread programming feature of the
new broadcast culture involves public participation, enhanced by
the new communications technologies of mobile telephony, internet and social media. From News, special interviews, Talk Shows to
documentary features, nearly no programme on TV or radio ends
without a phone call-in, text messaging, queries or comments by
email and social media from the public. This highly subscribed

370

Kwame Karikari

form of listener/viewer participation amounts to what Selormey
(2012) proposes is “a new form of voice mechanism…through the
radio phone-in programmes”, which contributes to citizen engagement in promoting public accountability and strengthening
of democratic culture.
Tettey (2011) adds that “talk radio”, enhanced by the public’s
use of the new technologies, most especially by the phone-in
mechanism, “has led to a fundamental shift in the demography of
contributors to political discourse”. The engagement of wider sections of society in public affairs discourse through broadcast media is even more critically important, according to Tettey (2008),
because much of the time it represents “counter-discourses that
challenge the hegemonic viewpoint of the state … within the virtual architecture of this reconfigured public sphere” of the new
communications technologies.
But which sections of the lower social classes have now found
their voices in public affairs discourses through the media could
be a useful enquiry to undertake. In Ghana there is a radio station everywhere and nearly every language and dialect is used
on the airwaves. Mobile phone usage penetration is significantly
high too. So, Tettey’s (2008) proposal, nearly a decade ago, that
the majority of media in Africa are located in urban areas and use
mostly European languages, and therefore the voices of “Rural
dwellers who constitute the majority …do not get articulated in
the mediated public sphere” is worth further investigation, at least
in Ghana.
Be that as it may, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between, on one hand citizens’ freedom of voice, and on the other,
the media’s freedom and responsibility to serve the public interest.
When citizens are assured of unrestrained access to the media to
amplify their voices, by utilizing that right, they tend to impose on
the media responsibility to satisfy their information needs, serve
as whistle-blowers against acts of injustice, as channels of exacting accountability from public authorities, and encourage them to
expand their platforms for the expression of more diverse voices.
Free, fair and transparent elections are one of the major pil-
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lars of constitutional representative democracy. In Ghana, no other process excites the public’s demands on the media to function with responsibility more than during the quadrennial general
(presidential and parliamentary) elections. Over the years, their
performance in providing public education, monitoring the integrity, transparency and peaceful conduct of elections marks the
Ghana media’s highest point in their commitment to their watchdog role in safeguarding democratic governance.
Of the new content formats emerging with the opening up of
the media space, none has made more dramatic impact in the
media’s watchdog roles of fighting corruption and abuse of power than investigative journalism as a specialized discipline in the
profession. It started cautiously and timidly among some of the
resurgent private press of the late 1980s, such as The Ghanaian
Chronicle, but has grown to be a sturdy presence on a number of
the leading commercial broadcast outfits. Astute investigative reporters have hounded every government by ferreting out of their
hiding places the dark dealings of ministers, top public officials,
public agencies and criminal deals in the private sector.
Radio documentaries, a very new format that has gained popular appeal on radio and television stations, are used to expose serious social problems concerning anything from prison conditions,
environmental degradation, human rights abuses and corporate
malfeasance. The dramatic effect of documentaries have usually
had the impact of arousing near instant public reaction and demands for rectification.
Public perceptions of media performance
Public complaints about media impropriety have become increasingly widespread. Much of that has expressed concerns
about the incessant invective, intemperate and insulting manner
of speech that characterises political discussion on air. The language of political discussion on radio, dominated by NDC-NPP
diatribe, is especially polarizing during election campaigns. It fuels
an atmosphere of tension and arouses fear of political violence
among the population.
One way by which the two dominant political parties, particu-
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larly, have sought to control the airways is by ensuring their presence on discussion and Talk Show programmes. The parties too
have been aided in this by the managers of radio and television
stations who have made it a routine of inviting representatives of
political parties to discussion programmes, interviews or any other
programmes, regardless of the subject matter of discussion.
More importantly, the parties have devised a discretely innovative and effective strategy of dominating or controlling public voice in political discourse on air, thereby tending to “drown
out” independent non-partisan voices. It is the strategy of “serial
calling”. The parties’ communications (propaganda) departments
mobilize cadre from their ranks whose principal daily function is to
use the mobile phone to call or send text messages to intervene
in radio or television programmes, most of the time, to attack opponents more than to elucidate on their parties’ programmes and
or policy ideas. The intervention of the “serial callers” is one major source of the improprieties on air that elicit most public complaints.
The partisan media have particularly attracted remarkable public opprobrium. The partisan newspapers received the unenviable
appellation of “rented press” from Martin Amidu, a former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, whose campaigns against corruption had earned him popular appreciation by the public giving
him the title “one man vigilante”. This followed a scurrilous campaign of personal attacks by newspapers of supporters of the NDC
government, the minister’s former employers, who had become
the target of his anti-corruption crusade.
The “rented press”, according to Amidu (2017) is a “press which
has no ideology, editorial visions, nor any editorial independence.
It is press that is put at the service of anyone who can hire it. These
are newspapers who (that) do the bidding of anyone who can pay.
They have no vision, no ethics – just cash. Nothing moral; just the
editor’s stomach. It is stomach journalism. They will sell their conscience for anything.”
Possibly influenced by the prevalent partisanship that dominates current affairs discussions, significant sections of the public
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are skeptical of the media’s credibility. In 2014 the IEA’s national
“Survey on Key Socio-Economic and Governance Issues in Ghana”
reported that 56% of respondents “believed that the news media
abused their freedom by printing or saying things they knew were
not true”. For unexplained reasons the figure fell to about 46% in
2016, but the proportion of those surveyed that doubted the media’s credibility was still disturbing.
Thus, by the political parties capturing the Talk programmes and
call-in times, the parties blur the vision and focus of the media as
watchdog of the public interest – acting, instead, as megaphones
of the parties. In this case, the media are seen not as being on the
side of the public but as lackeys and lapdogs of their owners or
political god fathers.
Media as watchdog: case studies
Various media organizations, irrespective of their ownership
backgrounds, have initiated and carried out different campaigns
on a variety of issues of public accountability, social justice, human
rights and environmental safety and protection. These activities,
examples of watchdog interventions, affirm the potential of the
freedom of the media in Ghana to promote issues of critical public
interest. They also give indications of the media’s autonomy in
confronting the state and non-state centers of social, economic and political influence on their responsibilities to the citizens
and the public. The sample of interventions analysed here as case
studies affirms also the capacity of the media, in conditions of
freedom, to set the kind of agenda that has the potential of provoking public engagement for social justice reforms. These examples of media watchdog role performance affirm the effects of
media enhancing citizen “mediated voice” expression and participation (Selormey, 2012).
In some of these watchdog activities, the media organizations
have gone beyond simply publishing or broadcasting their watchdog investigations or features on critical social justice or rights
issues. They have, instead, gone on to engage in direct action advocacy, sometimes in coalition or partnerships with other media
or rights advocacy civil society organizations, for redress of the
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issues.
They have undertaken advocacy actions by, as Opuni-Frimpong
(2015) has proposed, “pleading the cause of another, siding with,
vindicating, pleading and making recommendations on behalf of
others. … Advocacy is an action by an individual or group of individuals which aims to influence public policy and resource allocation decisions within political, economic and social systems and
institutions. Advocacy may include many activities that a person
or organization undertakes, including media campaigns, public
speaking, commissioning and publishing of research polls, the filing of an amicus brief, peaceful demonstrations, etc.”
The examples below are selected because they are among
those media watchdog cases that evoked or attracted most public
resonance, locally or nationally.
1.
The media campaign against mining and environmental destruction (‘galamsey’)
In March, 2017, the newspapers of the state-owned Graphic
Communications Group Limited and the commercial CitiFM jointly launched a campaign to stop “illegal” small-scale gold mining
in the country because of the devastation it had been wreaking
on the environment. (The illegal small-scale mining of gold was
called “galamsey”, a corruption of the pidgin expression “gather
and sell”.) For over a decade, environmentalists and media raised
alarm about the ecological destruction resulting from widespread
unregulated gold mining taking place in nearly every district of
the country. The effects were widespread destruction of virgin rain
forest reserves, farmlands, and most alarming of all the pollution
and extinction of major water bodies including streams, rivers,
ponds, small lakes and marshes. The “gold rush” had attracted
miners from neighbouring countries and places as far away as India and China.
Media exposure of this disastrous informal economic activity
included anything from news reports, features and radio and television documentaries on these mining activities and some acts of
community resistance. The public reaction included local and nationwide civil society coalitions demanding effective regulation of
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mining to protect the ecology and the livelihoods of affected rural
communities.
The campaign initiated by the two media organizations, starting
with editorials and radio discussion programmes, attracted other media organizations and dozens of civil society organizations,
big and small, including labour unions, faith-based organizations,
rights advocacy groups and think tanks. The campaign’s message
resonated around the country. And by all indications it portended to be the most impact-making media advocacy campaign in
recent years, considering its effects on mobilizing public opinion
and catalysing public response for action around the whole country. The immediate impact was attracting government attention.
The Minister of Mines and Natural Resources toured the worst
affected places and decreed a six-month moratorium on mining,
with orders to the police to arrest violators of the ban. Public forums sponsored by the media houses and broadcast live raised
questions and issues that tended to provoke demands for fundamental reforms in legislation and regulation affecting all mining
activities in the country.
The campaign was an example of media advocacy that leads
to general national awareness of an issue of national existential
import, and thus a matter of critical public interest. It was the outcome of years of media alerts on mining-induced environmental
degradation, sometimes following tip-offs from community activists, reports from environmental researchers, and sometimes as
outcomes from covering community struggles against the effects
of mining operations on livelihoods.
2.
The crusaders against corruption
Investigative journalism has come of age in Ghana and it has
become one of the journalistic activities that effectively monitor
accountability of government to the people. And the Accra-based
commercial Joy FM, one of the top ten radio stations, has in recent
years excelled in broadcasting exposes that make government
and other high public officials tremble through its revelations on
corruption scandals. In 2013 and 2014 the station’s celebrated
award-winning investigative journalist, Manasseh Azure Awuni
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shook the government and stunned the population, with revelations of graft and other criminal acts concerning two major socio-economic development programmes.
The first case, filed in a series of reports, was broadcast between
February-April, 2013. It concerned massive corruption that, in the
end, collapsed a much-publicized Ghana Youth Employment and
Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA), a programme
ostensibly set up to reduce youth unemployment by providing
thousands of jobs through training schemes. The Joy FM investigation revealed an intricate network of collusion between officials
of GYEEDA and some businessmen “who were siphoning beneficiary funds with the connivance of bank officials”. (Azure, 2016)
The media exposure led to a government investigation which
went nowhere. The key culprits accused in the media report, topmost among whom included the Minister of Youth and Sports,
were never punished even as their crimes “deprived thousands of
miserable youth their source of livelihood while officials of GYEEDA and some ‘successful’ businessmen built empires out of their
sweat.” (Azure, 2016)
The second investigation was about how corruption undermined implementation of a programme designed to uplift three
regions of the savanna zone of the country out of poverty. The
Northern, Upper East and West Regions are three regions that
occupy the savannah ecological zone of the north of the country. Colonial policy, dry climactic conditions and other factors had
rendered that part of the country socio-economically the poorest,
and lagging behind the rest of the country in every index of social and economic progress. The Savana Accelerated Development
Agency (SADA) was established by law passed by Parliament on
30 July, 2010. The principal object of SADA was to provide special
funds and mechanisms for the speedy development of the savanna north; it was an initiative designed to bridge the development
gap between the third northern savannah sector and the forest
and coastal southern part of the country.
Within two years of its inauguration SADA started tottering. Joy
FM investigations revealed massive misappropriation of millions
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of dollars of funds. Key agricultural projects funded under the programme were never executed and afforestation projects, among
other schemes, poorly or improperly implemented and managed
because the funds were largely diverted into private pockets of
officials put in charge of the scheme.
As with other investigative reports by the radio station – and
others – the “Sad SADA saga” provoked public displeasure as other radio stations and media picked up the issue in discussion programmes.
Following Joy FM broadcasts, aired in April 2014, the government of President John D. Mahama dissolved the board under
whose watch SADA derailed and reconstituted it and appointed
a new chief executive officer. But nobody was punished for causing the financial losses and incapacitating a national programme
meant to reverse decades-old underdevelopment of a third part
of the country.
3.
Radio documentaries and rights issues: JOY FM
and prison conditions
In March, 2015, Joy FM, one of the stations to introduce and
popularize the radio documentary format, broadcast a two-part
series of documentary stories entitled “Locked and forgotten”.
The programme investigated how scores of persons accused of
various crimes were remanded in prison custody to await trial by
the courts but were never brought to trial for months and sometimes years. The ordeals of these citizens whose rights to justice
had been so violated rankled many sections of the society and
provoked calls for redress by the Ministry of Justice. Public outcry
compelled the President and the Chief Justice to visit a number of
prisons. The government and the judiciary set up a programme
under which several numbers of such victims of injustice were released from prison.
4.
State-owned media asserting some independence
Despite the constitutional guarantees of their independence
in editorial decision-making, the state-owned media have been
remarkably silent in giving voice to those critical issues that gen-
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erally make government and state institutions uncomfortable or
even angry at their exposure. This attitude of playing safe must be
one important factor why none of the radio stations of the state
broadcaster, GBC, appeared among the ten top most-listened-to
stations.
The Daily Graphic in recent times, however, appears to be striving to break out of that mould and to find a voice to be relevant.
The newspaper published in 2015 two investigative reports that
exposed examples of serious misconduct of public officials.
The first was an investigation into widespread graft by top officials of the National Service Secretariat, the office that administers
the national service programme of graduates of tertiary educational institutions. The paper discovered a scheme by which, over some
years, the top managers of the organization inflated the number
of graduates registered for the national service programme. They
then skimmed off huge amounts of money purported to be allowances for the non-existing “ghost” national service personnel.
The government reportedly investigated the matter and promised
prosecution of the culprits, including a deputy minister of state.
Nothing came out of it.
The second investigative report by the Daily Graphic was a case
of abuse of office by the chairperson of the independent constitutional Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
(CHRAJ). The head of the Commission misconducted herself by
incurring for the organization unapproved financial liabilities. She
ordered unauthorized innovations on her residence and took residence for months in a hotel at the CHRAJ’S expense. An inquiry by
the Chief Justice’s office led to her dismissal.
What makes the state-owned newspaper’s watchdog reports
significant is that, for the first time since the Fourth Republic, the
paper sought to investigate an issue of public interest that tested the government’s commitment to accountability of persons in
high public office.
5.
Community radio initiatives in rural districts
Some examples of the watchdog advocacy work of two of the
29 members of the Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN)
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were selected for this study.
The Radio for Development (RADFORD) is located in Tumu, a
town in the Upper West region of northern Ghana close to the
border with Burkina Faso. Radio Ada, the very first community
radio in the country, is located in Ada, a coastal town some 50
kilometres east of the capital Accra.
(a) RADFORD’s campaigns
This community radio’s watchdog broadcast activities were
around three key subjects of concern to the mainly peasant farming population of the Sissala ethnic community covered by the
station’s transmission signals and programmes. They comprise:

(i)
Security from armed criminal groups.The Sissala East
and West Districts were among a number of rural communities in
the country that had come under attacks from gangs of armed
robbers in recent years. RADFORD’s campaigns, in response to
community reports to the station, included dedicated reporting
of incidents and setting up an early warning system of receiving
and broadcasting alerts of attacks from victims or witnesses. These
broadcasts resulted in increased police presence and patrols, more
effective community prevention of attacks, more arrests and general reduction in armed robbery incidents.
(ii)
Protection against environmental destruction. The Sissala districts are in the dry savannah ecological zone bordering on
the sahel. Its grasslands with very short rainfall seasons have sparse
trees and are easily vulnerable to degradation and desertification.
Meanwhile it is rich with the rare rose wood, a species of hard wood
treasured for its beauty and use for luxury furnishing. Unregulated exploitation leads to extinction. In 2015 hordes of smugglers
entered the forest reserves in the area to illegally exploit the treasured forest product. RADFORD’s investigative broadcasts led to
the mobilization of youth watch groups who, in collaboration with
forestry officials and police, eventually drove out the smugglers.
(iii)
Protecting young girls against backward cultural practices. Forced marriage to young girls, including elopement, is an
old practice prevalent among some ethnic groups, including the
Sissala people. The station’s campaigns have involved education to
change attitudes and encouragement to families to rescue young
girls given away to early marriages, most often by their fathers or
uncles. In 2006 six girls were rescued by villagers who reported
their actions to the station.
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(b) Radio Ada
The most outstanding watchdog role function this community radio station engaged in since it was set up some 15 years
ago concerned defending the economic rights of women in
the Ada community. For centuries, the area has been one of
the richest salt mining centres in Ghana. Traditionally, women
have been the principal social force in an informal system of
small-scale self-employed salt winning (mining) and trading.
But in recent years, the Ada salt industry became a new frontier of encroachment by big capital. And the women of Ada
went on the frontline fighting to protect their livelihoods and
sources of subsistence. They also resisted new mining practices, introduced by the big capitalintruders, which threatened
the ecology of the lagoons that produce the salt.
The work of Radio Ada involved dedicated broadcast campaigns that gave voice to the women for their self-organization, mobilization and advocacy to protect their economic and
social interests against an alliance of external big capital interests, local middle men and traditional (mainly male) authorities
(chiefs). This struggle was ongoing (at the time of this study)
and was not likely to be resolved soon. But Radio Ada and the
women it supported did not appear ready to relent yet.
Some common features of the media activities
The examples of watchdog interventions by the media are cited
because they were some of the more outstanding role functions in
recent years. They are cited also because they represent an insignificant proportion of the hundreds of media organisations in the
country that have taken up critical and significant public interest
causes beyond mere reportage or commentary, and without partisan political motives.
The cases cited also share some common features that give
these media activities the attributes of watchdog role functions.
The first is that all the media took the side of social justice, national developmental or public interest causes, be they on citizens’
rights, environmental protection or public accountability issues.
Secondly the activities involved sustained publication or broadcast
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of the issues over periods of time. Further, the advocacy activities
in these matters always attracted considerable public resonance
and supportive response.The media, in most cases, also involved
themselves in active mobilization of the aggrieved social sectors,
groups or communities beyond the routine act of reportage or editorial commentary. In addition, the targets of advocacy were not
always only government or state institutions. They included nonstate actors, such as private economic interests or perpetrators of
illegality or criminal behavior threatening the collective security of
communities. In some cases too, the media have cooperated with
public authority to address the issues raised.
Public responses to media’s watchdog broadcasts
New communications technologies, especially the mobile
phone and internet, have made instantaneous public interaction
with mass media publications a major development in promoting
free speech and citizen participation in governance and public affairs discourse. In all the watchdog cases studied – indeed as they
regularly do with most news bulletins and discussion programmes
– radio stations invited and involved listener comments, opinions
and perspectives. Most cases attracted condemnation and demands for justice or resolution of the problem from majority of
the public interventions as the case may be.
In some cases sections of the public volunteered support and
assistance. In the case of the campaign against illegal small-scale
mining, civil groups volunteered participation in the coalition and
demanded review of existing legislation and regulation of mining
generally.
Reactions to those cases of corruption involving government
agencies and or officials introduced partisan biases from the public interventions. Generally, the corruption cases were also roundly condemned by the majority of public commentators. However, party loyalists often called in or sent messages to rubbish the
media exposes as “opposition propaganda” or labelled the media
houses concerned as tools for the opposition.
The usually lengthy panel discussions that took up the media
exposures were often polarized along political party lines. This sit-
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uation arose principally because radio stations made it a practice
of inviting party activists and representatives to compose the discussion panels. That, therefore, set the tone and directed the tenor
of public contributions through the phone calls, text messages,
emails, twitter, facebook or other social media.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to show that the conditions
prevail in Ghana for the media to exercise the independence and
freedom required for vigorous and consistent watchdog role
functions. But their general performance of this fundamental role
in a democracy is far short from what is possible and necessary.
Among practitioners themselves, there is a sense that more could
be done. Of the five leading professionals interviewed, only one
considered that the generality of the Ghanaian media were doing
very well but that “some of the imperfections are more as a result
of lack of education and lack of resources on the part of the media.”(Attah Mensah, 2017)
The other four agree that the media’s watchdog role performance “is below average. I say this because we are all reactive
rather than being proactive. We tend to allow the politicians and
others to set the agenda and we follow. We are not able to initiate
the fight. Also a lot of us are corrupt. Sometimes you do a story
and some media people fight and defend the wrongdoers. Sometimes you find out later that they are in bed with some of these
wrongdoers. If you look at the kind of freedom we have and the
amount of space we occupy – in terms of radio stations going to
400, in all the regions and all the districts – if we were really doing our work well, there wouldn’t be so much rot in our system. I
am really not impressed with how we utilise our freedom.” (Azure,
2017)
“I don’t think they [the media] have done well. Maybe some
pockets do a good job. With the coming into being of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic and the liberalization of the media, you would think that when quantity improved quality would
follow. … But what you find is that most of our journalists are following the ministers, the district chief executives. Our newspapers
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are filled with a lot of ‘he said’ ‘they said’ stories. Our newspapers
are filled with a lot of PR stories. Even business, when business
is doing something it is the PR side of the business story that
is followed. Who is asking the businesses the critical questions?”
(Ashigbey, 2017)
The general verdict is that much, much more could be done
by the media. And that seems to suggest that, in spite of the favourable environment, the generality of the Ghanaian media lack
the “disciplined moral passion, hard work and intelligence” and
the “robust independence” Curran (2011) prescribed as a primary
predisposition for committed and relevant watchdog role functioning. As one of the interviewees has pronounced, one of the
important factors hampering the media’s commitment to this fundamental of roles in a democracy, is corruption among the media professionals. This widespread phenomenon ranges from the
petty cases of reporters collecting small amounts of cash from
subjects they cover before filing their stories, to reported cases of
editors and publishers or radio managers burying or ignoring big
stories of scandal in exchange for big cash bribes.
Active leading figures of the two dominant political parties form
the single largest proportion of any group of identifiable persons
who own radio stations around the country. This reality, coupled
with the partisan political influences on, and biases that hold sway
over so many among the media professionals, render large sections
of the media morally incapable of mounting watchdog activities.
For the partisan media, they raise critical questions of government
when their parties are in opposition. Similarly, when they raise critical issues about the activities of some business or some non-state
entity for public scrutiny, the subject being questioned would almost certainly have something to do with the rival political party or grouping opposed by that media’s favoured party. Serving
the party in state power or loyalty to a political party comes with
rapid access to material benefits never realisable through diligent
commitment to independent professional journalism. It may take
the form of immediate material rewards or appointment to one
or another high political office with attractive perks and access
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to material benefits. It is one of the principal attractions for many
young persons who enter media work. And with that motivation
any concerns for watchdog role performance for public interest
purposes is anathema to the seeming aspiring journalist.
These questions aside, there are objective factors of weak or
poor professional technical capacity of most of the media, especially the radio and television stations in the rural and district
towns, to undertake activities that demand more than basic skills
of journalistic work. The media industry has grown faster than the
development of the requisite human resource to meet its professional and technical needs.The low capacity of personnel is
further compounded by lack of resources to engage in activities
that would often involve preparation of material and campaigns
of advocacy that would usually require considerable time and financial resources, assets hardly available to the numerous outlets
of community radio or commercial stations owned by small and
medium-sized entrepreneurs.
These limitations on the Ghana media’s watchdog role functions may become even more constraining over time as the business-political nexus of media ownership gets more consolidated
and expansive with the dialectical processes of concentration.
These trends may be slowed down or reversed if a broadcasting
legislation is passed with provisions for effective regulation that
are responsive to these fundamental and critical questions for the
promotion of unencumbered media independence and transparent pluralism. And it may be questionable if the media ownership
cabal of an alliance of political and business elites would encourage enforcement of rules and regulations that threaten their hold
on these vital instruments of political, economic and cultural-ideological dominance.
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THE MEDIA AND ELECTIONS: The Nigerian and South African Experience
Abiodun Salawu and Kayode Eesuola
Introduction

One thing that the media do, be it in its print, broadcast and
digital forms, is utilize an array of devices to communicate with a
large, diversified audience.Democracy being a system that centers on the masses of a people shares certain significant symbiotic relationships with it (Rickert 2011). This explains why a large
chunk of the social science scholarship, especially in the fields of
Communications and Political Science; and in the sub areas of
Political Communication, Political Behavior and Psephology, has
established the link between the media and many institutions
of democracy: elections, political party, pressure groups, judiciary,
legislature and so on; and how all of them influence and affect
one another for effective functioning of a political system (Müller
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2014, Coronel 2015).
Election is, however, the main focus of this chapter, vis-à-vis the
relationship it has with the media. Nigeria and South Africa are put
in comparative perspective. Attempt is made to historicize, and
thereafter locate the similarities and differences of media operations during general elections in the two countries, with specific
focus on South Africa’s 2014 and Nigeria’ 2015 general elections.
The basis for comparison is clear: Nigeria and South Africa are the
biggest economies as well as biggest democracy in Africa, and
their general elections hold in a period of one year interval, making issues and discussions highly comparable on the basis of time.
The paper generally assesses the role of the media in politics and
democracy before narrowing down to elections, and of course
placing emphasis on the new media.
The problematic is that many scholarly efforts have been invested on the media watchdog functions on democracy, but neither
election as the soul of democracy, nor the form of the media that
is more active towards it has received ample attention. So, this
chapter will among other things determine the extent to which
the media plays its watchdog role by informing and educating
people on elections, and which, between the digital media and the
traditional mass media, has more potency on the people when it
comes to influencing elections in contemporary times. While doing this, we shall also address how the media has contributed
to successful conducts of elections and the overall development
of democracy in the two countries taken for comparison. After
that we give recommendations on which the new media in the
two countries can positively influence each other not only for the
purpose of election on which the paper focuses, but also on the
political development of the two countries in general.
The chapter then intends to respond to the questions of whether South Africans, more than Nigerians, relied on the media more
than other institutions for political knowledge and information
in their 2015 and 2014 general elections; whether South Africans,
more than Nigerians, used the new media for political knowledge
and information in 2015 and 2014 and, on the last note, whether
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peoples’ use of the media for political knowledge and information in 2015 and 2014, increased electoral participation in South
Africa more that in Nigeria.
In what follows, therefore, there is, at first, a political history
of both Nigeria and South Africa which is followed by a broad,
generic exploration of scholarly positions on the relationship between the media and politics, then democracy. This narrows down
to the particular case of elections, both in the generic sense and
in the two countries.
The Political History of South Africa and Nigeria
The political history of South Africa, particularly within the context of elections, will most accurately be traced back to 31st May
1910 when the Union of South Africa was created. That was byvirtue of the Imperial Parliament’s South Africa Act of 1909. At this
time, the lower house of the newly created Parliament of South
Africa, that is, the House of Assembly,together with the provincial
councilswas elected by first-past-the-post voting in single-member electoral divisions. Taole (2005) observes that initially in this
election, there were different qualifications in different provinces
as the franchise was the same as that for the lower houses in the
four colonies that had formed the Union.
This was followed by the enfranchisement of the poor whites
and the white women in 1930 when the National Party government of J. B. M. Hertzog passed the Women’s Enfranchisement
Act,that extended to all white women over the age of 21, the right
to vote and be voted for. This development contagiously led to
the Franchise Laws Amendment Act that lifted the property and
literacy requirements for white male voters in the Cape and Natal,
just a year after, and with this development all white citizens of
South Africa who had become 21 years at least became enfranchised. According to Taole (2005:17), “as the exclusion of women
and the literacy and property qualifications continued to apply to
non-white voters, these acts had the effect of diluting their electoral power by more than doubling the number of white voters.”
This was going to create a landmark political history in which the
first female Member of Parliament, Leila Reitz,was elected in the
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general elections of 1933 as representative of Parktownfor the
South African Party.
Between 1936 and 1948, the segregationist elections were
held. In 1936, there was segregation of black voters as the Hertzog government enacted the Representation of Natives Act that
eliminated the black voters from the common voters’ rolls, placing
them separately on what was called the “native voters’ rolls”. This
was, however, repealed in 1959 following series of agitations in
which the press played very significant roles. In 1948, the National
Party engaged in a policy of removing colored voters in a similar
manner to black voters, and the Parliament in 1951 passed the
Separate Representation of Voters Act, removing four members of
parliaments.
A whites-only kind of referendum was held in 1960 to decide
the possibility and modality of South Africa becoming a republic.
This was popularly known as the Republic Referendum, and the
republic eventually emerged in 1961, removing the remaining
black representation. The political alignments and realignments
that followed gave birth to the Tricameral Parliament in 1983. A
referendum had been held on constitutional reform leading to the
formation of the Tricameral Parliament, which consisted of three
separate houses to represent the whites, the colored and the Indian South Africans.
The Interim Constitution was enacted as negotiations continued for the eradication of apartheid. The interim constitution
introduced the non-racial universal suffrage, and adopted the
party-list proportional representation in place of the first-pastthe-post voting system, which is that in which voters indicate on
a ballot the candidate of their choice, and the candidate who receives most votes wins election. This made it possible for all races
in South Africa to take part in the elections of 1994, the first fully
democraticand multi-party exercise which became the founding
principles of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa. The new constitution guarantees the right of all citizens to vote as contained
in the Bill of Rights and it has guided the conduct of elections and
politics till 2014.
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For Nigeria, one can moderately trace electioneering politics
back to 1959 as struggles became intense on which party or parties
would control political power in the immediate post colonial period. The keen competition led to a situation in which major political
parties controlled majority of seats in their different regions with
none of them having enough votes to constitute government at
the national level. With this, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC)
and National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) formed a
coalition government which provided a measure of north-south
consensus that could have been difficult if the Action Group had
been second to NPC. With this arrangement the NCNC’s Nnamdi
Azikiwe became the Governor General and the NPC’s Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister.
Then came the 1964 general elections which had to be conducted independent of the Britons. It was a competition between the
Nigerian National Alliance that was formed by the NPC and NNDC,
and the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of
the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. The 1979 general elections ushered in the Second Republic which produced Alhaji Shehu Shagari
as the first executive president of Nigeria. This was followed by
the 1983 elections which reproduced Alhaji Shehu Shagari before
General Muhammadu Buhari-led military coup returned Nigeria
to square one. The military ruled till 1993 when another general
(presidential) election took place but was annulled. It wasnot until
1999 that other elections were held to return Nigeria to civil rule.
This was followed by the 2003 elections.
The 2007 general elections produced Umaru Musa Yar’Adua
and Jonathan Goodluck as President and vice–president respectively. Held between April 14 and 21,2007, it became significant
for witnessing handover of power from one elected civilian government to another. Akinwalere (2012) says the 2007 elections,
perhaps, illustrated the crudest manifestations of all that has ever
been wrong with elections in Nigeria, in terms of the extent and
magnitude of poor, fraudulent conduct and conflict-ridden nature of electoral politics. From ballot box snatching and stuffing,
manipulation of the party nomination process and imposition of
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candidates; down to incumbent executive interference in all aspects of the electoral process, electoral fraud aided and abetted
by high echelons of the election management body, use of security agencies by incumbents to intimidate opponents and ensure/
assure electoral ‘victory’, and use of thugs to interfere with the
electoral process. The impunity with which these dastardly acts
were committed was overwhelming, and Nigerians and friends
of Nigeria in the international community were so disgusted with
what happened that, virtually in unison, they demanded for reforms to bring about free, fair and credible elections.
It was generally established that the electoral commission in
Nigeria identified significant lessons learnt from the past elections
and factored them into the preparations for the conduct of another one which came in April 2011. The elections of 2015 followed,
and this changed leadership of Nigeria from the Peoples Democratic Party to the newly formed All Progressives Congress which
is in charge of the country till date.
The basis for comparison between Nigeria and South Africa is
clear. Both are the biggest economies as well as two of the biggest
democracies in Africa.Their general elections which have evolved
from the period of colonialism till the present, incidentally hold in
a period of one year interval, making issues and discussions highly
comparable on the basis of theme and time.
Politics, Democracy and the Media
It is well established in literature that the media play a key role
in democracy. The media perform the role of a ‘watchdog’ through
provision of information to the democratic society, and, to another extent, they stand as a forum representing views and opinions
of citizens. Today, all over the world, people rely almost solely on
newspapers, television, the internet and the radio as their main
sources of information and knowledge. Such information they
need in sports, education, business, health and especially politics- which connects everyone directly and indirectly is obtained
primarily from the media (Miller 2014). It is, therefore, difficult, if
not impossible to operate without the media in the modern world,
whether in a democratic society or otherwise. Neustadt (2008)
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holds that in the age of modernity, it is not possible to hold any
intelligent discussion on democracy if the roles played by print
and electronic media are ignored, especially, in terms of disseminating concrete and important information to the political public.
Whenever there is any innovation in the media, the public evaluates its potentiality towards improving democratic politics, and
media professionals are often judged based on their disposition
to democratic values. Of worthy note is that gladiatorial politicians, campaigners and political activists reach their large target
audiences thorough the media, so, the absolutist position of the
indispensability of the media in democracy cannot but gain a certain degree of understanding. This suggests why it is stated that
“following the creation of electronic media in the twentieth century, the connections between democracy, political campaigns,
public opinion, and journalistic practices have become the focus
of great attention and anxiety among communication scholars”
(Encyclopedia .com).
This is also why, since the 17th century, philosophers and rulers
alike have given due recognition to the media as what Colonel
(2015) calls the “Fourth Estate” that creates forum for debates
and discussions of issues that affect the public. This notion significantly endures all over the world in spite of the porosity, sensationalism and superficiality introduced by the social media, and
the notion that the media serve as the watchdog, “guardian of the
public interest, and a conduit between governors and the governed remains deeply ingrained” (Colonel 2015, p.2).
Indeed, the linkage of democracy to the media is as old as the
beginning of the use of liberal democratic theory in Europe, at
least as an intellectual exercise. In the era of the 17th century, John
Milton’s Aeropagitica advanced an argument towards the need for
encouragement of free discussion as a panacea to rejecting falsehood and illogical opinions, and, subsequently towards building
knowledge based on truth. In the United States of America, the
idea of media importance was enshrined in the Bill of Rights and
attracted impacts when the First Amendment to the constitution
was made. Today, the duo of media and democracy continue to
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attract serious discourse, and, in the words of Edelman (1988, 27),
this is, “...in part because of frustration with the early Federalists
which made Thomas Jefferson and other anti-Federalists some
passionate defenders of the free press in the early days of the
American republic”. Similarly, English philosopher John Stuart Mill
advanced a very convincing argument in support of free speech
and a free press in democratic politics, asserting that when people
are silenced, truth is suppressed and errors are expressed in the
political system.
In not up to two centuries has the modern media been able to
disseminate up-to-date political information to the public, and this
is largely due to the technological advancements witnessed globally to affect both print and the electronic media. Then, as Jürgen
Habermas (1962) reveals, the increase in the political awareness of
the public in America and Europe has a fundamental connection
to the development of the media. In these societies, not only did
people accept news reported by newspapers, for example, their
opinions were shaped by them.
However, as newspapers continued to depend on commercial
advertising for their survival, the proverbial saying of he who pays
the piper dictates the tune began to apply, and newspaper editorial policies and journalistic practices began to get increasingly
tainted by the yearnings and aspirations of those who control the
greatest financial resources. Habermas concludes that this makes
“wealthy individuals or those who control wealth have more influence over public opinion and, ultimately, over what policies are
changed than do members of the lower and middle classes” (1962,
11). This created a pool of scholars who have expressed some
worries about the fact that the heavy reliance on the modern media on governmental sources of information might lead in some
cases to less scrutiny and criticism of governmental policies; in
addition to the economic forces that might distort public debate.
Indeed, as scholars continue to theorize about the link between
democracy and the media throughout the twentieth century, high
emphasis has been placed on the extent of media effects, especially in response to the speed and manner in which governments
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of nations produced propaganda during the first and the second
world wars.
Nonetheless, there is hardly any of the foregoing opinions that
will not agree that the media represent an information tool and
forum for discussion of issues, assertion of positions and even
ventilation of anger. There is no doubt that a truly democratic
society requires citizens’ participation, and that a diligent media
has the capacity of keeping citizens engaged in the business of
governance, prompt them to take action--the entire virtue upon
which democracy is built-- and when, for instance, the media provide the public with some information in making informed choices
such as who to vote for and which policies should be supported or
opposed, the media can then be said to be playing a a watchdog
role.
In addition, there is, at least a role of the media that can be
considered most obvious and common. The media report news
and give information on politics, sports, war and peace to all of us
in the general public. One will consider this as the most important
role of the media, especially in a democratic setting where every
activity seems to, at least theoretically, focus on the citizens who
are expected to play critical political roles and take crucial and
informed decisions through the information available to them.
It is expected, therefore, under this circumstance, that the media
are professional and impartial when giving out information to the
general public on political events and activities of the government
within the political system.
Elections are critical in this regard. From the beginning of politicking to the declaration of interest down to the real contests and
declaration of winners, the media are expected to maintain neutrality, professionalism and objectivity while educating the public.
Indeed, “media coverage should be unbiased rather than favoring
any one candidate or point of view in order for the voters to make
informed decisions” (Dennis, 2009). In fact, Dennis asserts “political journalists can be especially helpful in this role. Many cover
candidates and the elections as a full-time assignment but can
provide both positive and negative glimpses into the candidate’s
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life” (2009, 102).
When the media serve as watchdog they protect the generalpublic from incompetent political aspirants and mediocre officials
by exposing their details through the press. Elchahabi (2015) exemplifies how this has worked:

Think for a moment about the Benghazi, Libya, attacks and ensuing
investigation. In September of 2012, U.S. diplomatic offices were attacked, leaving four Americans dead. The coverage regarding what
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton knew and when she knew it continually overshadowed her possible presidential candidacy. This is an example of watchdog media (2015, 8).

Even when exposures have nothing to do with corruption and
some evil doings, the media still protect the public by providing
information on the successes, strengths and weaknesses of election candidates, their political parties, election officials and their
practices. This watchdog function educates the public on the past
performances of political personalities and officials in politics, and
it obviously helps in holding politicians and their political parties
accountable to the political public.
As earlier indicated, the media provide a platform for registering people’s voices by allowing candidates and their political parties to communicate their electoral promises and campaigns to
the general public. This is often done through provision of debate
forums where candidates are invited to present their manifestoes
to the public. With this the media impact our political views and
color our opinions, and they directly or indirectly shape our electoral and general political behavior through the information that
their different platforms provide.
While the media do this on the part of gladiatorial politics, they
also simultaneously provide a platform for the public to convey
their political thoughts and feelings towards the candidates who
have used the media forums to reach them. Strong writers, columnists and opinion leaders used to do this. At present, however, it
is done mostly in the social media. Whichever way it is done, and
through whatever means, the media also promote the voice of the
people by giving them some open forums for debate, discussion,
analysis, criticism and appraisals. This is what strikes the balance.
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An example of such situation is provided by Castalls (2012):

During an election for example, a popular television station can hold
presidential debates to present the thoughts and programs of candidates to the public. After that, it can encourage viewers to submit
comments, questions and topics on issues they want the candidates to
address but that did not occur due to the reason of time during the live
broadcast. Such comments, questions and topics could be submitted
using the email, the Facebook or the twitter. Through a practice of this
nature, “the public can communicate opinions and concerns with one
another and even with the candidates and the government. In this way,
the media provide an interactive experience for the voters. The audience can be participants rather than simply viewers...

However, in spite of the foregoing plethora of roles and functions that the media play in developing political system, especially
a democracy, a great deal of controversy exists amongst scholars
on whether the mass media actually promote or destroy democracy. This is where the idea of media malaise theory originated from, and advocates of the theory claim that “because mass
media in established democracies mostly operate according to
market principles, they disregard their democratic duties, thereby inflicting serious repercussions on democracy; causing apathy,
cynicism and ignorance with regard to politics among citizens”
(Curra, and Cohen et al 2014, p.4).
Propounded in 1976 by Robinson, and expectedly attracting
many amendments as it tested the intellectual grounds, the media
malaise theory has most of the researches conducted on it in the
United States, giving room for different schools within it. There
are theorists within the media malaise tradition who completely
blame the television for the malaise (Becker, Whitney, Patterson)
for instance, while others subscribe more to the generic view
rather than blame one aspect of the media (Bennet, Rhine and
Newton).
Irrespective of the different traditions discussed in the foregoing, the Malaise Theory essentially presupposes that the way
media covers news or disseminates information to the public is
antithetical to the interest of the general public and the society as
a whole. In doing so, the Media Malaise theory emphasizes the
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political realm, claiming that the media have been rendered as an
instrument for declining public trust, creating political skepticism,
cynicism as well as apathy etc. Evidence can be traced to the predominant interest of the press today on sensational issues such
as scandal, conflict, deaths, fatal errors and dramatic situations to
attract their audience’s attention: the scenario of “Only Bad News
is News”. This is increasingly so in today’s vast world where newsmakers have to compete to survive in a capitalist society. Media
Malaise will assert that the media do not give a fair coverage to
the existing stories as a fresh and bigger story is searched. Specifically, when the world wide news is covered, it instantly generates a
breakthrough where only constant points are put forward without
adequate explanation of the details. This often creates a pool of
confusion in the society (Curran et al. 2014).
It is difficult to ignore the negative impact of this scenario on
politicians and the politics they play. As demonstrated in the case
of the United States general elections of 2016, politicians often
attack their opponents and do negative things rather than acting positively in order to have more publicity. This underplays the
positive aspects of their politics and the good work they do often
go untold. From the point of view of the Media malaise theory,
this situation creates a constant ambience of mistrust and cynicism; along with such a negative vibe that disrupts, if not destroy
the political environment. A study conducted in the United Kingdom found that the period before the elections is often full of
such political news and reports that stress the populace and create tension in the polity. People then usually tend to avoid such
news and reports by temporarily avoiding newspapers and some
television stations. As this scenario tends to make the politicians
less accountable to the public, it also, on the other hand, has damaging effect on political participation which is the foundation of
democracy. Inevitably also, it affects the quality of public life and
stability of the political system.
However, in contrast to the Media Malaise Theory there is the
Mobilization Perspectives to the Media, with both theoretical orientations making attempts to assess the role of the media in dual
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contrast manner. Adherents of the ‘mobilisation’ perspective insist that the Media Malaise theorists are quite unrealistic in their
expectation of the media. Though they appear to be in minority
compared to the Media Malaiseisits, the Mobilizationists feel that
the society does not contain such thing as objectivity, but is constantly responding to what is wanted and needed; after all, it is
only the news that people love to read or hear that should ordinarily be sent to them. That, on its own, the Mobilizationists will
argue, is what makes the media democratic and responsive to the
needs of the people. What they, mobilization theorists, perceive
to be more realistic is that people should assess the media based
on the ample information they provide to the public and leave the
rest for the ability of the public to sieve. In other words, what the
mobilization theorists will conclude is that media coverage of politics and electoral campaigns does not have significant influence
on behaviours of the public; it is the other way round (Strömbäck
and Shehata 2010).
But if media coverage of political issues and dissemination of
political information have little or no influence on the attitudes and
behaviors of the citizens, one can assume that people should be
less worried about the quality and authenticity of news as well as
attention that people pay to the media. To test the reverse, if media coverage of politics and political campaigns has a moderately
potent influence on the attitudes and behaviors of the general
public, it requires a very meticulous review to protect democracy
and the rule of law, and, if possible, the regulation of the media
by the governments of nations. What is historical, and which must
be stated at this juncture, is that scholars, at one period of history
or the other, have maintained the position that the effect that the
media has on their political audiences are quite indirect and insignificant; or that, on the other hand, the media exerts a potent, and
highly significant influence on their audiences. While the debate
continues and is unlikely to end at any time soon, the vast majority
of contemporary scholarship will not deny the fact that the media
will continue to have some form of influence on the general public
and their political behavior.
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But, again one must ask, does the quality of the media and its
information actually affect the quality of democracy? This is another one million dollar question that has generated debate and
responses over the years, and it is best answered by the findings
that here follow. As it happens, countries with a higher degree
of media performance show higher levels of political participation and less corruption. They also tend to have a more lively civil
society, and elected representatives seem to reflect the preferences of citizens more adequately. These findings illustrate that
media performance is clearly related to at least some aspects of
the functioning of a democratic regime. Therefore, given its relevance to democracy, it can be concluded that the discussion over
whether the media fall short of, or fulfil the normative demands
imposed on them is highly significant. This questions the general
and sweeping assumptions that both the ‘media malaise’ and the
‘mobilization theories’ make about the state of media and democracy. Ultimately, both perspectives could benefit from considering
comparative empirical evidence that distinguishes between different aspects of media performance and their influence on different
elements of democracy (Castells, 2007).
Media in Nigeria and South Africa
The media have developed in Nigeria and South Africa right
from the periods of colonialism, and have played critical roles in
the political development of the two countries. In South Africa,
media partnered with the people to fight segregationist policies
and prepare grounds for democratization (Kasoma, 1988). As this
was done in South Africa and indeed the entire South, especially in Zambia (Kasoma, 1986), same was going on in West Africa
as the press vehemently battled against military dictatorship that
overtook most of the countries. Whilst tracing the development
of media activities in the politics of Nigeria since the colonial period till the military era, Seng and Hunt (2006) conclude that for
Nigeria, political development was more of war of the press than
of protests and social movements. Thus, as far as South Africa and
Nigeria are concern, the media in the two countries have not been
found wanting in their watchdog roles.
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Shelly (2010, 16) however declares that “The advent of digital
media has turned the media landscape upside down. The news
cycle moves at lightning speed, thanks to live tweeting, blogging
and citizen journalism, all unknown just a few years ago”. In a bid
to stay relevant, Shelly further asserts, practitioners are fast adapting to the ways and methods of the new media, especially that
aspect which allows interactiveness and feedback mechanism.
This has been more critical in Africa where the task of the media
rests in the bulk of institutionalization and deepening of democracy. Since the media, both conventional and new, play a critical
role in social equilibrium, peoples all over the world rely on the
media for credible information that can in turn provoke informed
and civil debates that will ultimately transform their societies. This
was and has been the role of the media in Nigeria and South Africa.
A Note on the New Media
The phrase ‘new media’, can trace its popularity to a 2005 conference which drew attention to the conversation surrounding
the future of e-government and the role that social media, new
media and online communication would play. It is a drastic and
dramatic movement from the print and electronic media to the
use of the internet which Tambini (1999) calls “the third sphere”,
and where communication now goes away from the control of the
state; where it is free from the bound of commerce and has become a platform where free public deliberations occur.
The following interaction of Thomas Keenan presents an interesting way of establishing the concept of the new media. Cited
in Chun and Keenan (2006), it presents a simplistic and interactive
way of understanding the phenomenon:
When I explore the web, I follow the cursor, a tangible sign of presence
implying movement. This motion structures a sense of liveliness, of immediacy, of the now. I open up my “personalized” site at MSNBC: via
“instant” traffic maps (which, the copy tells me, “agree within a minute
or two” to real time), synopses of “current” weather conditions, and
individualized news bits, the Web site repeatedly foregrounds its currency, its timeliness, its relevance to me. A frequently changing tickertape scroll bar updates both headlines and stock quotes, and a flashing
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target floats on my desktop, signaling “breaking news” whenever my
PC’s on, whether or not a Web browser is open. The numerous polls
or surveys that dot MSNBC’s electronic landscape (they’re called “live
votes”) promise that I can impact news in an instant; I get the results
right away, no need to wait for the 10 p.m. broadcast. Just click. Immediate gratification. (Chun and Keenan, 2006, p.201)

The invention of the internet has over the years given a new
dimension to the operation of the media. The internet provides
some form of unparalleled avenue to the generality of people
trained and untrained, to disseminate information quickly and
cheaply across the world. Some scholars describe the availability of the new media as a way of compensating the people with
alternative means of democratizing their opinion, having for decades suffered from media monopolies orchestrated by the ownership of traditional media forms by very few commerce oriented,
large companies which have frustrated the diversity of opinions
that are expressed in established media in order to aid democracy
(Muller 2014). The free use of the web for information dissemination, however, implies that news read therein cannot be deemed
reliable as they may be posted by ill-informed, untrained persons
and sometimes robots. Muller adds that “while some political observers have discussed the potential of internet voting and campaign material distribution to rejuvenate interest in voting and in
political activism, others have argued that the tendency of internet
websites to engage in shallow political humor and parody is more
likely to foster cynicism than to combat it” (2014, 17). Indeed, the
rapid development of the Internet and its proliferation of use all
over the world is a big concern.
But the use of the social media via websites platforms has
expanded the frontier of political knowledge and information dissemination and, according to Bokor (2014), has led to a major paradigm shift from the old to the new media with almost unimaginable changes in both the way information content is received
as opposed to sent (cited in Pavlik and McIntosh 2011, p.68).
Bokor (2014, 11) adds that “The old media provided a unidirectional model of flow of information, a sort of one-way communication that is largely centralized and devoid of facilities by which
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the audience interact with one another on the information they
receive”. This is what the newspapers, the magazines, the television, the radio, telegraphy, telephony, photography and all sorts
do. However, with social media instruments such as the Facebook,
the Twitter and the Pinterest through which users are able to desire and share with both selected and general audience, the new
media “radically break the connection between physical place and
social place, making physical location much less significant for our
social relationships” (Croteau and Hoynes 2003, p.311).
Internet and Social Media Use in Nigeria and South Africa
All over the world, more and more people are making use of
the internet, both in and outside of the work settings; and this
activity is growing at geometric progression. As at November
2016, the figure of global Internet active users was 3,495,349,351
(Berners-Lee, 2016). Statista (2017) reported that as at April 2017,
the global figure of Internet active users was 3.81 billion, while
2.91 billion were social media users and still counting. This means
global Internet active users are now over the 3 billion mark equaling 51% global population (Statista, 2017). Berners-Lee (2016) and
Kemp (2016) contended that number of internet users equaled
46% global population.
By 2016, total users of the Internet in Nigeria were over 86 million (86,219,965) while in South Africa, they were over 28 million
(28,580,290) – more than half the population in both countries.
In another account, Internetworldstats (2017) recorded that by
March 2017, total users of the Internet in Nigeria were over 93
million (93,591,174) while in South Africa, they were over 28 million (28,580,290). Also, global statistics show that more than half
of planet earth now owns a mobile phone, with Internet and social media access exceeding 3.6 billion (Kemp, 2014). Mobile social
media use is also on the rise with 2.31 billion social media users,
delivering 31% global population (Kemp, 2016) and with 77% of
all social networking users now accessing via mobile devices (Berners-Lee, 2016). In South Africa alone, over a quarter of all South
Africans - 13 million people - now use Facebook (Statista, 2016).
Since the inception of the Internet and integration of email
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technology into personal and work lives, ways of communicating
began to change. However, it was not until the creation of social
media interfaces like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Whatsapp, Badoo, Snapchat, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube and other similar applications that we started seeing such a massive harnessing of the
potential of the now-pervasive online connectivity in our everyday
lives.
Media and Elections
There is little need repeating the role of elections in democracy.
In fact, election is so much of a pillar of democracy that a scholarhas equated the two (Bidson, 2004). Elections are a major democratic exercise in which the media can contribute positively or otherwise. In a way, the influence of traditional patrons, parties and
institutions (like churches) on the electoral process is fast diminishing as the society becomes increasingly modern and the media
becomes ever more pervasive. Gladiatorial politicians and political
parties do their campaigns and advocacy through the mediaand
this has some economic implications as electioneering campaigns
are increasingly getting expensive in many countries. The cost of
television and newspaper advertisement is colossal, and it often
accounts for the largest budget of elections. This is because candidates that are well-funded often stand a good chance of being
elected because, in the words of Coronel (2015), “they can buy
air time and newspaper space, and, in some countries...also bribe
journalists and editors who endorse their candidacies in various
ways using various strategies”.
As one strong pillar of democracy, the media play an imperative
role in influencing political discourse in the period of elections. In
a participatory democracy, almost all citizens get their news and
information from the media. The media colours people’s observation and subsequently process their political information about
coverage of elections. The traditional media (print and broadcast),
for instance can foster transparency and balance dissemination
of important electoral information. The new media, on the other hand, provides additional means and possibilities for citizens
to participate, acquire information and share knowledge. That is
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what one sees in the functions of such internet sources as social
media sites, blogs, email and other new platforms. Combined, the
traditional and new media play the all important roles of watchdog and platform for campaign and avenue for public debates
during elections (Elchahabi, Samer, 2015).
Media Performance in Different Countries
Performance of the media differs from one country to the other,
especially when measured through the yardsticks of information
dissemination, being a watchdog, and education of the public that
have been exhaustively discussed above (Norris, 2000). Not very
many social scientists, especially political scientists and sociologists will be surprised with this because of their taken for granted
knowledge that the character of every state or society will inevitably color the behavior of institutions and structures found in
it (Kari, 2013). Suffice to say that the nature and character of a
state determine the performance or otherwise of the media in that
state. These nature and character in question have to do with the
emergence of the state.
Alfan (2013) asserts that the mass media provide a structure of
the dominant class in every society. It is used to disseminate their
values to the entire society through hegemonic means, and that
is why the character of the dominant class would necessarily color
that of the media. Muller (2014) did a comparison of democratic
media performance in about forty five countries which reveals a
considerable variation with different patterns identified. Muller
observes that “Although some countries may be ascribed a higher
overall degree of media performance than others...It seems that
optimizing both media functions at the same time is only feasible up to a certain point. Countries perform badly or moderately
on both functions, or outstandingly on just one of the functions”
(2014, 5).
In a nutshell, the younger democratic states within the sample
generally lag behind (especially the Eastern European, Asian and
Latin American cases, but also some Southern European countries),
while different patterns of media performance can be observed
with respect to the more mature democracies. Muller adds that
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theextent of political information provided by the media, what he
calls “the vertical function”, appears to be well entrenched among
Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian countries and then Japan, while the
Anglo Saxon countries, the United States of America notably, are
generally rated the worst when it comes to media performance.
On the contrary, however, the ability of the media to represent
the public sphere at all times appears to be better entrenched in
Austria, Germany, Switzerland and a host of other central-western
European countries. In the final analysis, Muller’s patterns, which
are premised upon content and structural consideration as well
as the structural and the content levels, expressly reveal that “a
country’s performance on the structural level has an impact on
its performance on the content level, thereby suggesting that the
two levels are not independent of each other. The systemic conditions that media outlets operate in also appear to influence their
news coverage” Muller (2014, 5-6).
Analysis of How South Africans and Nigerians used the Media in the 2014 and 2015 General Elections
As earlier declared, this chapter focuses on the extent to which
the media play their watchdog role by informing and educating
people on elections. It also tries to address which, between the
digital media and the traditional mass media, has more influenceon the people when it comes to elections in contemporary times.
It also addresses how the media have contributed to successful
conduct of elections and the overall development of democracy
in Nigeria and South Africa based on the two general elections of
the two countries. Put differently, effort is targeted towards establishing the extent to which the media performed the watchdog
roles during these elections, and which form of the media did the
subject matter of media as watchdog during elections through
primary gathered from respondents. The actual work done in the
data gathering was an exploration of the disposition of Nigerians
and South Africans towards the media and during the elections of
2014 in South Africa and 2016 in Nigeria.
Limitations
Time was a major constraint in this study, considering what
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is required to compare the scenarios of the two large countries
involved. This limitation made the researchers restrict the study
to Lagos, Nigeria and Mafikeng, South Africa. Sampling carried
out in the two locations was augmented with an in-depth analysis of literature in the foregoingbefore arriving at conclusions. In
other words, the quantitative part of the study was conducted in
the University of Lagos, Nigeria, and the North West University,
Mafikeng, South Africa. The research investigated the relationship
and experience that people had with the old and new media in the
general elections of their countries. In this, reading of newspaper
and using tweeters, Facebook and other online sources are actively involved. This inevitably restricts the audience to the educated
ones, and explains the choice of universities as location.
Sampling Procedure and Size
The researchers adopted probability method, and used the systematic sampling procedure in which every tenth person within
the stream of people available on the two campuses were intervIewed through the questionnaires. This enabled the researchers
to attract respondents that cut across categories of the educated
people. Two hundred questionnaire copies were separately distributed in Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria had a higher return of
167 while South Africa was 156. Perhaps due to the simple nature
of the questionnaire, and the fact that the researchers persuaded
respondents to fill in the questionnaireon the spot, all instruments
filled in and submitted were valid.
TABLE 1.1. BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS
Country

Male

Nigeria

104

South
Africa

97

Female Popular
Religions

Urban
Resid.

Workers

160

Rural
Resid.

Students

93

Other
Religions

138

142

25

59

117

39

40

116

111

45

7

29

From responses generated from the questionnaire, all respondents used the media for their political knowledge and informa-

407

Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . .

tion, both in Nigeria and in South Africa. They relied on media information on such issues as profiles of the contesting candidates
and their political parties, date of elections at different levels, why
participating in the elections is necessary, and giving their own
opinions on an array of issues regarding the elections. As a result
of this, the researchers take absolutevalue because the number
of the questionnaire copies validly returned differed in the two
countries.
A total of 81 respondents from Nigeria received and relied on
elections information from the new media sources such as the
Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp while the rest 86 relied more
on the conventional media: newspapers, radio and television. In
South Africa, 134 respondents got and relied on elections information through the new media such as the Facebook, Twitter and
WhatsApp while the rest 22 relied more on the conventional media: newspapers, radio and television.
Media Use in Nigeria

Use of the media for political knowledge and information in
2015 and 2014, increased electoral participation in South Africa
more that in Nigeria.
160 out of the 167 respondents in Nigeria agreed that the use
of the new media increased their participation in the 2015 elections, while in South Africa, only 88 out of the 156 so agree. Extra
comments added under the questionnaire reveal a high degree of
disillusionment on the part of South Africans towards the attitudes
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of politicians who contested during the elections. This disagrees
with the line of argument that “Peoples’ use of the media for political knowledge and information in 2015 and 2014 increased
electoral participation in South Africa more than in Nigeria.
Participation in Elections of 2014 and 2016 due to
Media Use

Discussion of Findings
As earlier stated, discussions from the foregoing findings will
be supplemented by analysis of literature to arrive at conclusions.
The above responses to questionnaires indicate that
1. Nigerians and South Africans use, as well as partner with the
media as watchdog in democracy and the entire polity. This was
also true during the last general elections of 2015 and 2014.
2. While both Nigerians and South Africans rely more on the
new media for political information during elections, South Africans rely more on the new media than Nigerians. This might not
be unconnected to better availability of electricity and internet
technology in South Africa compared to Nigeria, and it provides
another area that demands research inquiry.
3. That while generally the use of the media increased political
participation among Nigerians and South Africans alike, as far as
the 2014 elections are concerned in South Africa, a high level of
disillusionment and seeming apathy greeted the participation of
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the people. High number of South Africans got information and
monitored processes of the 2014 elections through the media but
this did not manifest in high participation in the elections. What
this implies is that using the media for political purposes does
not on its own contribute to increased political participation; other
dominant issues at stake in the polity appear to be more potent. In
Nigeria, for instance, the issues of insecurity, economic depression
and corruption provoked high level of participation among the
people, irrespective of the lower use of the new media due to the
problem of electricity. What was at stake in South Africa in 2014
was totally different, and even with the higher use of the new and
the old media compared to Nigeria, a lower participation in the
election was recorded.
4. While the above is true, it does not necessarily mean a significant improvement in the political development of the two countries under study. The idea insinuated by this, that politicians,
once elected into the office, hardly ever follow the programs and
promises upon which they are elected, is virtually manifested in
the two countries today under Presidents Buhari and Jacob Zuma.
This is subject to debatethough.
To discuss the above in line with literature, it is noteworthy that
many scholars: Bennett and Entman (2001), Coleman and Blumler
(2009), Hindman (2009), Norris (2001), Shane (2004), and Wilhelm
(2000), have earlier studied the connection between politics and
the new media, as against the conventional or the analogue media. Of them all, Coleman and Blumler (2009) attempted to highlight the pros and cons of the Internet vis a vis how it will influence the future relationship between general citizens and political
gladiators, and between the two and the entire political system.
That being stated, almost all of the foregoing scholars have some
optimistic assurance that the new media and the Internet would
foster a deeper relationship between citizens and politicians;
without stating the exact dimension of the relationship though;
but the optimism changed as most of these researchers observe
that with the new media, the result is states’ loss of control over
information dissemination, and general reduction of interests in
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general politics, as well as how unequal access to the Internet
would imply unequal access to political information.
From the forgoing one can expressly deduce that the new media now occupy a conspicuous and strategic space in the realm of
politics, especially by significantly altering how the general public receive and consume information. Of all spheres of politics in
which the new media may have effect, elections as one of the most
important structures of democracy remains outstanding, and this
is what this chapter has focused on. The question can then be put:
How did political parties in South Africa use the new media in the
2014 national election, starting from campaign to declaration of
winners?
Swanson and Mancini (1996) observe that of all periodic activities in a democracy, election periods remain the most critical and
fundamental, as far as democracy is concerned. This is the period
when stakeholders and political parties present the best of their
strategies and programs to the public as a prelude to the latter’s
vote for or against the party in what determines selection of decision makers, shapes policies and re-allocates power and resources
within the political system.
The new media make a great impact on voters and what they
expect from parties they vote or do not vote for. In the past, all
information needed about parties and their candidates were obtained at political rallies, party advocates, radio, televisions and
newspapers.With the new media now, however, there is a remarkable increase in the use of the Internet as an information source,
upon which majority of the people now regularly rely as source
of information that is often needed to take informed political decisions. During electioneering campaigns, the new media play a
very important role in creating public awareness over the position,
history and integrity level of candidates; as well as their campaign
strategies, plans and positions. Apart from that, the media give
clues to the general public about the ideological orientations - if
any- of political parties and their candidates, after all, as declared
Funkhouser (1973, 12), “the average person takes the media’s
word for what the ‘issues’ are, whether or not he personally has
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any involvement or interest in them”. In their study, Williams and
Gulati (2008) analyzed the impact of new media on electoral outcome and summarize that online campaign activity is an important additional indicator of candidate viability that is independent
of traditional measures like expenditures, media coverage and
organizing activities. As further analyzed by Williams and Gulati
(2008), the aspect of online campaign is another important aspect
of the new media; that if a candidate has a well integrated and
clear packaging, through online campaigning he or she is likely
to generate a huge positive response.
This study has indeed established the potency of the media as a
watchdog in democracy. It has also shown that the new media are
fast overtaking the traditional one in playing the role of watchdog.
From the two countries studied, the watchdog function of the media, when performed, has the potency of increasing political participation of the people, as is expected of any democracy, but this
does not place the people in the control of their governments
because politicians in the two countries still find a way to deviate
significantly from political promises and programmes once they
get to the office. Based on this issue, it is high time that the media
extend the watchdog role to very proactive levels where they can
hold politicians accountable for their election promises without
necessarily waiting for periodic elections. Exactly how this will be
dome is unknown yet and can form a basis of new research in the
media, but somehow it has to be done in order to add significant
value to the role of the media as watchdog in a democracy.
Ultimately, evidences from the study throw up the conclusion
that the media in both countries under study are indeed watchdogs, not captured. This is without prejudice to the issues of relativity and grades as the level of advancement of media use differs
between Nigeria and South Africa. In spite of the difference in
levels, peoples of the two countries partner with the media on
political knowledge and political information, and they are quite
proactive in giving feedbacks and acting politically based on the
information they receive from and send to the media.
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CONCLUSION: Glancing Backwards,
Looking Forward
Ayo Olukotun

The issues in focus
This chapter recapitulates by backward glances at the contributions of the scholars and brings together some of the issues that
have been raised and analyzed within the context of the problematic alluded to by the title of the book, as to whether the Nigerian media have remained alert watchdogs of power or its lapdogs
and captive praise singers. It then goes on by way of synthesis to
broach scenarios as well as policy prescriptions to make what is
undoubtedly, a far from healthy watchdog into a more robust and
vigilant one.
It is no news but a staple, even cliché of our generation that ours
is preeminently the age of the media. Illustratively, we can underline the statement by drawing attention to the growing, almost
pervasive use of personal computers, rapid internet penetration in
Nigeria and many African countries, spaces, which Castels (1997)
once described as switch-off from the Information Superhigh-
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way; the spreading use of smartphones, as well as digital forms
of communication. In the United States, President Donald Trump
has mainstreamed the deployment of social media, in particular,
Twitter, to create a bully pulpit, as well as steer up controversies
nationally and globally. Television is often described as the fifth
Estate of the Realm while social media is seen by some as the sixth.
Indeed the Italian sociologist, Castel, has argued in a seminar trilogy that the information technology revolution has introduced a
new mode of production, which has bearing for wealth generation
and importantly, for the distribution and exercise of power within
nations and in the global community (Castels, 2000).
Obviously, this innovative development and media pervasiveness have differential impacts in the developed world and the developing nations of Africa. What the contributors to this book have
sought to document and analyze is the way and manner in which
the accelerating developments in media and communication are
affecting as well being affected by political transitional changes in
Nigeria’s semi democracy. In particular and considering the exciting role of the media in bringing about democratic transitions in
most African countries, including Nigeria, the book grapples with
the question of how much the media in Nigeria–for comparative
guidance, we also deal with Kenya, Ghana and South Africa – have
contributed to the enlargement of the democratic space and civic
discourse by holding elected leaders to minimum standards of
accountability.
Revisiting the performance debate
The title of the book poses the issue, somewhat sharply, by
raising the poser and question of whether the media have enabled
our emerging democracy through their watchdog role or whether
they have descended into a captive institution, the ventriloquist
of the establishment, barking feebly but unable to bite. It should
be noted that in Nigeria, the 1999 constitution, which compared
to Ghana’s 1992 constitution, is a bit too reticent on media freedom, nonetheless, mandates the media in Section 22 to monitor
governance and to hold elected officials accountable to the electorate. The question, around which the book is organized, there-
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fore, is not arbitrary, but one that derives from the constitutional
responsibility of the media to play the role of an active watchdog
of democracy. Anecdotally, one can illuminate the issues in focus
by recalling that in a television program aired on Channels Television on 13th January, 2018, political economist scholar and public
intellectual, Professor Pat Utomi alluded to a discussion on the
role of the media by mentioning that that once vibrant institution
has virtually gone to sleep. Utomi went on to rehash the view of
a discussant who said that “Once I pick up a Nigerian newspaper,
one of the main questions I am asking is who has paid for the stories that are published in it”. This, of course, may be an exaggeration, but in the absence of opinion polls to determine just much
the media has cascaded downwards in public esteem, it remains
a rough and ready gauge of what some concerned intellectuals
think about the media. In this respect, and as Lanre Idowu points
out in his chapter, the media cannot afford to capsize to economic
challenges to such an extent of becoming the butt of widespread
cynicism and sardonic jokes about its performance.
To be sure, corruption of media is not peculiar to Nigeria or
Africa; it is a global problem, which as a recent publication which
looks at the issue in eighteen countries makes clear, is related to
“government, unscrupulous politicians, overweening powers of
corporations regularly brought to bear on newsrooms” (White,
2015:1). The issue, however, is whether corruption is pervasive
enough in the Nigerian media to have rendered it a totally captive institution. As some chapters in the book suggest, the media
in an age of recession have become individually and collectively
vulnerable to seductive gratification. Nonetheless, it is possible to
discern counter narratives to the story of unmitigated corruption
especially in the quality press, which have been known to sack
senior editorial personnel over allegations of corruption. The case
referred to occurred at the Punch when the former Chairman, Mr
Ajibola Ogunsola fired a senior editorial personnel. As Ogunsola
told the story (Ikiebe 2015; 334):
He was the chairman of the editorial board. We were at the meeting
of the Nigerian Proprietor’s Association (NPAN) in Vanguard which
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hadn’t even started. We were having preliminary discussions in Uncle
Sam Amuka’s room. That was where I heard that there was this thing
at Babangida’s place and that the editors went including the editor of
Punch. And I said it’s not possible. And then I found out. The chairman,
Editorial Board…

Obviously, therefore, and as the audacity and the integrity of
the independently-owned Channels TV illustrates, the media and
their performance cannot be fixed into one ugly strait-jacket of
a corrupt and auctionable media. As the book demonstrates, the
Nigerian media are increasingly keeping abreast of technological changes, as well as development in New Media with the rapid
growth of the Online Media as well as the fact that virtually every
newspaper and broadcast station has an online section which attempts to globalise their content to varying degrees. It can hardly be otherwise, considering that the presidency and the legislature these days not only appoint personnel for Social Media, but
actively employ Facebook and Twitter to communicate with the
citizenry. Hopefully, these developments will be all the more accelerated with the completion of the transition of the broadcast
media in Nigeria from analogue to digital. The transition as well
from a media in jaws of an authoritarian hangover vulnerable to
the abuse of power by political authorities – as documented in
the chapter by Prof. Ogbondah, to a freer and unfettered media
needs to be completed. Nigeria continues to rank low on several
human rights and press freedom charts and for virtually all the
years between 1999 and 2016 is rated as partially free, while Ghana, for most of those years is rated free by the United States-based
Freedom House.
In this regard, the passing of the Freedom of Information Act
by the National Assembly in 2011, as documented by the chapter
by Edaetan Ojo, created a momentum in this direction, although
the indications are that journalists and civil society activists are not
taking advantage of these potential, while most Nigerian political
and public institution are yet to embrace the culture of openness,
which the FOI canvasses. Nonetheless, the media in Nigeria are
unlikely to succumb to the kind of censorship alluded to by Dr.
Kimani in the chapter on Kenya. It is also interesting to note that
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the competition in Nigeria for power and resources among large
ethnic groups thus creates a balance of terror, which has prevented the emergence of one man or one party dictatorship and consequently, of overt clamping down on the media.
Talking about ethnic competition, the two chapters in the book
that take up these important issues suggest that all too often the
framing of ethno-religious conflicts by media in different geographical regions tend to stoke the fires of such conflicts rather
than douse them. A watchdog media properly so called will be less
susceptible to manipulation by politicians and partisan groups
which seek to control the media narratives in periods of ethno-religious conflicts. Nigeria, as an unsteady federation, where the national question is often raised, has a long way to go in training
journalists to do conflict-sensitive reporting, avoid the publication
of hate speeches as well as counter the challenge of fake news,
which has tended to increase with the proliferation of social media outlets. Obviously, associations such as the Nigeria Union of
Journalists, the Nigerian Guild of Editors and the Newspaper Proprietors Association and the Broadcasting Organisations of Nigeria have prominent roles to play in capacity building directed
at media vulnerability to manipulation in times of ethno-religious
conflicts and elections. In this connection, the statement made by
former president, General Olusegun Obasanjo in August 2016 is
of note: “Nigeria is increasingly polarised and divided along ethnic
lines with the press fanning embers of division and separation.”
Considering that that the survival of the media is intertwined with
the survival of the Nigerian nation state, the media themselves
should create monitors, which can expose and limit the damage
that can be done by inflammatory reporting and the promotion of
sectarian and sectional interests by the media.
In other words, taking into account that the Nigeria 1999 Constitution explicitly mandates a national outlook and federal character by spelling out consociational remedies, the media while
not submitting to self-censorship should consciously cultivate
and promote trans-ethnic and inclusive mindsets and approaches
that mainstream diversity reporting. As I have pointed out else-
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where, the media, their constraints notwithstanding can act as the
bell-whether of democracy and improved governance by drawing
attention to issues of accountability, pushing government towards
greater respect for human rights, including those of minorities
and marginalized groups, exposing corruption and rent-seeking
behaviors and by setting the agenda for public discourse in such
way that captures these fundamental issues (Olukotun, 2000).
Before getting to policy recommendations, it is pertinent to
mention that, as argued in the chapter on economic and technological issues the biting recession of the last couple of years
has thrown the media, state and private, into more distress with
the consequent mortality of media institutions as well as degeneration in the working condition of journalists. The media will not
be taken seriously as long as they are reduced to a Begging-bowl
syndrome in which they supplicate, either as individuals or as institutions for bailouts from the high and mighty. The increasing
practice of putting journalists on the payroll of government and
corporation for the purpose of media management can only result in a further deepening of the incorporation of journalists into
national frameworks of spoils-sharing and distribution of the socalled national cake.
Policy prescriptions and recommendations
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the idea of the media as a healthy and robust watchdog connotes such activities as
a scaling up of investigative journalism, exposures of scandals in
high places, muckraking, as well as the maintenance of a vigil of
sort over the activities of elected officials, undoubtedly, the quality
press and sections of independent television have risen to the advocacy and watchdog billings of the media in the current period of
democracy. Although these activities and orientation fall short of
the magnificent anti-military role that the media once played, the
flames of daring and investigative journalism continue to flicker
now and again. Ready examples that come to mind include the
united opposition of the press to General Obasanjo’s Third Agenda which sought to elongate his rule illegally, the exposure of the
derelict character of the Nigerian Police College, Ikeja, by Chan-
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nels Television under the Jonathan Administration, the opposition
to profligacy and squander mania of President Goodluck Jonathan
years, as well as the insistence of a section of the media that the
former Secretary to Government of the Federation, Mr. David Bachir Lawal must step aside because of his involvement in what has
become known as the grass-cutting scandal, encapsulating the
payment of millions of Naira for cutting grass at some of the internally displaced person camps in Borno State. Indeed, it is interesting to note that under the Buhari administration, which made
the fight against corruption a flagship project, the Nigerian media
have been active in extending the tepid borders and outlook of
that agenda, especially in cases where government was reluctant
to sanction unethical behavior on the part of its appointees. It has
done this by the publication of front page news, as well as editorial
opinions, which have made it difficult for government to backtrack
on its own self-appointed role as the nation’s official crusader.
Given that fact, it is difficult to uphold a verdict that the media
have become a captured institution, though without doubt, the
opportunities for self-actualisation within the multiplying bureaucracies of Nigeria’s expensive democracy, the appointment of star
journalists as information personnel, the poor pay and low self-esteem of journalists, the lack of human resource organisation and
ethos within the media accentuated by the rapid collapse of media institutions have all resulted in cooptation of critical segment
of society, the media especially, into Nigeria’s notoriously corrupt
governmental system. For a nation, which regularly features at the
bottom league of Transparency International’s tables, it is hardly
surprising that corruption has increased in the media in the period
under study. For example, Mr. Steve Ojo, one of the founders of
private television in Nigeria argued that:
There are a number of television stations that retain state governments
as clients. In other words, any information those governors have, they
have to cover them. Galaxy will not accept that. We will not be tied to
the apron strings of anybody, including governors, because the point
is this, if a governor retains you to promote him, how can you criticize
his governance when he is not doing right? We balance our news and
make sure we do not get money from anybody simply to survive (The
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Punch, April 30, 2005, P.A24).

However, as indicated in other sections of the book, there are
hopeful tendencies which portend that this is not a problem without solutions. Therefore, the media themselves must become
more sensitive to corruption within their own ranks, so that they
can be more credible when they subject other Estates of the Realm
to critical scrutiny. The Freedom of Information Act remains an
important step forward in enhancing the watchdog role of the
media. To enhance its exciting possibilities, it is suggested that the
media should submit regularly requests for information to public
institutions and private entities covered by the Act, and thereafter
document and report on their experiences on how much relevant
institutions satisfy the requirements of the Law. They should also
carry out a systematic assessment of the level of compliance by
public institutions with various actions mandated by the law and
issue reports of their findings.
On the subject of corruption, Lanre Idowu’s paper is replete
with policy suggestions, which media managers and authorities
will do well to consider. For example, he suggests the need to
publish the infraction of journalistic codes through naming and
shaming mechanisms. In other words, just as outstanding journalists receive awards based on performance, the media should institute Halls of Shame; perhaps, along the lines of what Media Rights
Agenda is currently doing, with a view to going public with ethical
infractions. Obviously, no serious anti-corruption in the media can
succeed as long as employers of journalists continue to default on
salaries. In this regard, therefore, Idowu’s suggestion that media
proprietors should be compelled by legal means to pay their staff,
regularly and well enough, should be seen as an antidote to journalistic corruption. Apart from that, the famous beat association
which has developed into infamous cartels can be broken. Idowu
suggests that it is not just enough to train journalists well, they
should be moved around beats periodically. That is another way of
saying that, rather than allow reporters to entrench themselves in
certain beats, newsroom managers should ensure that they abort
the cartelisation of beats by redeployment of journalists across
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beats. Of course, the debit side of this proposal is that beats will
lack the expertise of journalists who have developed ties with news
sources. However, this drawback is more than compensated for by
the gains in a more sanitized newsroom environment.
Regarding the emergent digital media sector, it is important
that the communicative and participatory emphasis of these media
genre should be rescued from the possibilities of the kind of commercialisation and emphasis on soft/human interest stories, which
Oso and Akanni argue have rendered the conventional media less
effective as participatory and accessible along the lines suggested
by Jugen Habermas. That apart, the dangers of fake news, impersonation, over-politicisation, and the carryover of ethnic and religious conflicts should be countermanded through campaigns and
enforcement of existing regulations. In this connection, Oso and
Akanni referred to the recent circulation of a fake version of Buhari’s speech at the 2017 United Nations General Assembly, which
was disseminated on some popular blogs in Nigeria. Even when
we grant that fake news is a menace around the globe, society
must show a healthy awareness of its dangers by treating it in the
same way as it should deal with open corruption and the brown
envelop syndrome in the media. In the same vein, the presidency
dissociated itself from and condemned a fake tweet credited to
Buhari in the wake of the mass killings in Benue State in January,
2018, featuring justifying the attack on Benue farmers (The Nation,
Janury 14, 2018).
Regarding television and radio, it is obvious that there is too
much of a gap between privately-owned and state-owned broadcasting. One dimension of this problem is in the huge amount
paid by independent broadcasters, especially television, to the
National Broadcasting Commission as license fees. These tend to
make entry cost to the industry high and crippling for private sector operatives, who for now, are more credible than state-owned
broadcasters that tend to pander to the whims and caprices of
presidents, governors and their wives. Another way of putting this
is to say that the evolution of state-owned broadcasting into public broadcasting has been stalled; hence, making it easy for the
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temporary custodian of state power to control and manipulate
political content. A graphic illustration of this misnomer was provided when the Nigerian Television Authority, within a few days of
the announcement of the results 2015 General Election switched
sharply from a pro-Jonathan news approach to a pro-Buhari news
approach. For as long as the executive hires and fires state-owned
media personnel, so long would it continue to dictate or at least
control the content of state broadcasting. What is required here
is the setting up of a National Media Commission along the lines
of the Ghanaian example, which can act as buffers between the
states and the editorial department of state broadcasting.
Regarding the issue of diversity reporting in the context of ethno-religious reporting, it is important that the media, as suggested
by Dr. Danjibo, should be encouraged to invest more in the training and retraining of journalists as well as in investigative journalism, which would make them report objectively in times of crisis.
It is also essential that newspaper proprietors be encouraged to
include diversity factor, gender, ethnic and religious, as a way of
enhancing the abilities of media institutions to capture maginalised groups. Something like this occurred a few years ago when
the Guardian newspapers regularly flew in from Northeast Nigeria, a professor of political science to its editorial board meetings.
The idea was to enhance diversity and to ensure that a Northern
perspective of issues was part of the discussion. The present practice where newspapers are published in two or three locations is
capable of enhancing diverse perspectives in reportage and editorial contents generally, if aligned to an editorial object of reporting all the sides of a story. Important too, given Nigeria’s private
sector-led public sphere is the need to build upon the emerging
model of journalists becoming owners of media. This is capable of
redefining journalism, as the success of Channels television and
a clutch of online media, such as Premium Times and the Cable,
both founded by former senior editors, have demonstrated. Finally, it has been suggested that the partisan public sphere can
be reduced in influence and damaging potential if media owned
by politicians experiment with or outrightly embrace a trusteeship
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model, which distances the media from political control. This was
successful in the 1990s when the former publisher of the Guardian, Mr. Alex Ibru, put the newspaper under trusteeship when he
was appointed as minister by the General Sanni Abacha administration. This safeguarded the relative independence of that newspaper from the government of the day, thereby enabling it to continue to stay at the cutting-edge of advocacy for political reform
and democratisation.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ELEVEN
Research Instrument
Research Questionnaire
This is a questionnaire designed to measure which, between the traditional
and the new media, contributes more to your involvement in the general elections in South Africa (2014) and Nigeria (2016). Please fill in the information
based on the country to which you are responding. It is expected that you
respond to every question by ticking the space that appropriately represents
your view. Where you leave the space blank, the researcher assumes that you
are unsure of the answer to provide.
Ethically, you are assured of absolute confidentiality of the information you
give. Please do not write your name or institutional affiliation since whatever
response you provide shall be used solely for the purpose of this research.
We thank you as you take a few minutes of your time to complete the questionnaire. The first question is the overall summary and we advise that you respond to it last based on the belief that your response to others will assist your
summary instincts.
Country (Please tick as appropriate)
Nigeria
South Africa
Bio data
Please provide us with your bio data in what follows.
Gender
(1) Male
(2) Female
(3) Others
Religion
(1) Popular Religions in Africa(if Christianity or Islam)
(2) Other Religions
Type of Residence
(1) Rural/Semi Urban
(2) Urban/Cosmopolitan
Current Engagement Status
(1) Student
(2) State Employed
(3) Private Sector Employed
(4) Self Employed
Lowest Educational Qualification
(1) Doctoral
(2) Masters from University
(3) First Degree
(4) High School
Age Bracket
18-23
24-29
30-35
36-40
40-50
50-60
60-70
70 and above
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News
papers

Radio

Tele
vision

Twitter

Face
book

Other
Online
Sources

1. From which of the
media did you get political knowledge that
has direct bearing on
the political development of your country?
2. Where did you first
get information about
the last general elections in your country?
3. Through which
of these did you
first know about the
political parties in the
elections?
4. Through which of
these did you first
know about the candidates of the political
parties?
5. Where did you get
the most detailed information about programs
of the parties?
6. Through which of
these media did you
get best educated on
the need to participate
in the election?
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7. Which of these constantly reminded you
of the voting dates and
other updates needed
to participate in the
election?
8. Through which of
these did you receive
the highest political
campaign?
9. Which of the/.se
means did you use to
put your own political
opinion to the public?
10. Which of these
media did you use very
frequently and on daily
basis?
11. Through which of
these did you receive
your highest knowledge about elections
and politics generally?
12. Which of these
stimulated your interest
in voting?
13. From what source
did you get elections
results and count it
real?
14. Through which
means did you know
the winners of the
elections?
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